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Abstract
A Trust Management Framework is a collection of technical components and govern-
ing rules and contracts to establish secure, confidential, and Trustworthy transactions
among the Trust Stakeholders whether they are Users, Service Providers, or Legal
Authorities. Despite the presence of many Trust Frameworks projects, they still fail
at presenting a mature Framework that can be Trusted by all its Stakeholders. Partic-
ularly speaking, most of the current research focus on the Security aspects that may
satisfy some Stakeholders but ignore other vital Trust Properties like Privacy, Legal
Authority Enforcement, Practicality, and Customizability. This thesis is all about
understanding and utilising the state of the art technologies of Trust Management to
come up with a Trust Management Framework that could be Trusted by all its Stake-
holders by providing a Continuous Data Control where the exchanged data would be
handled in a Trustworthy manner before and after the data release from one party to
another. For that we call it: Continuous Trust Management Framework.
In this thesis, we present a literature survey where we illustrate the general picture
of the current research main categorise as well as the main Trust Stakeholders, Trust
Challenges, and Trust Requirements. We picked few samples representing each of
the main categorise in the literature of Trust Management Frameworks for detailed
comparison to understand the strengths and weaknesses of those categorise. Showing
that the current Trust Management Frameworks are focusing on fulfilling most of the
Trust Attributes needed by the Trust Stakeholders except for the Continuous Data
Control Attribute, we argued for the vitality of our proposed generic design of the
Continuous Trust Management Framework.
To demonstrate our Design practicality, we present a prototype implementing its
basic Stakeholders like the Users, Service Providers, Identity Provider, and Auditor
on top of the OpenID Connect protocol. The sample use-case of our prototype is to
protect the Users’ email addresses. That is, Users would ask for their emails not to be
iii
shared with third parties but some Providers would act maliciously and share these
emails with third parties who would, in turn, send spam emails to the victim Users.
While the prototype Auditor would be able to protect and track data before their
release to the Service Providers, it would not be able to enforce the data access policy
after release. We later generalise our sample use-case to cover various Mass Active
Attacks on Users’ Credentials like, for example, using stolen credit cards or illegally
impersonating third-party identity.
To protect the Users’ Credentials after release, we introduce a set of theories and
building blocks to aid our Continuous Trust Framework’s Auditor that would act as
the Trust Enforcement point. These theories rely primarily on analysing the data
logs recorded by our prototype prior to releasing the data. To test our theories, we
present a Simulation Model of the Auditor to optimise its parameters. During some
of our Simulation Stages, we assumed the availability of a Data Governance Unit,
DGU, that would provide hardware roots of Trust. This DGU is to be installed in the
Service Providers’ server-side to govern how they handle the Users’ data. The final
simulation results include a set of different Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that could
be utilized by the Auditor depending on the environment where it operates.
This thesis concludes with the fact that utilising Hard Trust Measures such as DGU
without effective Defensive Strategies may not provide the ultimate Trust solution.
That is especially true at the bootstrapping phase where Service Providers would be
reluctant to adopt a restrictive technology like our proposed DGU. Nevertheless, even
in the absence of the DGU technology now, deploying the developed Defensive Strate-
gies’ Flavours that do not rely on DGU would still provide significant improvements
in terms of enforcing Trust even after data release compared to the currently widely
deployed Strategy: doing nothing!
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Glossary of Terms
Term Description
Auditor
Agent or
Testing Agent
An artificial User that is created by the Auditor to deal with
suspicious (P)SPs to verify perceived doubts about them.
Auditor An internal governing unit of the Continuous Framework to pro-
cess Credentials Abuse reports, Rank SPs, and ban or punish
suspected M(P)SPs.
Case or C An Abuse Case containing a list of all the (P)SPs that have
been dealt with since the last Case submitted by a User for the
Auditor to detect the M(P)SP who is responsible for it.
Colluding
M(P)SPs
A group of M(P)SPs collaborating to fool the Auditor’s Defensive
Strategy by sharing their transactions history to deduce whether
a User they intend to Abuse is just an Auditor Agent or to make
sure that the targeted User have dealt with a large enough set
of M(P)SPs that makes it hard for an Auditor to detect the
colluding group.
xxiii
Counter-
Attacking
Strategy
A counter-attacking pattern that could be adopted by the ma-
licious Attackers to compromise the deployed Defensive Strat-
egy of the Continuous Framework’s Auditor in the quest to
abuse Users’ Credentials. The Main identified Counter-Attacking
Strategies are: Weak Colluding and Strong Colluding.
Credentials
or Personally
Identifiable
Information
(PII)
Small, but valuable, pieces of information that uniquely identify
an entity like, for example, email addresses, physical addresses,
phone numbers, credit cards numbers, passwords, and so on.
Defensive
Strategy
A defensive pattern that could be adopted by the Continuous
Framework’s Auditor to defend against malicious Attackers try-
ing to abuse Users’ Credentials. The main identified Defensive
Strategies are: Random, Conservative, and Aggressive.
Defensive
Strategy
Flavour
A customized combination of Ranking Algorithms, Utilities, and
Deployment Rules settings that have the characteristics of its
main Defensive Strategy, whether it is a Random, Conservative,
or Aggressive Defensive Strategy.
Digital Trust A special case of general Trust where the Trust Stakeholders
agree to engage in Digital Trust transactions with the “Intention
to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the
intentions or behaviour of another [Stakeholder] [9].”
xxiv
DGU Data Governance Unit. A hardware utility to enforce Hard Trust
in the Trust Network. If an SP Installs DGU, it should be impos-
sible for it to handle an acquired Credential without compliance
to its sticky policies. In addition, DGU would record all inter-
nal accesses to the Credential as well as all its approved sharing
destinations.
GPD Gradient Probability Distributor. A Raw Ranking Algorithm
that Ranks SPs badly the closer the User have dealt with them
just before getting an Abuse.
GT Group Tester Agent. A Raw Testing Agent that interacts with
a set of suspicious (P)SPs that are suspected to be colluding.
Continuous
Data Control
Enforcing the Users’ Sticky Policies before and after their release
to requesting parties.
Continuous
Trust Man-
agement
Framework
Our proposed Trust Management Framework that should pro-
vide Continuous Data Control for its Stakeholders’ data before
and after their release to the other parties.
Continuous
Trust Man-
agement
Framework
Design
A combination of the best practices we found in the current
Trust Frameworks in addition to what we thought necessary and
missing to present a generic design of a Continuous Trust Man-
agement Framework that fulfils the essential Trust Requirements
with special attention to the Continuous Data Control Privacy
Attribute.
IDP Identity Provider.
xxv
IIL Initial Interaction List. A list containing the interactions that
took place by a given User’s Credential prior to receiving the first
Abuse on that Credential. This list would also include all the
PSPs that this User have dealt with prior to that Abuse using
other Credentials for detecting weak colluding attacks.
IIR Initial Interactions Record. A Record containing all the IILs.
Malicious
Density
Theory
A theory describing the relation between the Density of the ma-
licious nodes population in a Network and the effectiveness of
the Auditor that tries to detect malicious activities.
MGR Malicious Groups Record. A Record containing all the suspicious
colluding groups. There are two variants of this Record to serve
the Strong Colluding Algorithm MGRsc and the Weak Colluding
Algorithm MGRwc.
MPSP Malicious Popular Service Provider.
MSP Malicious Service Provider.
Personally
Identifiable
Information
(PII)
See Credentials.
PIILs Popular Initial Interaction Lists. A Record containing the IILs
that have appeared frequently among different Users triggering
the possibility of colluding SPs.
PSP Popular Service Provider.
xxvi
Ranking
Approach
A family of Ranking Algorithms that cooperate to generate a
single Rank for each SP showing how Trustworthy it is based on
the combined efforts of all the Ranking Algorithms of this family.
Ranking
Algorithm
An Algorithm to process the aggregated data abuse records and,
thus, assign each SP a Rank based on how Trustworthy it ap-
pears per the analysis.
Selection
Algorithm
A descriptor for a family of Algorithms that analyze Users’ logs
to select suspicious (P)SPs to be processed by Raw Agent Rank-
ing Algorithms.
Simple Data
Abusing
Algorithms
A descriptor for a family of simple Uncolluding Attacking Al-
gorithms where the Attackers try to fool the Auditor by simple
Delaying the Abuse, Repeating the Abuse, and/or Ignoring to
Abuse certain Users’ or some of their Credentials.
SPR SPs Popularity Record. An Algorithm that sort all the SPs by
their popularity based on the frequency of their appearing in the
reported Cases.
SP Service Provider.
STD(SPx) Sole Testing Distributor. A Raw Ranking Algorithm that gives
all the Cases’ SPs an equivalent rank. The less SPs appearing
in the Case, the lower this unified Rank would be.
Sticky Policy A policy that is attached to given Credential detailing how its
owner wish it to be accessed, shared, used, and/or stored.
xxvii
ST Sole Tester Agent. A Raw Testing Agent that interacts with
only one suspicious (P)SP that is suspected to be Uncolluding
with other M(P)SPs.
Testing Agent See Auditor Agent.
TGR Global Trust Metric Record. A Record containing all the as-
signed global Ranks.
TG(SPx) Global Trust Metric. A Final Ranking Algorithm assigned to an
individual SPx, TG(SPx), by combining the value of the three
Final Ranks: TLRavg(SPx), TST (SPx), and TGT (SPx) with
customized weights given to each of them.
TGT Group Trust Metric. A Final Ranking Algorithm assigned to ei-
ther a group G, TGT(G), or an individual SP, TGT(SP ), based
on the size of the colluding group. The smaller the group size,
the smaller the assigned Rank. There are three Intermediate
Ranking Algorithms generating three different variations of this
Metric: Group Trust Metric TGTg, Strong Colluding Trust Met-
ric TGTsc, and Weak Colluding Trust Metric TGTwc. The Final
TGT value is generated by combining the value of the three
intermediate Ranks with customized weights given to each of
them.
xxviii
TGTR Group Trust Metric Rank Record. A Record containing all the
assigned group Ranks. There are two versions of this Record:
TGTR(G) for groups Ranks and TGT (SP ) for individual SPs
Ranks. Also, there are three variations of this Record for the use
of the corresponding Intermediate Ranking Algorithms: Group
Trust Metric TGTRg, Strong Colluding Trust Metric TGTRsc,
and Weak Colluding Trust Metric TGTRwc.
TLavg(SPx) Global Average Trust Metric. A Final Ranking Algorithm gener-
ating a global Rank for a given SPx by averaging the aggregated
TLRU values for that SPx.
TLRavg The Average TLRUs Record. A Record containing all the TLavg
Ranking values for all SPs.
TLRU Local Trust Metric Record. A Record containing all the TLUi
Ranking values.
TLUi(SPx) Local Trust Metric. An Intermediate Ranking Algorithm gener-
ating the average of the aggregated STD values for a given SP
in the context of a single User.
Trust
Attributes
A set of the main Trust Attributes of each of the main identi-
fied Trust Properties of each of the Trust Requirements that we
identified in the literature.
Trust
Challenges
A set of the main Trust Challenges that are facing the current
Trust Frameworks based on our literature survey.
xxix
Trust
Management
Framework
A collection of technical components and governing rules and
contracts to establish secure, confidential, and Trustworthy
transactions among the Trust Stakeholders whether they are
Users, Service Providers, or governing Authorities.
Trust
Measures
Level
A specific level, or category, in the Trust Measures Spectrum
Trust
Measures
Spectrum
A spectrum of different categorise of tools and solutions that are
categorized based on how strictly they rely on proofs to enforce
Trust in the Network ranging from Soft Trust to Hard Trust
Measures Levels
Trust Model A rough mathematical model we developed to mimic the Trust
Framework’s Users regarding to their perceived Trust and how
this Trust would be affected after receiving a Data Abuse or after
the Auditor detected the Abuser.
Trust
Network
Health
Gauges
A set of sensors to provide feedback reports about the health
status of the Trust Network. Such sensors would aid the Auditor
in figuring out whether to alter its currently deployed defences
and how harmful the effects of the current attacks are.
Trust
Properties
A set of the main Trust Properties that make up each of the
main Trust Requirements that we identified in the literature.
xxx
Trust
Requirements
A set of the main Trust Requirements that should be fulfilled
by any Trust Management Framework to satisfy its Stakehold-
ers that we came up with by analysing the main Trust Chal-
lenges along with the best practices deployed by the current
Trust Frameworks to tackle those Challenges.
Trust
Stakeholders
The main Stakeholders of our Continuous Trust Management
Framework are: End Users, Service Providers, Legal Author-
ity, the Framework’s Auditor (Governing the Network’s transac-
tions), and Identity Providers.
TST Sole Tester Trust Metric. A Final Ranking Algorithm generating
a global Sole Testing Rank by averaging the aggregated STD
values for a given SP coming from both the STD Algorithm and
ST Agents.
TSTR Sole Testing Trust Record. A Record containing all the TST
Ranks values.
Uncolluding
M(P)SPs
A single M(P)SP that launches its attack without relying on
collation feedback from other M(P)SPs.
User or U Ordinary User of the Trust Network.
xxxi

Chapter 1. Introduction
TRUST is the magical enabler for any two, or more, parties to engage in successful
interactions, transactions, or delegations, as we explore in Section 2.1. For a complex
environment like the Internet, which is composed of heterogeneous sets of sites and
services consumed by a heterogeneous mix of humans and automated agents, Trust
should lie at the heart of such an environment. The more Trust the Stakeholders have
in the environment, the more interactions will take place. Without Trust, such an
environment would be paralyzed.
That raises the need for a Trust Management Framework that provides and manages
a set of protocols and software units to enable establishing a Network where the
participants could engage in Trustworthy interactions. The currently available Trust
Frameworks cannot satisfy all the needs of their Stakeholders, described in Section
2.2. Hence, these Trust Frameworks cannot be truly Trusted by them, see our survey
of the current Trust Frameworks in Section 3.1.
Security solutions are plentiful but while it is true that Security is an important
Property of Digital Trust, it is not the only one. Enhancing the Security of online
transactions alone does not generate Trust and, hence, would pose limitations on the
nature of the transactions that the Trust Stakeholders would be willing to engage-in,
see Subsection 2.6.1. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to define and evaluate the
fundamental building blocks for a practical Continuous Trust Management Framework
that satisfies all its Stakeholders. Particularly speaking, we are focusing in supporting
the vitally lacked feature in the literature: the Continuous Data Control as we argue
in Section 3.5.
The rest of this Chapter presents the main hypothesis, methodology, scope, and the
main contributions.
1
In Chapter 2, we present a technical background on the subject to introduce the
concept of Trust and Trust Stakeholders along with a detailed study of the current
Trust Challenges, the corresponding Trust Requirements, and the Trust Measures
Spectrum of the available tools and protocols for the current Trust Frameworks to
deploy.
In Chapter 3, we present a thorough study of the literature where representative
Trust Management Frameworks samples for each Trust Measures Level, see Section
2.8, is evaluated. That is followed by a thorough comparison of those sample Trust
Frameworks in terms of how effectively they fulfil the Trust Requirements we list in
Section 2.5. That is followed by a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the
evaluated Trust Frameworks. From this discussion, we conclude with the need for
Continuous Trust Management Frameworks along with a list of the minimal Trust
Requirements they should provide to be qualified for the Continuous prefix.
In Chapter 4, we present the high-level design of our proposed Continuous Trust Man-
agement Framework along with a sample prototype to demonstrate the practicality
of our proposal given the currently available technologies. We also present in that
Chapter the design of a hypothetical Data Governance Unit, or simply DGU, that
could solve a lot of the Trust issues currently facing the Trust Networks.
In Chapter 5, we present a set of basic formal building blocks and deployment rules
to be used by an Auditor Unit to detect malicious activities and enforce Trust. These
building blocks include our novel idea of artificial Testing Users, or Agents as we
call them from now on, and how they could boost the performance of the proposed
Auditor.
In Chapter 6, we present a Simulation Model representing the interactions that we
implement in the prototype of Chapter 4. We describe in that Chapter the Simulation
Process where we used the Simulation Model to study the behaviour and optimize
the defensive parameters of our proposed Auditor when operating in large Networks
with variable environmental settings. The results we present in that Chapter include
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a set of Defensive Strategies Flavours that are suitable for deployment in different
environmental conditions against different launched Counter-Attacking Strategies.
In Chapter 7, we argue that our proposed Continuous Trust Framework Design is
capable of satisfying all its Stakeholders given our presented prototype and optimized
Defensive Strategies Flavours and, hence, prove our ideas are practical and provide
significant improvements to Users overall Trust. In that Chapter, we also evaluate
the performance of our Defensive Strategies Flavours and their immunity to the risks
presented in the Threat Model of Section 5.8 along with a list of possible enhancements
to improve our current Defensive Strategies Flavours.
Finally, In Chapter 8, we conclude this thesis with the outcomes of this study and the
possible future directions.
1.1 Hypothesis
The world would be ideal if we can Trust that every other party have good intentions
and would behave as expected. That is not the case and, hence, we have legislation
that governs legal contracts that can be used to judge who have breached the contract
terms in case of any dispute we have in public courts. To enforce such laws and
facilitate the work of our public courts, policing authorities are needed in real-life. In
cyber life, we need another form of policing authority and juridical system to foster
Trust with a high degree of certainty. At the same time, these cyber authorities
should be ethical in the sense that they do not overuse their digital powers to Abuse
Users’ Data or falsely accuse a Network resident of breaching a contract term. In
technical terms, the Trust Framework should be able to ethically protect two digital
commodities: Users’ Credentials (PII) and Users’ Data, see Subsection 2.6.2. This
protection should be provided before and after these digital commodities are released
per the release contract. While many current Frameworks offer reasonable protection
for these digital commodities before release, there is little done to offer after release
protection, see Subsection 3.4.1.
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The hypothesis of this thesis: it is possible, by aid of the novel Auditor Unit
presented in Chapter 5, and by utilising the current available Trust Frameworks in the
literature, to come up with a practical Continuous Trust Framework. This Continuous
Framework would significantly improve the Users’ Trust level by imposing Continuous
Data Control on Users’ Data and Credentials. That is, Data protection before and
after these digital commodities are released to the requesting Service Providers. By
doing so, our proposed Continuous Framework would provide an important Trust
Attribute that the current Trust Frameworks fail to provide: Data Control After
Release.
1.2 Methodology
As stated before, the aim of this thesis is to define and evaluate the basic theoretical
building blocks for a practical Continuous Trust Management Framework that satisfies
all its Stakeholders. For that, it is crucial to thoroughly understand the general
problem of Trust and, then, combine both novel theories and practical prototypes
to show the extent of the problem, what the proposed Continuous Trust Framework
Design could achieve, and how future Trust technologies could positively affect our
proposed Continuous Framework. Our methodology consisted of the following main
milestones:
• Surveying the Literature: This milestone is concerned with studying the
role of Trust in human lives in general as well as in computing to get a holistic
understanding of the extent of the Trust issues and their possible impacts. That
is vital to define the main qualities of Trust Framework’s Role, Scope, Stake-
holders, Challenges and Requirements. Moreover, a main goal of this milestone
is to categorize the existing Trust Frameworks in the literature to understand
their strengths and weaknesses as well as to utilize their best practices.
• Designing Continuous Trust Management Framework: This milestone is
concerned with producing a generic Continuous Trust Framework Design based
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on the best practices we observe in the literature survey milestone. This design
should serve as a guideline for any future research in the area.
• Proving the Practicality of the Continuous Framework Design: This
milestone is concerned with demonstrating the practicality of our proposed Con-
tinuous Framework by implementing a minimal prototype showing its main fea-
tures and how its Stakeholders would interact. An essential goal of this milestone
is to utilize the currently available Trust Frameworks in the literature to avoid
reinventing the wheel. Particularly speaking, it should incorporate an Identity
Service Provider, IDP, to manage the Users’ identities and to keep access logs
of them.
• Defining Theories and Building Blocks to Construct the Auditor Unit:
This milestone is concerned with formally defining a set of novel theories and
building blocks that would utilize the aggregated Users’ logs by the IDP of the
previous milestone. This Auditor Unit is to investigate any Data Abuse report
to figure out who is guilty for the Abuse that happened after the Data released
from its owner to the requesting Service Provider(s).
• Simulating and Analysing the Performance of the Auditor Unit: This
milestone is concerned with analysing the performance and efficiency of the
proposed Auditor. This milestone is about developing a Simulation Model to
run and optimize the proposed Auditor in a large Trust Network with variable
deployment settings.
1.3 Scope
It would have been great if this thesis could have covered every aspect of Digital
Trust and fully implement the proposed Continuous Framework. Nevertheless, we are
limited by the factors of time, resources, and experience. Hence, the scope of this
thesis is as following:
• Thorough and deep, not exhaustive, literature surveying.
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• Presenting a generic, not detailed, Continuous Framework Design based on the
best practices we observe in the literature survey.
• Developing a simple, not complete or deployment-ready, prototype to demon-
strate the practicality of our proposal.
• The presented Threat Model of Section 5.8 would describe many different at-
tacking categorise. However, the proposed Auditor Unit focuses only on tackling
Mass and Active Attacks rather than Targeted and/or Passive Attacks due to
their complexity, see Section 2.4.
• The Simulation Model implements a partial set of the proposed theories for
the Auditor Unit to give preliminary results proofing the hypothesis. Highly
accurate results would require a real model that would be tested by real humans,
which qualifies to be a separate research project by its own due to its complexity.
• Implementing specific core technologies that are present in the Continuous Trust
Framework Design like advanced Sticky Policies or the DGU Unit is out of scope
due to their complexity that may divert the development away from the original
aim and hypothesis.
• While it is crucial for real-life deployments of the Trust Framework to have good
QoS metrics such as scalability, resilience to Network conditions, and good re-
sponsibility speeds, neither our design nor our prototype implementation would
focus on these aspects at this early stage of conceptualizing the Continuous
Trust Management Framework.
1.4 Contributions
In this thesis, we introduce the following contributions:
• Extensive Literature Survey: an extensive survey covering the Trust related
concepts, categorise, and some important example Frameworks as we show in
Chapters 2 and 3.
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• Continuous Trust Management Framework Design: a generic design that
satisfy all its Stakeholders needs in a continuous manner, see Section 4.1.
• Minimal Prototype of the Continuous Framework: to prove the practical-
ity of the proposed Continuous Trust Framework Design based on the current
available technologies, see Section 4.2. The Code of this Prototype is pub-
lished as an open-source project and can be found on: https://gitlab.com/
Continuous_Trust_Prototype/Prototype.
• Designing a Hypothetical Data Governance Unit, DGU: this unit as-
sumes the existence of mature TCG technologies, see Section 4.4. If the pro-
posed design is implemented, it would significantly improve the Continuous Data
Control Attribute as we show in our Simulation Process findings, see Subsection
7.1.2.
• Novel Auditor Unit: the theories, building blocks, and deployment rules for
an Auditor Unit that can offer Continuous Data Control, see Chapter 5. Among
these theories, we introduce the theories and governing rules to utilize artificial
Testing Agents that would pose as real Users to prove whether a suspicious
Service Provider is acting maliciously.
• Developing Defensive Strategies Flavours for the Auditor: this is a set
of Defensive Strategies Flavours that resulted after many simulation refinement
optimisation stages based on the three mainly identified Strategies: Random,
Aggressive, and Conservative. These Flavours, are suitable for different environ-
mental settings and against a variety of launched Counter-Attacking Strategies
as we show in Sections 6.7 and 6.9. The Code of the Simulation Model of
the Auditor and its interactions with the Trust Network Stakeholders, which
we used to come up with our proposed Defensive Strategies is published as an
open-source project and can be found on: https://gitlab.com/Continuous_
Trust_Simulator/Simulator.
7

Chapter 2. Trust and Trust Framework Requirements
The aim of this research project and thesis is to define and evaluate the basic build-
ing blocks for a Continuous Trust Management Framework that could be Trusted
by its Stakeholders by providing Continuous Trust where the exchanged Data would
be handled in a Trustworthy manner throughout all the transactions phases. In this
Chapter, we present the results of our survey and analysis of the rich literature of
human Trust, in general, and Digital Trust, specifically, to answer the following fun-
damental questions:
• What is the definition of Digital Trust?
• Who are the digital Trust Stakeholders?
• How Digital Trust is established and how does its life cycle look?
• What are the current Trust Challenges?
• What are the Trust Stakeholders’ main Trust Requirements?
• What are the main Trust Measures that are being utilized by the current Trust
Frameworks?
Despite the wealth of novel ideas in the Digital Trust literature, there are still many
dynamically evolving Challenges to be tackled. For that, we list in this Chapter the
main Trust Challenges facing the current Trust Management Frameworks. These
Trust Challenges are followed by their corresponding Trust Requirements where each
Requirement has a set of Properties, which in turn have their own Attributes. Finally,
we conclude this Chapter by illustrating the Trust Measures Spectrum categorizing
the available tools and protocols at the disposal of the current Trust Managements
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Frameworks into different Spectrum Levels ranging from Soft Trust Levels like Cues
and Clues to Hard Trust Levels like Hard Verification.
2.1 Defining Trust and Trust Frameworks
Searching the word Trust in any search engine would reveal all sorts of theories,
opinions, and practices that are related to almost any form of interactions whether
it is among humans or machines. As Nissenbaum describes, Trust, in general, is
a precious capital to any community, online or off, which flourish communication
and transaction with a tolerance level to vulnerabilities that would be due to non-ill
intentions [10]. A special forum discussing the view of Trust across different disciplines
came up with the following definition: “Trust is a psychological state comprising the
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or
behaviour of another [9].” In his PhD thesis that tried to formalize a computational
concept of Trust, Marsh described the Trust situation as “choosing to put ourselves
in another’s hands, in that the behaviour of the other determines what we get out of
a situation [11].”
Interactions involving computers or other technical means are no exceptions to the
Trust rules. It is stated by Osterwalder that any technical development would rely, in
its heart, on a form of Trust or delegation of Trust to other institutions [12]. Zhang
et al. gave a more detailed description by thinking that Digital Trust is a subset
mapping of the general Trust, where the specific subset and interpretation of Trust
are dependent on the context [13].
For that, we define the Trustworthy Transaction to be any digital transaction
that promise to fulfil a minimum set of Trust Requirements, see Section 2.5, that
proves the good intentions of all the parties engaged in this transaction. Accord-
ingly, we define the Trust Management Framework as a collection of technical
components, governing rules and contracts to establish secure, confidential, and Trust-
worthy Transactions among the Trust Stakeholders, see Section 2.2, whether they
are Users, Service Providers, or Legal Authorities.
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So far, Trust has been described as a mental state enabling the Trust parties to engage
in risky interactions where the expected loss, due to the failure of one party to fulfil its
promises, usually outweigh the expected gain, if the involved parties acted as expected
[11]. One may argue that Trust could be solely initiated by strong evidence and
guaranties, which would remove the risk factor from the Trust definition. Nevertheless,
achieving this high level of certainty is usually very expensive, if not impossible, in
terms of the computational cost, limitations on the range of offered services, and
the uncomfortable User experience as described by Nissenbaum [10]. A good Trust
Management Framework should utilize a balanced set of Trust Measures from the
Trust Measures Spectrum, See Section 2.8, that are neither too soft to be easily
compromised nor too hard to be hostile for the Trust Stakeholders.
2.2 Trust Stakeholders
Trust Stakeholders are the main parties that are involved directly or indirectly
in a Trustworthy Transaction, see Section 2.1. Depending on the context of the
transaction, the Stakeholders could be Human Users, Software Agents, Legal Entities,
State Authorities, or even a mix of all the previously mentioned groups. Nevertheless,
most of the Stakeholders could be classified in one of three general groups: Service
Providers, ordinary Users, and Legal Authorities. Each group of Stakeholders has its
own needs and Requirements to engage in Trustful interactions.
For the Service Providers, it is important to authenticate the services’ Users. Authen-
tication could be as simple as an identity check but also could involve more complex
analysis like credit history check. Moreover, some service providers wish to mine their
Users’ Data to generate personal profiles that could be used, for example, for targeted
advertisements [14].
For the Users, the most precious commodities that they care about during any Trust
relationship are their Credentials and Data. They wish to protect them in two different
points of time: before and after releasing them to the second party. For that, it is
important to verify the credibility of the online system to Trust using it. In addition,
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some Users have concerns about the Security levels of the system while others would
have concerns about the Privacy of their Data. As a result, many clients would have
different Trust Requirements that they wish to negotiate with the Service Providers
before engaging in any transaction.
For the Legal and Governmental Authorities, it is important to track cyber criminals,
to monitor any transaction they suspect, and to enforce digital laws that are con-
cerned, for example, with copyrights or fair trade competition. Such Requirements
are very challenging to implement in practice due to the universal nature of the In-
ternet where there is not a single authority or even country that governs the cyber
web. The introduction of inter-linked systems, like cloud computing, just amplified
the previous issues and added a new dimension of challenges [15]. Moreover, many
Service Providers would refuse to collaborate with the Legal Authorities because they
do not want to upset their customers who demand Privacy.
2.3 Trust Life Cycle
Per Nielsen, Trust is “hard to build and easy to lose [16].” As a result, it is im-
portant to understand the Trust building process and to picture how the Trust life
cycle looks like. Zhang et al. described the Digital Trust building process as the
problem of: initiating Trust, coming up with proper Trust metrics, aggregating feed-
back and propagating ratings, and setting a proper Trust Management Architecture
[13]. Pearson and Benameur talked about the life cycle from a more abstract angle
as they described three different phases in any Digital Trust relation: building Trust,
maintaining stable Trust, and then losing Trust [15].
A general view of the Digital Trust Life Cycle, based on the current literature, is shown
in Figure 2.1. The drawn cycle starts with building an appropriate Trust Framework to
manage digital Trust in the desired context. Once the Trust Framework is ready, Trust
Stakeholders could engage in Trust Requirements negotiation. Based on the agreed
Requirements, proper Trust metrics are generated to provide solid ground to judge
all parties’ conformance to the agreed contracts. After that, the Trust Framework
12
Figure 2.1: Digital Trust Life Cycle
should have the ability to aggregate useful feedback regarding the performance of
all the engaged parties in the different Trusty interactions so it can prepare useful
ratings and recommendations for any party wishing to engage in future transactions
with any of the evaluated parties. If the Trust Management Framework failed to
fulfil its promises or to keep up with its Users’ expectations, it would quickly lose
their Trust and, hence, a major update or a completely new Framework should be
introduced to continue the Trust cycle.
2.4 Trust Challenges
As stated earlier in the introduction, Digital Trust does not equal digital Security. In
fact, increasing the Security level does not necessarily imply Trust; it could be the
opposite. Securing all transactions and communication channels may require revealing
private or confidential Data that may increase the concerns of the participants about
the usage of their personally identifiable Data, PII, which would lead to a distrust
situation [12].
Per the 2010/2011 Computer Crime and Security Survey, CSI, cyber Security attacks
could be categorized based on their coding themes [17]:
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• (Mass) Basic Attacks: Phishing, ports scan, brute force attacks, old school
viruses, and so on.
– Malware Attacks: Extensions of the basic attacks utilising malware cus-
tomisation and targeting toolkits.
• (Targeted) Attacks 2.0: Advanced Persistent Threat, APT, attacks where
an organised committee of professional experts launch a digital attack targeting
a specific entity with all the possible attacks at many different Security layers.
Two recent examples are the Aurora and Stuxnet attacks.
Standard Security toolkits, like antiviruses and firewalls, could effectively minimise
the risks of most of the Basic Attacks. However, that is not usually the case for the
more advanced Malware Attacks that target specific entities with more complicated
techniques, including social engineering. When it comes to the Targeted Attacks, the
IT Security decision maker gets more confused due to the lack of visibility of the
possible range of attacks that his enterprise might be exposed to or even face at any
given time [17].
Another important classification of the possible Trust threats is based on the activity
status, as explained by De Vivo in [18]:
• Active Attacks: The Attackers here would interfere in the performance of the
compromised Network, trying to alter how it normally behaves. For example,
erasing Data, modifying some entries, or causing denial of service.
• Passive Attacks: The Attackers here would not interfere in the performance
of the compromised Network. Rather, they would simple sniff for the Data of
their interest to utilize for their benefit, see Subsection 2.6.2. Unlike the Active
Attacks, the Passive Attackers do not leave many foot-prints which makes their
detection rather harder.
In many cases, a given attack could be described based on both above classifications.
That is, an attack would normally be either a Mass or a Targeted Attack that is
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indulging in Active or Passive attacking activities. When it it comes to the advanced
Targeted Attacks, it is expected that the Attacks would be a mixture of both Ac-
tive and Passive Attacks. Such a mixture may also be utilized by some Mass Basic
Attackers, specially the Malware extended version of it.
2.5 Trust Requirements
Figure 2.2: Trust Requirements
In this and the following Sections, we describe the main Trust Requirements that
should be fulfilled by any Trust Management Framework to satisfy its Stakeholders.
We came up with this list of Trust Requirements by analysing the main Trust Chal-
lenges we list in Section 2.4 along with the best practices deployed by the current
Trust Frameworks to tackle these Challenges. In other words, whenever it becomes
possible to tackle a Trust Challenge, by means of technical advancements, then tack-
ling this Challenge would become a requirement rather than a mere wish by the Trust
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Stakeholders. Not fulfilling such Requirements may lead the Trust Stakeholders to
lose their Trust in the corresponding Trust Framework. That would be especially true
in case of a breach of the Trust contract between two Trust Stakeholders since such
incidents would make it clear that one of the Stakeholders is not doing its best to
fulfil the Requirements of the others, see Section 2.3 for more details about the Trust
Life Cycle.
Like in real-life transactions, any two or more parties would have two main Require-
ments to establish a Trustworthy contract:
• Enforcement: The ability to enforce the terms of the agreed upon contract
by guarding the Trust transaction against malicious activities from outsider
malicious entities as well as malicious activities conducted by some of the internal
Trust Stakeholders against the agreed upon contract. Moreover, in case one
party fails to deliver the quality of service it promised to in the contract, other
parties should be able to resort to Legal Authorities for compensation.
• Flexibility: The ability to negotiate a tailor-made contract addressing the
specific needs for the involved Stakeholders.
In Figure 2.2, we illustrate the two main Trust Requirements: Enforcement and Flex-
ibility along with their main Trust Properties and those Properties’ Attributes as well
as the Trust Spectrum of the variety of Measures levels that could be deployed by
the Trust Frameworks for the sake of fulfilling the Trust Requirements. More details
about the Trust Spectrum can be found in Section 2.8. In the following Subsections,
we describe the main Trust Requirements of Figure 2.2 in more details.
2.6 Properties of the Trust Enforcement Requirement
The first keyword that would come up to many readers’ mind when mentioning the
Trust Enforcement Requirement would be Security. It is true that Security is a crucial
Property of the Trust Enforcement Requirement but this Requirement is more general
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than just providing Security for the Trust Stakeholders. In fact, Security is like a safe
guard for the communication and transactions among the Trust Stakeholders against
outsider malicious entities. Nevertheless, Security does not necessarily guard against
malicious entities that are part of the concerned Trust Stakeholders. That is, if one of
the Trust Stakeholders decides to act maliciously, Security alone may not prevent him
from doing so since he has unrestricted access to the exchanged Data among the Trust
Stakeholders. To protect the exchanged Data from unauthorised malicious activities
conducted by a malicious Trust Stakeholder, the Privacy Property is needed. In case
the deployed Security and Privacy measures fail at preventing malicious activities
whether these activities are from internal or external attackers, the Trust Stakeholders
would need to resort to a Legal Authority that would have the power of law to gather
all sorts of needed evidence, whether digital or physical. The gathered evidence would
be used to investigate any dispute among the Trust Stakeholders to find out who is
at fault and, hence, should compensate the other parties. For that, we discuss in
the following Subsections these Trust Enforcement Requirement Properties, as they
appear in Figure 2.2:
• Security
• Privacy
• Legal Authority Enforcement
2.6.1 Security
While Security is not the only Property of Trust Enforcement Requirement, it is defi-
nitely the most important one. Security is like the outer gate for the Trust Framework.
If malware and Trojans exploit the Security gate, all the internal Trust Enforcement
mechanisms could fail dramatically. Apart from the standard Security threats that
could be tackled with general toolkits like firewalls and antiviruses, there are many
device specific or even situation specific Security dimensions that should be tackled
carefully. For example, the introduction of ordinary web browsers to the smart phones
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introduced a new set of unanticipated threats. That is because the original design of
the web browsers was to show web pages, and was not to directly operate physical
resources like sending SMS or making a phone call [19]. Another example can be
found in a non-software dimension. While software Security toolkits are the main
components of digital Security, it is worthwhile to consider the physical Security of
the enterprise buildings. Davis showed that most of the enterprises today rely on
third-party companies to guard their physical buildings where the Data warehouses
are located. Such third parties do not usually deploy advanced guarding mechanisms
such as biometric logging and pc-proximity detectors, which would generate a new
layer of possible physical attacks [20]. A tricky part of Security is reliability. If a
software cannot scale well, it may crash at the first DoS attack which may cause ir-
reversible loses to Users business or even Data. In addition to scalability, a software
should be well tested and sanctioned, as part of the reliability requirement, to prevent
leaving unintended Security holes for the malicious hackers. Below we list some of
the primary Security Attributes, as they appear in Figure 2.2, that should be imple-
mented by any Trust Framework that is serious about enforcing Trust, based on the
best practices that are already present by well-established solutions in the literature
and in the market as well.
• Secure Communication: This is a basic, yet crucial, Security Attribute to
eliminate the threat of the man in the middle attack, MiM, where an out-
sider malicious entity may try to intercept the communication among the Trust
Stakeholders to compromise the Trust Framework Security measures. This ba-
sic Attribute has been identified early on the literature with the well-known
Kerberos protocol that establishes secure communication channels appearing in
the literature since the late 1980s, see Subsection 3.1.10 for more details about
Kerberos.
• Authentication: This is another basic, yet crucial, Security Attribute that
requires any party trying to access a sensitive set of Data or engage in a trans-
action to be authenticated, i.e. to possess Credentials that prove she is allowed
to do the action she is trying to perform. This is important to guard against
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malicious outsider attackers trying to gain unauthorised access to the exchanged
Data among the Trust Stakeholders. It is similarly important to prevent unau-
thorised employees working for an entity that is part of the Trust Stakeholders
from gaining unauthorised access to the Data as agreed upon in the Trust con-
tract. Moreover, this Attribute could help in logging who accessed what and
when for the purpose of presenting evidence for the Legal Authority that may
investigate any disputes among the Trust Stakeholders, our proposed Auditor
automate this task as presented in Chapters 4 and 5. There are various ways to
accomplish authentication in the literature like biometric measures, two steps
verification, or simply possessing valid usernames and passwords, see Subsection
3.2.3 that shows a variety of access control techniques deployed by some of the
Trust Framework that appears in the literature.
• Compatibility with Security Tools: This Attribute is about the Trust
Framework ability to to integrate with already existing legacy Security and
Trust solutions. While a Trust Framework may be implemented completely
from scratch to address all the Security and Trust Attributes, it would be prone
to errors, due to the enormous size of the project, that would be easily mitigated
by adopting the long established and polished solutions in the literature that
are also maintained by dedicated teams of experts. In addition, entities welling
to adopt such a new Trust Framework may find it challenging to abandon the
current solutions they deploy in their servers for a fairly long time which would,
in turn, cause a problematic bootstrapping phase for the new Trust Framework.
• Open Source Development: While the previous Security Attributes would
not normally generate controversial debates among Security experts, this At-
tribute does. The advocates of open source development argue that it boosts
the Security level of the produced software by opening it up for more experts
to review it other than its authors, just like how peer-reviewed academic pa-
pers work [21]. Nevertheless, the opponents reply by questioning whether there
are actually real experts taking the time to voluntarily review the open source
software for Security vulnerabilities [22]. An empirical study by Guido suggests
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that there is no significant advantage to either closed or open source software
development approaches in terms of Security at the time of conducting their
study in 2011 [23]. In other words, open source software, in theory, would boost
the Security of the final product by letting external experts audit the produced
code. In practice, there must be good motives for such experts to step in and
do the auditing. Otherwise, the only experts who would review the code would
be the malicious attackers trying to attack the system. Moreover, if there is
any concern about malicious insider attackers, then closed source development
should not be an option since the insider attackers could hide their malicious
actions behind closed source code. For that, a Continuous Trust Management
Framework that tries to ensure all parties about its fairness and neutrality to-
ward the needs of all of them should be developed as an open source project so
that all Trust Stakeholders who may have conflicting interests could check for
themselves whether the project is fulfilling its promises or not.
2.6.2 Privacy
Data protection is a must for any Trust Framework to be truly Trusted by all of its
Stakeholders. Data breachers usually look for financial sensitive Data for identity
fraud or digital robbery crimes. This could be observed from the 2010 Verizon Se-
curity report which states that 33% of Data breaches in 2010 affected the financial
sectors while 23% of breaches in that year affected the hospitality sector [24]. For
that, providing proper Privacy measures for the exchanged Data among the Trust
Stakeholders is a vital Property for all of them. Below is a list of the main Privacy
Attributes, as they appear in Figure 2.2, that should be provided by a Continuous
Trust Management Framework whenever they are needed:
• Anonymity: This Attribute is about concealing the identity of the owner of the
Data set that a certain party have collected through Trusted communications
and transactions. In some applications, this Attribute is a must in all the Trust
transaction life phases. In other words, Users should be able to engage in a
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Trust transaction without even revealing their identity, or any side information
leading to conclude their identity. Such applications include voting, whistle
blowing, seeking medical advice be persons who are too embarrassed to discuss
their issues in public, and the like of these scenarios. In other applications, it
is acceptable that the Service Provider identify the owner of the collected Data
set but whenever the provider decides to share its collected Data sets with a
third-party, with prior consent with the Data owners, then the provider should
make every effort to conceal the identities of the Data owners. Such applications
include, for example, commercial online stores requiring the detailed information
of the customers to fulfil their orders. These stores may decide to share their
log of transactions with a marketing firm to perform Data mining to explore
new purchases trends or demographics of their customers. In such cases, the
online stores should conceal the identities of its customers before sharing with
the third-party firm. When anonymising the Data sets, it is not always sufficient
to obscure the name of the customer. If it is, somehow, known that only one
customer is living in a given area, then that customer could be implied in the
transferred Data sets even if his name was obscured. For that, the online store
could agree with its customers to provide a certain K-anonymity factor where
at least K customers could be implied given the obscured Data sets where the
larger the K value is, the more anonymised the customer would be [25]. While
most traditional P2P service providers, for example, scarify Users’ need for
anonymity for the sake of improved Security [26], many newer Frameworks are
focusing more on this important Privacy Attribute, see Section 3.1 for more
details.
• Pseudoanonymity: This Attribute is about enabling the Trust Framework
Users to have multiple identities when interacting within the Framework’s en-
vironment. Just like in real-life, many of us would have a formal persona at the
workplace that seems completely unrelated to our more relaxed and fun persona
we have when we interact with friends and families. Likewise, we would have
many different identities, or hats, depending on the context where we interact.
In many cases, mixing up all the Attributes of our different identities to form a
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new unified identity is not desirable at all. Most of us would not be happy if a
potential employer starts inspecting our private Facebook or Twitter accounts
where we may discuss controversial issues or simply exchange jokes that may be
considered inappropriate. For that, many people tend to create pseudo-names
whenever they need to get a new identity that is unrelated to their professional
one and, for that, any Trust Framework that manages its Stakeholders identities
should be able to offer pseudo-anonymity for them. This need has been already
recognised by some of the current Trust Framework that we evaluate in this
thesis such as Tas3, PrimeLife, and UMA in Subsections 3.1.3, 3.1.4, and 3.1.6
respectively.
• Continuous Data Control: While improved Security could guard the Trust
Stakeholders’ exchanged Data against outsiders’ attacks, ordinary Users would
still have valid concerns about whether their collected Data are handled properly
by the Service Provider they Trusted to engage with. Moreover, some Users may
even require at some instances to get their records completely removed from the
Service Providers servers, a digital right that seems simple but, yet, many Service
Providers fail to achieve specially in the cloud environment where there are
multiple backup records for the same Data set [15]. As Joshi and Kuo describe,
Service Providers face a trade-off between protecting Users’ Data and selling
these Data to advertisers to generate revenue [14]. Hence, ordinary Users need
the ability to control what Data the Service Providers would collect from them
and how those providers would handle their Data after they are acquired. We
refer to this Privacy Attribute as Continuous Data Control. This control could
be enforced by tailor-made contract negotiations, as we describe in Subsection
2.7.2, to control the flow of Users’ Data before they are acquired by the Service
Providers. Once Users’ Data are acquired by the Service Providers, some form
of technically sound assurance about the behaviour of the Service Provider is
required. Such assurance could be generated by Hard Trust Level Measures that
are based on evidence [27] or perhaps by softer Trust Measures Level that are
based on Users’ ratings and views of the Service Providers [9], see Section 2.8
for more details about the Trust Measures Levels. Despite the importance of
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this genuine need, there is little done to address it in the literature and, hence,
the need for our proposal for a Continuous Trust Management Framework, see
Subsection 3.4.1 for more details.
2.6.3 Legal Authority Enforcement
This is another crucial Trust feature that is rapidly getting more mature and effective.
It is true that less than 30% of the cyber-attacks incidents faced by the participants
in the 2010 CSI survey were reported to the Legal Authorities because of the victims’
believe that Legal Authorities can do little to improve the situation [17]. But it is
also true that the sentencing of Albert Gonzalez for stealing about 170 million credit
cards, for example, frightened his fellow hackers and raised the confidence in the
power of the Legal Authorities [17]. Digital laws are necessary to protect the ordinary
Users’ interests in complex situations where, for example, Data control is lost in the
cloud [15] or where non-competitive marketing schemes could be enforced by utilising
technologies like the TPM chip [28, 29]. Below is a list of the main Legal Authority
Attributes, as they appear in Figure 2.2, that should be provided by a Continuous
Trust Framework whenever they are needed:
• Active Legal Authority: Interestingly, what makes the Legal Authority En-
forcement Property of Trust Enforcement unique is the fact that it requires an
Active Legal Authority that takes efforts and implements measures in addition
to the Attributes provided by the Trust Framework. In other words, no matter
how good the Trust Framework is designed and implemented, the Legal Author-
ity Enforcement Property would not be completely satisfactory to all the Trust
Stakeholders without the Legal Authorities being active by taking extra efforts
and implementing certain measures to make effective Legal Enforcement. For
example, legal acts and guidelines could aid the Service Provider in designing
a better and more Trusted Framework as most participants in the 2010 CSI
survey thought that compliance with regulatory laws helped them improve their
Security [17]. The Security analysis of e-government portals in the US states
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suggests a similar result [30]. Nevertheless, among the main challenges facing
legislators today are keeping up-to-date with the rapidly evolving technologies
such as TPM and cloud computing. In addition, legislators should try to make
the lengthy laws more accessible and easy to comprehend by service providers
who are currently confused about whether a particular law does apply to them
or not [17].
• Data Handling Laws: This Attribute is about designing the Trust Framework
so that it respects all the legal acts governing how it should handle any Data it
acquires. That is a complex Attribute with different sets of laws that apply at
different region where the Trust Framework operates. One of the key legalisation
in this regard is the EU Directive for Data Protection which, since its application
two decades ago, has acted as a role model for other legalisations around the
globe. In addition, it forced indirect legal changes to comply with it since it
restricts processing and retaining Data of EU residents to regions where their
Privacy is protected per its terms [31]. The developed interest in protecting
Users’ Privacy online has led Cavoukian, the Privacy Commissioner in Ontario
Canada, to come up with the 7 laws of identity which are nicely translated
into software design requirements by the TAS3 developers [32]. Another good
analysis of the legal and Trust Challenges facing the Cloud Frameworks today,
which could be viewed as specialised forms of Trust Frameworks, is presented by
Pearson and Benameur [15]. Of course the developers of any Trust Framework
should carefully put in mind any specific laws that applies in the regions where
they intend to operate their Framework. Nevertheless, some common rules
based on the laws and studies we have listed here are likely to be common to
many regions around the globe, due to globalisation effects where some countries
would alter their own legalisation to facilitate trade and communication with
other regions. The generic rules are as following:
– User’s Consent prior to processing his Data
– No unnecessary Data processing, in complying with existing contracts or
Legal Authorities request, should be allowed
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– The Data processor, destination, purpose of access, and alteration should
be logged and be available to its owner
– The Data collector should obtain the minimal amount of personal Data
that is necessary to facilitate the consented Data operation
– The Data owner has the right to alter her shared personal Data or even to
erase all the copies of such Data (the right to be be forgotten)
An important special case where proper Data handling mechanism should be in
place is where the Legal Authorities need to access protected Data by the Trust
Framework to investigate a dispute or a crime. This operation is a subject for
controversial debate between the proponents who argue that such access is vital
to resolve open crimes and opponents who fear that possibly corrupted Legal
Authorities may abuse their power to access unnecessary Data for any illegal
purpose such as blackmailing certain people or to track individuals who may
have ideologies or thoughts against the mainstream norms that are imposed
by a totalitarian regime. The case of the San Bernardino terrorist’s encrypted
iPhone is a recent example showing how deep the conflict is between the Legal
Authorities, the FBI in this case, who wish to access the protected Data and the
Trust Framework admin, Apple in this case, who does not want to get distrusted
by its Users if it corroborated with the Legal Authorities. Similar cases are
expected in the future and it is likely that the legislators would demand Service
Providers, such as Apple, to corporate in enabling access to protected Data if
demanded by the Legal Authorities [33]. For that, proper implementation of the
Data Handling Laws would make the Trust Framework flexible enough to allow
efficient access to the protected Data without revealing more than the required
Data by law. In addition, all the Data access operations would be logged for the
reference of the Data owners. That is necessary so that Users do not fear that
the Service Providers are corroborating with possibly corrupted Authorities to
undermine their freedom of speech or to exercise illegal snooping on them.
• Fair Competition: This is another interesting Attribute that requires the
Trust Framework to comply with the antitrust laws that prohibit monopolising
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a certain market. That is, any deployed Trust Framework should avoid practices
that lead to vendor lock-in such as storing Users’ Data using a proprietary format
that cannot be processed by other competing Trust Frameworks or by preventing
Users, or making it difficult for them, to move their Data to another competitor.
While some software experts argue that the antitrust laws are irrelevant to
the relatively new software markets, Katz and Shapiro argue against this idea
with a detailed comparative study supporting their position [34]. In his famous
Trusted Computing FAQs, Anderson describes some scary scenarios where few
companies could control a singular Trust Framework that would enable them to
abuse their powers to track people and control everything they produce digitally
whenever it goes against the norms or the totalitarian laws that are followed by
those companies [29]. For that, it is vital to distribute the Trust Management
power among many competing Trust Frameworks that are governed by public
and private bodies to insure proper usage of the powers that are associated with
managing such Frameworks as well as to insure the existence of a safe resort
for any oppressed minorities or individuals who cannot maintain their digital
archive legally in totalitarian state-controlled Trust Frameworks.
• Digital Rights Management: It is true that the power abuse, in the form of
oppressing freedom of speech, that is associated with the development of Trusted
Computing is an undesirable side effect [29]. Nevertheless, the main motivation
that ignites its development is the desire to protect the digital media from illegal
pirating that costs businesses billions of dollars and undermines their ability to
flourish [35]. For this sake, the developers of any Trust Framework should put at
the heart of their design measures and technologies to minimise digital pirating
to maintain the Trust of the Service Providers that the Users would respect
their Digital Rights. In addition to the efforts of the Trusted Computing Group
in trying to enforce Digital Rights Management, or simply DRM, a plethora of
technologies such as watermarking and digital signatures are introduced in the
Usage Control domain, or simply UCON, as we illustrate in Subsection 3.1.2.
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2.7 Properties of the Trust Flexibility Requirement
While it is vital for any Trust Framework to enforce the terms of any agreed upon
Trust contract among its Stakeholders, it is equally crucial for such Frameworks to
be flexible enough to accommodate the differing needs of their Stakeholders in any
possible context. That is, a flexible Trust Framework is a practical Framework that
does not constrain its Stakeholders to a rigid implementation deploying only a limited
set of features, lacking essential support, and unreliable due to the lack of sufficient
software testing or adhering to the well-established standards. Further, a flexible
Trust Framework is a Framework that enables its Stakeholders to customize their
contracts based on the context of the desired transaction and the level of importance
of the exchanged Data in the transaction. Finally, a flexible Trust Framework is
a Framework that enables its Stakeholders to delegate some of their roles to other
human or even digital assistants whenever they need to in a smooth, efficient, and
secure manner. For that, we discuss in the following Subsections these Trust Flexibility
Requirement Properties, as they appear in Figure 2.2:
• Practicality
• Customizability
2.7.1 Practicality
This Property of the Trust Flexibility Requirement is about ensuring that the Trust
Framework is practical for its Stakeholders to deploy and use in their desired trans-
actions. That is, any Trust Framework claiming to hold this Property must have
a stable deployed implementation that support the main Trust Properties. Further,
there must be reasonable documentation and support options to aid the Stakeholders
in starting to use the Trust Framework and to troubleshoot any problems that may
arise later on. Finally, a practical Trust Framework should be reliable to govern the
Trust transactions among its Stakeholders by undergoing sufficient tests and adhering
to well-established industry standards.
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• Documentation & Support: This Attribute is about providing some essential
documentation for the potential Stakeholders to start using the system as well as
some support options to aid them in troubleshooting any future problems. Plus,
this Attribute is about providing continuous updates and patches to existing
problems because no software is immune to errors and, hence, there must be
active developers to maintain the Trust Framework and keep it safe and Trusted.
Of course, if the Deployment Attribute is not established, this Attribute would
be of little importance.
• Deployment: This Attribute is about deploying a stable implementation of
the Trust Framework in the real-life for Stakeholders to use. While there is a
plethora of academic projects, prototypes, and beta versions of proposed Trust
Frameworks, most of these proposals lack real-life deployments as can be seen in
Subsection 3.2.2. That is due to the excessive amount of the required resources
needed to carefully design a good Framework and, then, implementing such a
design in a complete manner. Such resources are not available to individual
developers or even academic units. Rather, such efforts would normally require
state and industry sponsorship and support.
• Reliability: This Attribute is about applying essential testing to the implemen-
tation of the Trust Framework to make sure that it does what it is supposed to
do in the normal, the special, and the unlikely use cases. That is, the testers
should put on mind the inexperienced Users who may not follow the instruc-
tions or the Users who may input the wrong type of inputs whether intentionally,
for malicious reasons, or not. The testers should also consider all the contexts
where the Framework would operate let it be in a congested unreliable Network
or among Stakeholders utilising different interfaces or APIs. Following well-
established standardisation while implementing the Trust Framework as well as
obtaining some form of testing certification confirming the quality of the imple-
mented Framework are some forms of achieving this Attribute, see Section 2.8
for more details.
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2.7.2 Customizability
This Property is about catering to the differing needs of the Trust Stakeholders based
on the different Trust transactions scenarios and importance of the executed trans-
actions and the exchanged Data within those transactions. It is crucial for the Trust
Stakeholders to be able to engage in Trust contracts negotiations to come up with
suitable contracts for the specific context of their agreement. Nevertheless, the ability
to easily classify the Stakeholders’ Data beforehand would facilitate the negotiation
process as every party would be able to clearly distinguish between each Data type
and how it should be handled internally once acquired.
• Data Classification: This Attribute is about enabling each Trust Stakeholder
to classify its own Data. Whereas increased Security could minimize the Data
breaches incidents, it would negatively affect the User experience and, hence,
proper Data classification is needed to distinguish critical Data that should be
treated with higher Security measures [36]. Such classification does not need to
be binary. Rather, the Trust Framework may have a scale to rate the importance
of each datum with a corresponding set of extra Security and Privacy measures
attached to each level on that scale. In all cases, the Personally Identifiable
Information, PII, are normally of higher importance than the Data sets that are
generated by the owners of those PIIs. That is because the Data sets owners’
Privacy could be exploited if their PIIs are not protected properly, see Subsection
2.6.2 for more details. For that, we present this basic Data classification scheme
which could be further fine-grained by any Trust Framework:
– PII Credentials: These are like digital signatures or tokens that are
associated with a single identity as described by Linn in [37]. Email address,
home address, full name, phone number, and credit card number are few
examples.
– Data Sets: These are larger Data sets that are owned by an identity.
Digital documents, media files, written emails, or comments on social media
are few examples.
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• Negotiation: In real-life transactions, a one-template contract does not suite
everyone. Digital transactions are no exception. If a company is to process a set
of top confidential Data in a cloud environment, for example, it would require
high Security Measures that may affect the QoS delivered. The other cloud
tenants might view such requirements as hostile and absolutely unnecessary for
their needs. Hence, it is essential for any Trust Framework to have flexible
negotiation mechanisms to create tailor made contracts that suits the needs of
every individual client. Such negotiation is usually costly [27]. The proposal of
Dragoni and Massacci is a preliminary step towards optimizing the negotiation
cost [38].
• Delegation of Authority: This Attribute is about giving proper access con-
trol to other human or digital assistants to do some tasks on behalf of one of the
Trust Stakeholders. That is an essential Property in many real-life use-cases.
For example, when a businessman wish to delegate an online Service Provider
to sell or purchase stocks on his behalf whenever the prices reach pre-set thresh-
olds. Another example is when an elderly woman wish to delegate her grandson
to reserve medical appointments or to discuss her health status with the medical
staff on her behalf. Proper delegation requires fine-grained access control where
the delegate would not get greater authority and power than what the delega-
tor intended to give. In addition, proper delegation should be easy to handle,
revoke, and distribute among different delegates with different set of delegated
authorities. There are many Trust Frameworks that address this issue such as
the TAS3 and the OAuth 2.0 Frameworks, see Section 2.8 and Subsections 3.1.3
and 3.1.7for more details.
2.8 Trust Measures Spectrum
The notion of Soft Trust, which was introduced by Rasmusson et al. [9], called the
Trust status that could be achieved by the ratings and views of the digital social
communities as Soft Trust Measures. In contrast, we would name the Trust status
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Figure 2.3: Trust Measures Spectrum
that could be achieved by utilising accurate proofs asserting whether a certain Trust
party is conforming to the Trust contract as the Hard Trust Measures as suggested by
Dragoni [27]. In between the Soft Trust Measures and the Hard Trust Measures is a
spectrum of different Measures that we classify in this Section. Figure 2.3 illustrates
the Trust Measures Spectrum per our classification with seven main Trust Measures
Levels.
Before briefly commenting on each Trust Measure Level, it is important to note that
classifying a certain Measure as a Soft Measure does not mean that it is worse than
a harder Measure, and vice versa. In fact, any Trust Framework should incorporate
a good balance of Soft and Hard Measures. Moreover, it should be noted that many
of the evaluated Frameworks deploy utilities that would incorporate more than one
Trust Measures Levels as we show in Section 3.1.
• Cues and Clues: This is the softest Measure Level in the Trust Measures
Spectrum. In this level, the Service Provider initiates Trust with his clients by
means of long established reputation, brand name, and transparency regarding
the deployed Security and Privacy measures and polices. Despite lacking techni-
cal evidence, these measures have positive and significant effects on the ordinary
Users’ Trust status [16, 39]. However, the hardly established Trust is very easy
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to lose due to a major Security or Privacy breach [16]. Such incidents are very
likely to happen if no proper Harder Trust Measures Levels are deployed by the
Trust Framework.
• Policies and Contracts: This is a little bit harder Trust Measure level as the
Service Provider provides its Users with official guarantees in the form of legal
contracts like a Service Level Agreement, SLA, which is a plain textual legal
agreement. Despite its guarantees, it is hard in many situations to translate
its promises into real actions in the Framework as the case, for example, in the
cloud-computing field [15]. Another approach is to use the P3P, which is a ma-
chine understandable language to enforce Privacy Requirements of legal agree-
ments [40]. One project that took a step forward in this Trust Measures Level
is EnCoRe that aims to develop a tool that maps SLA abstract agreements to
machine understandable languages like P3P [41]. Another approach to formally
define access rights is the classic Role Based Access Control, RBAC, where ac-
cess to certain Data is restricted to Users with specific roles [42]. The literature
is rich with policy languages to map RBAC roles to machine understandable
forms. Among the highly cited and utilized such languages are XACML [43]
and PERSIM [44]. Nevertheless, without proper strong Enforcement, all the
generated policies in this Trust Measures Level would be useless except in the
case of a legal dispute which is normally expensive and poses the hard challenge
of proving any agreements’ breach.
• Standardisation and Certification: In this Trust Measures Level, the Service
Provider proves his competence and willingness to adhere to any signed contract
by showing a quality certificate that is obtained from an official Trusted Author-
ity. One of the most notable certification system that is currently deployed and
sponsored by many international governments is the Common Criteria Cata-
logue [45]. There are seven levels of Security evaluations ranging from the most
basic, EAL 1, to the most comprehensive, EAL 7. A full source code evaluation
is done only at the highest evaluation level, which is also the most expensive one
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to implement. In addition, it is usually hard to compare the results of two certi-
fied products, which makes it hard and confusing for a client to decide on which
provider to deal with based on their certifications [12]. Other possible forms
of certification could be done by developing protocols by dedicated groups of
developers governed under the umbrella of a standardisation body like ISO [46],
IETF [47], W3C [48], or OASIS [49] as examples. A formally developed protocol
should be generally safer to use since it is supposed to be thoroughly inspected
by respected participants coming from different entities. However, the devel-
opers are, at the end, human beings that are prone to be affected by politics,
personal interests, or simply human mistakes. An example of a controversial
standard is the IETF standard OAuth 2.0 where the main editor resigned from
his position claiming that the group have made the new version of the protocol
so loose that it is impractical for small firms and Users to make correct use of
it [50].
• Reputation Systems: This is the middle point in the Trust Measures Spec-
trum. In this Trust Measures Level, the social power is exploited to generate
ratings and recommendations [13, 51]. In addition, many proposals and projects
utilized a form of evidence gathering from previous interactions to generate more
comparable and Trusted ratings [27]. Despite the effective power of social rat-
ings, there are serious challenges that face the advocates of this line of research.
Among those challenges, per [27], are to deal with evaluating the new entrants
to the systems, which is partly examined in [52], to deal with human subjective
ratings, and to deal with the malicious nodes who attack the integrity of the
ratings [26]. It is worth mentioning that the highly cited Trusted P2P projects,
EigenTrust [53] and PeerTrust [54], are not implemented for real-life deployment
yet and, hence, cannot be evaluated for their effectiveness [27].
• Access Control: This harder Trust Measures Level is mainly concerned about
restricting access to Users’ Data or Credentials to only authenticated and autho-
rised entities. In other words, it tries to implement the Enforcement measures of
the Sticky Policies that are found in the above-mentioned policies and contracts
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Trust Measures Level. One of the oldest, and the most reliable, access control
protocols is the classic Kerberos [55] where mutual client and server authenti-
cation takes place through secure communication channels by incorporating a
Trusted third-party who knows both the server and the clients. Another more
recent example is the OAuth 2.0 protocol, which tries to make it easy for a User
to give certain entities access rights to a limited set of his Data or Authorities
[56]. While this Trust Measures Level is effective in simple access scenarios, it is
not sufficient in complex scenarios where, for example, the Data owner requires
unlinkability, anonymity, pseudonomity, or Data protection after release.
• Identity Management: In this Trust Measures Level, the main focus is on
managing the Users’ digital personalities and Credentials. That is, providing the
set of tools and usable mechanisms to create contextual profiles, delegate the use
of certain Credentials, support Attribute based authentication, and anonymise
the User personality whenever necessary. Some of the worth mentioning projects
that tries to implement those ideas are PrimeLife [57], TAS3 [3], OpenID Con-
nect [7], Shibboleth [58], and UMA [59] projects, see Section 3.1 for more detailed
analysis of these Frameworks. In fact, the TAS3 and PrimeLife are inactive
academic projects and the Shibboleth is concerned with a limited set of inter-
institutional authentication. In contrast, the OpenID Connect and UMA are
active projects that are concerned with more mainstream identity management
scenarios. Per Maler, one of the key developers of the UMA project, the new
vision for mainstream access control is illustrated in Figure 2.4. In that Figure,
we can see that the trio of the OpenID Connect, UMA, and OAuth 2.0 could be
integrated to support a wide range of modern access control scenarios. That is,
the task of Authentication would be taken care by the OpenID Connect pro-
tocol, which manages User’s identity claims and provides Single Sign-On, SSO.
Further, the OpenID Connect provides identity tokens, after the User consent
to do so, enabling requesting third parties to access a set scope of the managed
User’s identity claims such as name and email address. The OAuth 2.0 protocol
would take care of securely Authorising apps and Users, by confirming the
validity of the access tokens they provide. Finally, the UMA protocol would
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Figure 2.4: A New Venn Of Access Control For The API Economy [1]
take care of the Delegation task where a User would categorize his Data and
Credential into different scopes, which the User give consent for other Users or
apps to access in the negotiation process during the authentication process that
is carried out by the OpenID Connect protocol [1].
• Hard Verification: This is the hardest level within the Trust Measures Spec-
trum where the main focus here is to achieve the highest form of certainty
despite the high QoS cost. In other words, it can support the Enforcement
of the previous layers rules even after Data release. The list starts with a
strong cryptographic mechanism called Homomorphic encryption [60] which is,
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despite being introduced in 1986, still impractical because of its high processing
cost. The work of Gentry provides significant optimization to the Homomor-
phic computation cost [61], but it is still expensive to be implemented in real life
applications. The TPM technologies that are being developed by the Trusted
Computing Group, TCG, is aiming to generate Hard Trust by means of software
and hardware remote attestation to ensure that every component is behaving
as expected [62]. Once a component, whether hardware or software, misbehave,
it would transparently show its status to the concerned parties. Despite its po-
tential benefit, it raises many concerns among the ordinary Users about their
Privacy and control over their own machine [29]. However, proper legislation
would eliminate such concerns and fears [28]. It is worth mentioning at this
point that relying solely on TPM technologies would not solve all our Security
and Trust issues; Rather, it is a building block toward a proper Trust Framework
[63].
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Chapter 3. The Need for Continuous Trust Management
Frameworks
In Chapter 2, we answer fundamental questions regarding the concepts of Digital Trust
and Digital Trust Management Frameworks by surveying the literature. In particular,
we list a set of main Challenges currently facing Trust Management Frameworks, see
Section 2.4, today along with a list of essential Trust Requirements, see Section 2.5
that should be fulfilled by any Trust Management Framework to counter the current
Challenges. Further, we present a Trust Measures Spectrum, see Section 2.8, that
categorizes the current Trust Management Frameworks per the type of Measures they
deploy to establish and offer Digital Trust.
In this Chapter, we present a collection of some of the existing Trust Management
Frameworks that we picked based on the breadth of the Trust Spectrum they cover and
the variety of the Trust Attributes they implement. Following that, we explore here
to what extent those Trust Frameworks fulfilled the Trust Requirements of Section
2.5 and by using what Measures from the Trust Measures Spectrum of Section 2.8.
We present the results of our comparisons in tabular format to ease comprehending.
These results are followed by a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the
investigated Trust Frameworks.
Our investigation will show that while the investigated Trust Frameworks excel at ful-
filling traditional Security Attributes, they fail at providing Continuous Data Control
because there are limited, under-researched, measures to protect the Trust Stakehold-
ers Data after they release it to other parties. This fundamental weakness restrains
the current Trust Frameworks from providing Continuous Trust for their Trust Stake-
holders and makes it impossible to fulfil all the Legal Authorities Trust Attributes.
In addition, the lack of Continuous Data Control makes it less significant to invest in
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strengthening the current Customizability Trust Attributes. For that, we argue by the
end of this Chapter for the importance of developing a Continuous Trust Management
Framework that is designed and implemented to provide the missing Continuous Data
Control.
3.1 Current Trust Frameworks at a Glance
Figure 3.1: The Current Picture of The Trust Frameworks/Protocols Literature
Unlike the late 1980’s where a literature survey for Trust Frameworks may return a set
of academic projects to secure the Data communication channels, the literature picture
today is more vibrant and complicated. In the current picture of the Trust literature,
the hot spot is not the communication channel; rather, more attention is currently paid
to Users’ Privacy, Data protection, and access management rights. While some Trust
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solutions are well-established protocols; many are still in their infancy as academic
projects or in their adolescence as draft protocols. To add more complexity to the
picture, some solutions focus on specific Trust issues like authorisation or identity
management for example while many recent projects take a more holistic approach
toward implementing the essential Trust Requirements’ Properties and Attributes, see
Section 2.5.
At the moment, the topic of Trust Management Frameworks is not largely studied
as a unit. Instead, each particular Trust issue, or a group of closely-related Trust
issues, are studied alone. For that, there is no unified view of how the Trust Stack
should look like. To capture the current picture of the Trust Frameworks and how it
is evolving, we show our Trust Stack view in Figure 3.1, where we put the hardware
and the basic, but essential, Security features at the bottom of the stack while putting
the more advanced Trust layers that are concerned with Privacy, Trust ranking, and
Trust dissemination on the upper layers of the stack.
In Figure 3.1, we list few representative Trust Frameworks that were selected from
different pools and categories to sample the current residents in the Trust Frameworks
literature. In that figure, we list the evaluated Frameworks in the layers where they
mostly operate, for more details, see Section 4.1. The selected Trust Frameworks have
been carefully analysed to extract different sets of comparable features and trends.
In the following Subsections, the analysed Trust Frameworks are briefly introduced.
In Section 3.2, we compare these Trust Frameworks on the aspects of their support
to the Attributes of both the Trust Enforcement Properties and the Trust Flexibility
Properties as well we their utilisation of the different Trust Measures Levels.
3.1.1 TCG
The Trusted Computing Group, TCG, approach towards Trusted computing is to
root all the Trust chains to a Trusted hardware chip, called Trusted Platform Mod-
ule, TPM, that has many built-in Security features like storing sensitive Data and
generating secret keys [64]. Due to its generic nature, TCG standards could be used
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in a variety of fields like: risk assessment, e-commerce, computing assets management,
Security monitoring and emergency response [64]. As of the time of writing this thesis,
the TCG group is active and running with an estimated number of around 2B devices
deployed with TPM chips [65].
To grasp the technical image of TCG, Lee-Thorp [66] mentioned that an ordinary
TCG platform is usually made of the following main technical components:
• Trusted Platform Module, TPM: this is a tamper resistant chip [64] that
is capable of performing Security tasks like keys and passwords management as
well as encryption/decryption tasks without the need to depend on untrusted
communication channels or software layers [67].
• Root of Trust for Measurement, RTM: the RTM is a computing engine that
is capable of measuring and securely storing integrity metrics. The initiation of
the RTM is normally done by a pre-Bios Boot Block, BBB, that is called CRTM.
CRTM is also expected to be tamper resistant and only execute Trusted pre-
authorised software [66].
• The Software Stack, TSS: this stack is an interface to access the functions
of the TPM to extend the hardware Trust to the application layer. Among its
features, TSS include interfaces for existing crypto APIs which extend TPM
support for applications using those APIs [67].
Based on TCG’s Trust features and technical components, it is predicted that TCG
standards would enable protected storage facilities in the short run, improve access
management policies based on the running software status in the medium run, and
establish strong system integrity measurement based on the reporting and attestation
features in the long run [68]. The long-run vision should be enabled by the integrity
metrics reporting functions, which is also known as remote attestation [66]. The
purpose of the remote attestation is to verify to an external challenger the integrity
metrics of the running system. The current attestation model is designed around the
idea of computing the hash values of the Trusted software or OS and, then, comparing
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those securely registered hashes with newly computed hashes at the boot time. If the
pre-computed hashes matches the newly calculated hashes, the TPM will vouch for the
integrity of the running software. In order to protect the device owners’ Privacy, it is
possible to use Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol, DAA. This protocol basically
assumes a Trusted Certification Authority, CA, that knows all the Endorsement Keys,
EK, of the valid TPM machines. Then, if a TPM owner wishes to prove attaining
certain properties without compromising their anonymity, he could contact the CA
along with a newly generated key called Attestation Identity Key, AIK, to be verified
against the User’s EK. If the transaction success, the CA would sign the AIK and
return it to the User who can then forwarded it to the verifier. [69].
If the TCG protocols got widely adopted, we could expect a revolutionary trusted
computing experience. Nevertheless, there are still many issues and research chal-
lenges facing the TCG ultimate goal of fully trusted computing. Among those issues
are:
• Trusting Roots of Trust may be achieved through a variety of ways but is an-
ticipated to include technical evaluation by competent experts [64]. ”That is
said and by looking at the TCG documentation road map [64], we see that the
experts are assumed to be the Common Criteria body. Per the Common Cri-
teria manual [70], code level verification is done only at the highest assurance
level testing, EAL7. However, the Common Criteria website [71] indicates that
the three certified trusted computing products have got EAL4 certificates. For
Security sensitive operations, is it sensible to root all the computing Trust to
unverified source code?
• TPM is assumed to be tamper resistant but, in practice, it is not. As mentioned
by Sadeghi, the current practice is to connect TPM chips to the I/O system using
unprotected channels that can be easily compromised. A proposed solution is
to use cryptographically protected communication channels for TPM chips [63].
To further demonstrate the shortcomings of the current TPM chips, Christopher
Tarnovsky showed how to access the non-volatile memory containing the Users
Data in the Infineon’s TPM in Black Hat 2010 [72].
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• In the current TCG architecture, TPM could become a bottleneck to the system
performance. Plus, it does not scale pretty well in open computing systems [66].
• As mentioned earlier, the attestation model assumes static hash values while, in
practice, those values can be easily modified during the run time by exploiting
Security bugs or swapping the memory, for example [63]. Moreover, it is almost
impossible to Trust the code of nowadays complex software which means that
verifying their hash values does not make great sense. The attestation metrics for
software are low level metrics like the configuration file or software image while
the more important property would be the software semantics and behaviour
[66]. Moreover, even if it is attested that a platform is genuine, the vendor
usually does not guarantee the behaviour of the platform. Another limitation
of the current attestation model is the fact that it cannot guarantee capabilities
or system functionality. Lastly, TCG attestation currently doesn’t refer to a
single running instance of a given software; rather, it refers to a software entity
in general. As a result, a better Trustworthiness evaluation methodology is
needed.
• Per Pearson, without proper legislation, a huge spectrum of commercial abuse
to the consumers Privacy and freedom could result by the TCG standards [28].
That is due to the potential power of the remote attestation that could, for
example, enable some vendors to sell software or media that could be read for a
limited number of times or consumed in certain locations only. More threats and
concerns are described in the Trusted Computing’ Frequently Asked Questions
[29]. Proper legalisation is essential to promote the use of TCG standards in a
wide scale.
3.1.2 UCON
The Usage Control, or simply UCON, is an approach focused on access management
that was introduced by J. Park in 2002 [2, 73] and then formally modelled by X.
Zhang [74]. The aim of UCON is to provide a unified Framework that can provide
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dynamic fine-grained access control to digital resources before and after release. That
is, a UCON system should be able to offer client-side reference monitor to enforce
the dynamic access policy which is dependent on the client usage in contrast to the
traditional access control approaches like Mandatory Access Control, MAC, or Role
Based Access Control, RBAC which are capable of only providing static access poli-
cies through server-side reference monitors that cannot enforce any access rules after
granting access to the client. In other words, the UCON approach ”encompasses tra-
ditional access control, Trust Management, and digital rights management and goes
beyond them in its definition and scope [2].” Since its first publishing, UCON at-
tracted a lot of academic attention and its development became an active research
area [75]. Nevertheless, there is not a formal research group or standardisation body
that supports this approach, as far as the authors know.
Figure 3.2: UCON Model Components [2]
The UCON high-level components model, based on the work of J. Park, is shown in
Figure 3.2. This model consists of subjects, having certain attributes, trying to get
rights to access objects, or some of its attributes, that are protected by the UCON
Framework. The UCON model differs from the traditional access protocols by utilis-
ing the authorisations, obligations, and conditions components, or simply ABC, where
the traditional protocols would rely on the authorisation component solely in making
access decisions. The authorisation component encapsulates who has rights to access
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what while the obligation component takes care of checking if any required obligation
by the requester is fulfilled, like filling up a disclaimer form, and the conditions compo-
nent is responsible for making sure that any environmental or system-oriented, like the
presence of an anti-virus, is fulfilled. Finally, the UCON model realise two important
properties that are missed in the traditional systems: continuity and mutability. The
first means that the policy Enforcement should continue even after granting access
rights while the second means that certain attributes, like number of usages, could
be automatically updated instead of manual attributes update like in the traditional
systems case. Utilising the ABC components, continuity of usage policies, and mu-
table attributes, a UCON system can maintain two usage decisions points: the first
point to grant the initial access right and the second to update the access right based
on the usage and deployed policy [2].
A survey covering the active research in developing the UCON protocol showed many
different realisation and variations on adopting the UCON model [75]. For the purpose
of this comparative study, the reported features from the many different research
papers to develop UCON models which are presented in the Lazouski et al. survey
[75] are treated in this study as if they are a single UCON Framework implementation
for simplicity reasons. In terms of UCON architecture, the key component is called
the Reference monitor which is like a gateway that receives any request to access
digital Data. Each request would be evaluated by a Policy Decision Point, PDP, and
its decision would be enforced by a Policy Enforcement Point, PEP. The reference
monitor could be located in the server-side, the client-side, or in both locations. In
the hybrid approach, the server-side part of the reference monitor could handle Data
protection before release while the client-side part could take care of enforcing its
usage policy after release.
Looking at the PEP in more details, there are many Enforcement methods that were
surveyed by Lazouski et al. [75]. One of the reported methods is digital watermark-
ing which is basically about injecting an invisible piece of Data that is attached to
the protected Data object. The purpose of the digital watermarking is to track the
Data distribution and whether the object is distributed per the agreed upon contract
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or not. Another Enforcement approach is the digital container where a Data object
is encrypted and cannot be accessed, even after release, unless the Virtual Machine,
which contains the PEP module, decrypt it. Of course, this VM should be imple-
mented in a tamper-resistance way or it would be useless. Tamper resistance VM
could be achieved by code obfuscation, to prevent altering the code. Another ap-
proach towards tamper resistant VM is called Model-Based Behavioural Attestation,
MBA [76]. MBA utilizes low level hardware attestation techniques, such as TPM
chips, to facilitate a higher-level attestation layer that evaluates a Data consumer
Trustworthiness based on her behaviour [76].
The UCON approach towards Trust Management covers many important aspects of
it. In fact, it is among the few Trust Management approaches that provide effective
proposals to protect digital Data after release. Nevertheless, this approach still faces
many issues and obstacles that needs to be tackled. First of all, there is no standardis-
ation body or even an academic research group that takes care of generating a unified
standard or protocol for UCON. Without an agreed upon standard, UCON would
remain an inspiring research theme that is hardly applicable to real-life computing.
Moreover, despite the proof of concepts implementations that are scattered in the lit-
erature, there are not full implementations that could be evaluated for their reliability
and effectiveness. That is important because when it comes to policy Enforcement
after Data release, by means of VMs, the tamper resistance feature is a conceptual
idea that is challenging to implement in practice. When it comes to tamper resis-
tance, code obfuscation approach requires using closed source software, otherwise, the
malicious client may replace the obfuscated VM with a fresh copy of the open source
software. Closed source software may provide Security but never provide Trust since
the fear of a malicious code developer sharing the source code with malicious clients.
Hence, the implementer would be left with hardware tamper resistance approach with
all the challenges currently facing the TCG attestation, see Subsection 3.1.1.
45
3.1.3 TAS3
The Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services, TAS3, project is a EU funded
project that was concerned with developing a generic Trust architecture for Web
Services computing. As mentioned by Kellomaki, the main objectives of this project
are to fulfil the requirements of the complex and heterogeneous business process, to
empower ordinary Users with User-centric and dynamic access management policies,
and to secure the communication channels that transmit PII Data among different
entities [3].
Per Kellomaki, Trust should be technically enforced in the TAS3 architecture [3]. In
case that was not possible at some situations, a Legal Framework that is proposed
by Alhadeff and Alsenoy should be used as a last resort [77]. Some of the design
objectives of the TAS3 architecture, per [3], are:
• Empower Users with the ability to manage how their PII Data and attributes
are used and disseminated.
• Provide useful, and accessible by Users, distributed auditing system.
• Employ a binding Legal Framework to complement the technical enforced Trust.
• Utilize a set of Trusted third-parties to manage and enforce Trust related tasks
like authorisation and keys management.
• Deploy strong encryption and Privacy preserving protocols.
• Develop sticky-policies to cryptographically attach access policies to Data. Those
policies should be empowered by policy Enforcement infrastructure.
• Enable auditing and quality assurance entities to test whether online services
do comply with their specifications.
Per Alhadeff, the TAS3 project views the Trust ecosystem as a collaboration among
different entities to enable the TAS3 architecture [77]. Such collaborating entities
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would form what is called a Trusted Network, TN. The TN would involve the following
main Stakeholders:
• Data Subjects, or simply TAS3 End-Users: These End-Users include Ser-
vice Providers and service requesters of either computing application services or
Trusted Third Party services like certification agencies or reputation engines.
• TAS3 Governance Entities: Those entities may include a centralised Trust
Guarantor and/or a TN Governing Board that could be made of the TN Stake-
holders in addition to some Legal Authorities.
It is also mentioned by Alhadeff that the ideal situation to bootstrap a TN is to have
a central Trusted and already respected authority to anchor the TN. Otherwise, a
consortium of smaller Trusted entities should assume that rule [77].
Figure 3.3: A Components Overview for the TAS3 Architecture [3]
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To get a deeper understanding of how TAS3 works, Figure 3.3 shows a detailed view
of the architecture’s components. Some of the main components in that figure per
Kellomaki [3] include:
• Authorisation services.
• Authentication services.
• Privacy preserving services: to generate pseudonymous identities and minimise
the identities and attributes linkability.
• Trust negotiation services: to decide if the other end of the transaction is Trust-
worthy enough to start a dialogue.
• Secure business process management services: to help business services to oper-
ate and get dynamically updated in a secure manner.
• Delegation services: to enable a User to delegate Credentials to another User or
agent.
• Discovery services.
• Trusted registries: to track all services in the TN that provide services conform-
ing to the TAS3 specifications.
• Attribute authorities: to vouch that specific Users posses certain attributes.
• Secure repository services: to store Users’ attributes securely in accordance with
their attached policies.
• Trust and reputation services.
• Secure audit services: to provide a tamper resistant log of all the transactions
made within the TN boundaries for the use of legally authorised entities.
• On-line compliance testing services: to frequently and anonymously interact
with all the services in the TN to ensure their compliance with their published
specifications and policies.
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As can be spotted in the above objectives list, Users’ Privacy is a core component of
the TAS3 architecture. Per Vandevenne et al., the TAS3 researchers do not think that
Trust or Privacy are negotiable; rather, satisfying the access control policy by giving
a required set of Credentials is what agents should negotiate. Moreover, The TAS3
negotiation module is designed to enable the User to prove to the Service Provider
that it holds certain attributes without necessarily revealing all of those attributes
[78]. In fact, each personal attribute may have an associated access policy, Sticky
Policy, requiring the requesting server to fulfil certain promises or to possess certain
qualities before the attribute get transferred. Similarly, the requesting server may not
reveal all its policies to clients. Rather, some parts of the policy could be publicly
accessed (like terms and conditions) while other parts like (which employees can access
clients Data) is restricted to internal entities [78].
A possible implementation of the Sticky Policies, which Kellomaki describes, is to
develop a language to express and exchange the Sticky Policies, named: TAS3 Simple
Obligations Language, SOL. That language, or any other similar language, would
attach an access control and retention policy for each Data item. When a requester
asks for a specific Data item, he would send pledges regarding how he would treat
the requested Data. The Requester Policy Enforcement Point, PEP, would check the
received pledges against the Data attached obligations and, if they match, it would
send the requested Data [79]. More details about the Sticky Policies and how we are
using them can be found in Section 4.4.1.
The TAS3 project provides a great Framework that considers Users’ Privacy at its
core design. Despite being an inactive academic project, its outcomes could be utilized
to develop a more robust practical Trust Network. Nevertheless, we observe many
deficiencies like:
• The Sticky Policies are not enforced once the attributes are transferred from its
owner to the requester. It is clearly said in the project’s architecture document
that Sticky Policies should be ideally attached to the attributes they protect by
cryptographic means to prevent its disclosure unless with accordance with the
policy terms [3]. However, it is also mentioned in that document that ”this is a
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difficult research problem and will be addressed in other TAS3 deliverables [3].”
As far as we know, this issue was not addressed in any other deliverable. In that
case, once the Data leaves its owner, there would be no technical guarantees
about enforcing its obligations except for the reputation rankings, which cannot
detect passive Data snooping or even some active manipulation where the Data
owner cannot detect which requester have breached the exchanged Data policy.
Of course, it is possible to rely on legal Enforcement but, again, if the Data
owner cannot technically proof who breached his Data, the legal path would
probably leads to nowhere. Utilising Some form of software attestation, similar
to the TCG or UCON approaches, to launch the TN to ensure the integrity of
the running Enforcement software would dramatically enhances the Trust level
of and reduce the risk of colluding parties or even contract breaches.
• It is not clear from the documentation if it is possible for the Data owner to
retrieve access to his Data if he found that the requester has breached the con-
tract. But it was clearly described by Kellomaki that the Data owner can attach
a retention policy using the SOL language [79]. Again, if software attestation is
to be used, it would be possible to keep the Sticky Policy attached to the Data
wherever it goes and, hence, it would be possible to implement a revocation
mechanism.
• The online compliance testing services, which is part of the TAS3 architecture,
is a good idea in concept. In practice, it was not clear in the documentation how
the testing would be carried out if the required service needs payment. Since the
testing request would be anonymous, it should behave like a normal User and
pay for the required service. It could be that after the end of the transaction,
the testing module reveals its identity and ask for repayment. In that scenario,
the Service Provider could analyse the testing module pattern and, hence, could
guess if an incoming request is a test or not which would break the testing
algorithm. A better approach could be by asking each member of the TN to
pay in advance a membership fee to cover the cost of testing.
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• Another issue with the testing module is the fact that it cannot detect passive
Data snooping. However, it could detect some forms of active Data theft if
it uses a strategy like sending random attributes to only one entity and then
monitor the Internet to check if the exchanged Data have been leaked or not.
If yes, it would be easy to map the leaked Data to the only suspicious service
provider and, hence, this provider could be removed from the Trust Network.
3.1.4 PrimeLife
The PrimeLife project is a EU funded project that is concerned with tackling the new
Privacy challenges that were posed by the emerging web that formed online social
communities, mashup applications, and lifelong storage with nearly unlimited storage
[57].
Users’ Privacy lies at the heart of the PrimeLife project. The PrimeLife researchers
think that to protect Users’ Privacy, Users should reveal the minimum required knowl-
edge while the other end Data usage should be governed by access policies [57]. More-
over, as a mean to better control lifelong Privacy, hiding Data through identity man-
agement and User control is usually preferred over its disclosure as it is impractical to
remove personal Data from other entities devices [57]. Per Pfitzmann et al. [57], the
PrimeLife Project acknowledges and tries to fulfil the following Privacy requirements,
if needed by Users or legislators:
• Privacy of attributes that leads to direct identifiability: That includes
both anonymity and pseudonymity.
• Privacy of attributes that leads to indirect identifiability: That includes
Data confidentiality, Data storage and processing minimisation, and empowering
Users with Privacy control tools.
• Contextual integrity
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The PrimeLife project is an umbrella for many smaller projects that all aim to tackle
the Privacy issues in different domains. Nevertheless, one mini-project that we con-
sider as a Trust Framework is the PrimeLife Privacy-preserving access control system
[80]. This proposed architecture has a generic SOA architecture to support the Pri-
vacy oriented Data handling that is proposed. Furthermore, it is independent from
policy languages or specific deployment platforms to keep it open for specific imple-
mentations. To come up with this generic architecture, the developers came up with
39 general requirements to cover the different area of Privacy, authentication, PII
access, and cross domain communication [80].
Figure 3.4: A High-Level Architecture for the PrimeLife Privacy Language [4]
The basic idea of this architecture is to match the Privacy policies governing handling
the PII from the different providers and consumers with Sticky Policies that controls
the release of the Data to only the authorised entities without leaving any linkable
traces in the SoC sphere. For such a solution to work, the policy language should
be as precise as possible to cover all the legal aspects. Examples of the currently
deployed policy languages are XACML and P3P which, although providing fair enough
functions to express the Privacy policies and to handle access control, are limited
in dealing with Data handling and in their understandability by Users. PrimeLife
project worked on extending the ontologies of those languages to address some of those
raised issues. Trabelsi and Njeh describe the detailed architecture of the PrimeLife
Police Language, PPL, which extend the XACML access control policy to enable Data
Handling Laws Enforcement by means of encryption [4]. The general picture of this
proposed architecture looks like Figure 3.4:
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While PrimeLife project offered a well thought about Privacy-oriented architecture
for Data exchange, there are many rooms for improvements in their proposal. First of
all, despite the fact that PPL improved the way in which the currently deployed policy
languages such as XACML and P3P handle access control, it should be noted that
XACML, and any other language that is extending it like PPL, are concerned with
how to attach the access control policies to the Data but not with how such policies
are enforced at the end-points. For that reason, once the Data leaves its owner, there
are no technical guarantees offered by the PrimeLife Privacy preserving architecture
regarding how the Data would be treated after its release.
3.1.5 ABC4Trust
Per Camenisch et al., the main objectives of the Attribute-Based Credentials for Trust
project, simply ABC4Trust, is to define the main components and Data artefacts in
a common abstract architecture for all systems that are meant to implement Privacy-
preserving Attribute-Based Credential systems [5]. While the Prime and PrimeLife
projects showed that ABC systems provide good Privacy, they presented a limited
number of demonstrators which means a gap between theory and practice that raises
the need for the ABC4Trust project.
The general goals of the ABC4Trust project, per Camenisch et al. [5] are:
• To present a generic Framework that can accommodate the different Privacy-
ABC systems by identifying the functional modules and producing suitable spec-
ifications for the Data objects, APIs, and protocols.
• To present clear criteria to compare the features of the different implementations
of the proposed modules.
• To present reference implementations for each of the proposed modules.
Per [5], the main Privacy issues facing the identity management systems today are:
• The Service Provider knows all the Users’ transactions history.
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• Possible linkability across different domains.
• The identity proportionality is often violated (by collecting excessive number of
personal attributes).
The proposed ABC4Trust architecture, per Camenisch et al., attempts to overcome
the abovementioned issues [5]. This proposal does not only conform to the basic
laws of Privacy like the principle of necessary processing (which became mandatory
in countries like GermanyâĂŹs for eID usage), but also open the door for future
research to deploy stricter legalisation by means of:
• The wide variety of attested personal Credentials that would be possible to
collect, thanks to ABC4Trust, without revealing the whole set (selective disclo-
sure). Nevertheless, the wide deployment of such systems would introduce the
challenge of establishing proper methods to process them legally.
• Currently, many Data controllers are needed to collect the personal Credentials
and transactions logs for future inspections, if needed. The inspection feature
offered by ABC4Trust would eliminate this need as the Credentials would be
offered whenever needed by a credible inspection authority.
• The unlinkability feature would enable the Enforcement of purpose-binding re-
quirements using the ABC4Trust architecture.
Among the goals of this architecture is to enable its Users to deploy the ABC4Trust
features on top of the existing technologies such as WS-*, SAML, OpenID Connect,
OAuth 2.0, and X.509. It was analysed by Camenisch et al. how this architecture
could be integrated with the aforementioned technologies to overcome some of their
Security and Privacy shortcomings [5].
The main Stakeholders in the ABC4Trust architecture are shown in Figure 3.5. In
that figure, the User is the human client who tries to access resources protected by the
verifier who demands certain Credentials to be provided by issuers who may specify
some terms and conditions to enable certain inspectors to de-anonymise the Credential
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Figure 3.5: Architecture for Attribute-based Credential Technologies [5]
token or to enable a revocation authority to invalidate the use of the token with certain
or all verifiers. The revocation authority could also be demanded by the User to disable
the utilisation of his presented token to certain providers without affecting the usage
of the same Credential with other verifiers. That is important so that a malicious
verifier could not use the token for identity theft purposes. It is worth noting in
this project the introduction of the Revocation Authority and the Inspector, which
are relatively new to the Trust Management literature. However, such an ambitious
architecture would pose many legal challenges. Hence, A preliminary legal analysis
of the ABC4Trust architecture is provided by Camenisch et al. [5] as the basis for a
more thorough analysis in the future.
The architecture developers designed it to carefully tackle some of the main Security
and Privacy issues. For example, to prevent Credential Pooling where Users would
share their issued Credential to access resources they are not allowed to, it is proposed
by Camenisch et al. to use Credential binding to a User’s secret and, then, the issuer
may insist that password or secret should be used to create all the different Credential
that would make that secret so valuable that a User would hardly be willing to share.
As an extra protection, the binding could be a person-to-device that is distributed in
a way that makes it 1-1 relation (smart card for example) [5]. Another example is the
possibility to make certain Data inspectable by only certain Legal or pre-agreed-upon
Authorities. In this case, the User should generate his presentation token encrypted
by the inspector’s public key. This feature could be useful in other situations like
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treating a bank as an inspector opening encrypted bank account number with payment
to verifier as inspecting grounds.
As can be observed so far, the ABC4Trust architecture is innovative in the way it
tackles the current Security issues without sacrificing the User’s Privacy or the Le-
gal Authorities rights of inspection in case of suspicion. Nevertheless, there are still
some Security issues that were not tackled in this proposal. For example, if collusion
between the verifier and the inspector happens, no guarantees would be available for
the User. An improved approach would be to enforce User notification before de-
anonymising any Credential. Moreover, while this architecture provides well-tailored
protection for Users Credentials, it offers no protection for the exchanged Data. Al-
though the User might be anonymised, his Data might be linkable to his real identity,
depending on the nature of that Data, which would raise some linkability issues.
3.1.6 UMA
The User-Managed Access standard, or simply UMA, is an effort of the UMA work-
group which is part of the Kanatra initiative. Per the project website, the UMA
workgroup is concerned with developing standards that enables the web Users to con-
trol their Data sharing and service access with interoperable implementations of the
standards [59]. A full implementation of the protocol in Java that adheres to the soft-
ware design core principals like modularity and unit testing is described by Machulak
et al. [81].
The UMA developers think that the XAML based approach to Data management are
either inflexible or lack the User-centricity mechanisms [6]. Their proposed alternative
approach is to implement a protocol named User Managed Access (UMA) which tries
to fulfil the following ten requirements for any User managed system:
• Access relationship service
• User-driven policies and terms
• User-managed access relationships
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• Auditing
• Requester-Host direct access
• Multiple hosting services
• Entity separation
• Resource orientation
• Representation agnostic access control
• Preservation of Users’ Privacy
Figure 3.6: High-Level Overview of the UMA Protocol [6]
Figure 3.6 shows a high-level overview of the UMA protocol. In that Figure, the
authorising User is the User who stores his Data at different hosts while depending on
the authorisation manager to deal with Data access requests to ensure that only those
requesters who promise to obey the access control policy can get the Data. The Data
access restrictions are heavily based on the OAuth 2.0 and, hence, it shall be assumed
that all OAuth 2.0 Security features could be implemented in UMA including TLS
secure communication [56]. From the protocol specifications [6], it can be seen that
it is possible for a User to require in the access policy that a requester should provide
certain claims before gaining access. Such claims could be, but does not have to be,
signed by a Trusted third-party.
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This protocol is one of the latest additions to the Trust Management literature with
the advantages of being formally standardised and sponsored as well. Nevertheless,
one of its main shortcomings is the fact that it lacks after release protection. There are
not even attached Sticky Policies with the released Data in case a genuine requester
wishes to adhere to Data access policies set by its original owner.
3.1.7 OAuth 2.0
The OAuth 2.0 Framework is published as an IETF standard Track since October
2012 [56]. Among the main adopters of the OAuth 2.0 Framework is Facebook [82].
Per Hardt, the traditional way for a third-party application to access a resource on
behalf of a client, or its owner, is to explicitly ask for the client’s login Credentials,
typically username/password [56]. Such an approach is inherited with many downsides
including:
• Insecure storage of the sensitive Credentials, in plaintext, by some applications.
• Applications get too much access to all the protected resources by the given
password.
• Revoking granted access for an application means changing the password that
is used by all the other applications.
• Compromising the application means compromising all the Users’ Data.
Given the abovementioned issues, the objective of the OAuth 2.0 Framework is to
enable applications to get a limited access to online resources on behalf of client.
OAuth 2.0 approach is made possible by introducing an authorisation layer which
grant authorisation tokens of limited scopes to the third-party applications. The
OAuth 2.0 Framework is designed to be used over the HTTP protocol only and it
depends on implementing its Security features such as secure messaging, signatures,
and encryption on the TLS/SSL protocols to increase the Framework flexibility and
not to re-invent the wheel.
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In terms of the protocol usability, OAuth 2.0 does not support or mandates a specific
form of Security, authentication, or contract negotiation giving the Security engineers
full flexibility when tailoring down specific solutions for their systems. Nevertheless,
the authorisation layer provided by this protocol should be compatible with the other
Security layers in the deployed applications. OAuth 2.0 standard and threat model
can be found online in [56]. Plus, some draft implementations are available on the
OAuth 2.0 official website [83].
Despite being an IETF standard that is gaining more adoption among the biggest
players in the Internet, there are many issues that a system designer should consider
before relying on OAuth 2.0. One of those issues is the fact that there is no mecha-
nism to protect against colluding parties like the resource server and application to
compromise the resource owner Data.
3.1.8 OpenID Connect
The OpenID protocol is a Single-Sign-On, SSO, protocol that enables individuals to
sign in to multiple websites using a single identity managed and provided by a single
OpenID host, OP. Among the goals of the OpenID protocol are [84]:
• Accelerating the sign-up process.
• Eliminating the need to manage many accounts/passwords (this could be viewed
as a disadvantage because losing one password means losing all the accounts.
Exactly the same case as using the email address as the username for every site
with the same password everywhere because our brains cannot remember many
passwords).
• Giving the User greater control over her online ID with the choice to use the
same ID in many websites so that she can take her reputation to other websites
she visits (there is still no technical means to transfer the reputation in some
kind of universally agreed-upon measures).
59
• Minimising the Security risks of losing a password because the passwords are
not shared with other websites (a claim that cannot be technically proved),
the providers of OpenID are more kin to protect Users’ Security than others
(another claim that cannot be proved), and if a compromise occurs, you can
simply change your password (which is the same case with other providers).
The newly introduced OpenID Connect protocol is simply a realization of the OpenID
identity authentication on top of the OAuth 2.0 authorization layer [8]. While the
original OpenID 2.0 implements its own encryption and message formats to securely
communicate the authentication process, a cumbersome and error-prone task for many
developers, the OpenID Connect is relying on the OAuth 2.0 layer to accomplish this
task by utilising the widely deployed and accepted TLS protocol. At the moment,
the OpenID Connect Protocol is a final IETF Standard with various implementations
on a plethora of programming languages provided and adopted by many professional
organizations such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft [85]. Despite being a new
protocol, it is estimated that there are over half a billion Users’ accounts that are
ready to be used by OpenID Connect thanks to the major identity providers, such as
Google and Microsoft, adopting it [86].
In Figure 3.7, the main components of the OpenID Connect protocol are illustrated
on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, see Subsection 3.1.7 for more details. The Core
component defines the main authentication process and flows based on OAuth 2.0
while the optional Discovery and Dynamic Client Registration components define how
clients could identify a new OpenID provider and register with them automatically.
The optional Session Management and Form Post Response Mode components aid
the client at handling how to manage the returned parameters and responses from
the OAuth 2.0 protocol [7].
Figure 3.8, illustrates the abstract authentication flow that is executed by the OpenID
Connect Protocol. In this Figure, the End-User wishes to get a service from a Service
Provider that is called a Relying Party, RP. To allow the End-User to access the
service provided by the RP, the RP forwards the End-User to the webpage of its
OpenID Connect identity provider, OP, to authenticate itself. Once the End-User
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Figure 3.7: A General Protocol Suite of the OpenID Connect [7]
Figure 3.8: An Abstract Authentication Flow of OpenID Connect Protocol [8]
authenticates itself, possibly by using a pair of username/password, it would authorize
the RP to access a set of its Credentials, such as username and date of birth. The
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Op would then send an id token, and possibly an access token as well, to the RP who
could then use it to ask the OP for the End-User’s Credentials whenever needed [8].
Despite the novel solutions provided by the OpenID Connect protocol, it does have
some Security and Privacy loopholes that needs addressing. Per Mainka et al., the
automation of the OpenID host discovery and the subsequent client registration in-
troduced in this product opens the door for a set of second-order vulnerabilities.
Such vulnerabilities include, for example, malicious clients tricking innocent Users
to authenticate themselves through genuine OpenID providers and, then, hijack the
returned access tokens allowing the attackers to gain confidential Users’ information
[87]. The Security issues are not limited to the protocol’s design itself but also extends
to the implementations as well. Li and Mitchell studied 103 OpenID Connect clients
that support the Google’s implementation of the protocol and revealed a set of critical
Security issues. These issues are caused by deficiencies in Google’s implementation
as well as the way how the clients are configured to communicate with Google and
consume its returned tokens [86]. What we also note is the fact that the OP is always
assumed to be Trusted and, hence, there are no rules to enforce encrypting the End-
Users’ Credentials while stored in the OP servers as well as rules facilitating how such
encrypted Credentials would be decrypted by the RP once it is authorized to access
them.
3.1.9 Shibboleth
Shibboleth is a federation Single Sign On, or simply SSO, project that enables inter-
organisations authentication [58]. This Framework is widely deployed, mainly by
higher education institutions due to the support of the JISC advanced institution.
Further, it is completely open source released under the Apache Software License
[58].
Basically, Shibboleth works by forming a federation of institutions that Trust each
other. Then, the participating parties would agree to accept identity tokens from each
other proving the identity of their Users without necessarily revealing their whole set
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of attributes. Then, when a User of one institution tries to access a restricted resource
by another institution that is part of the federation, Shibboleth would basically ask
the User to select her ID provider from a given list. Then, Shibboleth enables trans-
ferring the required User’s attributes from the ID provider to the Service Provider
with the option to set attributes exchange policies. Finally, instead of updating the
communication metaData among all the participant parties in the federation, the fed-
eration would contain a metaData central file that would be updated periodically by
each participant [58].
Technically speaking, per Cantor et al., all the messages exchanges are done via en-
crypted SSL/TLS channels. Moreover, it is recommended for identity providers to
sign their messages to mitigate the risk of rouge ID providers’ attacks. In addition,
the target parameter in the authentication request should be anonymised, by having a
static value and, then, tracking the real target by means of state value for example, so
that the ID provider do not get extra information about the activities of the ID owner.
Finally, if the Users’ Privacy is to be considered, it is recommended that a transient
ID should be used and that ID should not be used twice to prevent linkability [88].
The apparent problem of Shibboleth is in the fact that it is institutional-centric rather
than User-centric [89]. That is because the maintenance of the User authority is not
lifelong; once a User is not affiliated with an organisation anymore, he cannot be
authenticated to control his generated Data [89]. Moreover, all the involved parties,
Service Providers and ID providers, should engage in pre-negotiations to create fed-
erations that support the SSO feature which makes it hard for small institution or
individual Service Providers or un-affiliated Users with formal organisations to utilize
this solution [89]. Another shortcoming of Shibboleth is the lack of Data access rights
management after the owner release his Data to the Service Provider. In addition,
there are no guarantees against colluding parties among a federation that leaks their
Users Data to each other. The worst-case scenario for a User is to get affiliated with
a whole corrupted federation where there would be no technical guarantees that his
Privacy would be ever respected.
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3.1.10 Kerberos
Per Neuman and Tso, Kerberos is a distributed authentication protocol that enables
a client to identify its identity to a verifier without exposing confidential Data for
the Network eavesdroppers, by means of cryptography [55]. Data integrity and con-
fidentiality are optional features of Kerberos protocol. Kerberos website states that
Kerberos is ”the most widely deployed system for authentication and authorization
in modern computer Networks [90].”
The adopted authentication mechanism by Kerberos is the cryptographic authentica-
tion approach in contrast to the inconvenient password approach and the less secure
assertion by a Trusted third-party approach [55]. Moreover, Kerberos work by having
the Users registering a password, User key, in the authentication servers’, or simply
AS, DB by means of physically going and registering or possibly by means of asym-
metric encryption. Then, if the User wishes to access a resource in a service server, or
simply SS, it should send a request to the authentication service, a Trusted party by
all the nodes in the system, who would issue a timestamped Ticket-Granting-Ticket,
or simply TGT. Note here that the time stamp is to prevent an interceptor from break-
ing it, a lengthy process, and then impersonating the original client. The timestamp
would then be hashed by a common secret between the AS and the SS to prevent the
client from tampering with it and, hence, preserving the ticket integrity. If the same
client wishes to access another SS, he can just send his request to the AS along with
his TGT to get a new session key without the need to use the login Credentials again,
in accordance with the Single-Sign-On principle. Once the verification between the
client and the server is done, a secure communication channel can be established using
the session key, to initiate symmetric cryptography channel, to exchange Data in an
integral and confidential manner. However, any software that wishes to use Kerberos
need to be Kerborised, which is basically some modifications and upgrades to make
it understand and use the Kerberos protocol.
Per Neuman and Tso [55], the main drawbacks of Kerberos V5, the standard Kerberos
which was initialy developed in 1989, are:
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• Ineffective against password guessing attacks, in case Users choose poor pass-
words.
• A Trusted path to enter the password is required, in other words, the password
should not be entered to a malicious software by the User.
• Kerberos is not standalone, it should be integrated with other parts of the
system, like the OS for example.
• Kerberos does not offer protection for the entire communication between two
nodes in the Networks, it only protects Data exchanges between software that
have been modified to incorporate Kerberos.
• Kerberos is not an authorisation software but it can be used to transmit autho-
risation Data, in other words, a building block for authorisation systems.
3.2 Evaluating the Current Trust Management Frameworks
In this Section, we present extensive tabular comparison of the picked sample Frame-
works in Section 3.1 based on how they fulfil the Trust Requirements presented in
Section 2.5 as well as the Trust Measures they incorporate from the Trust Measures
Spectrum of Section 2.8.
3.2.1 The Trust Enforcement Properties and Attributes Supported by
Current Trust Frameworks
In this Subsection, we compare the evaluated Trust Frameworks in terms of how they
provide the Properties of the Trust Enforcement Requirement that we present in Sec-
tion 2.6 as well as in Figure 2.2. The results of our comparisons are tabulated in Table
3.1. When it comes to the Trust Security Property, the leftmost group of columns
in Table 3.1, we notice that all the Trust Frameworks provide some sort of Secure
Communication Channels given its vital role to transfer sensitive Data among the
Trust Stakeholders. Further, all the evaluated Trust Frameworks also provide some
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sort of an Authentication Layer although the complexity of this layer would vary from
basic access control like in the case of Kerberos to very advanced Authentication like
in case of OpenID Connect. In addition, most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks are
flexible enough to accommodate some of the currently available Security solutions and
plugins. In fact, many of the Frameworks manuals ask the implementers to choose
of the shelve solutions for certain modules of their architectures instead of provid-
ing a ready to deploy implementation, see Section 3.1. The exception here are the
more specific and mature Trust Frameworks: Shibboleth, Kerberos, and PrimeLife.
Finally, all the evaluated Trust Frameworks are open source, which would facilitate
independent code check for integrity assurance.
When it comes to the Trust Privacy Property, the centre group of columns in
Table 3.1, we compare the Anonymity and Pseudoanonymity Privacy Attributes in
one column due to their strong relation and the fact that most of the evaluated Trust
Frameworks provide some sort of both Trust Attributes. We compare the Continuous
Data Control Attribute in two columns: Data Control Prior Release and Data Control
After Release. The reason for creating these two Sub Attributes is the fact that
most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks provide good measures to control the Trust
Stakeholders Data prior to releasing them to other parties but they fail to enforce any
control after release which make the Continuous Data Control Attribute unfulfilled.
The conceptual solutions provided by TCG and UCON are the only Trust Frameworks
that have some sort of Data Control After Release. The problem with TCG is the
immaturity of the TSS layer where it still can’t attest or capture a lot of relevant
Data. More research is needed to get a fully reliable Trust Framework that can
provide Continuous Data Control based on the TCG roots of Trust, see Subsection
3.1.1. In contrast, the current direction in realising the UCON conceptual model to
provide Continuous Data Control is to utilize TCG solutions with all its inherited
issues, see Subsection 3.1.2.
When it comes to the Legal Authorities Trust Property, the rightmost group of
columns in Table 3.1, we notice that most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks support
the Active Authorities Access Attribute in theory. In practice, it is up to the Trust
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Frameworks’ managers to decide whether to offer this Trust Attribute as well as the
Legal Authorities themselves to decide whether to get active and utilize this Trust
Attribute. In addition, we see that most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks cannot
fully offer the Data Handling Laws Attribute or the Digital Rights Managements
Attribute since the lack of the Data Control After Release Attribute. Even the TCG
and UCON Trust Frameworks which offer some sort of these Trust Attributes are of
limited reliability as we discuss in Subsection 3.2.2. Of course, the legislator should
understand the current state of the art where implementing this Trust Attribute is not
technically possible yet in most of the scenarios. Finally, most of the evaluated Trust
Frameworks appear to be fair competitors in the market except for the Shibboleth
because it favours institutions over individuals who are not unaffiliated with such
institutions.
67
Security Attributes Privacy Attributes Legal Authority Attributes
Framework
/ Protocol
Secure
Commu-
nication
Au-
thenti-
cation
Compatibil-
ity with
Security
Tools
Open
Source
Anonymity
& Pseu-
doanonymity
Data
Control
Prior
Release
Data
Control
After
Release
Active
Legal
Authori-
ties
Data
Handling
Laws
Fair
Competi-
tion
DRM
TCG Yes
TNC
Access
policies
for groups.
Classic
authenti-
cation &
TCG
Security
tokens
Yes
HW/SW
multi-
tier
authenti-
cation
Yes
Open source.
Supports IDS,
VMs, Trusted
HW, Secure
OS, & SW
attestation.
Provides
building blocks
based on other
technologies
Yes Yes Yes
HW/SW
multi-tier
authentica-
tion to
decrypt
Data
Partially
Auto
encryption &
remote
attestation
Possible
By
contract
conditions
Possible
Full Data
control by
auto
encryption
&
attestation
Fair
Possible
unfair
competi-
tion in
absence of
proper
laws
Possi-
ble
Full
Data
control
by auto
encryp-
tion &
attesta-
tion
UCON Possible
Many
prototypes
use
encrypted
containers
Par-
tially
Has an
Authori-
sation
compo-
nent
Yes
Accommodates
existing
Security
solutions
Possi-
ble
No stan-
dardisa-
tion
Possible
Accommodates
anonymity
algorithms
Possible
HW/SW
attestation
like in the
case of
MBA
Partially
HW/SW
attestation
like in the
case of MBA
Possible
By
contract
conditions
Possible
By proper
Enforcement
Fair
Possible
unfair
competi-
tion
without
laws
Yes
HW/SW
attesta-
tion &
water-
mark-
ing
68
Security Attributes Privacy Attributes Legal Authority Attributes
Framework
/ Protocol
Secure
Commu-
nication
Au-
thenti-
cation
Compatibil-
ity with
Security
Tools
Open
Source
Anonymity
& Pseu-
doanonymity
Data
Control
Prior
Release
Data
Control
After
Release
Active
Legal
Authori-
ties
Data
Handling
Laws
Fair
Competi-
tion
DRM
TAS3 Yes
Using
encryption
controlled
PEP &
PDP
Yes Yes
Accommodates
existing
Security
solutions
Yes Yes Yes
By Sticky
Policies
Partially
Auditing
engine to
rank Trust-
worthiness
Possible
By
contract
conditions
Partially
Design
principles
based on
laws but no
after release
protection
Good
Open
source.
Could be
built over
& co-exist
with other
solutions
No
PrimeLife -
PPL
Yes
Using
encryption
Yes Yes
An access
control layer
independent of
lower layers
Yes Yes Yes
Restricted
access to
authorised
nodes
No Possible
By
contract
conditions
Partially
Data min-
imisation &
generic
Privacy
legal
principles
compliance
but no after
release
protection
Good
Open
source &
no
tying-up
with a
service
provider
could be
inferred
No
69
Security Attributes Privacy Attributes Legal Authority Attributes
Framework
/ Protocol
Secure
Commu-
nication
Au-
thenti-
cation
Compatibil-
ity with
Security
Tools
Open
Source
Anonymity
& Pseu-
doanonymity
Data
Control
Prior
Release
Data
Control
After
Release
Active
Legal
Authori-
ties
Data
Handling
Laws
Fair
Competi-
tion
DRM
ABC4Trust
(PrimeLife
Sequel)
Yes
Using
encryption
Yes Yes
A high-level ID
MGT
independent of
lower layers
Yes Yes Partially
Encryption,
revocation
for IDs but
not Data
raising
linkability
risk
Partially
Possible to
revoke usage
of
Credentials.
But no
control over
consumed
Data
Possible
By issuers
allowing
Authori-
ties to
decrypt &
de-
anonymise
Creden-
tials
Partially
Supports
EU Data
minimisa-
tion Act
plus utilities
to enforce
stricter
future law
Good
Open
source &
could be
built over
& co-exist
with other
technolo-
gies
No
UMA Yes
Handling
protected
resources
on
different
servers
Yes Yes
Focused on
Web 2.0
No Possible
Tailoring
access for
providers to
partial profiles
Yes
Using
access
control
policies
No Partially
Access
policies
may
conform
with laws
Possible
By contract
conditions
but, no after
release
protection
Good
Most
implemen-
tations
open
source
No
70
Security Attributes Privacy Attributes Legal Authority Attributes
Framework
/ Protocol
Secure
Commu-
nication
Au-
thenti-
cation
Compatibil-
ity with
Security
Tools
Open
Source
Anonymity
& Pseu-
doanonymity
Data
Control
Prior
Release
Data
Control
After
Release
Active
Legal
Authori-
ties
Data
Handling
Laws
Fair
Competi-
tion
DRM
OAuth 2.0 Yes
TLS
secure
messaging
Par-
tially
An
Authori-
sation
layer to
support
Authen-
tication
systems
Yes
Accommodates
different ways
of
authenticating
and proving
IDs
Yes Partially
Anonymity if
providers don’t
need ID. But
no protection
against
colluding
parties
Partially
Authorised
content
release.
But, no
guarantees
against
colluding
parties
Partially
Authorisation
server can
revoke access
but no
guarantees
against
colluding
parties
Possible
By
contract
conditions
No
No minimal
processing,
guarantees
against
colluding
parties, or
after release
protection
Good
Open
source
No
OpenID
Connect
Yes
TLS
secure
messaging
Yes Yes
Accommodates
different ways
of
authenticating
and proving
IDs
Yes Partially
Anonymity if
providers don’t
need ID but no
protection
against
colluding
parties
Partially
No Data
transfer
without
User’s
consent
but, no
guarantees
against
colluding
parties
No Possible
By
contract
conditions
No
No minimal
processing,
guarantees
against
colluding
parties, or
after release
protection
Good
Open
source
No
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Security Attributes Privacy Attributes Legal Authority Attributes
Framework
/ Protocol
Secure
Commu-
nication
Au-
thenti-
cation
Compatibil-
ity with
Security
Tools
Open
Source
Anonymity
& Pseu-
doanonymity
Data
Control
Prior
Release
Data
Control
After
Release
Active
Legal
Authori-
ties
Data
Handling
Laws
Fair
Competi-
tion
DRM
Shibboleth Yes
SSL/TLS
channels
Yes No Yes Yes
Offers
Transient
identity if
Privacy
required
Partially
Only
allowed
access
without
colluding
federated
parties
protection
No Possible
By
contract
conditions
protection
Partially
Supports
EU principle
of necessary
processing
by proper
policies but
no after
release
protection
Limited
Favours
institu-
tions over
ordinary
Users who
are not
affiliated
with them
No
Kerberos Yes
Symmetric
authenti-
cation
using
Trusted
third-
party
Par-
tially
Basic
access
control
No Yes No Partially
Secure
channels &
basic
access
control
No No
Can’t
support
laws by its
own
No
Can’t
support
laws by its
own
Good
Open
source
No
Table 3.1: Comparing the Trust Enforcement Attributes of Figure 2.2 Supported by Current Trust Frameworks
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3.2.2 The Trust Flexibility Properties and Attributes Supported by
Current Trust Frameworks
In this Subsection, we compare the evaluated Trust Frameworks in terms of how they
provide the Properties of the Trust Flexibility Requirement that we present in Section
2.7 as well as in Figure 2.2. The results of our comparisons are tabulated in Table
3.2. When it comes to the Trust Practicality Property, the leftmost group of
columns in Table 3.2, we notice that most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks offer a
fair amount of the Documentation and Support Attribute to help potential developers
and deployers getting start. Moreover, most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks are
active projects except for the TAS3, PrimeLife, and ABC4Trust academic projects
which have already terminated. The same could be said about the Deployment At-
tribute: all the evaluated Trust Frameworks are already deployed except for the three
academic projects which have only some sort of pilot projects that have been partially
deployed for experiments. Finally, most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks have se-
rious reliability issues. The exceptions were the more mature and specialised projects
that focus on a partial set of the Digital Trust issue. Those Frameworks are OAuth
2.0, OpenID Connect, Shiboleth, and Kerberos.
When it comes to the Trust Customizability Property, the rightmost group of
columns in Table 3.2, we notice that the Data Classification Attribute is left to the
Users to establish themselves by setting suitable access policies for their Data. Further,
most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks are neutral and could offer some sort of the
Negotiation Attribute as external layers integrated on top of them. Finally, most of
the evaluated Trust Frameworks offered some sort of the Delegation Attribute with
the exception of the UCON and Kerberos Trust Frameworks.
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Practicality Attributes Customizability Attributes
Project /
Framework
Documentation &
Support
Active De-
velopment?
Deployed? Reliability Data
Classification
Negotiation Delegation
TCG Good
Available Guides &
ready to use
applications
Yes Partially
TPM, TSS,
TNC, and
MTM
specifications
Limited
Issues with attestation.
Plus, basing roots of
Trust on the condition of
OS integrity isn’t enough
Yes
TNC aid
tailoring access
policies for
different groups
No Possible
TNC & TSS could
aid Authentication
layer with
delegation
UCON Limited
No official umbrella -
scattered research in
many papers
N/A
No official
research
umbrella
Partially
Many
prototypes in
the literature
Limited
No real-life
implementation that
could be analysed or a
standardisation umbrella
Possible
By setting
appropriate
policies
Yes
The main model &
some prototypes
support negotiation
No
UCON is about
protecting access
to Data not about
Identity MGT
TAS3 Limited
Various guidelines are
provided but, the
documents are hard to
follow since many
parts are incomplete
No
Finished on
2011
Partially
ZXID engine
as a reference
implementa-
tion of the core
TAS3 Security
Limited
Still at prototype level
without any sort of
support
Possible
Using Sticky
Policies
Yes Yes
PrimeLife
- PPL
Good
Full book summarising
project results
No
Finished on
2011
Partially
Some
prototypes
available as
Open Source
Limited
Still at prototype level
without any sort of
support
Yes
Using PPL
access policies
Possible
Policy engine that
could accommodate
negotiation modules
Yes
ABC4Trust
(PrimeLife
Sequel)
Fair
Good documentation
along with video
tutorials. But, no
reference
implementations
No
Finished on
2014
Partially
Pilot
prototypes
Limited
Still at prototype level
without any sort of
support
Yes
By setting
appropriate
access policies
Possible
Issuers set
conditions &
providers set
policies for external
Negotiation modules
Yes
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Practicality Attributes Customizability Attributes
Project /
Framework
Documentation &
Support
Active De-
velopment?
Deployed? Reliability Data
Classification
Negotiation Delegation
UMA Good
Easy to access
documentation and
FAQ
Yes Yes
Three imple-
mentations:
SMARTAM,
Fraunhofer
AISEC, and
UMA to TAS3
Fair
Still in beta but the
SMARTAM is up to date
implementation of the
standard and the Cloud
Identity Ltd. provides
UMA support
Yes
By setting
appropriate
access policies
No Yes
OAuth 2.0 Fair
Specifications & threat
model but, no de-facto
implementation or
guidelines yet
Yes Yes
By large
corporations
like Facebook
Good
Widely deployed &
supported protocol
Yes
By setting
appropriate
access policies
Possible
Possible to enforce
pre-negotiated terms
Yes
OpenID
Connect
Good
Plugins for popular
environments plus
libraries of sample
code and specifications
Yes Yes
Over 500M
enabled Users’
accounts
Good
Widely deployed &
supported protocol
Yes
By choosing
what personal
attributes could
be shared with
service providers
No Yes
Shibboleth Good
Documentations for
both developers &
deployers
Yes Yes
Mainly by high
education
providers
Good
Research efforts are not
deployed until getting
stable
Yes
By setting
appropriate
access policies
Possible
By setting
attributes exchange
policies
Yes
Kerberos Good
Documentations
tailored for different
interest groups
Yes Yes Good
Widely deployed and
stable
No No No
Table 3.2: Comparing the Trust Flexibility Attributes of Figure 2.2 Supported by Current Trust Frameworks
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3.2.3 Current Trust Frameworks on the Trust Measures Spectrum
In this Subsection, we compare the sample Trust Frameworks we picked in Section
3.1 in terms of the Trust Measures Levels they deploy out of the Trust Measures
Spectrum we describe in Section 2.8 as well as in Figure 2.3. The results of our
comparisons are tabulated in Table 3.3. When it comes to the weakest Trust Measure
Level, Cues and Clues of the second column in Table 3.3, most of the evaluated Trust
Frameworks got good ranking. That is due to the support those projects are getting
from the big players in the market like Microsoft, Intel, and Facebook to name a few.
Moreover, most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks utilize some sort of the Policies
and Contract Trust Measure, as shown in the third column of Table 3.3. Regarding the
Standardisation and Certification Trust Measure, of the fourth column of Table 3.3, all
of the evaluated Trust Frameworks have some form of standardisation except for the
three academic projects. In addition, it is noted that the Reputation Management
Trust Measure, of the fifth column of Table 3.3, is underutilized by the evaluated
Trust Frameworks. When it comes to the Access Control Trust Measure, of the sixth
column of Table 3.3, all of the evaluated Trust Frameworks supported some sort of
Enforcement methods. In regards to establishing Trust by the Identity Management
Trust Measure, as shown in the seventh column of Table 3.3, most of the evaluated
Trust Frameworks utilize some sort of it or, at least, serves as building blocks for
such systems. Finally, most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks failed at utilising the
Hard Verification Trust Measure, as shown in the last column of Table 3.3. That is,
a minority of the evaluated Trust Frameworks support Continuous Data Control but
with limited reliability as we discuss in Subsection 3.2.2.
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Project /
Framework
Cues &
Clues
Policies &
Contracts
Stan-
dardisa-
tion &
Certifi-
cation
Reputation
System
Access Control Identity
Management
Hard
Verification
TCG Yes Yes
Uses HW
verification,
remote
attestation &
Network level
policies
Yes
ISO
standard
No Yes
Uses HW
verification,
remote
attestation, TNC
& Network level
policies
Yes Yes
Uses HW
verification,
remote attestation,
& Network level
policies
UCON No
No
standard-
isation
umbrella
Yes
By means of
Sticky Policies
No Possible
The MBA
realisation ranks
Trustworthiness
of Users based on
behaviours
Yes
Access policies
enforced using
reference
monitors
Partially
Utilities to protect
Users’ attributes
but isn’t mainly
concerned with
managing Users’
Data
Possible
The MBA
realisation depends
on HW roots of
Trust like TPM
attestation
TAS3 Yes Yes
By means of
sticky policies
and a Legal
Trust Framework
No Yes
Reputation Trust
engine to rank
nodes based on
audit trail
Yes
By means of
Sticky Policies
Enforcement
before release
Yes No
PrimeLife -
PPL
Yes Yes
Using PrimeLife
Policy Language
- PPL
No No Yes
Using PPL
engine to enforce
access control
rules
Possible
A building block for
Privacy-preserving
access control
system
No
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Project /
Framework
Cues &
Clues
Policies &
Contracts
Stan-
dardisa-
tion &
Certifi-
cation
Reputation
System
Access Control Identity
Management
Hard
Verification
ABC4Trust
(PrimeLife
Sequel)
Yes Yes
Both client and
Service provider
can set their own
access policies
No No Yes
Using access
policies,
encryption, and
revocation
authorities
Yes
Privacy-preserving
ID MGT layer over
other
authentication
Frameworks
Yes - Creds.
only
By access policies,
encryption, and
revocation
authorities
UMA Yes Yes
Users specified
access control
policies
Yes
IETF
Standard
Possible
Possible to
require a
reputation
certificate
Yes
By deploying
OAuth 2.0 to
control access
Yes No
OAuth 2.0 Yes Partially
Only
pre-negotiated
contracts
Yes
IETF
Standard
No Yes
By authorisation
tokens with
variable Security
measures
Partially
Relies on IDPs to
authenticate Users
No
OpenID
Connect
Yes No Yes
IETF
Standard
Possible
Service Providers
could require
User’s claims
coming from
Trusted IDP
and/or reputation
certificates
Yes
Deploys
authentication
layer on top of
OAuth 2.0
Yes
Users can
authenticate
themselves by using
one ID from a
Trusted IDP
Partially -
Creds. only
Tamper-resistant
proofs but no
guarantees against
malicious IDPs
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Project /
Framework
Cues &
Clues
Policies &
Contracts
Stan-
dardisa-
tion &
Certifi-
cation
Reputation
System
Access Control Identity
Management
Hard
Verification
Shibboleth Yes Yes
Attributes
exchange policies
Yes
Based on
SAML
standard
No Yes
SSL/TLS to
enforce SAML
policies
Yes No
Kerberos Yes Partially
Trivial access
policies
Yes
IETF
proposed
standard
No Yes
Trivial access
policies
Possible
External plugins
could be coded
Yes
Symmetric
authentication
using Trusted
party
Table 3.3: Themes Comparison of the Evaluated Trust Frameworks
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3.2.4 Other Relevant Projects and Frameworks
Since the Trust term in computer science is very broad, it is unrealistic to compre-
hensively cover all the relevant projects and Frameworks to it. This Subsection lists
some relevant projects and Frameworks for reference of any interested researcher.
These projects are organised in four different categories: industry/standard bodies
led projects, academic projects, deployed authentication and authorisation solutions,
and governmental initiatives. Each project or Framework is tagged by the resources
it protects and the fields of computing it covers.
Unevaluated Industry / Standard Bodies Led Projects
Project /
Framework
Brief Description Protected Re-
sources
Covered Fields
TCG The Trusted Computing Group, TCG, aims to
develop open standards to tackle the computing
Trust issues by, mainly, rooting all the Trust chains
to a Trusted hardware chip, called TPM, that has
many built-in Security features like storing sensi-
tive Data and generating secret keys [64]
Generic Generic
TCG: MTM The Mobile Trusted Module, MTM, is the sibling
of the TPM for the mobile industry [91]
ID Mobile
TCG: TNC The Trusted Network Connect protocol, TNC, is
an access management standard for Networks [92]
Generic Client/Server
80
Unevaluated Industry / Standard Bodies Led Projects
Project /
Framework
Brief Description Protected Re-
sources
Covered Fields
Common Cri-
teria
An international ISO standard that sets common
Security evaluation measures to generate different
levels of Security certificates [71]. Such certificate
would, in turn, give some Trust to the evaluated
product.
Generic Generic
Central Au-
thentication
Service (CAS)
A Single Sign-On protocol that was originated in
Yale University 2004 [93]
ID Client/Server
Higgins 2.0 A cloud-based Framework to protect personal
Data sets [94]
Generic Cloud
OASIS A non-profit standardisation body to develop open
standards to handle online information in many
areas including web services and cloud computing
[49]
Generic Generic
OASIS: WS-
Trust
A protocol to establish Trust relationships by issu-
ing, asserting, and managing Credentials exchange
on top of a secure communication channel estab-
lished by the WS-security protocol [95]
ID WS
OASIS: SAML A protocol to exchange authentication and autho-
risation information between client and identity
providers which help in establishing SSO [96]
ID Generic
OASIS:
XACML
An access control policy language that defines how
to enforce authorisation rules using XML syntax
[97]
Generic Generic
Table 3.4: Other Industry/Standard Bodies Led Projects
Unevaluated Academic Projects
Project / Frame-
work
Brief Description Protected
Resources
Covered Fields
PrimeLife A EU funded project that lasted from March
2008 until October 2011 [98]. The goal of the
PrimeLife project is to correspond to the new
Privacy challenges that are posed by the emerg-
ing web of online social communities, mashup
applications, and lifelong storage with nearly un-
limited storage capacity [57]
Generic WS; Clien-
t/Server;
Social Net-
works
PrimeLife: Clique a Privacy enhanced social Network where Users
define who has the right to see every single entry
[99]
Data Client/Server;
Social Net-
works
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Unevaluated Academic Projects
Project / Frame-
work
Brief Description Protected
Resources
Covered Fields
PrimeLife: Scram-
ble!
A tool providing audience segregation by encryp-
tion by means of implementing a Firefox exten-
sion that decrypt any piece of published Data if
and only if the publisher has given permission to
the other end to read the entry [99]
Data Client/Server;
Social Net-
works
PrimeLife: Per-
sonal Data MOD
An extension to the phpBB forum that reminds
the User of his actions that are visible to other
audience groups (registered, moderators, owner,
everyone) [99]
Data Client/Server;
Social Net-
works
PrimeLife: Pri-
vacy Enhancing
Selective Ac-
cess Control for
Forums
A tool that enables a User to set more fine-
grained access control policies for his individual
entries [99]
Data Client/Server;
Social Net-
works
PrimeLife: Du-
dle - Privacy-
enhanced Web 2.0
Event Scheduling
A tool that enables social Network Users to cre-
ate anonymous polls [99]
Data Client/Server;
Social Net-
works
PrimeLife: The
Privacy Dash-
board
A Firefox extension that shows to the User what
are some of the Service Providers do with his
Data (like lasting cookies, third-party content,
flash cookies, usage of p3p policies,...). Plus,
it enables the User to restrict givining/receiving
Data for certain websites or content that utilize
some of the predefined practices [99]
Data Client/Server;
Social Net-
works
PrimeLife: Over-
Encrypt
A tool that stores encrypted Data in untrusted
Databases while showing it to a selected group of
Users via the use of client-side Firefox extensions
[99]
Data Client/Server
PrimeLife: Pri-
Views
A Data fragmentation tool that stores most of
the Data in an outsourced untrusted server while
retaining the small fragments that contains the
values or the part that makes the large set mean-
ing full in the owners computer. This has the
advantage of not using encryption which slows
down the progress and makes it more expensive
[99]
Data Client/Server
PrimeLife: Iden-
tity Mixer Crypto
Library
A Java library that enables a User to create Cre-
dentials and prove ownership of them to enable
deploying applications that offer pseudonymity
[99]
ID Client/Server;
Social Net-
works
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Unevaluated Academic Projects
Project / Frame-
work
Brief Description Protected
Resources
Covered Fields
PrimeLife: PET-
Uses
A usability questionnaire to enable flexible mea-
surement of a given Privacy Framework in terms
of its general usability and how the software aids
the Users’ understanding and management of
Privacy aspects [100]
Generic Generic
PICOS A EU funded project to develop technologies that
enhance Privacy for mobile communities which
lasted from 2008 until 2011 [101]
Generic Mobile
SSEDIC A EU funded project to create a thematic Net-
works for the European eID and is scheduled to
last from 2010 until 2013 [102]
ID Generic
ICT-Endorse A EU funded project, which lasted from 2010 un-
til 2013, to prepare a legal technical framework
for data privacy management. One of the main
goals of the project is to develop an open source
toolkit to guarantee that personal Data are be-
ing handled in legally compliant manner. The
other goal is to generate a certification method-
ology to better evaluate the Trustworthiness of
ICT products with respect to Privacy and Data
protection [103]
Generic Generic
Table 3.5: Other Academic Projects
Unevaluated Deployed Authentication and Authorisation Solutions
Project / Frame-
work
Brief Description Protected
Resources
Covered Fields
CoSign: Secure,
Intra-Institutional
Web Authentica-
tion
An open source project originally designed to
provide the University of Michigan with a secure
single sign-on web authentication system. cosign
is part of the National Science Foundation Mid-
dleware Initiative (NMI) [104]
ID Generic
Stanford WebAuth WebAuth is an authentication system for web
pages and web applications [105]
ID Generic
Facebook Platform A complete platform that offers ID login, graph
access, and other FB functionalities for mobile
and web developers [106]
Generic Generic
Flickr Authentica-
tion API
Authentication API using Flicker [107] ID Generic
83
Unevaluated Deployed Authentication and Authorisation Solutions
Project / Frame-
work
Brief Description Protected
Resources
Covered Fields
Google Accounts
Authentication
and Authorization
Authentication and authorisation API using
Oauth 2.0 to access Google accounts [108]
Generic Generic
Authentication and
Authorization with
Yahoo
A set of APIs to authenticate using OpenID, au-
thorise using OAuth 2.0, or doing both opera-
tions at once using a hybrid protocol. Single sign
on is also provided using BBAuth [109]
Generic Generic
U-Prove An unlikable and Privacy preserving partial ID
code by Microsoft [110]
ID Client/Server
OpenAM An authorisation and authentication manage-
ment Framework that establishes SSO [111]
ID Client/Server
Table 3.6: Other Deployed Authentication and Authorisation Solutions
Unevaluated Governmental Initiatives
Project /
Framework
Brief Description Protected Re-
sources
Covered Fields
FICAM Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Manage-
ment: A guide for the US official agencies to man-
age clients’ Credentials [112]
ID Generic
Future ID A project to create an identity management in-
frastructure that is scalable, flexible, and preserve
Privacy for Europe by combining the existing eID
technology with other federated identity manage-
ment and other Trust Management solutions [113]
ID Generic
Table 3.7: Other Governmental Initiatives
3.3 Strengths of the Current Trust Management Frameworks
In this Section, we highlight the strengths and advantages of the evaluated Trust
Frameworks of Section 3.2. This is important so that new Trust Frameworks could
try to utilize the well designed and implemented software components, or even con-
cepts, offered by those evaluated Trust Frameworks instead of reinventing the wheel,
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specially that most components of the evaluated Trust Frameworks are open-source.
Particularly speaking, the evaluated Trust Frameworks did a great job in implement-
ing the Trust Security Property as well as most of the Trust Privacy Attributes with
fair enough addressing of the Trust Practicality Attributes.
3.3.1 Strong emphasis on Security Attributes
Given that proper system-security acts as the gate-keeper for any Trust Framework,
addressing the continuously arising Security issues is well handled by many computing
researchers, specially those designing and developing Trust Frameworks, see Subsec-
tion 2.6.1. For that, the evaluated Trust Frameworks are doing an excellent job at
implementing the Trust Security Property. That is, most of them offer some sort of
secure communication channels and basic authentication. Even if new Security issues
emerge, the evaluated Trust Frameworks are flexible enough to be compatible with
external Security tools, many of them already utilize of the shelve components such us
TLS secure communication protocol. In fact, most of the software components of the
evaluated Trust Frameworks are open source which makes it easier to accommodate
cutting-edge solutions for future Security issues.
3.3.2 Good realisation of the Privacy Attributes - except for the After
Release Data Protection
Given the increased concern for Privacy, this vital Trust Property is getting more
attention from computing researchers, see Subsection 2.6.2. This attention can be
observed by noting that most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks offer some sort of
User Anonymity or Pseudoanonymity, as well as some sort of Data control prior to the
Data release. In particular, the Trust Frameworks that are concerned about Identity
Management (TAS3, PrimeLife, ABC4Trust, OpenID Connect, and UMA) are the
best on these aspects. The Trust Frameworks that offer an Identity Provider, IDP,
are designed to support the Anonymity and Pseduoanonymity Privacy Attributes as
well as to make it possible for the Data owners to control who gets what of their
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Data. Nevertheless, supporting the vital Data Control After Release Trust Attribute
is under-researched as we highlight in Subsection 3.4.1.
3.3.3 Reasonable Practicality Attributes
As expected, despite the wealth of novel and cutting-edge solutions found in the
evaluated academic projects (TAS3, PrimeLife, and ABC4Trust), they do not offer
a good realisation of the Trust Practicality Property. That is expected due to the
limited resources they have. In fact, their task is to give inspiration for new and
creative ideas to be adopted by the big industrial players and the standardisation
bodies.
On the other hand, the standardised Trust Frameworks are offering reasonable reali-
sation of the Trust Practicality Property. That is, they offer fair documentation and
support, they are still undergoing active development, and have some sort of deployed
prototypes. Yet, they are not all equal. TCG, despite being sponsored and developed
by the big players in the industry, is still of limited reliability due to its immaturity.
UMA, OpenID Connect, and OAuth 2.0 Trust Framework are thriving in real-life
and integrating well to offer a futuristic Trust Framework, as we mention in Section
2.8. Furthermore, Shiboleth and Kerberos Trust Frameworks are well-established and
adopted by millions of Users to facilitate federated authentication and basic access
control.
3.4 Weaknesses of the Current Trust Management Frameworks
In this Section, we highlight the weaknesses of the evaluated Trust Frameworks of
Section 3.2. This is important so that new Trust Frameworks should focus on ad-
dressing these shortcomings with novel solutions. The evaluated Trust Frameworks
are severely lacking support for the vital Data Control After Release Attribute which,
in turn, makes it impossible to offer satisfactory realisation of the Legal Authority
Trust Property. Furthermore, while most of the evaluated Trust Frameworks are
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flexible in theory, there is a lack of solid realisations of the Customizability Trust
Property.
3.4.1 Lack of Continuous Data Control
As we mention in Subsection 2.6.2, the Continuous Data Control Privacy Attribute
is about giving the Data owners the power to control who access their own Data and
how they would handle it after they gain access to it. While many of the evaluated
Trust Frameworks come up with solutions to control who could gain access to Users’
Data, there is little done to control how such Data would be handled after its release
to other parties. For that, we divide the Continuous Data Control Attribute to two
separate sub-attributes in our tabular comparisons of Subsection 3.2.1, to give credit
to the Trust Frameworks that have tried to offer the Data Control Prior to Release
while failed to offer significant Data Control After Release.
Even the Trust Frameworks that offered some sort of Data Control After Release are
not of satisfactory level yet. That is, while the TCG Framework offers promising
hardware utilities for attestation and remote rules Enforcement, there is a lack of a
concrete software layer that translates the theoretical powers of attestation to practical
software solutions. In addition, there are various bugs and issues found in the TCG
Framework hardware components, as we mention in Subsection 3.1.1, making solutions
based on the TCG attestation of limited reliability.
When it comes to the UCON Framework, there is the fundamental problem of lacking
a standardisation umbrella, which means that every team could have their very own
interpretation of what a UCON System should do and provide. In fact, the main
focus of the UCON Framework is to offer solid DRM for creative Data owners, more
so than tackling the issue of Data Control After Release. In addition, many UCON
implementations rely on the attestation powers of TCG to offer the DRM Attribute
which make it inherit the above-mentioned TCG limitations. However, we note that
some other novel UCON Data Access Enforcement solutions, such as watermarking,
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could be utilized by a Continuous Trust Management Framework to enforce Data
Handling Laws after release.
The other researched Trust Frameworks offer less significant implementations of the
Data Control After Release Sub-Attribute. The TAS3 Framework includes an Audit-
ing engine to rank the Trustworthiness of the Trust Network Residents, but we could
not find any implementation or design documents associated with this engine to verify
its potential. The ABC4Trust project offers some revocation of access to Credentials
that have been released by Users to Service Providers. That is a good basic Data
Control After Release feature, but it is not enough. Data Control After Release is
not only about enabling Users to revoke access to their release Credentials, but also
about controlling who could access what and for what purpose. Further, this control
should not be associated only with Users’ Credentials but should also be extended to
Users’ generated Data. Finally, we draw similar conclusions for the possible access
revocation offered by the OAuth 2.0 Framework, in that there are no guarantees about
colluding Authorisation Servers that may abuse its access powers.
3.4.2 Lack of solid implementation of the Legal Authorities Attributes
As we mention in Subsection 2.6.3, having an active Legal Authorities Enforcement
is crucial to complement any shortcomings of the deployed technical Trust solutions.
While some of the evaluated Academic Trust Frameworks focus on the legal aspects
of Digital Trust and produced valuable documentations of the relevant laws and how
they could be technically satisfied, this vital Trust Enforcement Property is still under-
utilized. It is possible in theory to give Legal Authorities access to protected Data in
case that is needed, but this is a cumbersome and a controversial task in practice, see
Subsection 2.6.3. Further, the lack of the Data Control After Release Sub-Attribute
does not only limit the level of possible compliance with the Data Handling Laws or
the level of offered DRM but also means losing the chance to log valuable information
regarding who accessed what and when. If such logs are available, they would be
valuable for the Legal Authorities to view and analyse in case of a dispute between a
Data owner and suspected Data breachers.
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3.4.3 Lack of solid implementation of the Customizability Attributes
Despite the fact that it is possible, in theory, to support the Trust Flexibility Cus-
tomizability Attributes, there is little offered in practice apart from the excellent
Delegation Attribute offered by Trust Frameworks like TAS3 and OAuth 2.0. We
could not find solid software components that would aid the Users to easily classify
their Data based on importance or type. Lacking the Data Classification Attribute
along with lacking the Data Control After Release Attribute makes it of less value for
the Trust Stakeholders to negotiate for Data Handling Laws. That is probably the
cause of lacking solid implementations of negotiation software components apart of
the experimental components, offered in the evaluated academic projects.
3.5 Why a Continuous Trust Management Framework and What it Should
Provide?
In Section 2.1, we show that the notion of Digital Trust is a state of mind where the
Trust Stakeholders would engage in transactions with the believe that the other party
is Trustworthy and will do its best to deliver the best service per the negotiated terms.
For that, any Framework claiming to be a Trust Management Framework should make
every possible effort, given the current state of the art of technology, to fulfil the listed
main Trust Requirements in Section 2.5.
In Section 3.4, we mention three main weaknesses in the state of the art Trust Frame-
works. The most critical limitation is the lack of proper Continuous Data Control.
The lack of this control raises the doubt among Data owners about how their Data
would be handled after they release it to other parties which would, in turn, reduce
the level of the perceived Trust by those Data owners. This issue is the most crit-
ical limitation of current Trust Frameworks, also because it is a main cause for the
other two mentioned weaknesses: Lack of solid Implementations of the Legal Author-
ities Attributes and Lack of solid Implementations of the Customizability Attributes.
Therefore, we argue that a Continuous Trust Management Framework is a necessity
as the natural next step to grow the current Trust Framework to their full potential.
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Once this step is taken, it would be easier to strengthen the other weak points we
mention in Section 3.4. To deserve the Continuous prefix, the Trust Management
Framework should pay more attention to the Continuous Data Control Attribute, see
Subsection 2.6.2, during all phases of its Stakeholders’ transactions. That is, before
and after one party releases Data to another party.
Given the limited amount of resources dedicated to a PhD thesis, it is not realis-
tic to implement a full, ready to deploy, Continuous Trust Management Framework.
Rather, our aim is to design a generic Continuous Trust Management Framework
along with implementing a minimal prototype version of it that fulfils the basic Trust
Requirements of Section 2.5. As we mention in Section 2.8, all of the UMA, OpenID
Connect, and OAuth 2.0 Trust Frameworks could be integrated to offer a future Trust
Framework. Such a Trust Framework would rely on OAuth 2.0 to take care of the
Authorisation task, which in turn could rely on well-established protocol like TLS to
establish secure communication, while relying on OpenID Connect to handle Authen-
tication, and UMA to handle the complexities associated with Identity Management.
The combination of these projects offer the best collection of Trust Requirements
along with the more immature TCG, the unstandardized UCON Framework, and the
overly narrow Shibboleth and Kerberos Frameworks. Building on and utilising the
combination of the OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, and UMA would be the natural step
toward implementing our vision for a Continuous Trust Management Framework.
Our Continuous Trust Framework Design along with our minimal prototype are pre-
sented in Chapter 4. The theoretical building blocks for the Auditor component that
we introduce in the Continuous Trust Framework Design to provide the Continu-
ous Data Control are presented in Chapter 5 while the simulation of the Auditor’s
performance is listed in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 4. Designing the Continuous Trust Management
Framework, Prototype, and Problem Demonstration
In Chapter 3, we illustrated why the current Trust Management Frameworks are not
sufficient to satisfy the needs of the Trust Stakeholders and, hence, the need for our
proposed Continuous Trust Management Framework. In Section 4.1, we introduce
the design of our Continuous Trust Management Framework that tries to fulfil the
essential Trust Requirements we identified in Section 2.5. Our design pays special
attention to the Continuous Data Control Privacy Attribute, given as the weakest
point of the current Trust Frameworks in Subsection 3.4.1.
To prove the practicality of our proposed design, we present a sample Prototype in
Section 4.2. This Prototype assumes a simple use-case where the Continuous Trust
Management Framework is mainly concerned with protecting its Users’ emails against
unauthorised sharing, which could be detected through a received spam from an un-
known sender. This Prototype implements the basic functionalities of the Continuous
Framework such as the GUI, authentication, authorisation, Data handling, and Data
logging for policy Enforcement purposes. That is, this Prototype proves the practi-
cality of implementing a secure Continuous Framework to handle Users’ Data and log
the Data transactions just before releasing it to the Service Providers. For the variety
of the Trust Management use-cases that could exist in the real world, we argue in Sec-
tion 4.3 that our sample use-case could be generalised to cover all the other use-cases
relating to Continuous Data Control.
The Data Governance Unit, DGU, is a hypothetical unit providing hardware roots of
Trust as we present in Section 4.4. This hypothetical unit would offer true Continuous
Data Control if adopted by all the Service Providers in the Network. However, the
TCG technologies, which are the best candidates to be the base for our DGU Unit, are
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not mature yet to allow the development of the DGU, see Subsection 3.1.1. Further,
service providers may not be willing to adopt the DGU straight away without natural
resistance to change. For that, we present Auditorial Ranking Algorithms in Chapter
5 to utilize the collected logs by the developed Prototype of this Chapter in order to
detect the Malicious-Data Abusers based on technologies that are available at hand.
That Chapter will also present Algorithms assuming the presence of the DGU Unit
to evaluate whether it would be vital for the proposed Continuous Trust Management
Framework.
4.1 Continuous Trust Management Framework Design
In Section 3.1, we evaluated some of the main Trust Frameworks in the literature to
get a general understanding of the Trust Challenges these Trust Frameworks try to
address. Here, we combine the best practices found in these Trust Frameworks in
addition to what we thought necessary and missing to present a generic Continuous
Trust Framework Design that fulfils the essential Trust Requirements of Section 2.5
with special attention to the Continuous Data Control Privacy Attribute. In Figure
3.1, the evaluated Trust Frameworks are operating within six main layers. Hence,
our Continuous Trust Framework Design consists of components existing within these
six layers. In addition, our Continuous Trust Framework Design includes a vertical
Toolkit layer containing essential utilities to be used by other components residing
in different layers. This Design is illustrated in Figure 4.1 where each yellow box
represents a software building block that can consist of smaller coding modules as
illustrated on the smaller outer boxes. An exception to this rule would be the Hard-
ware Trust layer, which is a mixture of Trusted hardware units and managing coding
blocks. Below we talk about each layer in detail:
• Hardware Trust: This layer contains the Hardware Roots of Trust. All the
Trust that would be built up in this Design would be compromised if this layer
fails. Unlike the rest of the layers, some of the functional components in this layer
are assumed to be implemented in hardware chips like the TPM, see Subsection
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Figure 4.1: Continuous Trust Framework Design
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3.1.1. The featured components include a Virtualization Engine to facilitate in
dividing the stored Data in different environments depending on their Security
requirements. Another component is an Integrity Management unit which de-
pends on Remote Attestation and Status Signalling units that are built on the
hardware chips. This Integrity Management unit should be able to make sure
that the deployed version of the Continuous Framework software is not altered
or compromised. An important software building block that operates on top of
the hardware roots of Trust is the DGU Unit. This unit would act as a gover-
nance unit observing all the Data going in and out the server-side of the Service
Provider installing it to prevent any Data handling that is unauthorised by the
Data owner. See Section 4.4.
• Secure Communication: This is the first Network level layer that is con-
cerned with creating secure communication channels. It contains Encrypted
Communication Channels like Kerberos, see Subsection 3.1.10. Further, there
should be several APIs to Legacy Systems to communicate with our Continuous
Framework.
• Authentication: The main authentication building blocks are in this layer. It
contains an ID Providers Directory like Shibboleth, see Subsection 3.1.9, as well
as a Credentials Matching unit that verifies the identity of the entity trying to
Authenticate itself.
• Authorisation: This important layer operates after the authentication process
success. It is responsible for enforcing the Data associated access rules, Sticky
Policies, through the Sticky Policy Management unit. This unit evaluates access
requests against the attached Sticky Policies and, if the request is approved, the
Token Granting unit would generate a token enabling the requester to obtain
the Data through the identity management layer in a similar fashion to how
OAuth 2.0 or Kerberos, for example, would work, see Subsections 3.1.7 and
3.1.10. The Revocation Authority unit would enable the Data owner to get full
control over her Data or Credentials by revoking a previously granted access
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token in a similar manner to how ABC4Trust Framework works, see Subsection
3.1.5.
• Identity Management: This layer utilizes the layers underneath it to man-
age each User profile. It has a Delegation Engine to grant access authorities to
other Users or applications in a similar manner to TAS3, see Subsection 3.1.3,
or UMA, see Subsection 3.1.6. There are also an anonymization engine, to pre-
vent linking specific Data to specific Users, and a pseudonymity management
unit, to help Users to create partial personal profiles that are suitable for cer-
tain online contexts. These two units are inspired by the work found in the
TAS3 and PrimeLife, see Subsections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 projects. There is also a
Data Management unit that consists of many building blocks. These building
blocks include a Policy Attachment unit, a Data Classifier based on the owner
preferences, a Data Storage Engine, and a Legal Conformance Checker to check
whether a certain policy adheres to certain laws or not. The Storage Unit stores
the encrypted Users’ Credentials and Data sets. It would not decrypt and re-
lease any Credential or Data sets unless for a bearer of a valid access token in
a similar manner to the OAuth 2.0 protocol, see Subsection 3.1.7. While most
of the previous units appear in other projects like TAS3, see Subsection 3.1.3,
PrimeLife, see Subsection 3.1.4, and OpenID Connect, see Subsection 3.1.8, the
Legal Conformance unit is not found in the literature but it would be very
helpful to satisfy the Legal Authorities, one of the key Continuous Framework
Stakeholders.
• Trust Management: At this top layer, all the available features in the bottom
layers are utilized to provide the Trust Requirements required from a Continu-
ous Framework as listed in Section 2.5. The first component here is the Trust
Dashboard which is a presentation layer enabling the human Users to set their
access policies, check their current delegations and contracts, check the Trust-
worthiness rankings of Service Providers prior to engaging in a transaction,
revoke previously granted access tokens, and so on. That is similar to the work
found in TAS3, see Subsection 3.1.3, and some of the PrimeLife mini-projects,
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See Subsection 3.2.4. The Auditor Unit deploys a set of Ranking Algorithms
to rank down and ban suspicious Service Providers. To confirm its suspicions,
it can create artificial Users, Testing Agents, to interact with the suspicious
Service Providers and verify whether they act maliciously or not. The Trust
Propagation unit would make sure to propagate the latest rankings to all Users,
Service Providers, Legal Authorities, and so on. The Logs Manager keeps in-
teraction records between different Network entities to be used by the Ranking
Algorithms in case of disputes. See Chapter 5 for more details about the design
of the Auditor. TAS3 and UCON, see Subsection 3.1.2, also rank each entity in
the Network based on its behaviour and others’ feedback. The Negotiation En-
gine helps at matching the Users’ Trust Requirements with the Service Providers
capabilities and policies to facilitate the negotiation process.
• Toolkit: This layer is a warehouse of all the necessary and reusable components
to facilitate the work in other layers. Unlike the rest of the building blocks in
Figure 4.1 that represent required functionalities that could be implemented by
combining different software or even hardware components, the building blocks
of this layer are solid software solutions that could be utilized by the differ-
ent building blocks in the rest of the layers. For that, these building blocks are
coloured green instead of orange. This layer includes an Access Policy Language
similar to XACML or PPL, see Subsection 3.1.4. It also contains an SSL/TLS
Interface to deploy the basic Security features found in that protocol instead of
rewriting them in a similar manner to OAuth 2.0, see Subsection 3.1.7. There is
a Public keys Management unit to facilitate in authenticating and authorising
Users. Furthermore, there are Crypting and Watermarking units to help pro-
tecting Users’ Credentials and Data in accordance with their associated Sticky
Policies in a similar fashion to UCON projects, see Subsection 3.1.2.
4.2 Continuous Trust Management Framework, the Simple Prototype
In this Section, we list the details of the simple Continuous Trust Framework Pro-
totype that we developed to prove the practicality and usefulness of our proposed
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Design in Section 4.1. We start by listing the technologies we used to develop the
Prototype. We then describe the sample use-case we use to demonstrate the prob-
lem of offering Continuous Data Control. Further, we discuss the generic design and
components of our Prototype, which is built on top of the OpenID Connect protocol.
The code of this Prototype is published as an open-source project and can be found
on: https://gitlab.com/Continuous_Trust_Prototype/Prototype.
4.2.1 Development Utilities
In developing and executing this Prototype Model, many different software and code
libraries were utilized. The main ones are:
• IDE: Eclipse Java EE IDE for Web Developers - Indigo Service Release 2
• Programming Language: JavaSE 1.6
• Build Automation Utility: Maven 3.0.4
• Database Management: MySQL 5.1.37
• Web Server: Apache Tomcat 7
4.2.2 Problem Demonstrator, the Example Use-Case
In Section 3.1, we saw that the currently available Trust Frameworks already take care
of most of the layers and units available in our proposed Continuous Trust Framework
Design, see Section 4.1. The main exception is the Auditor Unit, see Figure 4.1,
which is vital to offer the Data Control After Release Attribute. There is currently no
technical way to verify whether an entity that acquired Data from another would have
leaked or Abused the Data it acquired. For that, we present a minimal Continuous
Framework Prototype that implements the basic functionalities of the Continuous
Trust Framework to serve two main purposes. First, to show the practicality of
developing and deploying the Continuous Framework given the currently available
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technologies. Second, to show the current problem of lacking the Data Control After
Release Attribute, the issue which we tackle by the proposed Auditor’s Algorithms of
Chapter 5 using the logs that this Prototype is capable of collecting.
The story of our simple use-case is as follows: we assume a Trust Network where
Users are interested in getting services done from Service Providers. To authenticate
the Users, Service Providers, SPs, would ask for some of the Users’ Credentials includ-
ing their email addresses. Users would normally attach a Sticky Policy, see Subsection
4.4.1, to their Credentials asking not to share them with third-party SPs. Neverthe-
less, some Malicious SPs, MSPs, would ignore these Sticky Policies and would share
these Credentials with third-party MSPs. Those MSPs would utilize the maliciously
acquired Credentials to spam the email addresses of their victim Users. At that point,
the User would get aware that his Sticky Policies were violated and, hence, he files a
complain to the Auditor. Without any Auditor Algorithms, the Auditor would simply
reply back to the User saying that he has no idea which is the MSP violated his Sticky
Policies.
In Section 2.4, there are many different types of attacks and threats facing the entities’
Data and Credentials. To focus our efforts, the scope of our example use-case
only considers one type of attacks that is widely common: Basic Active Attacks
on Users’ Credentials. That is, Targeted 2.0 Attacks, Passive Attacks, or any type
of Attacks against Users’ Data sets is out of scope for our Prototype and the following
simulation experiments. Further, we only consider attacks from the MSPs against the
Users and not the other way around. In this Prototype, we assume genuine Auditor,
IDP, and Users despite that they could act maliciously in real-life. Also, we consider
one type of User’s Credentials Abuse, that is email spamming.
It is true that security toolkits could effectively minimise the threats of the Basic Mass
Attacks, as we show in Section 2.4. Nevertheless, we noted in that Section that the
current security toolkits are not effective in tackling the extended “malware version”
of the Basic Mass Attacks. In our use-case, the Users are tricked into trusting an MSP
that should not be trusted and, hence, they do not hesitate to share their personal
data with that MSP who would, in turn, spam them back. For that, we consider
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the illusion provided by the MSPs as a form of social engineering, or simply malware,
that could not be tackled by conventional security toolkits. After all, no current Trust
Framework offers real protection against this form of attack as we show in Section
3.5.
In Section 4.3, we argue that our use-case could be generalised to cover a wide range
of other Continuous Data Control Use-Cases. Further, in Section 7.1.2 we argue that
despite the limitation of our Prototype’s scope, the Prototype provides solid grounds
to protect against other types of threats that are not considered in this scope.
A summary of the main entities that we include in our Prototype is as follows:
• User: this entity represents an end User wishing to exchange her Credentials
with a Service Provider to get a service.
• Service Provider, SP: this entity represents a Service Provider aggregating
Users’ Credentials, full name and email address, before providing the service.
Some SPs are bad and, hence, leak (sell) the Data to MSPs.
• Malicious Service Provider, MSP: this entity represents a malicious SP
that gets (buy) Users’ Credentials from other SPs. It uses the obtained Data to
abuse victim Users with spam messages.
• Auditor: this entity represents the Authority in the Continuous Framework.
Any spam victim could report it to the Auditor who should find out who is
the guilty SP. The Auditor could then access all the stored logs related to the
submitted Cases to judge who are the guilty SPs. Each Case includes the details
of the reporting User (name, email) as well as a copy of the spam message (sender
name, sender email, date, title, and body). The Auditor has the option to add
a comment to the Case, change the status of the case from open to close, and
choosing a convicted SP from the list of all the SPs in the system.
• OpenID Connect Identity Provider, IDP: this entity represents the server
that stores Users Credentials and control access to them in addition to main-
taining access logs.
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• Simulation Manager: this entity represents the simulation website where both
Users and SPs could register in the Network and start interacting. During the
simulation setup, the admin could make certain SPs affiliated with Malicious
Service Providers so that they forward to them any Credentials they receive
from the Users who interact with them. For simulation purposes only, the
admin can also access the logs maintained by the MSPs to check whether the
Auditor’s initial judgments are correct or not. That is, it is possible, but not
implemented, to create an index showing the percentage of correct judgments
made by the Auditor.
Figure 4.2: The MVC Generic Design Pattern
4.2.3 Prototype Implementation Based on OpenID Connect
Here we briefly describe our Prototype implementation of the use-case presented in
Subsection 4.2.2. In implementing this Prototype, we realised the SPs, MSPs, Audi-
tors, and the Simulation Manager as RESTful Web Services interacting by exchanging
JSON tokens, see [114] for more details about RESTful Technology. Because a Net-
work consisting of only one SP, one MSP, and one Auditor is not realistic, we created
a number of replicas of each entity by overlaying the original Web Services. That
is, while each duplicate of SPs or MSPs would act independently per the simulation
settings, they would share exactly the same business logic and the GUI theme. Mod-
ifying the original SP or MSP Web Service would result in automatic updates to all
the overlays depending on it. All the Web Services are developed using the Spring
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MVC Framework to decouple the different layers of the Web Services code that, in
turn, improves scalability, usability, and Security, see [115] for more details about this
Framework. We list screenshots for the different implemented entities in Appendix A
while we show our generic MVC design in Figure 4.2. The components of Figure 4.2
work as following:
• View: This is the View, or Presentation, layer consisting of JSP display pages
and CSS styling sheets. This layer communicate with the Control layer by means
of HTTP Requests sent to the Java Servlets of the Control layer.
• Control: This is the Control layer where the business logic is implemented. The
first gateway to this layer is the Java Servlets which accepts HTTP Requests
coming from the View layer. For simple Data CRUD operations (Create, Read,
Update, Delete), the Servlets will directly forward the requests to the Java
Services that would, in turn, forward it to the Data Access Objects, DAOs, in
the Model layer. If the HTTP Requests are to communicate with another entity,
another User or SP for example, then the request would be directly forwarded
to the RESTful APIs to send JSON messages to the intended entity. If the
entity wish to run some Algorithms, for example an Auditor wish to update its
Rankings, then this task would be carried out by the Java Classes.
• Model: This is the Model, or Data Storage, layer. The gateway to this layer
is the Data Access Objects, DAOs, that performs the requested Data CRUD
operations, see [116] for more details about DAO objects. These objects could
be extended to work as a filter prohibiting any unauthorised operation, perhaps
against the Sticky Policies of the requested Data. The DAO objects utilizes
object oriented Java classes to represent each of the entities or Data sets that
are stored in the DB. When fetching or persisting the MySQL DB, the retrieved
or persisted Data would be realised by the DAO objects as Java Entities giving
an extra level of abstraction from the details of low level SQL operations. We
achieve this abstraction by using the Java Persistence API, JPA 2, specification,
see [117] for more details.
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Having described how each entity of our Prototype is implemented, we now describe
how they interact within the Prototype Framework. First, this Prototype is working
as a minimal Continuous Framework incorporating the OpenID Connect, MITREid
Connect implementation [118]. There are many advantages for choosing the MITREid
Connect implementation including:
• Implements the authentication and authorization tasks of our Prototype. In fact,
it relies on the OAuth 2.0 protocol for authorization and the OpenID Connect
protocol for authentication [1].
• A reasonably documented and maintained Java implementation.
• Achieves single sign-on and exchanging Credentials with consents.
• The OAuth2 protocol provides mechanisms to implement revocation authorities
and its JSON tokens, which are used to exchange Credentials. That could be
extended to attach Sticky Policies.
• Relies on Spring Security layer to provide secure communication Channels.
Figure 4.3: Authentication Flow using OpenID Connect
Our implementation of the Continuous Framework, powered by the OpenID Con-
nect, includes OpenID Connect providers, IDPs, so that SPs could access the Users’
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Credentials using those IDPs per the pre-agreed Sticky Policies even if the Users go
offline. In addition, the IDPs would maintain logs of all the Data accesses so that
these logs could be submitted to an Auditor upon its request to investigate reported
spam Cases. In the OpenID Connect terminology [119], the Users are realised as
End Users while the SPs, MSPs, and Auditors as Clients. Figure 4.3 shows how a
typical Authentication Flow in our Prototype looks like. The details of this flow are
as following:
• Step 1: An End User, through the Simulation Manager website, tries to interact
with a Client. The Client could be an SP, or an MSP posing as a genuine SP,
offering a service which End Users would be interested in. A Client could also
be an Auditor, which End Users would like to submit their spam Cases to him.
• Step 2a: The Client would reply back to the User request by asking to get an
Access Token to present for the IDP to Authenticate the User and acquire some
of its Credentials.
• step 2b: The User would, in turn, forward the Access Token request to the
IDP.
• Step 3: The User would authenticate herself to the IDP, using her stored
Credentials and password combination for example, and would give consent
that she agrees to grant the access token to the requesting Client.
• Step 4a: The IDP would generate an Access Token and send it to the User.
• Step 4b: The User would, in turn, forward the Access Token to the requesting
Client.
• Step 5a: The Client would send the Token to the IDP asking to access the
User’s Credential(s).
• Step 5b: The IDP would fetch the Credentials and send it back to the request-
ing Client and that ends the Authentication and Data release process.
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Figure 4.4: Malicious Interaction Sequence Diagram
The lack of Continuous Data Control Problem is illustrated in Figure 4.4 that
shows a malicious interaction sequence diagram. In that Figure, if the Client the End
User releases her Credentials to happened to be an MSP posing as a genuine SP1,
then SP1 would forward the Credential to another MSP2. MSP2 would spam the
victim User and the User would have no idea who is MSP2 since she has never dealt
with him before. As a result, it would submit a spam report Case to the Auditor.
The Auditor would get access to all the logs recorded by the IDP. Nevertheless, it
would not be able, in most Cases, to decide who is the guilty SP of leaking the User’s
Credentials since there are no Ranking Algorithms deployed yet in the Prototype. In
Chapter 5, we introduce the theories to establish a useful Auditor that can analyse
the recorded logs by the IDP and make some judgements about the guilty SPs based
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on them.
4.3 Generalising the Continuous Data Control Problem
So far, we have used a simple email spamming use-case, which we introduce in Subsec-
tion 4.2.2, to demonstrate the problem of lacking the Continuous Data Control After
Release Attribute. Our initial Prototype collects Data logs about every single Data
transaction to aid our proposed Auditor entity in the quest to identify and eliminate
the MSPs from the Trust Network, see Chapter 5 for more details about our proposed
Auditor.
It is true that the spamming problem where the Auditor is mainly concerned with
providing Continuous Data Control for only one Credential, the email-address, is rela-
tively simple. Nevertheless, our proposed Auditor along with the Defensive Strategies
we identify in Chapter 6 could be utilized to protect other types of Credentials against
Basic Active Attacks, but not necessarily against Passive Targeted Attacks, see Sub-
section 2.4 for more details about the possible types of attacks. That is, the Auditor
would record logs of all the Users’ Credentials released in the Network. Further, as
long as the MSP is generating a wealth of Abuse Cases, our Auditor should be able
to detect its malicious behaviour by analysing the recorded logs using the Algorithms
we describe in Chapter 5 and per the rules of the Defensive Strategies of Chapter 6.
While the Abuse in our current sample use-case is noticed by the spam message
the victim User receives, there are other signals to look after for different types of
Credentials’ Abuse. For example, each User, or perhaps the Auditor itself, could
deploy a simple software that would utilize the main available search engines to run
regular searches for the User’s Credentials like the full name, address, and contact
info. If these Data appear in a website where it is not supposed to appear, then that
would trigger an Abuse that should be reported to the Auditor. Another Abuse trigger
would be a User reading his Credentials printed in the newspaper or to get billed for an
unknown credit card transaction. In Section 7.1.2, we argue that our proposed Auditor
could provide reasonable Continuous Data Control even with a limited number of
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reported Abuse Cases, for rarely used Credentials or hard to detect Abuses. Further,
we argue in that Section that our proposed Auditor could also protect against Passive
Targeted Attacks provided that our DGU Unit gets implemented and widely adopted
by SPs.
4.4 DGU, the Hypothetical Data Governance Unit
In our proposed Prototype of Section 4.2, we utilize state of the art technologies
like OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0. In this Section, we present the design of the
hypothetical Data Governance Unit, or simply DGU. The DGU is designed to play a
vital role in empowering the future Continuous Framework at protecting its entities’
Credentials and Data even after releasing them to other parties. The current design
assumes the availability of the TCG technologies, TPM and TSS in particular, that
are described in Subsection 3.1.1. Given that these technologies are still novice with
many challenges to overcome before being widely adopted, we have not implemented
the DGU Unit yet. Rather, we present here a use-case that could motivate more
research and development in the TCG field.
Our DGU design has few essential requirements to work as expected and eliminate
the threat of a malicious DGU. These requirements include:
• Open Source DGU Implementation: so that independent programmers
could participate in its development while others could evaluate its integrity
and Trustworthiness.
• Server-Side Installation: of the DGU software by SPs wishing to prove they
are Trustworthy.
• TPM Chip Enabled Servers: to build on the hardware roots of Trust it
provides. That is, the TPM chip would be used to verify that the SP is deploying
a Non-Tampered DGU Software as it is maintained in the DGU official
website.
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• Disabling RAM Access: to prevent the SP from attempting to sniff the keys
utilized by the DGU to encrypt/decrypt the Users’ Data or even to sniff those
Data while they are processed in the RAM, see [120] for more details about
RAM sniffing attacks.
In more details, the SP server Database would have the sensitive Users’ Data en-
crypted, depending on the agreed policy with the User. The DGU would install a
DAO gatekeeper that controls access to the Database. That is, it would do the en-
cryption to persist the Data and the decryption to allow the SP to use the Data
provided that the SP gives a valid reason according the attached Sticky Policies. In
case the reason is valid, the DGU would decrypt the requested Data, handle it back
to the SP, and log this action in its record to refer to it in case of dispute or the
User reporting Abuse of her Data. In Subsection 4.4.1, we give more details about
what are the Sticky Policies and what purposes they could associate with the Data or
Credentials they are assigned to. Further, we describe the generic design of the DGU
Unit and the main tasks it would perform in Subsection 4.4.2.
The hypothetical unit would be a powerful Trust enabler that, if adapted by all enti-
ties, would enforce a very high-level of Trust on everyday transactions. Nevertheless,
there are many challenges facing its realisation. As we mention earlier, it relies on sta-
ble and mature implementations of the TCG technologies, which is not a reality yet,
as we discuss in Subsection 3.1.1. Further, even if it exists, people would be very sus-
picious to adopt it due to its restrictive powers, see [29]. Even if it got widely adopted
by the different entities residing in the Trust Network, we suspect performance issues
when it comes to continuous encryption, decryption, and screening operations as we
describe them in Subsection 4.4.2. Further studies beyond this thesis are required
to determine the exact computational costs of our proposed DGU Unit and how to
optimize it.
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4.4.1 DGU Sticky Policies
Setting up Data access control rules is an active research area with various languages
and protocols to achieve, see Section 2.8. The Sticky Policy technique is an advanced
way of cryptographically bounding the access control rules to a corresponding piece
of Data or Credential as described by the TAS3 developers [3]. As the pioneers of
the Sticky Policy technique, TAS3 developers support different methods to integrate
it within the Simple Access Protocol, SOAP, that is widely used in the legacy Web
Services to exchange XML structured Data. Such integration methods include ex-
panding the Data model corresponding to the exchanged piece of Data to include its
Sticky Policy or to wrap the whole XML payload in a custom TAS3 defined layer so
that it includes the Sticky Policy [3]. For Sticky Policy to be used in our Prototype of
Section 4.2, it should be realised as an extension to the JSON message that is being
used in our RESTful implementation rather than an extension to the SOAP message.
When it comes to defining the policy itself, available standards like P3P can provide a
wealth of detailed purposes and Users-roles, providing access rights to certain groups
of Data, see Subsection Section 2.8. That is, each piece of Data would have a list of
acceptable purposes to be offered by a specific list of entities, admins for example,
allowing them to handle this piece of Data per their supplied purpose. For the purpose
of our generic design, we grouped the possible purposes that could be supplied by the
SP to its DGU to decrypt a piece of stored Users’ Data as following:
• View: this purpose is to say that the SP wishes to view the requested Creden-
tial. It is vague why the view is requested and, hence, it would look suspicious.
Even if the Sticky Policy permits such a purpose, this SP would be in the
shortlist of suspicious SPs if the User reported a compromise on this Creden-
tial. Probably, the Auditor would associate this purpose with Targeted Attacks
against a particular User rather than a Mass Classic Attack, see Section 2.4.
• Process: this purpose is usually about retrieving a collection of Users’ Data
or Credentials to process them. For example, to get some statistics about the
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Users’ demography or interests. Because it is not important for the SP to know
the identity of each User to execute such processes, the DGU could utilize an
Anonmisation Engine to anonymous the returned collection for the SP, see [25].
• Communicate: this purpose is about communicating with a User via email,
phone, social media, or any other possible way. For such a communication
to happen, the DGU should reveal the requested communication medium in
a similar fashion to the View purpose. This pose the risk that an MSP may
communicate genuinely with a victim User and, then, utilize the revealed com-
munication medium for malicious activities, like spam in our sample use-case.
For that, the DGU could deploy a Communication Engine that would take the
message from the SP and send it, on its behalf, to the requested User without
revealing its contact address to the SP. This analogy also applies to payment
requests, credit history validation, telemarketing, and so on.
• Share with Third-Party: this purpose is about sharing Users’ Data with a
third-party SP. Sometimes Users would agree to allow some SPs to share their
Data with third-party SPs to send them, for example, relevant offers or perhaps
to check their credit history. Nevertheless, the third-party might be an MSP
who would Abuse the acquired Data. When an SP who has already Installed
DGU shares some of its Users Data to other SPs that has not Installed DGU yet,
the result would be losing the Sticky Policy Enforcement provided by the DGU.
We have considered this issue in the Threat Model of our proposed Auditor, see
Subsections 5.8.4 and 5.8.7.
4.4.2 DGU Generic Design
Figure 4.5 shows the main components required for the DGU to function. Note that
this Figure omits the building blocks belonging to the SP and the Auditor that are
not directly related to the DGU. The listed Components are as following:
• DGU DAO: this Data Access Object is the gatekeeper of the SP Database.
All the Credentials that the SP would acquire from the IDP would be encrypted
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Figure 4.5: DGU Generic Architecture
with the public key of the DGU installed in the SP server. That is, only the
DGU DAO is able to decrypt the Data that are stored in the SP’s own Database.
The DGU DAO would only decrypt a piece of Data if the supplied purpose is
valid per the requested Data Sticky Policy.
• Anonymization Engine: this engine would be used to anonymise a requested
piece of Data when the identity of the Data owner is irrelevant to the SP’s
retrieval request. An example would be the case of a Process request.
• Encryption/Decryption Engine: this is a generic unit that could be used by
the SP whenever it needs to encrypt anything. That is, the SP is not allowed to
encrypt anything unless by using this unit. This is essential to prevent the SP
from smuggling Users’ Data through encrypted messages sent to other associated
MSPs. This unit would screen all encryption requests to figure out whether it
contains some of the released Users’ Data, through genuine purposes. If such
Data is found, it would check whether the granted release authorise sending it
to the intended destination or not. If not, this unit would refuse the encryption
request.
• DGU Proxy: this proxy would screen all the outgoing Data from the SP’s
server to make sure that no Users’ Data are leaving without proper permit from
the DGU Unit. If this proxy detects an encrypted output Data that was not
signed by the Encryption/Decryption Engine, then it should not allow it to leave
the server.
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• Public Keys Engine: this engine would take care of maintaining the public
keys of the Users, SPs, and installed DGUs for the purpose of exchanging the
Data with only authorised entities.
• Communication Engine: this engine would take care of fulfilling the com-
munication request from the SPs intended for the Users without revealing the
communication address of the Users to the communicating SPs.
4.5 Beyond the Continuous Trust Framework Prototype
In Chapters 2 and 3, we have studied the Trust Management Frameworks as whole
entities trying to learn their current strengths that we should maintain as well as their
weaknesses that we should tackle. In Section 3.4, we argued that the most serious
weakness of the current Trust Management Frameworks is the lack of Continuous
Data Control Privacy Attribute, see Subsection 2.6.2 for more details about this At-
tribute. For this reason, we argued for the need for a Continuous Trust Management
Framework in Section 3.5 at the end of Chapter 3.
In this Chapter, we proposed a generic Continuous Trust Management Framework
Design that is based on the best practices and components found in current Trust
Management Frameworks such as OpenID Connect, UMA, OAuth 2.0, and TCG
technologies. In addition, we included new components in that design to support the
Continuous Data Control Privacy Attribute in order for our proposed Framework to
deserve the Continuous prefix. Namely, the two main components that we introduced
in that design are: The Auditor and the DGU components. To prove the practicality
of our proposed design, we have implemented a sample Prototype of it that contains
the basic functionalities, based on a modified version of OpenID Connect protocol.
In that Prototype, we have shown clearly the main weakness of the current Trust
Management Frameworks that we are trying to tackle: the inability to protect Users’
Credentials after they are released to third-parties as well as the inability to detect
the Abusers, i.e. the Lack of Continuous Data Control Attribute that we discussed in
Subsection 3.4.1.
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In Section 4.4, we proposed the Data Governance Unit, DGU, to enforce the Continu-
ous Data Control on the exchanged Data among the Trust Stakeholders. Nevertheless,
this DGU Unit is still an abstract concept that is not yet implemented and, hence,
cannot provide an immediate solution to the current lack of Continuous Data Control.
Further, we envision that even after the successful implementation of the DGU unit,
it would be a controversial software that would receive a great deal of resistance from
Service Providers to install due to its excessive powers and restrictions it imposes on
those who opt to install it, in addition to its high computational cost.
In the following Chapters, we take a different approach to what we were doing so
far. Instead of studying the Trust Management Frameworks as whole units, we focus
our attention on the newly introduced components of this Chapter, the Auditor and
the DGU, to explore how they would be implemented and what effect they would
have in a bootstrapping environment where SPs are not very keen on adopting the
DGU. That is, we introduce in Chapter 5 the basic Ranking Algorithms, the Basic
Deployment Rules, and a set of supporting Utilities to help the Auditor in analysing
the collected logs of interaction that our Continuous Trust Management Framework
is currently able to collect, see Subsection 4.2.3.
In Chapter 6, we implement a simulation model to model how a large number of Trust
Stakeholders would interact and how to optimize the Ranking Algorithms and Deploy-
ment Rules of the Auditor to minimise the effects of the Malicious Service Providers,
MSPs. By the end of that Chapter, we get to know a set of Defensive Strategies each
with its own strengths and weaknesses. In real-life scenarios, smart Auditors should
dynamically alter its deployed Defensive Strategy based on its perceived environmen-
tal settings. Further future studies should incorporate these Defensive Strategies into
the Prototype of this Chapter and study how they would work in the real life out of
the Simulation Model
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Chapter 5. Trust Auditor Conceptual Design and Algorithms
In Chapter 3, we justify the need for a Continuous Trust Management Framework.
That is, we compared the state of the art Trust Frameworks and showed that while
they excel in fulfilling most of the fundamental Trust Requirements Properties of
Section 2.5 and Figure 2.2, they fail at providing Continuous Data Control as we show
in Subsection 3.4.1. In Chapter 4, we proposed a Continuous Trust Framework Design
that utilizes the existing features of the state of the art Trust Frameworks as well as
introduces new building blocks to support the Continuous Data Control Attribute.
Further, we present in that Chapter a prototype of our proposed Continuous Trust
Management Framework that implements the basic features of the design as well as
aggregates interactions logs and enables spam victims, a special use-case for Data
Abuse that could be tackled with Continuous Data Control, to report the Abuse
spam they receive to the Auditor Unit of our Continuous Framework. As we show in
Section 4.3, the general detection and reporting of the Data Abuse Cases would be a
similar job to the implemented special case in our prototype, the email-address Abuse
Case.
After reporting the Data Abuse Cases to the Auditor, the similarities between the
state of the art Trust Frameworks and our proposed Continuous Trust Management
Framework ends. Our Auditor Unit would analyse all the relevant Data Abuse Cases
to detect the Malicious Service Provider, MSP, that is guilty for the reported Case. In
this Chapter, we introduce a novel set of algorithms, building blocks, and deployment
rules that could be utilized by the Auditor in its quest to detect MSPs. In Chapter
6, we simulate the introduced defensive tools of this Chapter to construct a set of
Defensive Strategies that are suitable for different environmental situation as well as
varying Counter-Attacking Strategies.
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Figure 5.1: Auditor Theoretical Building Blocks
5.1 Basic Elements
In this section, the main Ranking Approaches are introduced along with their main
components. The Auditor’s ranking process assigns a public Rank to each SP in the
Network. This rank is called the Global Trust Metric, TGR. As illustrated in Figure
5.1, the TGR Rank is dependent on the results of three different Ranking Approaches:
• Average of Local Trust Metric, TLavg : a Ranking Approach that is based
on how close an SP usually appears in the Abuse logs just before getting the
Abuse. The closer it is, the higher the probability of maliciousness is and, hence,
the lower the Rank, see Section 5.2.
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• Sole Testing Trust Metric, TST : a Ranking Approach that is based on
Abuse received after dealing with a sole SP indicating that it is almost definitely
that this SP is the Abuser, see Section 5.3.
• Group Testing Trust Metric, TGT : a Ranking Approach that is based on
Abuse received after dealing with a group of suspected SPs indicating a possible
collation between some of the group MSPs, see Section 5.4.
Each of the above-mentioned Ranking Approaches would consist of internal compo-
nents that could be categorised as:
• Raw Ranking Algorithm: an Algorithm that assigns a specific Rank for each
SP based on certain patterns in the received spam cases.
• Raw Testing Agent: an artificial User created by the Auditor to testify
whether an SP, or a group of SPs, are acting maliciously.
• Intermediate Ranking Algorithm: an Algorithm that generates SP Ranks
by processing the generated Ranks by Raw Ranking Algorithms and Agents.
• Final Ranking Algorithm: an Algorithm that generates SP Ranks by incor-
porating the generated Ranks by all the Intermediate Ranking Algorithms and
Agents. In Figure 5.1, the three internal TGR blocks: TLRavg Rank, TST
Rank, and TGT Rank are all considered to be Final Ranking Algorithms. In
turn, the TGR Rank itself is also a Final Ranking Algorithm that is based on
the results of its internal Final Ranking Algorithms.
Figure 5.1 also shows a set of Utility Units which the Auditor need to calculate and
interpret the TGR Ranks. These Utility Units could act as Selection Algorithms
that aid the Auditor in selecting suspicious SPs for the following Raw Testing Agents
Algorithms:
• SPs Popularity Record - SPR: an Algorithm that sort all the SPs by their
popularity based on the frequency of their appearing in the reported Data Abuse
Cases, see Subsection 5.6.1.
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• Initial Interactions Record - IIR: a Record containing all the Initial Inter-
action Lists, IILs, where each list contains the interactions that took place by a
given User’s Credential prior to receiving the first Abuse Case on that Creden-
tial. This list would also include all the Popular SPs, PSPs, that this User have
dealt with prior to that Abuse Case using other Credentials for the purpose of
detecting Weak Colluding Attacks, see Subsection 5.6.2.
• Data Governance Unit - DGU: a hardware Utility Unit to enforce Hard
Trust in the Trust Network. If an SP Installs DGU, it should be impossible for
it to handle an acquired Credential without compliance to its sticky policies. In
addition, DGU would record all internal accesses to the Credential as well as all
its approved sharing destinations, see Section 4.4 and Subsection 5.6.3.
• Health Gauges: a set of powerful sensors to provide feedback reports about
the health status of the Trust Network, see Subsection 5.6.4.
In Figure 5.1, it is shown that the Deployment Rules block contains the TGR Rank
Final Ranking Algorithm as well as the Utility Units. That is to indicate the fact
that the Auditor is able to decide who are the bad MSPs based on the Deployment
Rules of its setup, see Section 5.7 where we describe a set of basic Deployment Rules.
In Chapter 6, we conduct a series of Simulation Experiments to optimize these basic
Deployment Rules. The outcome of those experiments is a set of Defensive Strategies,
each with its own strengths and weaknesses.
5.2 TLRavg Ranking Approach
In this Section, we describe the basic building blocks of the TLRavg Ranking Ap-
proach and how they would work as they appear in Figure 5.1. In a nutshell, the
Gradient Probability Distributor, GPD Raw Algorithm evaluates the guilt probabil-
ities for each Service Provider, SP, that appear in all the reported Data Abuse Cases
by the victim Users. This evaluation is based on how close, chronologically, an SP
appears in the Abuse logs to the timing of the Abuse. The closer it is, the higher the
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probability of maliciousness and, hence, the lower the Rank the SP would get. The
TLRu Intermediate Algorithm then aggregates the SPs Ranks that are local to each
victim to construct the Local Trust Metric Record, or simply TLRUi , that contains
Trust Ranks that are local to the Ui. The TLRavg Final Ranking Algorithm then
creates global Rankings for each SP by averaging its local Ranks aggregated form all
the TLRu Records of all the Network’s Users.
5.2.1 Gradient Probability Distributor
This is a Raw Ranking Algorithm for the TLRavg Ranking Approach, as shown in
Figure 5.1. This Algorithm assumes that the last SP who got the User info is more
likely to be the Data Abuser while the first SP in the chain is the least suspicious. The
reasoning behind this Algorithm is common sense. That is, if the victim was a happy
Network User for a fairly long time before getting a Data Abuse just after dealing
with a new SP for the first time, then that new SP is probably the MSP behind the
Data Abuse. The GPD is listed in Algorithm 5.1, summarised in Equation 5.1 and
explained in Example 5.1.
Algorithm 5.1: Gradient Probability Distributor, GPD
• Each reported case, Ci, has n SPs that are presented in chronological order.
• Assign each SPj in Ci a guilt probability, GPDCi(SPj) that initially equals its
order j divided by n.
• Divide each GPDCi(SPj) by the sum of all the generated guilt probabilities in
Ci, that is:
∑n
k=1
k
n .
• If the same SPx appears m times in a given Ci, then treat each appearance as an
independent SPj . Finally, GPDCi(SPx) =
∑m
l=1GPDCi(SPx)l
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GPDCi(SPj) =
j
n ∗∑nk=1 kn or simply: GPDCi(SPj) =
j∑n
k=1 k
where n is the number of SPs in Ci and j is the position of the SP
And: GPDCi(SPx) =
m∑
l=1
GPDCi(SPx)l (5.1)
where m is the number of times a distinct SPx appears in Ci
Equation 5.1: Gradient Probability Distributor, GPD
Example 5.1: GPD Processing
If C1 = {SP3, SP3, SP4} Then:
GPDC1(SP3) =
1
3 + 2 + 1 +
2
3 + 2 + 1 =
1
2
And GPDC1(SP4) =
3
3 + 2 + 1 =
1
2
5.2.2 Local Trust Metric Record
This is an Intermediate Ranking Algorithm for the TLRavg Ranking Approach, as
shown in Figure 5.1. After evaluating all Cases, Cs, for a given User, Ui, the Auditor
can generate a Local Trust Metric Record, or simply TLRUi , that contains Trust
Ranks that are local to the Ui. Each TLRUi should contain a set of Local Trust
values for each SP that the given Ui has dealt with so far. Such value would be
referred to as TLUi(SPx) for any SPx that Ui has dealt with. The highest value
for TLUi(SPx) would be 100, which means that the SPx is fully Trustworthy in the
context of its transactions with Ui. On the other hand, the lowest value would be 0.
The TLUi(SPx) value is determined solely by the sum of all the guilt probabilities for
SPx for all the reported Cases by Ui in a negative linear relationship. That means,
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the guiltier SPx within the context of Ui is, the less locally Trustworthy, TLUi(SPx).
That yields Equation 5.2 which is demonstrated in Example 5.2.
TLUi(SPx) = (1−
∑n
j=1GPDCi(SPx)
n
) ∗ 100 (5.2)
where n = the number of Cases, in the context of Ui, where SPx appeared
Equation 5.2: Local Trust Metric, TL
Example 5.2: Calculating TLU(SP )
If U1 has the following Cases:
C1 =
{
GPD(SP4) = 23 , GPD(SP3) =
1
3
}
,
C2 =
{
GPD(SP2) = 13 , GPD(SP3) =
2
3
}
Then:
TLU1(SP2) = (1−
1
3
1 ) ∗ 100 = 23 ∗ 100 = 66.67%,
TLU1(SP3) = 1−
1
3+
2
3
2 =
1
2 ∗ 100 = 50%,
TLU1(SP4) = 1−
2
3
1 =
1
3 ∗ 100 = 33.33%
That would give us:
TLRU1 = {TLU1(SP2) = 66.67%, TLU1(SP3) = 50%, TLU1(SP4) = 33.33%}
5.2.3 Average of Local Trust Metric Record
This is the Final Ranking Algorithm for the TLRavg Ranking Approach, as shown in
Figure 5.1. This Algorithm creates a global sense of the local TLRUs aggregated from
all the Network’s Users by creating the Average TLRUs Record, or simply TLRavg.
This Record contains the average TL values for each SP within the context of all the
different Users who interacted with it as shown in Equation 5.3 and demonstrated in
Example 5.3.
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TLavg(SPx) =
∑n
i=1 TLUi(SPx)
n
(5.3)
where n = the number of Users who interacted with SPx
Equation 5.3: Average of Local Trust Metric, TLavg
Example 5.3: Calculating TLavg(SP )
If the Trust Network has two Users: U1 and U2, and the corresponding TLRU s are
presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 respectively, then the generated TLRavg would looks
like Table 5.3.
SP TL(SP)
SP2 83.33%
SP3 50%
SP4 60%
Table 5.1:
TLRU1
SP TL(SP)
SP1 50%
SP3 75%
SP4 50%
Table 5.2:
TLRU2
SP TLavg(SP )
SP1 50%
SP2 83.33%
SP3 62.5%
SP4 55%
Table 5.3:
TLRavg
5.3 TST Ranking Approach
In this Section, we describe the basic building blocks of the TST Ranking Approach
and how they would work as they appear in Figure 5.1. In a nutshell, the Sole Testing
Distributor, STD, Raw Ranking Algorithm assigns each SP that appear in the log of
a reported Data Abuse Case an equal guilt probability. The less SPs appearing in a
single Case log, the more the probability that one of them is an MSP. The Sole Tester,
ST, Raw Ranking Agent is an artificial User created by the Auditor to deal with a
sole suspicious SP. If the ST Agent receives a Data Abuse, this would indicate that
the suspicious SP is almost definitely an MSP. The TST Final Ranking Algorithm
then is dependent on the aggregated STDCi(SPx) evaluations for each SPx within the
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Network whether such evaluations come from the STD evaluations of the reported
Data Abuse Cases or from ST Raw Testing Agents reports.
5.3.1 Sole Testing Distributor
The Sole Testing Distributor, STD, is a Raw Ranking Algorithm for the TST Ranking
Approach, as shown in Figure 5.1. In 5.8.6, it is shown that the GPD Raw Ranking
Algorithm could be easily fooled by Simple Data Abusing Algorithms, like delaying
the Abuse so that the abusing MSP would look innocent while an innocent SP might
get ranked malicious by the GPD Raw Ranking Algorithm. For that reason, this
additional Ranking Algorithm is introduced. When theGPD Raw Ranking Algorithm
processes a reported Abuse Case, it would give worse Ranks to those SPs that the
User have dealt with just before getting the Abuse. In contrast, the STD processor
would give all the Case’s SPs an equivalent Rank. This unified ranking function has
a negative linear relationship with the number of total SPs appearing in the Case.
In other words, the less SPs appearing in the Case, the more likely that one of them
is malicious regardless of how soon the interaction took place prior to the Abuse. If
an SPj appeared more than once within a Case Ci, then this Algorithm would count
only one appearance and remove all the rest from the calculations. The final STD
function is shown in Equation 5.4 and explained in Example 5.4. It should be noted
that while the GPD and the STD Raw Ranking Algorithms have similar concepts,
they differ in the fact that the generated GPD values are guilt probabilities, used
to generate TLRUs Ranks, while the generated STD values are already SP Ranks.
That is, a high GPD value indicates a more suspicious SP while a high STD value
indicates a less suspicious SP.
An interesting scenario would arise if the concerned Credential has a sticky policy
permitting sharing it with another SP, see Subsections 4.4.1 and 5.8.4. In that special,
but common scenario, it would be more accurate to include all those SPs who acquired
that Credential through sharing in the STD calculations. That would be only possible
in case that SPx has already Installed DGU, see Subsection 5.6.3, since it would enable
tracking all the SPs that SPx has shared with them this Credential. Since SPs who
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Install DGU should not be able to directly Abuse Users’ Data, the generated list of
SPs who acquired the Abused Credential should be filtered by removing all those SPs
who have already Installed DGU. The filtered list of SPs should be processed by the
STD Algorithm, which is listed in Algorithm 5.2.
Algorithm 5.2: The Sole Testing Distributor, STD
• When Processing a Case Ci, remove all duplicate SPs from the evaluation list.
• If an SPx within the evaluation list has already Installed DGU, then all those
SPs that have acquired the Abused Credential by sharing with SPx, or SPy who
originally got it by sharing with SPx, should be added to the SPs evaluation list.
• After extracting all the SPs who acquired the Credential through sharing, all
those SPs who Installed DGU should be removed from the evaluation list.
• Given n is the final evaluation list size, the STD value should be obtained by
subtracting 1n from 1 and multiplying the result by 100 to obtain a percentage
Rank.
STDCi(SPx) = (1−
1
n
) ∗ 100 (5.4)
Where n is the number of SPs in Ci
Equation 5.4: Sole Testing Distributor, STD
Example 5.4: STD Processing
If C1 =
{
SP3, SP3, SP4, SPDGU6
}
And SP6(Sharing−Tree) =
{
SPDGU2 , SP3
}
And SP2(Sharing−Tree) = {SP5}
Then C ′1 = {SP3, SP4, SP5}
And STDC′1(SP3) = STDC′1(SP4) = STDC′1(SP5) = (1− 13) ∗ 100 = 66.67%
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5.3.2 Sole Tester Ranking Agent
In Equation 5.4, there is an interesting special case where in a given Cx, there is only
one SP in the log, SPy. That would yield an STDC1 value of 0 meaning that it is
definite, in the perspective of this Algorithm, that SPy is actually the malicious Data
Abuser to blame for Cx. Of course, that is not necessarily true if the User has previous
Cases containing an SPz that has decided to Abuse now, just on time after this User
happened to interact with SPy right after reporting an older Abuse Case. However, if
this is the initial interaction for this User using this Abused Credential, see Subsection
5.6.2, and it is not believed that SPy has shared the acquired Credential with another
SP, see Subsections 4.4.1 and 5.8.4, then it could be concluded that SPy is definitely
the Abuser.
The Sole Tester, ST, is a powerful Raw Ranking Agent that is designed based on the
above-mentioned special case. Its aim is to verify whether a suspicious SP is really
behaving maliciously or not. In this Algorithm, it is assumed that if a Trusted User,
an artificial User created by the Auditor, has only dealt with one SPx in its entire
lifetime and it manages to get a Data Abuse, then it is definitely that the Data Abuser
is that sole SPx which this User has dealt with. That leads to the conclusion that SPx
should be ranked malicious with STD(SPx) = 0 Rank. Of course, this assumption
might be falsified if the acquired Credential has been shared with a malicious MSP,
Subsection 5.8.4. In case the Sticky Policy of the Abused Credential does not allow
sharing, then it would be definite that SPx is acting maliciously and it is highly
recommended for the Auditor to ban it from the Trust Network immediately. Even if
the Sticky Policy allows sharing, a wise Auditor should consider to ask any detected
SP as a potential sole Abuser to either Install DGU or get banned from the Network
regardless of its current Rank. Such Deployment Rules are discussed in Section 5.7
as well as in Chapter 6 where different Defensive Strategies are optimized.
It should be noted that a smart MSP may decide to use a Dropping Attacking Al-
gorithm where it would decide not to Abuse a certain Credential or a certain User
to fool the ST Agent, see Subsection 5.8.6. To counter such attacks, the ST Agent
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should maintain continuous interactions with its associated SP and the Auditor should
replace that ST Agent after a time threshold. The ST process is listed in Algorithm
5.3.
Algorithm 5.3: The Sole Tester, ST
• Based on a Selection Algorithm, select a suspected SPx for ST testing.
• Create a new Ux to act as a Sole Tester, ST (SPx).
• Let ST (SPx) interact only with the selected SPx.
• If ST (SPx) receives a Data Abuse, then obtain the evaluation list, process it
by the STD Algorithm, update the TSTR Record, stop verifying SPx, and kill
ST (SPx).
• Stop ST testing, return STD(SPx) = 100%, and kill ST (SPx) after reaching a
time threshold τST−maxLife without receiving a Data Abuse.
• If, after waiting for a time threshold τST−idle, ST (SPx) does not get any Data
Abuse, then ST (SPx) should engage in a new transaction with SPx and repeat
the above steps.
5.3.3 Sole Testing Metric Record
This is the Final Ranking Algorithm for the TST Ranking Approach. It is dependent
on the aggregated STDCi(SPx) evaluations for each SPx within the Network whether
such evaluations come from the STD evaluations of the reported Data Abuse Cases
or from ST Raw Testing Agents’ reports. The Sole Testing Trust Metric, TST (SPx),
Algorithm for STD(SPx) Ranks is just like how the TLavg(SPx) Algorithm is for the
GPD(SPx) guilt probabilities. All the different TST (SPx) Ranks should be stored in
a special Record called the Sole Testing Trust Record, or simply TSTR. The entries
of this Record can be calculated using the Equation 5.5, see Example 5.5.
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TST (SPx) =
n∑
i=1
STDCi(SPx) (5.5)
Where n is the number of Cs where SPx appears.
Equation 5.5: Sole Testing Trust Metric, TST
Example 5.5: Calculating TST (SP )
If the Auditor received three Cases and their corresponding STDs are presented in
Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, then the generated TSTR would looks like Table 5.7.
*Note that if the sticky policy of the Abused Credential in U2 : C1 prevents sharing with
a third-party, then SP5 would be definitely the Data Abuser and, hence, TST (SP5) = 0
despite all its STD values in the rest of the Cases.
U1:C1
SPs : SP1, SP3, SP6
STDU1:C1 = 66.67%
Table 5.4: STDU1:C1
U1:C2
SPs : SP2, SP3, SP5, SP6
STDU1:C2 = 75%
Table 5.5: STDU1:C2
U2:C1
SPs : SP5
STDU2:C1 = 0%
Table 5.6: STDU2:C1
SP TST(SP)
SP1 66.67%
SP2 75%
SP3 70.84%
SP5 62.5%
SP6 70.84%
Table 5.7: TSTR
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5.4 TGT Ranking Approach
In this Section, we describe the basic building blocks of the TGT Ranking Approach
and how they would work as they appear in Figure 5.1. In a nutshell, the Group
Tester Raw Ranking Agent, GT is an artificial User created by the Auditor to deal
with a suspicious group, G, of SPs. If the GT Agent receives a Data Abuse, this
would indicate that there is at least one MSP among the G members or, if all sole
MSPs are caught using the TST Ranking Approach of Section 5.3, the existence of
a collation between some of the G members. The TGTsg, TGTsc, and TGTwc Inter-
mediate Ranking Algorithms assign colluding Rankings to each SP based on different
ways of interpreting the logs submitted by both the GT Agents and genuine Users.
The TGTsg Ranking Algorithm considers only the GT Agents reported Cases and
counts how many times the same reported G appears in the rest of the reported Cases
to generate the colluding Ranks. The TGTsc also considers the GT Agents reported
Cases and counts how many times subgroups of G appears in the the rest of the re-
ported Cases to generate the colluding Ranks. The TGTwc considers reported Cases
coming from both the GT Agents and Users and counts how many times subgroups
of G appears in the rest of the reported Cases to generate the colluding Ranks. The
interesting thing about the TGTwc Algorithm is the fact that it adds SPs that have
dealt with the victim User but not necessarily with the Abused Credential of the eval-
uated G. The TGT Final Ranking Algorithm then is dependent on a biased weighted
average of the ranks of the three Intermediate Algorithms.
5.4.1 Group Tester Ranking Agent
While the ST Agents Algorithm is so powerful that it could give a definite prove that
a particular SP is acting maliciously, it will not work very well in case of colluding
SPs. That is because such SPs, especially popular ones, would try to imply whether
a new User is in fact an artificial Testing Agent or not, see Subsection 5.8.7. To
uncover such collations, the Group Testing Ranking Approach, TGT , is introduced.
At its core lies the Group Tester Raw Ranking Agent, GT. Basically, the GT Agent
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is another artificial Agent, just like the ST Agent, see Subsection 5.3.2. Instead of
interacting with only one suspicious SP like how the ST Agent works, the GT Agent
would interact continuously with a group of SPs, G, to give them confidence that he
is a genuine User rather than an artificial one. When the GT Agent receives a Data
Abuse, it would be definite that at least one of those SPs is malicious or have shared
the GT Agent’s Credential with an MSP, see Subsection 5.8.4.
The GT Agent methodology is simple. It would always be assumed that there is an
ST Agent for each SP within G and all those ST Agents yield negative results, i.e.
no malicious acts detected. Hence, the GT Agent would imply that there are at least
two colluding SPs within G. The smaller G is the stronger the probability that its
members are colluding. Let’s call the group of tested SPs at a given moment G’ where,
G′ ∈ G. Once a Data Abuse is received during testing, G’ would be added to a special
Record called the Malicious Groups Record, MGR. Of course, if SPx has Installed
DGU and shared the GT’s Credential with SPy, then SPy should be included in G’.
The MGR Record is useful for all of the TGT Intermediate Ranking Algorithms.
The trivial assumption that there is an ST Agent for every SP being tested by the GT
Agent could be either forced or relaxed by the Auditor, depending on its Deployment
Rules, see: Section 5.7 and Section 7.3. Even if it is relaxed, i.e. the assumption is
not always true, the results of the GT Agents’ testing would still be good educated
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guesses. The GT Agents’ mechanism is listed in Algorithm 5.4.
Algorithm 5.4: The Group Tester, GT
• Based on a Selection Algorithm, the Auditor should create a new Ux to act as a
new GTx to test a group of suspicious SPs, Gx, that contains n SPs.
• GTx would randomly select an SPx ∈ Gx for the next interaction.
• When GTx gets a Data Abuse, update the MGR by adding G′x, which is the
group of all the SPs that GTx has interacted with so far, i.e G′x ∈ Gx as well as
all the SPs that got GTx Credential through sharing by SPs ∈ G′. Stop verifying
Gi, and kill GTx.
• Stop repeating and kill GTx after reaching a time threshold τGT−maxLife.
• If, after waiting for a time threshold τGT−idle, GTx does not get an Abuse, it
would repeat the above steps.
5.4.2 Simple Colluding Group Metric
This is an Intermediate Ranking Algorithm that is dependent on the MGR entries.
As stated in 5.4.1, the smaller the colluding G is, the stronger the probability that
its members are colluding. On this ground, the Simple Colluding Group Trust Met-
ric Record, TGTRsg(G) is created by copying the Gis from the MGR Record and
assigning each of which a TGTsg(Gi) Rank based on Equation 5.6.
TGTsg(Gi) = 1− 2
n
: where n = number of SPs ∈ G′i (5.6)
Equation 5.6: Group Trust Metric Rank for Gs, TGTsg(G)
Since it is possible that a specific SPx appears in n Gs. Hence, this Ranking Algorithm
would assign SPx a ranking value that is equivalent to the Rank of the smallest G
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it appears in per Equation 5.7. The individual TGTsg(SP ) Ranks are stored in the
TGT Record for SPs, TGTRsg(SP ).
TGTsg(SPx) = MIN(TGTsg(G), SPx) (5.7)
: ∀TGTsg(G) ∈ TGTRsg(G) where SPx ∈ G
Equation 5.7: Group Trust Metric for SPs, TGTsg(SP )
5.4.3 Strong Colluding Group Metric
This is another Intermediate Ranking Algorithm for the TGT Ranking Approach.
This Ranking Algorithm is also dependent on the MGR entries and tries to overcome
some of the weaknesses of the TGTsg Algorithm, see Subsection 5.4.2. As stated in
Subsection 5.4.1, the smaller the colluding G is, the stronger the probability that its
members are colluding. While the TGTsg Ranking Algorithm is a good attempt in
the quest to discover malicious colluding entities, it suffers from the fact that once the
collation size gets reasonably large, the TGTsg Ranks would always be high and, hence,
would increase the collation’s members Trustworthiness rather than reducing it. It is
true that it is normally difficult and expensive for an attacking entity to sustain a large
collation. Nevertheless, it is quite possible for a GT, especially when launching an
Abuse Delay Attack of Subsection 5.8.6, to end up with a very large TGTsg(G) entry.
That is because by the time it manages to get a Data Abuse, its testing Credential
would have been shared with many innocent SPs as well as other MSPs who are not
part of the suspected collation. Even without sharing, the Abuse delay attack would
cause the Selection Algorithms to select very large suspicious collations, from the IIR,
because of the noise made by the non-colluding (M)SPs, during the prolonged Abuse
delay, rendering the whole GT testing useless, see Subsection 5.6.2 for more details
about the IIR. For example, if the suspected collation size is 10, then the resulted
TGTsg Rank would be at least 80%, which indicates very good Trustworthiness.
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The Strong Colluding Group Metric, TGTsc, applies deeper analysis on the MGR
entries to detect possible collations. That is, it only considers Popular SPs, PSPs,
through the use of the SPR Record of Subsection 5.6.1, for its colluding analysis since
MPSPs are the most influential partners in any collation because of their popularity
among Users. Moreover, the TGTsc considers the frequency of appearance for any
recorded Gx including in the case where its members appear as members within a
larger Gy. The two factors that would reduce the TGTsc Rank for a Gx are: smaller
Gx size and higher frequency of appearance. Once the combination of these two factors
reaches a pre-adjusted threshold by the Auditor, the TGTsc Rank would be 0. This
threshold is called the Popular Colluding Record Threshold, or simply pcrThreshold.
In a similar fashion to the TGTsg Ranking Algorithm, there are TGTsc(SP ) Ranks
that are calculated using Equation 5.8 and stored in the TGTRsc(SP ) Record. In
addition, a modified version of the MGR Record called MGRsc is created for the
purpose of counting the frequency of appearances for each Gx even within a larger
Gy.
Given: pcrNum(SPx) =
n∑
i=0
2
Gi.size()
∗Gi.counter()
where n is the number of Gs containing SPx,
Gi.size() is the counter of how many times Gi appears in the MGR,
and pcrNum is a variable trying to count the number of assured collations
i.e. spam received after just two SPs got the Credential
Then: TGTsc(SPx) =
pcrThreshold− pcrNum(SPx)
pcrThreshold
∗ 100 (5.8)
Note that TGTsc(SPx) lower limit is 0
Equation 5.8: Strong Colluding Group Trust Rank, TGTsc(SP )
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5.4.4 Weak Colluding Group Metric
While TGTsc excels at detecting colluding MPSPs that normally would bypass the
TGTsg Ranking Algorithm, by launching the Abuse Delay Attack of Subsection 5.8.6,
there are cases where it would dramatically fail. Particularly speaking, when the
colluding MPSPs realise how the TGTsc works, they could deploy more complicated
colluding policies to elude it, Subsection 5.8.7. For example, they could decide not
to Abuse any User unless she deals with a minimum number of colluding MPSPs
regardless of the used Credential, NtoAbuseU , to prove that it is a real User rather than
a GT Agent with a single testing Credential. As an added advantage for the attackers,
such a policy would enable them to identify the new User as a human targeted User
in a faster way since all the Credentials she uses are counted in the decision process
rather than focusing on only the interactions of 1 Credential at a time. Such a policy
would trick the TGTsc Ranking Algorithm to suspect innocent PSPs to be colluding
because the reported Abuse logs for a single Abused Credential could simply include
only one member of the collation while the rest of the collation members could have
dealt with other Credentials generated by the Agent, to prove he is a genuine User.
In an attempt to counter such an attack, we introduce the Weak Colluding Group
Metric, TGTwc that is another Intermediate Ranking Algorithm for the TGT Ranking
Approach. While the TGTwc colluding analysis Equation is the same as TGTsc, see
Subsection 5.4.2, this Ranking Algorithm has two fundamental differences:
• The generated MGRwc includes not only the PSPs that have interacted with
the Abused Credential, but also the PSPs that have dealt with all the User’s
Credentials so far.
• To increase the maliciousness detection speed, TGTwc does not only consider
reports coming from GT Agents, but also all the IILs, see Subsection 5.6.2,
coming from ordinary Users.
From the above-mentioned rules, it can be seen why this Algorithm is named Weak.
It is normally unfair to consider every PSP that a User has dealt with prior to an
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Abuse Case as a suspected collation member. In addition, it is quite possible that
ordinary Users could act maliciously, perhaps artificial Users created by colluding
entities, to destroy the integrity of the Trust Network. For that, this Algorithm
should be deployed and utilized with extra caution to avoid mistakenly ranking down
innocent PSPs. For that, a separate Popular Weak Colluding Record Threshold,
pcrWeakThreshold, is created to control how harsh this Algorithm should be in
deducing a PSP is in fact colluding.
5.4.5 Group Testing Metric Record
This is the Final Ranking Algorithm for the TGT Ranking Approach. It is dependent
on the aggregated TGTsg(SPx), TGTsc(SPx), and TGTwc(SPx) Ranks for each SPx
within the Network. The Auditor would give each of these three Intermediate Rank-
ings a custom weight depending on the adopted Defensive Strategy, see Section 6.9,
and the currently observed Network status, see Subsection 5.6.4, to generate the final
TGT (SPx). All the different TGT (SP ) Ranks should be stored in a special Record
called the Group Testing Trust Record, or simply TGTR. The entries of this Record
can be calculated using the Equation 5.9.
TGT (SPx) =Wsg ∗ TGTsg(SPx) +Wsc ∗ TGTsc(SPx)
+Wwc ∗ TGTwc(SPx) (5.9)
where: Wsg +Wsc +Wwc = 100
Equation 5.9: Group Trust Rank, TGT(SP)
The case study 5.6 gives a glance at the main features and weaknesses of each Inter-
mediate Ranking Algorithm. This case study shows how different TGTRs could be
generated using the same Cases log based on the different assigned weights for each
of the Intermediate Ranking Algorithms. In addition, it shows that the TGTsg(SP )
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would be very similar to the TGTsc(SP ) because both are dependent on the reports
coming only from GT Agents regarding PSPs that have dealt with the Abused Creden-
tial only. One main difference between the two Ranking Approaches is the fact that
it is possible to reduce the Auditor’s certainty about the observed Strong Colluding
Attack by increasing the pcrThreshold value. In the case study, the pcrThreshold is
set to 2 causing the TGTsc Rank of the innocent PSPDGU4 to be better than its TGTsg
Rank since TGTsg lacks the certainty adjustment feature. Another main difference,
that cannot be spotted in this case study, is the fact that if the TGTsc Ranking Al-
gorithm detects a small suspicious Gx appearing together even once, it counts all the
other appearances of Gx members together, even within larger Gs, to filter out any
noise generated by normal Users’ activities and speed up the detection process.
When it comes to the TGTwc Ranking Algorithm, the results are quite different and
generally harsher than the rest of the TGT Intermediate Ranking Algorithms causing
more malicious and even some innocent PSPs to be ranked malicious as shown in
the case study. The reason is the fact that this Algorithm depends on the reports
coming from all the Network Users regarding all the PSPs a single User has dealt
with prior to receiving the first Abuse. This feature makes it possible to detect com-
plicated colluding attacks where the attack would be spanning across many Users’
Credentials, see Subsections 5.4.4 and 5.8.7. In the other hand, TGTwc is too aggres-
sive since it would consider groups of PSPs to be colluding just because they appear
frequently in the reported Cases. For that, the Auditor may decide to set the value of
pcrWeakThreshold a bit high to reduce the probability of ranking an innocent PSP
as malicious.
Example 5.6: TGT Case Study
let the entities of the Trust Network look like Table 5.8, current Users interactions
look like Table 5.9, current Agents interactions look like Table 5.10, PCRThreshold
== 2, and PCRWeakThreshold == 4. Then, the generated MGR, MGRsc, and
MGRwc would look like Tables 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 respectively. Furthermore, the
generated TGTsg(G), TGTsg(SP ), TGTsc(SP ), and TGTwc(SP ) would look like Tables
5.14, 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17 respectively. Finally, Tables 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21 show
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the different generated TGT values depending on the distributed weights given to the
different TGT Intermediate Ranking Algorithms. Note that the green cells denominate
correct Ranks, red cells denominate wrong Ranks, and white cells denominate neutral
Ranks. Also, note that in both Tables 5.9 and 5.10, the Abuse event is coloured the
same as the SPs who caused it for illustration purposes. In real-life, the Auditor would
have no idea who caused an Abuse or even how to differentiate for sure between PSPs,
SPs, MSPs, or MPSPs.
SP PSP MSP MPSP Colluding MPSP Uncolluding
SP1 PSPDGU4 MSP2 MPSP
DGU
3 MPSP13
SP6 PSP5 MSP9 MPSP7
SPDGU10 PSP8 MSP
DGU
11 MPSP15
SP12 PSP14 MSP17
PSP16
Table 5.8: Trust Network Entities
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
U1
Cred.1 PSPDGU4 SP12 Abuse MPSP7 MSP5 MPSP7
PSPDGU4 Shared with MPSP13
G’wc PSPDGU4 , MPSP13, PSP14
Cred.2 PSP14 MSP2 PSP8 MPSPDGU3 Abuse
MPSPDGU3 Shared with MSP17
G’wc MPSPDGU3 , PSPDGU4 , MPSP7, PSP8, MPSP13, PSP14
U2
Cred.1 PSP16 MPSP15 MPSP13 Abuse Abuse SP1
G’wc MPSPDGU3 , PSP5, MPSP13, MPSP15, PSP16
Cred.2 SP12 MPSPDGU3 Abuse MSP9
MPSPDGU3 Shared with MSP9, PSP5
G’wc MPSPDGU3 , PSP5, MPSP13, MPSP15, PSP16
Table 5.9: Current Users Interactions
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t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
GT1
G PSPDGU4 , MPSP13, PSP16
Cred.1 PSP16 PSPDGU4 MPSP13 Abuse Abuse
PSPDGU4 Shared with MPSP15
G’wc PSPDGU4 , MPSP7, MPSP13, PSP14, MPSP15, PSP16
Cred.2 Unimportant MPSP7 PSP14 SPAM PSP5
G’wc PSPDGU4 , MPSP7, PSP14, MPSP15, PSP16
G’ PSPDGU4 , MPSP13, MPSP15, PSP16
GT2
G MPSP13, MPSP15, PSP16
Cred.1 MPSP13 PSP16 Abuse
G’wc PSPDGU4 , MPSP7, MPSP13, PSP16
Cred.2 Unimportant PSPDGU4 MPSP7 PSP8
PSPDGU4 Shared with SP12
G’wc
G’ MPSP13, PSP16
Table 5.10: Current Agents Interactions
MGR
G Count
PSPDGU4 , MPSP13, MPSP15, PSP16 1
MPSP13, PSP16 1
Table 5.11: MGR
MGRsc
G Count
PSPDGU4 , MPSP13, MPSP15, PSP16 1
MPSP13, PSP16 2
Table 5.12: MGRsc
MGRwc
G Count
PSPDGU4 , MPSP13, PSP14 3
MPSPDGU3 , PSPDGU4 , MPSP7, PSP8, MPSP13, PSP14 1
MPSPDGU3 , PSP5, MPSP13, MPSP15, PSP16 2
PSPDGU4 , MPSP7, MPSP13, PSP14, MPSP15, PSP16 1
PSPDGU4 , MPSP7, PSP14, MPSP15, PSP16 2
PSPDGU4 , MPSP7, MPSP13, PSP16 2
Table 5.13: MGRwc
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TGTsg(G)
G Rank
PSPDGU4 , MPSP13, MPSP15, PSP16 50%
MPSP13, PSP16 0%
Table 5.14: TGTsg(G)
TGTsg(SP)
SP Rank
MPSPDGU3 100%
PSPDGU4 50%
PSP5 100%
MPSP7 100%
PSP8 100%
MPSP13 0%
MPSP15 50%
PSP16 0%
Table 5.15:
TGTsg(SP)
TGTsc(SP)
SP Rank
MPSPDGU3 100%
PSPDGU4 75%
PSP5 100%
MPSP7 100%
PSP8 100%
MPSP13 -25% ⇒ 0%
MPSP15 75%
PSP16 -25% ⇒ 0%
Table 5.16:
TGTsc(SP)
TGTwc(SP)
SP Rank
MPSPDGU3 71.67%
PSPDGU4 -11.67% ⇒ 0%
PSP5 80%
MPSP7 38.33%
PSP8 91.67%
MPSP13 -11.67% ⇒ 0%
MPSP15 51.67%
PSP16 26.67%
Table 5.17:
TGTwc(SP)
TGT
TGTsg weight 33.33%
TGTsc weight 33.33%
TGTwc weight 33.33%
SP Rank
MPSPDGU3 90.55%
PSPDGU4 41.66%
PSP5 93.32%
MPSP7 79.44%
PSP8 97.21%
MPSP13 0%
MPSP15 58.88%
PSP16 8.89%
Table 5.18: TGT Weights Com-
binations 1
TGT
TGTsg weight 80%
TGTsc weight 10%
TGTwc weight 10%
SP Rank
MPSPDGU3 97.17%
PSPDGU4 47.50%
PSP5 98%
MPSP7 93.83%
PSP8 99.17%
MPSP13 0%
MPSP15 52.67%
PSP16 2.67%
Table 5.19: TGT Weights Com-
binations 2
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TGT
TGTsg weight 10%
TGTsc weight 80%
TGTwc weight 10%
SP Rank
MPSPDGU3 97.17%
PSPDGU4 65%
PSP5 98%
MPSP7 93.83%
PSP8 99.17%
MPSP13 0%
MPSP15 70.17%
PSP16 2.67%
Table 5.20: TGT Weights Com-
binations 3
TGT
TGTsg weight 10%
TGTsc weight 10%
TGTwc weight 80%
SP Rank
MPSPDGU3 77.34%
PSPDGU4 12.5%
PSP5 84%
MPSP7 50.66%
PSP8 93.34%
MPSP13 0%
MPSP15 53.84%
PSP16 21.34%
Table 5.21: TGT Weights Com-
binations 4
5.5 Global Trust Metric Record
The Global Trust Metric, TG(SP), is the Final Ranking Algorithm that incorporates
all of the presented Ranking Approaches as they appear in Figure 5.1. It is dependent
on the aggregated TLavg(SP ), TST (SP ), and TGT (SP ) Ranks for each SPx within
the Network. The Auditor would give each of those three Ranks a custom weight
depending on the adopted Defensive Strategy, see Section 6.9, and the currently ob-
served Network status, see Subsection 5.6.4, to generate the final TG(SP ). All the
different TG(SP ) Ranks should be stored in a special Record called the Global Trust
Metric Record, or simply TGR. The entries of this Record can be calculated using
the Equation 5.10 while Example 5.7 demonstrate how it works.
Note that it may seems counter intuitive to assume that, for a certain SPx, it is
possible to get TLavg(SPx) = null while TST (SPx) 6= null since no SP would be
added to the Auditor ranking system before it appears in a reported Case and each
reported Case would be processed by both the GPD and the STD Algorithms which,
in turn, produces the TLavg and TST Ranks. However, when an SPx is banned from
the system, see Section 5.7, it is possible to ignore all the Cases where SPx appears
since it would be the accused SP for Abuse in all those Cases. Such ignorance could be
applied by all the Ranking Algorithms or might be restricted to only one Algorithm,
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the TLRavg for example. That is because ignoring all the Cases where an old MPSP
has appeared for a long time would cause a massive number of logs to be ignored
causing a major re-ranking shake to the system and increased inaccuracy that could
be irrecoverable, see Subsection 5.8.8.
TG(SPx) = WTLavg ∗ TLavg(SPx) +WTST ∗ TST (SPx)
+WTGT ∗ TGT (SPx) (5.10)
: where if any ranking value is null, its W would be divided
equally on the remaining ranks
Equation 5.10: Global Trust Metric, TG
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Example 5.7: Generating the TGR Record
Assume that at the current moment the TLRavg Record looks like Table 5.22, the
TSTR Record looks like Table 5.23, and the TGTRSP Record looks like Table 5.24.
If we let the Ranks weights to be WTLavg = 10,WTST = 20, and WTGT = 70, then the
corresponding TGR Record would looks like Table 5.25.
SP TLavg(SP )
SP1 50%
SP2 70%
SPDGU3 100%
SP4 44%
SP5 20%
SP6 null
SPDGU7 60%
SP8 19%
SP9 null
Table 5.22: TLRavg
SP TST(SP)
SP1 null
SP2 85%
SPDGU3 100%
SP4 20%
SP5 38%
SP6 null
SPDGU7 40%
SP8 47%
SP9 null
Table 5.23: TSTR
SP TGTSP (SP )
SP1 36%
SP2 44%
SPDGU3 100%
SP4 59%
SP5 null
SP6 60%
SPDGU7 75%
SP8 0%
SP9 null
Table 5.24: TGTRSP
SP TG(SP)
SP1 33.8%
SP2 54.8%
SPDGU3 100%
SP4 49.7%
SP5 29.9%
SP6 60%
SPDGU7 66.5%
SP8 11.3%
SP9 null
Table 5.25: TGR
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5.6 Utility Units
In this Section, we describe the basic Utility Units and how they would work as they
appear in Figure 5.1. In a nutshell, The SPs Popularity Record, SPR, is a Selection
Algorithm that aid the Auditor in the task of selecting candidate SPs for ST or GT
Raw Agent Testing based on their popularity among Users. The Initial Interaction
Record, IIR, is a Record of all the Initial Interactions Lists, IIL, for the Users that
are part of the Trust Network and would also serve as a Selection Algorithm since
the first SPs to acquire the compromised Credential are probably the ones who are
continuing to compromise it. The Data Governance Unit, DGU, is a powerful Utility
Unit to enforce Hard Trust in the Trust Network. The Trust Network Health Gauges
are a set of sensors to update the Auditor about the current status of the Network
and its own performance to adjust its defensive parameters, if necessary.
5.6.1 SPs Popularity Record
The ST Ranking Agent, see Subsection 5.3.2, is vital to detect malicious SPs that
operate independently while the GT Ranking Agent, see Subsection 5.4.1, does a great
job in detecting potential collusion among MSPs within the managed Trust Network.
Nevertheless, there must be some efficient and effective Selection Algorithms to select
single SPs for ST testing or groups of them for GT testing. The SPs Popularity
Record, SPR, is one of the vital Selection Algorithms to aid the Auditor in the task
of selecting candidate SPs for ST or GT testing.
The SPR, is necessary because most of the Users would deal most of the times with
a small set of popular SPs, PSPs, like Google, Facebook, and Twitter, for example.
The presence of other insignificant SPs in most of the reported Cases would generate
Data noise diverging the focus of the Ranking Algorithms away from the significant
(M)PSPs. For this, the SPR, should be created to order the SPs based on their
popularity. Then, Auditor could identify the Popular SPs List, PSL, by considering
the the top %20 of SPs in the SPR. This list could be then the subject for further
investigations, depending on the Deployment Rules of the Auditor, see Section 5.7.
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For the sake of simplicity, the %20 threshold is chosen based on the Pareto Principle,
which states that %80 of effects is generated by %20 of causes [121]. Nevertheless,
the Auditor admin could decide to change this threshold if necessary. Algorithm 5.5
shows the procedure to populate the SPR while Example 5.8 demonstrates it.
Algorithm 5.5: The SPs Popularity Record, SPR
• At the initialization of the Trust Network, create an empty SPR Record.
• For every newly reported case Ci, traverse each SP ∈ Ci.
• If the currently traversed SP does not have an entry in the SPR, create a new
entry for it with a counter value = 1.
• If the currently traversed SP has an entry in the SPR, increase its counter by 1.
• Keep the SPR ordered by the value of its counters.
• If the current PSL is requested, return the top %20 of the SPR.
Example 5.8: Generating the SPR Record
If the current recorded activities by all Users looks like Table 5.26, then the SPR
Record would looks like Table 5.27.
User Interactions
U1
SP1, SPDGU3 , Abuse!, SP5,
SP1, Abuse!
U2
SPDGU3 , SP1, SP4, Abuse!,
SP6, SP1, Abuse!
Table 5.26: Users’ Interac-
tions
PSL? SP Counter
PSL SP1 4
SPDGU3 2
SP4 1
SP5 1
SP6 1
Table 5.27: SPR
5.6.2 Initial Interactions Record
As stated in 5.6.1, there must be some efficient and effective Selection Algorithms
to select groups of SPs for ST and GT Raw Testing Agents inspections. The Initial
Interactions Record, IIR, is another powerful Selection Algorithm to aid the Auditor
in that selection task. The IIR is a Record of all the Initial Interactions Lists, IIL,
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for the Users that are part of the Trust Network. The IIL is a good starting point
for the Auditor to form a testing group, Gi, that is a good candidate for further GT
Agents testing. That is because if Ux has dealt with Gi members before getting its
first Abuse, then the Auditor would be sure that at least one SPx ∈ Gi is acting
maliciously. If Ux continued interacting with Gi+1 before getting the second Abuse,
it would be wrong to assume that there is at least one SPy ∈ Gi+1 and SPy /∈ Gi
acting maliciously. That is because the Abuse might be coming from the malicious
SPx ∈ Gi that we assumed its existence earlier.
In real-life large Trust Networks, the raw IIR would still be a large inefficient pool of
Gs to choose from for GT Agents testing. That is, fine grained selection mechanisms
are needed. For that, we create a statistical Record named the Popular IILs, PIILs. As
the name suggests, this Record would count how many times a certain IIL is observed
within the IIR to select the mostly reported IILs. That is important because those
frequently appearing SPs in the reported initial Abuses would be highly suspicious
for engaging in colluding activities. The chronological order of SPs in IILs should
be neglected by both the IIR and the PIILs. Moreover, if IILx ∈ IILy, then the
IILy should be counted twice: in its own Record and in the IILx Record because
members of IILx might be the main colluding party in the whole Trust Network and
the presence of other SPs with them in other IILs might be just coincidences, i.e.
Data noise. The IILs entries of the PIILs Record should be ordered by the highest
appearing frequency. Algorithm 5.6 shows the procedure to populate the IIR and its
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associated PIILs while Example 5.9 demonstrates it.
Algorithm 5.6: The Initial Interactions Record, IIR and The PIILs
• At the initialization of the Trust Network, create an empty IIR Record and an
empty PIILs Record.
• If a Ux reports an Abuse to a Credential Credy, check whether Credy has a
presence in the IIR, i.e. whether this is the initial Abuse to it.
• If the previous check reveals that this is the initial Abuse to Credy, then create
a new IIL for Credy, IILy, containing all the unique SPs that Ux has dealt with
using Credy prior to getting its initial Abuse.
• Attach to the IILy a list of PSPs, categorised by the SPR of Subsection 5.6.1,
that Ux has dealt with using all its Credentials prior to getting Credy initial
Abuse. This list is needed by the TGTwc Ranking Algorithm of Subsection 5.4.4.
Name this list Gwc.
• Add IILy to the IIR.
• Check whether the members of IILy, Gv, exist in the PIILs as a standalone
entry. If it does, then increase that entry’s Counter by 1.
• If the previous check reveals that Gv does not exist in the PIILs, then add IILy
to the PIILs.
• When adding a new IILy to the PIILs, check all the PIILs entries. If an entry
ILLz where ILLy ∈ ILLz exists, then increase the IILy counter by 1. If an entry
IILw where IILw ∈ IILy exists, then increase IILw counter by 1.
• After adding a new IILy to the PIILs, update the PIILs entries on a descending
order based on the entries counters.
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Example 5.9: Generating the IIR Record
If the current Users’ interactions look like Table 5.28, then the generated IIR should
looks like Table 5.29 and the associated PIILs should looks like Table 5.30.
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
U1
C1 PSPDGU3 PSP13 Abuse PSP7 SP5 PSP10
PSPDGU3
Shared with
PSP8
C2 PSP14 SP2 PSPDGU3 PSP8 PSPDGU4 Abuse
PSPDGU3
Shared with
SP17
PSPDGU4
Shared with
PSP13
U2
C1 PSP14 PSP8 PSP13 Abuse SP1 Abuse
C2 PSP8 PSPDGU3 Abuse SP9
PSPDGU3
Shared with
PSP13
Table 5.28: Current Users Interactions
List Contents
IILU1:C1 PSP
DGU
3 , PSP8, PSP13
Gwc(IILU1:C1 ) PSPDGU3 , PSP8, PSP13, PSP14
IILU1:C2 SP2, PSP
DGU
3 , PSP
DGU
4 , PSP8, PSP13, PSP14, SP17
Gwc(IILU1:C2 ) PSPDGU3 , PSPDGU4 , PSP7, PSP8, PSP13, PSP14
IILU2:C1 PSP8, PSP13, PSP14
Gwc(IILU2:C1 ) PSPDGU3 , PSP8, PSP13, PSP14
IILU2:C2 PSP
DGU
3 , PSP8, PSP13
Gwc(IILU2:C2 ) PSPDGU3 , PSP8, PSP13, PSP14
Table 5.29: IIR
List Contents Count
IIL1 PSPDGU3 , PSP8, PSP13 3
IIL2 PSP8, PSP13, PSP14 2
IIL3 SP2, PSPDGU3 , PSP
DGU
4 , PSP8, PSP13, PSP14, SP17 1
Table 5.30: PIILs
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5.6.3 Data Governance Unit
The Data Governance Unit, DGU, is a powerful Utility Unit to enforce Hard Trust
in the Trust Network. As detailed in Section 4.4, the DGU Unit should be imple-
mented so that it makes it impossible for any SP that acquires a Credential to handle
it without compliance to the Credential’s Sticky Policies. In addition, DGU should
record all internal accesses to the Credential as well as all its approved sharing des-
tinations. However, deploying DGU without proper Deployment Rules and a stable
supporting Ranking Algorithms would not guarantee Trust Enforcement within the
Trust Network, see Subsection 2.8. That is mainly because it is not expected that
all Network entities, Users and SPs, would agree to Install DGU once it is rolled out
without initial hesitation and resistance. Hence, there would still be loopholes during
the bootstrapping period where MSPs would be able to Abuse whatever Credentials
they acquire by sharing them, with compliance to the Sticky Policies, to other MSPs,
which did not Install DGU yet, to do the Abuse on their behalf, see Subsection 5.8.7.
Of course, targeted attacks is always possible, see Section 2.4, but dealing with this
category of malicious attacks is out of this thesis scope, see Section 1.3.
Given the associated vulnerabilities of deploying DGU during bootstrapping period
when not all entities are expected to voluntarily Install DGU, there are some rules
the Auditor can customise to mitigate this issue. First of all, when the Rank of a
given SP gets lower than the Banning-Threshold, see Section 5.7, it could give that
SP the chance to avoid getting banned by agreeing to Install DGU. This would help
in reducing the amount of banned innocent SPs by giving them the chance to prove
their innocence. Nevertheless, those innocent SPs may find it annoying to Install
DGU with all its limitations, specially in small new Trust Networks that are trying
to bootstrap. For such SPs, it might be preferable to be banned instead of Installing
DGU. Hence, the following two installations options could be utilized by the Auditor
to make it easier for SPs to start adopting the DGU technology:
• Install DGU: this option allows the SP that agrees to Install DGU to share
the acquired Credentials with any other SP as long as this sharing does not
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violate the Credentials’ Sticky Policies.
• Enable Strict DGU: in addition to satisfying the Credentials’ Sticky Policies,
this option restricts the SP that has already Installed DGU from sharing the
acquired Credentials unless with other SPs that have also Installed DGU to
completely close the loophole that enables Data abusing by sharing with SPs
that have not Installed DGU yet.
Given the above installation options, the Auditor should deploy different handling
rules for each SP Installing DGU depending on the installation option. It should be
safe to give an SP that choose to Enable Strict DGU option a 100% Trust Rank and,
then, start ignoring its appearance in new Cases’ logs since it wonâĂŹt be able to
Abuse Users under any circumstances, except for Targeted Attack Abuse that is out
of scope. On the other hand, SPs that choose the Install DGU option should not
get absolute Trust. Rather, they should be ranked and evaluated by the ordinary
Ranking Algorithms just like any other SP. However, once an SP choose to Install
DGU, it should get a fresh start by clearing its TLRavg, TST , and TGT Ranks. In
addition, it should get a new high TGR Rank as an appreciation for their acceptance
to Install DGU. The colluding SPs which were forced to Install DGU may resort
to more complicated forms of colluding that are more challenging to detect by the
current Ranking Algorithms, see Subsection 5.8.7. For that, the Post DGU Install -
Rank should not be too high, so it does not take too long to lower down and, eventually,
detect its malicious behaviour, if there is any. Algorithm 5.7 explains how an Auditor
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could utilize the DGU.
Algorithm 5.7: How Auditor could Utilize DGU
• If TGR(SPx) ≤ Banning Threshold, then the Auditor could offer SPx to either
Install DGU or getting banned of the Trust Network
• If SPx accepted to Install DGU, then:
– Ignore all its TLRavg Cases prior to this time without deleting or ignoring
the TLRavg Ranks for other SPs that appeared with SPx in the same logs.
– Delete all its TST and TGT Cases, including the rest of SPs that appear
within those Cases.
– Give SPx a new high TGR Rank = Post DGU Install Rank.
– Continue evaluating SPx as normal.
• If the TGR Rank of SPDGUx ≤ Banning Threshold, then the Auditor should
offer SPDGUx to either Enable Strict DGU or getting banned from the Network.
• If SPx accepted to Enable Strict DGU, then:
– Ignore all its TLRavg Cases prior to this time without deleting or ignoring
the TLRavg Ranks for other SPs that appeared with SPx in the same logs.
– Delete all its TST and TGT Cases, including the rest of SPs that appear
within those Cases.
– Give SPx a new high TGR Rank = Post Enable Strict DGU Rank (nor-
mally 100%).
– Stop evaluating SPx and ignore all its appearances in new Cases.
• If SPx denied to Install DGU or Enable Strict DGU when either is offered, then:
– Close all the Cases where SPx appears by declaring that SPx is accused as
the Abuser.
– Depending on the Deployment Rules, the Auditor may want to ignore all
the TGT logs where SPx has appeared.
– Ban SPx from the Trust Network.
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5.6.4 Trust Network Health Gauges
In a dynamic large Trust Network, it should be expected that Users would have
altering interaction trends while the malicious entities would deploy adaptive attacks
in their quest to bypass the proposed Ranking Algorithms and Defensive Strategies,
see Section 5.8. For that, it is crucial for a successful Trust Auditor to have a set
of powerful sensors to provide feedback reports about the health status of the Trust
Network. Such sensors, which we call Trust Health Gauges, would let the Auditor
knows whether its current deployed Defensive Strategy is doing a good job or it is time
to try something new since the attackers may have already optimized their Counter-
Attacking Strategies, see Section 6.7 for details about the Defensive Strategies and
the Counter-Attacking Strategies.
Four general groups of Trust Health Gauges are described below. Note the omitting
of the detailed equations since they are simple formulas that could be implied from
the textual description. Also, note that a fifth possible group to analyse the malicious
Users trends is not listed here since detecting malicious Users would require a User
Reliability Index, see Subsection 7.3.7, which is out of this thesis scope.
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Group 1: General Health Gauges
• The Trust Health Ratio of MSPs: Hsp = 1− SPnMSPs−estSPn
• The Trust Health Ratio of Undetected MSPs: Hsp−undetected = SPnMSPs−detectedSPnMSPs−est
• The Trust Health Ratio of MSPs Growth Rate: Hsp−GR = 1− SPGR−MSPsSPGR
• The Trust Health Ratio of Users Credentials Integrity: HCred = 1− Credn−abusedCredn
• The Trust Health Ratio of Open Cases: HC−open = 1− CopenCn
• The Cases Growth Rate: CGR(t2) = Cn(t2)−Cn(t1)Cn(t1)∗(t2−t1)
• The Cases with new PII Growth Rate:
CGR−newPII(t2) = Cn−newPII(t2)−Cn−newPII(t1)Cn−newPII(t1)∗(t2−t1)
• The Users Growth Rate: UGR(t2) = Un(t2)−Un(t1)Un(11)(t2−t1)
• The SPs Growth Rate: SPGR(t2) = SPn(t2)−SPn(t1)SPn(t1)∗(t2−t1)
• The MSPs Growth Rate: SPGR−MSPs(t2) = SPnMSPs−est(t2)−SPnMPSs−est(t1)SPnMSPs−est(t1)∗(t2−t1)
The metrics of this group could be used by the Auditor to imply many facts about the
current health status of the Trust Network. For example, a low Hsp would indicate
an infected Network with a high density of MSPs and, hence, Users should take extra
caution when dealing with any SP while the Auditor should deploy more Aggressive
Defensive Strategies, see Section 6.7. Moreover, a high Hsp−GR value would indicate
that the Network is getting more attractive for attackers. That could be caused by its
weak Defensive Strategy, its huge success, or both. Another example would be a large
value of HCred combined with a small value of HC−open would indicate a low volume of
malicious activities that are complex enough to defeat the Defensive Strategy. That
would be an indicator that the current deployed Defensive Strategy has successfully
deterred malicious entities from launching inexpensive massive attacks and resorted to
more expensive and less attractive forms of colluding attacks as the only way to gain
anything from the Trust Network, leading to a small number of Abuse Cases that are
mostly not resolved. A final example would be the observation of large values of UGR
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and SPGR that would indicate an active and growing Network while small values of
the same variables would indicate a saturating, possibly distrusted, Network status.
Group 2: Testing Agents Health Gauges
• The Performance Ratio of the ST Agents: PST = ST+STn where ST+ is the number
of Agents that received Abuse, as anticipated by the Selection Algorithm
• The Performance Ratio of the GT Agents: PGT = GT+GTn where GT+ is the number
of Agents that received Abuse, as anticipated by the Selection Algorithm
• The MIN, MAX, AVG, and Deviation σ of the Following Variables: Size(GT+),
τtoST+ , τtoGT+ , NtoST+ (number of recreated STs needed to detect an MSP), and
NtoGT+ (number of recreated GT Agents to detect a malicious collation)
These internal Health Gauges should help the Auditor in optimising how the Raw
Ranking Agents are deployed. For example, large PST and PGT values may indicate
effective Selection Algorithms and, hence, the Auditor may decide it is not yet the
time to change the settings (unless the G sizes for the GT Agents is very large, leading
to less assertive Ranks). Another example is utilising the AVG value of Size(GT+) to
optimize the selected G size for new GT Agents while the values of τtoST+ and τtoGT+
could be used to adjust the Agents killing time. Furthermore, large NtoST+ and NtoGT+
would indicate the utilisation of a Users-Drop Attacking Algorithm by the attackers,
see Subsection 5.8.6. Lastly, observing the deviation σ is vital because high σ values
would indicate that the malicious activities do vary in their patterns and, hence, the
AVG values should not be relied upon heavily to optimize the deployed Defensive
Strategy.
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Group 3: Malicious SPs Trends Gauges
• The Number of Actual Detected MSPs: SPnMSPs−act
• The Number of Estimated Total MSPs: SPnMSPs−est = CopenAV G(CMR) +SPnMSPs−act
• The number of Cases required to detect an MSP: CMR(SPx) = ∑ni=1 i where n
is the number of all Ci such that SPx ∈ Ci
• The MIN, MAX, AVG, and Deviation σ of the following variables: CMR,
NMSPs−Uncollding(Cx) (number of suspicious individual SPs, not part of a sus-
pected collations within Cx), and NMSPs−Colluding(Cx) (number of different sus-
picious malicious collations within Cx)
This is another set of internal Health Gauges to help the Auditor understands the
MSPs trends and, hence, adjust its Defensive Strategies. For example, a low AVG
value of CMR could indicate an effective Defensive Strategy or, more likely, most of the
detected attacks are made by immature attackers. However, combining a low AVG
CMR with a low Hsp−undetected value would indicate that the current Defensive Strategy
is only good at catching simple attacks and is ineffective at detecting more complicated
attacks that are currently being launched. Another example would be observing
high values of NMSPs−Uncolluding(Cx) and NMSPs−Colluding(Cx) indicating that there
are many attacking entities, larger collation that are unobserved yet, or high ratio of
Users not reporting all their Abuse Cases.
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Group 4: Ranking Algorithms Trends Gauges
• The Ratio of detected SPs by each Ranking Algorithm:
RDeetctedBy−TLRavg , RDetectedBy−TST , RDetectedBy−TGTsg , RDetectedBy−TGTsc ,
RDetectedBy−TGTwc , RDetectedBy−TGR
• The Ratio of detected Colluding, Uncolluding, Banned, Installed DGU, and
Enabled Strict DGU SPs: RDetected−Colluding, RDetected−Uncolluding, RBanned,
RInstall DGU , REnable StrictDGU
• The Growth Rate of detected MSPs by each Ranking Algorithm:
GRDetctedBy−TLRavg , GRDetctedBy−TST , GRDetctedBy−TGTsg , GRDetctedBy−TGTsc ,
GRDetctedBy−TGTwc , GRDetctedBy−TGR
• The Growth Rate of detected Colluding, Uncolluding, Banned, Installed
DGU, and Enabled Strict DGU SPs: GRDetected−Colluding, GRDetected−Uncolluding,
GRBanned, GRInstallDGU , GREnable StrictDGU
This is another set of internal Health Gauges to help the Auditor in understanding
how its deployed Ranking Algorithms are performing and how the SPs are affected
to better adjust its Defensive Strategies. For example, a low RDetectedBy−TST could
indicate that most attackers at the moment are colluding entities and, hence, the ST
Ranking Agent could be turned off to reduce the associated cost of running it. A high
RDetectedBy−TGTwc could indicate either more complicated forms of Colluding Attacks
that are being deployed against the system or the fact that the currently deployed
Defensive Strategy is so aggressive that many innocent SPs are being mistakenly
detected by the TGTwc Ranking Algorithm. The GR rates would also help the Auditor
in adjusting the Algorithms’ weights in the TG formula in favour of the Detector that
is showing a higher GR rate. While high Ratios of RInstall DGU and REnable Strict DGU
would indicate that most of the SPs have finally accepted the DGU technology and,
hence, the Abuse rates should be anticipated to drop down sharply. A high Ratio
of RBanned may indicate that the current Defensive Strategy is aggressive and many
innocent SPs are refusing to Install DGU and prefer to be banned from the Network.
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5.7 Basic Deployment Rules
By the aid of the aforementioned Ranking Algorithms and Utility Units, the Auditor
should define a set of Deployment Rules to control how those basic building blocks
would interact with each other. Below is a sample set of such rules that are suggested
to start running the Trust Framework. Nevertheless, our exhaustive Simulation Pro-
cess generated a set of Defensive Strategies with differing Deployment Rules suitable
for different environmental conditions against a variety of Counter-Attacking Strate-
gies, see Section 6.7.
General Rules
• Rule 1: Set suspiciousSPRank = 25%.
• Rule 2: Create the suspiciousSPs Record to contain all the SPs that show
suspicious behaviour.
• Rule 3: Create the bannedSps Record to contain all the banned SPs from the
Network.
• Rule 4: Set banningSPRank = 5%.
• Rule 5: Set the suspiciousRange = 5%.
• Rule 6: When we get TG(SPx) ≤ suspiciousSPRank then add SPx to the
guiltySPs(Cy)∀Cy where SPx ∈ Cy and @SPz ∈ Cy where TG(SPz) ≤ TG(SPx).
Also, add SPx to the suspiciousSPs Record.
• Rule 7: ∀Cx where ∃SPy ∈ guiltySPs(Cx) and ∃SPz where
TG(SPz) ≈ TG(SPy)± suspiciousRange, add ∀SPz
to guiltySPs(Cx) and to the suspiciousSPs Record.
• Rule 8: ∀Cx where ∃SPy where TG(SPy) ≤ banningSPRank, then give SPy
the option to Install DGU, Enable Strict DGU if it has already Installed DGU,
or getting banned. If SPy refused the DGU offer, add SPy to the bannedSPs
Record and ban it from the Network.
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• Rule 9: ∀Cx where MIN(guiltySPs(Cx)) = SPy and
∃SPz ∈ guiltySPs(Cx) where TG(SPz) > (TG(SPy) + suspiciousRange), then
remove ∀SPz from guiltySPs(Cx). If Cx has been already closed, then reopen it
to update the guiltySPs(Cx) Record and regenerate all the Ranks accordingly.
If SPz was banned, the ban might be reversed if the Ranks recalculation would
lead to TG(SPz) > banningSPRank.
• Rule 10: Create the PSL Record by aggregating the top 20% of the SPR
entries.
TLRavg Rules
• Rule 1: Set the minimum number of Users who have interacted with SPx before
deciding to ban SPx based solely on TLRavg(SPx) Ranking, in the absence of
TGT (SPx) Rank, TLRUsToBanSP = 5.
• Rule 2: Set the minimum number of Users who have interacted with PSPx be-
fore deciding to ban PSPx based solely on TLRavg(PSPx) Rank, in the absence
of the TGT (PSPx) Rank, TLRUsToBanPSP = 20.
TST Rules
• Rule 1: ∀ ST Agents, let τST−maxLife = 60 Days and τST−idle = 1 Day.
• Rule 2: Create an ST (SPx) ∀SPx ∈ PSL.
• Rule 3: Create an ST (SPx) ∀SPx ∈ top 20% of TLRavg.
• Rule 4: Create an ST (SPx) ∀SPx ∈ bottom 20% of TLRavg.
• Rule 5: Create an ST (SPx) ∀SPx ∈ IIR(IILy) : IILy(size) = 1.
TGT Rules
• Rule 1: ∀ GT Agents, let τGT−maxLife = 60 Days and τGT−idle = 1 Day.
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• Rule 2: Create a GT (SPx) ∀SPx ∈ PSL.
• Rule 3: Create a GT (SPx) ∀ top 20% of PIILs entries.
• Rule 4: Ignore ∀Gy where SPx ∈ Gy and SPx ∈ bannedSPs in the TGT
calculations. Recalculate all the TGT Ranks for the rest of SPs accordingly.
DGU Rules
• Rule 1: Create the Installed DGU Record to contain all the SPs that agreed
to Install DGU.
• Rule 2: Create the Enabled Strict DGU Record to contain all the SPs that
agreed to Enable Strict DGU.
• Rule 3: Set the postInstallDGURank = 80%.
• Rule 4: Set the postEnableStrictDGURank = 100%.
• Rule 5: Set the probability of inviting a random SPx to Install DGU at a given
day to be vInstall DGU = 2%.
• Rule 6: Set the probability of inviting a random SPx to Enable Strict DGU at
a given day to be vStrict DGU = 1%.
• Rule 7: ∀SPx who agree to Install DGU at ti, ignore ∀Cy where SPx ∈
Cy and Cy created before ti while calculating TLRavg(SPx) and TST (SPx).
Remove ∀Gy where SPx ∈ Gy and Gy created before ti. Set TG(SPx) =
postInstallDGURank.
• Rule 8: ∀SPx who agrees to Enable Strict DGU at ti, ignore ∀Cy where SPx ∈
Cy and Cy created before ti while calculating TLRavg(SPx) and TST (SPx).
Remove ∀Gy where SPx ∈ Gy and Gy created before ti. Set TG(SPx) =
postEnableStrictDGURank. Ignore SPx presence in any future Cz in the cal-
culations of the different Ranking Algorithms.
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5.8 Threat Model
In Section 3.5, we argue that the current Trust Management Frameworks are doing
excellent job in providing most of the Trust Requirements, except for the vital re-
quirement of Continuous Data Control. For that, we introduce our Trust Framework
Design in Section 4.1 where we borrow most of the components from existing Trust
Frameworks like OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0. Nevertheless, we introduce in that
Section a completely new component we called the Auditor, which we explain in great
detail in this Chapter, to provide Continuous Data Control.
Given that the Auditor is a completely new component that does not exist in the
current literature the same way we design in this thesis, it is obligatory for us to
study its threat model. That is because even the simplest forms of attacks against
this Auditor, see the Simple Data Abusing Algorithms of Subsection 5.8.6, would not
be tackled by currently available Security toolkit. Nevertheless, studying the threat
models for the rest of the components appearing in Section 4.1 is out of our scope.
For that, we are not going to consider, for example, the threat of Man in the Middle
Attack since it is associated with the Encrypted Communication Channel component.
Similarly, we will not consider the Social Engineering Attack aiming to convince the
User or SP to voluntarily compromise their Credentials since it is targeting the humans
using the Trust Framework rather than attacking a specific component within the
Trust Framework.
In this threat model, the serious possible attacks to compromise the proposed Auditor
are introduced. Some of these attacks are subjects of further simulation studies in
Chapter 6 to better determine the extent of their influence on the overall Auditor
performance. Other threats are not simulated for lack of resources issues. Never-
theless, Chapter 7 contains some theoretical mitigations and possible future research
directions to tackle the presented threats as well as general discussions of their extent
and possible effects in light of the simulation results and the proposed optimisations.
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5.8.1 Users not Reporting All Abuse Cases
Ideally, all Users would report all the Abuse Cases they receive. However, this be-
haviour is unlikely to be true in real-life for a variety of reasons. Such reasons could
be a cumbersome and confusing reporting procedure for the Users, lack of faith in the
Trust Framework’s ability to detect the malicious entities, or simply laziness. It is
expected that the larger the number of ignored Cases by Users, CnI , the greater the
negative effect would be on the overall accuracy of the calculated Ranks. Particularly
speaking, the TLRavg Ranks would be the most sensitive metric to changes in CnI .
That is because of the fact that TLavg calculations are dependent on the chronological
order of appearance of each SP within the reported Case log and, hence, ignoring to re-
port an Abuse could cause massive TLavg distortion. It is also expected to negatively
affect the TGT Ranks, with less severity, because the resulted potential colluding
groups would get larger causing less certainty about whether they are colluding or
not. Nevertheless, even if Users do not report all Cases, once an SPx is considered
malicious, it would be possible to reopen closed Cases were SPx is involved and recon-
sider the possibility that SPx is the actual Abuser rather than SPy that was accused
for this Abuse. This recalculation is vital for Auditors that are heavily dependent on
the TLRavg Ranking Algorithm. The simulation experiments in Chapter 6 confirm
these expectations, see Section 7.2.1.
5.8.2 Malicious Users Reports
This is a tricky attack to detect. The goal of such an attack could be either to
give MSPs high Trust Ranks or to give Trustworthy SPs lower Trust Ranks through
reporting fake Cases. This attack affects mainly the TLRavg Ranking Algorithm and
PIILs Record that is used as a selector for GT Agent Testing. This threat is not
simulated in Chapter 6 but a potential mitigation is discussed in 7.3.7.
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5.8.3 Making Money by Fooling the Testing Agents
This is an interesting possible attack against our proposed idea of Testing Agents
presented in Subsections 5.3.2 and 5.4.1. Unlike the rest of the attacks, this attack
aims to make money rather than to compromise Users’ Credentials. When the Auditor
has suspicions about a PSPx, it would probably create one or more Testing Agents
to interact with it. If the service provided by PSPx is a paid service, then the Testing
Agents would have to pay for the service they request to carry on their testing. Hence,
it is possible for PSPx to occasionally Abuse some of its Users to raise suspicions and
let the Agents start their paid investigations. By employing some Malicious Users
who would be colluding with PSPx, PSPx could guarantee that it would never be
detected by the Auditor if it Abuses only those Malicious Users. That is, the Auditor
would receive Abuse Cases regarding the actions of PSPx only from the colluding
Users. PSPx may never take the risk of abusing any Uncolluding User. While we
have not evaluated this threat in our Simulation Process, the proposed mitigation for
Malicious Users in Subsection 7.3.7 should help tackling this type of attacks.
5.8.4 SPs Sharing Users’ Credentials with MSPs Unintentionally
This threat is not an attack. Rather, it is a possible collaboration between an inno-
cent SPx with malicious SPy without SPx knowing the malicious intentions of SPy.
SPx could simply decide to exchange Users’ Credentials, which have Sticky Policies
allowing such exchanges, with a popular SPy for a variety of reasons like marketing.
If it happens that SPy is malicious, it would simply start abusing the Credentials it
acquired through legitimate sharing with SPx. Such accidental collaborations were
assumed in the Simulation Model of Chapter 6 but without trying to anticipate the
extent of their negative effects. However, some mitigations to minimise this threat
effect are offered in 7.3.3.
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5.8.5 Reverse Engineering the Auditor Algorithms by an ME
A Malicious Entity, ME, may inject the Trust Network with a huge number of ma-
licious Users who would interact genuinely with MSPs belonging to the same ME.
Such Users would report Cases to the Auditor and then would monitor how the TG
values corresponding to those reported MSPs would be affected by the different Users
reporting patterns. By doing this, the ME would be able to reconstruct a rough model
of the Auditor’s internal deployed Ranking Algorithms along with their associated De-
ployment Rules and, hence, would be able to optimize its Counter-Attacking Strategy
accordingly.
Another method to gather reliable facts about the Auditor’s internal Ranking Algo-
rithms would be for a single person, or entity, to create several temporary SPs that
would indulge in malicious activities and, once caught, it would capture the char-
acteristics of the User that turns out to be the Testing Agent, i.e. its interaction
pattern like frequency and variety. The constructed model would be fed to other SPs
that belong to the same undercover owner in a feedback loop learning process. Every
caught SP would contribute its Data to improve the reconstructed model and feed it
to the learning feedback loop.
A more powerful method to infer the Auditor’s Algorithms would be to alter the
Attacking Settings and monitor whether these changes are affecting their published
TG Rankings negatively, indicating that the Auditor is aware of their moves, or not.
In the Uncolluding Attackers case, the main Ranking Algorithms that they should
Counter-Attack are the TLRavg and TST Ranking Algorithms, see Sections 5.2 and
5.3. The TLRavg Ranking Algorithm is weak and easily fooled by moderate Attacking
settings. Hence, a wise Auditor is better off deploying the TST Ranking Algorithm
to minimise the threats of the Uncolluding Attackers. Nevertheless, the TST Rank-
ing Algorithm comes with the high cost of required Testing Agents. For that, the
Auditor may wish to turn off the TST Ranking Algorithm at some periods, assum-
ing the Uncolluding Attackers wont notice this closure, to minimise the Agents cost.
If the Uncolluding Attackers got able to notice, or guess, this period of turned off
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TST Ranking Algorithm, they could try take advantage by relaxing their attacking
settings, to Abuse more Users without being caught. When doing so, they would
keep an eye to see whether their official TG ranks published by the Auditor are being
reduced significantly. If they are, that would signal that the Auditor is turning on the
TST Ranking Algorithm and it is time to deploy more complex Counter-Attacking
Strategies.
Similarly for the Colluding Attackers, they could start their Attacks with, for exam-
ple, Strong Colluding Attacks. Once the Auditor deploys a Strong Colluding oriented
Defensive Strategy, the Attackers would know it by observing their TG Ranks falling
down gradually. When the Attackers are sure that the Defensive Strategy is Strong
Colluding oriented, they could switch to Weak Colluding Attacks. Once they observe
their TG Ranks falling gradually, they would know that the Auditor has finally dis-
covered their new technique and, hence, they should switch back to Strong Colluding
Attacking Strategy or perhaps a mixture of the two Attacking Strategies. See Sec-
tion 6.7 for more details about the Defensive Strategies and the Counter-Attacking
Strategies.
5.8.6 Misleading the Auditor with Simple Data Abusing Algorithms
It is expected that smart MSPs would do their homework and read this open source
proposal to understand the basic building blocks and how to fool them. The following
are some of the important Simple Data Abusing Algorithms that could be deployed
by them:
• Abuse-Delay Attack: knowing that the Auditor deploys the GPD Algorithm,
an MSPx could launch this attack where it simply sets a timer to delay abusing
the User to fool the GPD Algorithm by giving time for other, possibly innocent
SPs, to appear in the Case log after MSPx. The longer the delay, the higher
the number of other SPs that would appear in the chain causing the Rank of
MSPx to get even more better.
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• Abuse-Bombarding Attack: To make things even worse, the User may have
only interacted once with MSPx but MSPx could combine the Abuse-Delay
attack with a Abuse-Bombarding Attack where it would delay abusing its victim
User by a long enough period before bombarding him with consecutive Abuses.
That would result in mistakenly giving MSPx a high TLavg(SPx) while others,
probably PSPs, would get low TLavg(SP ) values. That is because within the
short interval between each consecutive Abuse, it is highly likely that the User
would have dealt with a PSP that would in turn appear as a sole SP in the
reported Cases for each of the bombarded Abuse Cases.
• Credential Drop and User-Drop Attacks: knowing that the Auditor could
create some form of Testing Agents, MSPx may decides to deploy a Credential-
Drop Attack where it decides to neglect abusing a specific Credential belonging
to Usery. A special case of this attack would be the User-Drop Attack where
MSPx would neglect all the Credentials belonging to Usery. The dropping
could be for a temporary period or could be permanent. In case of temporary
dropping, continuous interactions for a long enough period would enable the
Testing Agent to eventually get positive results. However, in case of permanent
dropping, if the Testing Agent happened to be an ignored User or if the main
Testing Credential happened to be the ignored Credential, then the Agent would
never get an Abuse from the tested MSPx and, hence, would always return
negative results. The Dropping Attacking Algorithm could be simply random
or could be based on some guessed or implied facts, e.g. the ratio of Testers
Users
or the
interaction patterns of genuine Users like frequency and variety, see Subsection
5.8.5.
5.8.7 Colluding M(P)SPs
In spirit of getting reliable facts about how the Auditor works, MSPs could decide to
collude by sharing their Users’ DBs. To simplify the analysis of this threat, we would
always assume the presence of a Malicious Entity, ME, that would combine all the
collected Data by the collation’s members for further analysis and to conclude whether
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the collation’s members could go ahead abusing a given User or not. In practice, the
ME could be simply one of the collation’s members or the whole analysis could be
done in a distributed fashion rather than centralised as presented in this thesis.
There are two main benefits for MPSPs to take the risk of colluding and sharing their
Users’ DBs. The first would be to serve the purpose of verifying whether a Userx is a
genuine User who has interacted with other SPs in a similar pattern to the modelled
average User, see Subsection 5.8.5. if Userx does not behave per the average User
model, the tested MSP could launch the User-Drop Attack to fool the Auditor, see
Subsection 5.8.6.
The second benefit for colluding MPSPs, out of their colluding, would be the fact
that even in case they got inspected by a GT Agent that would be dealing in purpose
with a group of SPs, which could include some or all of the collation members, a
large enough collation group would lead to reduce the detection accuracy of the GT
Agent, see Subsection 5.4.1. That could be achieved by applying a policy where
they would never Abuse any User who have not dealt with a specific number of the
collation’s members. The larger that number is, the less useful the corresponding
TGT (SP ) values would get. Such large number combined with utilising the Simple
Data Abusing Algorithms described in 5.8.6 to get high TLavg values for the collation’s
members could render the final TG(SP ) values useless. That would be especially true
given that the ST Agents would always return negative results since the collation’s
members would never Abuse a User who have only dealt with one MPSP and, hence,
the collation’s members would always get high TST (SP ) Ranks.
In details, the two colluding parameters that an ME has to set are:
• NtoAbuseC : the minimum number of colluding MPSPs a victim Userx should deal
with using Credentialy before ME allows abusing this Credentialy.
• NtoAbuseU : the minimum number of colluding MPSPs a victim Userx should deal
with using any of its Credentials before ME allows abusing Userx.
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It should be noted that NtoAbuseC is a more conservative attack setting compared to
NtoAbuseU . That is because it is always true that NtoAbuseC ≤ NtoAbuseU since even if an
ME set NtoAbuseC > NtoAbuseU , a victim Userx who has dealt with NtoAbuseC colluding
MPSPs using Credentialy would automatically satisfy the condition of dealing with at
least NtoAbuseU == NtoAbuseC . In other words, even if a victim Userx has dealt with the
NtoAbuseU , the ME wont allow its collation’s members to Abuse Credentialy ∈ Userx
unless he uses Crdentialy to interact with at least NtoAbuseC . Setting NtoAbuseC >
1 would guarantee avoiding the possibility of being caught by an ST Agent whose
testing Credential is in fact Credentialy, see Subsection 5.3.2. Nevertheless, setting
NtoAbuseU high andNtoAbuseC low combined with a long enough Abuse-Delay Attack, see
Subsection 5.8.6, would lead to generating long PIIL entries that could include only
one or two colluding MPSPs and a lot of innocent PSPs, which would badly affect the
accuracy of both the TGTsg and TGTsc Ranking Algorithms, see Subsections 5.4.2
and 5.4.3. If the collation includes only two or three MPSPs, it might be easy to
detect. However, the attacks we are describing could include more than that. Those
colluding MPSPs would have already dealt with other Credentials corresponding to
a victim User and, hence, they would satisfy the condition of high NtoAbuseU without
necessarily leaving footprints of all the collation members in all the reported Cases of
a single Credential. The TGTwc(SP ) Ranking Algorithm tries to tackle this issue by
analysing all the PSPs a victim User has dealt with regardless of the used Credential.
Nevertheless, this approach has its own shortcomings, see Subsection 5.4.4.
The colluding threat could have many variations, below are some important ones:
• Colluding MPSPs: in this simple colluding form, a group of MPSPs would
be involved in the collation. Once the ME verifies that a given Userx has dealt
with at least the specified NtoAbuse parameters, it would disseminate to all the
collation MPSPs that it is alright to start abusing Userx per their own applied
Simple Data Abusing Algorithms, see Subsection 5.8.6. Of course, if a colluding
MPSP decided to User-Drop Userx at the time of acquiring his Credentials,
it would not share those Credentials with the ME and, hence, this encounter
wonâĂŹt be counted in the NtoAbuse counters. This setting could significantly
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reduce the number of Users a collation could Abuse. Nevertheless, it would
reduce the collation’s footprint in the Trust Network making it more challenging
to detect its members by the Auditor.
• Colluding MPSPs with a large pool of MSPs: given it is expensive and
risky to arrange a collation among a large number of MPSPs, this variation
requires a smaller number of MPSPs to collude along with a large pool of MSPs
which are inexpensive to create by the ME. The MPSPs would act completely
genuine to prevent the risk of getting detected and then banned by the Auditor.
Nevertheless, once an MSP interacts with a given User, it would double check
with the ME whether that User has satisfied the NtoAbuse conditions. If it does,
it would get the green light to Abuse. Since MSPs have naturally very low
footprint because of their unpopularity, they are very hard to detect specially
if they are involved in a collation. However, this variation, despite its very low
risk for the attackers, is not expected to give high gain for the attackers in terms
of the volume of Abuse they could send.
• Advanced MPSPs and MSPs Colluding to bypass DGU restrictions:
when the Auditor deploys DGU defensive rules and Strategies, see Subsection
5.6.3 and Section 5.7, this advanced variation could be utilized by the ME to
counter these defences. It works in a similar manner to the Colluding MPSPs
variation but once an MPSPx got detected by the Auditor and gets asked to
Install DGU, it would bypass this restriction by legally sharing its Users’ DB
with a random artificial MSPy that the ME could create for this purpose, see
Subsection 5.8.4. MSPy would then send the shared DB to the ME on behalf
of MPSPx so the NtoAbuse counters would be updated as if MPSPx has not
Installed DGU. If MPSPx needs to Abuse a given User, it would simply ask
MSPy to do it in its behalf. Since it is possible to create a very large pool of
artificial MSPs by the ME, it is possible for MPSPx to switch the MSP it shares
with its DB to prevent the Auditor from observing any suspicious ties between
MPSPx and MSPy leading to banning both of them.
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5.8.8 MPSP Committing Suicide Attack
If an MPSPx got caught after a long period of time, the amount of ignored Cases
and recalculated Ranks as a result of banning MPSPx and accusing it for most of
the prior Cases instead of the other SPs who were found guilty, see Section 5.7, could
severely affect the integrity of the Auditor. As a result, the Auditor could halt for a
period of recovery time τMPSP−Halt. The recovery speed would rely upon new Users
joining the Trust Network or existing Users generating new Credentials to interact
with the available SPs in the Network.
Knowing this fact, an ME may try to launch a Suicide Attack by letting one of its
MPSPs act genuinely for a long period of time and, then, it would alter its behaviour to
start acting maliciously without any efforts to hide its identity to get caught. Once it
gets caught, the Auditor would get into the recovery period, τMPSP−Halt, which would
be the perfect timing for other M(P )SPs ∈ ME to Abuse all the Users already in
their DBs without their Ranks being affected immediately. In theory, the recovery
period could be calculated as shown in Equation 5.11. It should be noted that to
make any sense of that Equation, the Auditor should maintain accurate statistics and
approximations to get the current values for the Equation’s variables, see Subsection
5.6.4.
165
τMPSP−Halt = CMR∗(SPnMSP−est−new−SPnMSP−est−old)(CGR∗UGR)+(CGR−newPII∗Un)−(CMR∗SPGR−M )
where τMPSP−Halt is the recovery period after detecting an MPSP and τMPSP−Halt ∈ Z≥0 ,
CMR is the minimum # of Cases to recover per SP and CMR ≥ 1,
SPnMSP−est−new is the estimated # of M(P)SPs after the Suicide Attack and SPnMSP−est−new ≥ 1,
SPnMSP−est−old is the estimated # of M(P)SPs before the Suicide Attack and SPnMSP−est−old ≥ 1,
CGR is the reported Cases Growth Rate per User and CGR ≥ 0,
UGR is the Users Growth Rate and UGR ≥ 0,
CGR−newPII is the reported cases Growth Rate for newly generated PII Data per User
and CGR−newPII ≥ 0 and CGR−newPII ⊂ CGR,
Un is the current # of Users and Un ≥ 1,
SPGR−M is the MSPs Growth Rate and SPGR−M ≥ 0.
(5.11)
Equation 5.11: Recovery Period after Detecting an MPSP, τMPSP−Halt
In Equation 5.11, it should be noted that: τMPSP−Halt ∈ Z≥0 because any negative
time would mean the recovery happening in the past, which does not make sense in
real-life. In fact, when the fraction denominator gets much larger than the numerator,
the recovery time would get much shorter and vice versa. It should also be noted that
while the growth rates could be close to 0 when saturation is reached, the absolute
numbers of current SPs and Users cannot be < 0. In addition, CMR ≥ 1 because
without at least one reported case of Abuse, the Auditor wonâĂŹt be triggered to
investigate. Another point to note is that CGR−newPII ⊂ CGR. Finally, it is worth
mentioning that it should be safe to replace Equation 5.11 with Equation 7.1 as shown
in subsection 7.2.7.
When the τMPSP−Halt value approaches a negative value or ∞, then it should be
assumed that there is almost no hope to recover. That is, the Auditor would get into
irrecoverable halt when the fraction numerator approaches∞ or the denominator gets
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≤ 0. Based on these facts, the following scenarios has the power to lead the Auditor
towards this point of irrecoverable halt:
• When CMR approaches ∞, i.e. when the Auditor cannot detect an M(P)SP
regardless of how large is the number of reported Cases. That is in fact more
like an internal problem that could be controlled by improving the deployed
Ranking Algorithms. However, it would be challenging to reduce it significantly
without introducing radical changes to the proposed Algorithms in this research.
• When (SPnMSP−est−new − SPnMSP−est−old) approaches ∞, see Subsection 5.8.9.
• When CGR and eventually its subset CGR−newPII approaches 0. That would be
the case when the Trust Network saturates and/or when Users lose faith on the
Network and stop interacting with SPs within it.
It is interesting to note that when the Network starts with a high CMR value, that
would lead to Users losing faith in the system and, hence, declining values of the
following set of variables {CGR, UGR, Un}, which would make the τMPSP−Halt. In
addition, the more the Network gets matured and saturated, the smaller the values of
{CGR, UGR} would get. In other words, unless Un >> SPnM , CMR should get smaller
as the time pass. Otherwise, the τMPSP−Halt would continue to get larger until it
reaches the point of irrecoverable halt.
5.8.9 MSPs Registration Bombarding
When a Suicide Attack takes place, the ME launching such attack should be expected
to be managing a more holistic battle behind the scenes, i.e. this attack would be
probably followed by other Targeted Attacks to defeat the Trust Network defensive
lines, see Attacks 2.0 in Section 2.4. Hence, it should not be a surprise if the ME would
follow the Suicide Attack directly with an MSPs Registration Bombarding Attack
where almost all of the new SPs registering in the Network would be malicious. In
other words, the Equation of τPSL−Halt would approximate to Equation 5.12.
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τMPSP−Halt =
CMR ∗ SPn
(CGR ∗ UGR) + (CGR−newPII ∗ Un)− (CMR ∗ SPGR) (5.12)
where SPn is the current number of SPs and SPn ≥ 1,
SPGR is the SPs Growth Rate and SPGR ≥ 0.
Equation 5.12: Recovery Period after Detecting MPSP assuming the
MSPs Registration Bombarding Attack, τMPSP−Halt
Per Equation 5.12, in Networks, specially saturated ones, where SPGR >> UGR,
SPn would eventually gets >> Un leading to τMPSP−Halt ≈ −∞, i.e. reaching the
irrecoverably point. The Auditor may think about blocking new SPs from joining the
Network during the estimated recovery period to mitigate this scenario. However, this
would be ineffective if the ME has already bombarded the Network with MSPs prior
to launching the Suicide Attack.
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Chapter 6. Trust Auditor Model, Simulation and Results
In Chapter 5, we have introduced the basic conceptual building blocks for an effec-
tive governing Auditor to be the core component of our proposed Continuous Trust
Framework Design as presented in Chapter 4. In this Chapter, a Simulation Model
is introduced in Section 6.3 to analyse how such an Auditor would behave in real-life
given different sets of Users and SPs with a population of Malicious Entities, MEs,
deploying different Trust attacks per the threat model presented in Section 5.8. The
Simulation Process of this Chapter allows us to get a general picture of how our Au-
ditor could perform in Trust Networks consisting of thousands or even millions of
nodes. Through simulation, it is possible to let a large enough number of nodes to
interact with that Auditor for a fairly long period of time to capture the picture of
its performance. Real life development of such large number of nodes and getting
volunteers to manage them by adopting different behaviours according to the testing
goals for a long period of time would be impractical and unnecessary at this stage of
the research.
To initiate the Simulation Process, we developed a Java Simulation Model, see Section
6.3. That model basically implements the basic Auditor building blocks described in
Chapter 5 and assumes the Users of the Trust Network would build their perceived
Trust based on the Trust Model we present in Section 6.4. Further, our Simulation
Process utilizes a cycle-driven simulation library called PeerSim to run our Simulation
Model and capture the results, see Section 6.2. To correctly comprehend the effects
of the various Defensive factors and the Counter-Attacking settings, we defined the
settings we are interested in testing and, then, designed sequential partial factorial
sets of experiments grouped as shown in Section 6.5. These sequential experiments
are grouped in eight Experimental Stages and their results are described in Section
6.6.
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While conducting the Experimental Stages, we realised some defensive patterns that
are countered by other patterns of attacks. By the end of the Experimental Stages,
we were able to classify three unique Defensive Strategies as well as several optimized
settings, Flavours, for each of those Defensive Strategies along with the two main
Counter-Attacking Strategies as we elaborate in Section 6.7.
During the Simulation Process, we optimized the Defensive Strategies by testing alter-
ing their settings under different Environmental Settings, i.e. genuine Normal Nodes
populations, Malicious Nodes populations, and the level of Users’ Ignorance Rate in
reporting the received Abuse Cases. We noticed some variations in the performance
under different variations of the Environmental Settings. That led us to further in-
vestigate the matter and, hence, came up with the Malicious Density Theory that
we present in Section 6.8. In that theory, we show that the MPSPs Detection Rates
would differ depending on the Malicious Nodes Density within the Trust Network.
At the end of the Experimental Stages, we tested all the Defensive Strategies Opti-
mized Settings against each other as well as the case of deploying nothing. Section
6.9 shows the detailed results of this comparison. In that section, it is clear that
our proposed Strategies would significantly improve the current Users Trust Rate and
reduce the Compromised Credentials Rates. That is of course not by completely pre-
venting all possible attacks. Rather, it is by raising the rules of the game between
the Defensive Auditor and the Counter-Attackers. That is, we make it very hard and
expensive for an Attacker to compromise a Credential and, hence, we reduce the level
of the overall abusing. Since this work is far from perfect, it has its limitations. A list
of the limitations and mistakes we are aware of is presented and discussed in Section
6.10.
6.1 Simulation Scope
The Aim of this Simulation Process is: to design unique Defensive Strategies
for the Auditor and to optimize their settings against different sets of colluding and
Uncolluding M(P)SPs who would dynamically optimize their Attacking Strategies.
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by generating a set of unique Defensive Strategies’ Flavours Auditor’s Defensive
Strategies
Defensive Strategy refers to: a distinctive perceived behaviour of the Auditor’s
defensive settings. That is, the Defensive Strategy is a textual description of the
overall effect the internal settings of the Auditor would cause in terms of detecting
and banning suspicious SPs.
Defensive Strategy Flavour refers to: a unique optimized combination of defensive
building blocks with a predefined set of weights and parameters as well as Deployment
Rules, see Sections 5.1 and 5.7 for more details. A Defensive Strategy could have a
large number of Flavours depending on the optimisation or manual settings by the
Auditor.
Attacking Strategy refers to: a unique combination of malicious attacks and pre-
defined attacking parameters, see Subsections 5.8.6 and 5.8.7 for more details.
Optimisation refers to: maximising certain features as well as minimising, or at least
neutralising, unwanted features. Particularly, the optimisation process in the context
of the Defending Auditor aims to:
• Maximise the Perceived Trust by the Network Users
• Minimise the Number of Testing Agents because of their operational costs
(creation, engaging in costly interactions, and maintaining) and because a Net-
work that is dominated by a population of Testing Agents is not worth joining
by either SPs or Users
• Minimise the Number of Undetected M(P)SPs
• Minimise the Number of Open Cases
• Minimise the Number of Compromised Credentials
• Minimise the Number of Banned Innocent (P)SPS
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• Minimise the Number of Users Installing or Enabling Strict DGU, to
ease the bootstrapping process
On the other hand, the optimisation process in the context of the Attacking M(P)SP
or ME aims to:
• Maximise the Number of Undetected M(P)SPs
• Maximise the Number of Compromised Credentials
It should be noted that due to resources limitations, not all of the threats discussed in
Section 5.8 were considered in this simulation process. The potential effects of those
omitted threats are discussed in Section 7.2. The threats and attacks that are within
the simulation scope are:
• Users not reporting all Abuse Cases, see Subsection 5.8.1
• Innocent SPs sharing Users’ Credentials with M(P)SPs unintentionally, see Sub-
section 5.8.4
• Misleading the Auditor with Simple Data Abusing Algorithms, see 5.8.6
• Colluding M(P)SPs, see Subsection 5.8.7
6.2 Development Environment
In developing and executing this simulation project, many different hardware, soft-
ware, and libraries were utilized. The main components are:
• Hardware: A Dell Desktop Computer running Intel(R) Core (TM) i7 CPU 860
@ 2.80 GHz with 4030 MB of RAM memory
• OS: Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise
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• IDE: Eclipse Java EE IDE for Web Developers - Version: Luna Service Release
2 (4.4.2)
• Programming Language: Java - JVM 1.8.0
• Simulation Library: PeerSim 1.0.5 [122]
• Statistics Software: Minitab 17 with aid of MS Excel Sheets - Version: Pro-
fessional Plus 2013
The code of this Simulation Model is published as an open-source project and can be
found on: https://gitlab.com/Continuous_Trust_Simulator/Simulator.
6.3 Simulation Model
As stated in Section 6.2, the chosen library to simulate the proposed Auditor building
blocks of Chapter 5 is PeerSim, for its simplicity and ease of use [122]. This library
offers two simulation options: cycle-driven and event-driven [123]. While the event-
driven option would be more realistic, the cycle-driven is less challenging to execute.
The main disadvantages of the cycle-driven approach are the lack of the transport layer
and concurrency simulation. However, Network latency and communication efficiency
simulations are not in this project scope, see Section 6.1, and not necessary at this
stage of the research and, hence, the cycle-driven approach has been chosen to develop
the simulation model. It should be noted that in this approach, each execution cycle
represents a unit of time that could be anything from a millisecond to a full year
or even more. The interpretation of that unit of time depends on the context of the
simulation and how the model is designed to act in each different cycle. In the context
of this research project, we choose to set this unit of time to be a single day. That may
not be accurate enough to represent real Users’ interactions. However, this limitation
has little impact on the validity of this simulation as discussed in Section 6.10.
Per [123], the main components of a PeerSim simulation model are as following:
• Network Nodes: Main interacting nodes in the Network.
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• Initializers: Responsible for initializing new instances of Network nodes.
• Controllers: Execute the logic of the Simulation at different running cycles
by triggering the Network Nodes to behave in certain ways per the experiment
settings.
• Observers: Capture metrics of interest, in the form of customised Data files or
objects for further analysis.
• Configuration Files Set the experiment settings and the values of the simu-
lated factors.
Figure 6.1: The Simulation Model High-Level Architecture
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Our Simulation Model is designed to analyse the behaviour of the real Network resi-
dents without actually implementing them. That is, unlike the presented prototype in
Section 4.2 where real-life Users, SPs, IDP, and an Auditor were deployed exchanging
real Data, the nodes in this Simulation Model are Data objects that do not exchange
Data the same as real-life nodes would do. For instance, in real-life, when a User
wishes to get a service from an SP, it would ask the IDP to forward its Credentials to
that SP and, in turn, that SP would directly contact that User. However, in this Sim-
ulation Model, the IDP would forward the User’s Credentials to the SP and record
in its logs that the SP has accessed the User’s Credentials without any real Data
exchange between the User and the SP like in the real-life scenario.
Figure 6.1 illustrates a high level class diagram of our Simulation Model as realised by
the PeerSim convention. Note that the details of the internal methods, variables, and
utility classes are omitted in this Figure. While the whole code along with its detailed
documentation is available as an open source project, we will give a brief introduction
to the listed general components in Figure 6.1.
Config. Files:
• Experiment< x >.txt: Each of these Configuration files includes the factors’
settings, the number of simulation cycles, the number of times the experiment
should be repeated, and the PeerSim meta instruction to link the classes.
Initializers:
• SimulationInitializer: A helper object that initializes the first Nodes that
bootstrap the Network.
• DynamicInitializer: A helper object that initializes the Nodes that dynami-
cally join the Network.
Controllers:
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• Network: Starts at the beginning of each experiment to create the required
number of initial Nodes as specified in the Configuration File.
• RMGR DynamicNetworkGenerator: Dynamically adds more Nodes at the
beginning of each execution cycle per the Growth Rates sets in the Configuration
File and the required new Testing Agents by the Auditor.
• Simulation Engine: Manages how to execute the new execution cycles with
triggers to the different Network Nodes to perform different tasks as required by
the simulation setting. For example, the Auditor would be required to update
the TGR Ranks and send them back to the IDP at the set frequency of cycles
in the Configuration File.
Observers:
• PerformanceObserver: Activated at the last execution cycle to gather and
analyse the statistics collected by the Network Nodes and, then, publish its
summary in the form of textual Data Files for further analysis using Minitab
software, see Subsection 6.5.3 for more details.
Network Nodes:
• RMGR Node: Contains the basic identifiers and methods needed by all the
nodes such as the random number generators. Those generators are needed by
all the different nodes to make dynamic decisions based on pre-set probabilities
in the Configuration Files to mimic the desired behaviour of the simulation
experiment.
• Super Node: Acts like an internal Data holder that is needed to ease the
Simulation Process. For example, when the Auditor wishes to dynamically
create new Testing Agents, it would pass their details to the Super Node that
would, in turn, makes it readable for the RMGR DynamicNetworkGenerator in
the following execution cycle.
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• IDP Node: Resembles the Identity Provider that stores the Users’ Credentials
and pass them to the approved SPs by their owners. The IDP would always
store access logs and transfer them to the Auditor whenever requested to do so
in case of reported Abuse Cases by the corresponding User, see Section 4.2.
• Auditor Node: Implements all the building blocks of Section 5.1 that are
controlled by some Deployment Rules, see Section 5.7.
• User Node: Resembles a real-life User that interacts in each cycle by a dynamic
probability depending on its perceived Trust of the Network. This User ignores
reporting a received Abuse at a pre-set probability and would also increase his
overall Trust or decrease it depending on how effective the Auditor is at resolving
the currently reported Abuse Cases as well as how most of the current Users
Trust the Network, see 6.4.
• SP Node: Has different versions: (P)SP, Uncolluding M(P)SP, and Colluding
M(P)SP. The innocent (P)SP version do nothing but genuinely fulfilling the re-
quest of the User. The Uncolluding M(P)SP deploys some Simple Data Abusing
Algorithms, see Subsection 5.8.6, with pre-set settings in the Configuration Files
per the simulated behaviour. The Colluding M(P)SP would also deploy similar
Simple Abusing Algorithms but would, in addition, pass its acquired Credentials
to the ME Node that it is associated with so that the ME Node could decide
whether a certain Credential or User could be attacked per its Colluding Attack
settings that are controlled as well in the simulation settings, see Subsection
5.8.7.
• ME Node: An entity managing a group of M(P)SPs, see Subsection 5.8.7.
6.4 Trust Model
For the sake of measuring the effectiveness of our introduced Auditor in the simula-
tion experiments, we needed to implement a Trust Model that simulates the Users’
attitudes when it comes to Trusting online SPs and their reactions when they receive
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Abuse Cases. The Technology Acceptance Model, TAM, is a theory introduced by
Davis in 1989 to model the Users’ attitudes toward using technology based on the
concerned technology perceived usefulness and ease of use [124]. Various extensions
to that theory came on the following decades to incorporate the concepts of perceived
Security, Privacy, and Trust as seen in [125] and [126]. Nevertheless, we have opted
not to rely on this theory for various reasons. First, while this theory incorporates
various elements in deducing the Users’ Trust such as perceived usefulness and eas-
iness, our simulation experiment is concerned with studying the effects of a set of
measures that would improve only one aspect: Privacy. For that, implementing this
generic model would add an extra layer of complication to our small project that we
could not afford. Second, most of the conducted studies to generate the TAM models
are based on groups of students rather than the general public and, hence, there is
a potential bias on the generated models. Given the model’s inaccuracy, due to the
potential bias, and implementation complexity, we concluded that it is not justified
to invest in incorporating these models in our simulation study. Instead, we opted for
a minimal arbitrary model to get started with the intention to refine our Trust Model
in the future experiments if it is needed. Fortunately, we found that our Trust Model
was fair enough and there is no need to refine it. That is because our introduced
set of defences raises the bar of the game between the defending Auditor and the
Counter-Attackers to the point that the generated attacks would be so minor that it
would not affect the overall perceived Trust, see Subsection 6.10.1 for more details.
trustt = trustt−1 + (trustt−1 ∗ IncreaseRate100 ) (6.1)
: where 0 ≤ trustt ≤ 100 and the default values are:
trust0 == 50, IncreaseRate == 1.
Equation 6.1: Trust increase in each cycle without an open Case
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trustt = trustt−1 − (trustt−1 ∗ DropPostAbuse100 )
DecreasePeriodPostAbuseCount =
DecreasePeriodPostAbuseCount+DecreasePeriodPostAbuse (6.2)
: where 0 ≤ trustt ≤ 100 and the default values are:
trust0 == 50, DropPostAbuse == 10, DecreasePeriodPostAbuse == 25.
Equation 6.2: Trust decrease after receiving an Abuse Case
(if(DecreasePeriodPostAbuseCount > 0)) :
trustt = trustt−1 − (trustt−1 ∗ DecreaseRate100 )
DecreasePeriodPostAbuseCount−− (6.3)
: where 0 ≤ trustt ≤ 100 and the default values are:
trust0 == 50, DecreaseRate == 1.
Equation 6.3: Trust decrease in each cycle with open Cases
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trustt = trustt−1 + (trustt−1 ∗ IncreasePostAbuseResolved100 )
DecreasePeriodPostAbuseCount = DecreasePeriodPostAbuseCount−
(DecreasePeriodPostAbuse− PeriodToClose) (6.4)
: where 0 ≤ trustt ≤ 100, PeriodToClose >= 0
and the default values are:
trust0 == 50, IncreasePostAbuseResolved == 5.
Equation 6.4: Trust increase after resolving Abuse Case
In our Trust Model, we assumed that the initial Trust at the bootstrapping phase is
50% in an attempt to model the real-life state where Users would have some unproven
doubts toward dealing with any new entrant to the market. Of course, the percentage
of doubt would vary from person to person based on their previous experiences and
the way each individual decision making process. Nevertheless, we needed a simple
arbitrary point to start with and, hence, we selected the 50% middle point. At each
new execution cycle, if the User did not receive any Abuse Case, or if it received but
ignored, the User’s Trust on that Trust Framework is expected to grow, but at a slow
pace because we know that Trust is “hard to build and easy to lose [16]”. For that,
we choose to grow that Trust by 1% at each cycle without any received Abuse Case
until reaching the maximum of 100% as listed in Equation 6.1.
When an Abuse Case is received, many real-life Users are expected to simply ignore
it due to laziness or unimportance and, hence, that wonâĂŹt affect the overall Trust.
However, when a User decides to report an Abuse Case, that would imply that this
Abuse had damaged to some extent their overall Trust in the system. Hence, the Trust
is expected to drop dramatically, again because we know that Trust is “hard to build
and easy to lose [16]”. For that, we choose to drop that Trust by 10% following an
Abuse Case as listed in Equation 6.2. Afterwards, we expect most Users who opted to
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be part of our newly invented concept of Continuous Trust Management Framework
would be waiting anxiously for a response from the Auditor to confirm detecting the
Abuser. The more time it takes to get that response, the more of the User’s Trust
on the Framework would be lost. For that, we choose to drop that Trust by a rate of
1% at each following execution cycle for a total of 25 cycles, for each reported Abuse
Case, as listed in Equation 6.3. The reason for the arbitrary point of 25 cycles before
stopping the Trust decrease due to one Abuse incident is the fact that human Users
tend to forget as time passes and continue dealing with an SP that is useful and easy
to use despite the Privacy issues that it may has [125].
The Trust decrease due to a reported Abuse Case is expected to stop once the Auditor
detects the guilty SP, as a way of appreciation to the sincere efforts of the Auditor at
providing the Continuous Data Control Attribute that is lacked in most other Trust
Framework. Of course, the Trust increase is not expected to be as much as the initial
Trust decrease that followed the reported Abuse Case because Trust is “hard to build
and easy to lose [16]”. For that, we choose to increase that Trust by 5% as listed in
Equation 6.4.
newCredt = randBoolean(1− (NewCredRate100 ∗
trustt
100 )) (6.5)
: where randBoolean(x) is a random generator returning false at probability x
and the default value is: NewCredRate == 10.
Equation 6.5: Probability of generating a Credential at t
181
(If(newCredt)) :
strictCredt = randBoolean(1− StrictCredProb100 ) (6.6)
: where randBoolean(x) is a random generator returning false at probability x
and the default value is: StrictCredProb == 10.
Equation 6.6: Probability of assigning a Strict Sharing Policy to a
new Credential at t
(If(!strictCredt)) :
shareWithTopt = randBoolean(
trustt
100 ) (6.7)
: where randBoolean(x) is a random generator returning false at probability x
Equation 6.7: Probability of assigning a Share with Any Policy to a
new Credential at t
When it comes to generating Credentials, email addresses or credit card numbers
for example, we expect that the more Trust the User has in the Trust Framework
the more Credentials she will be willing to use in that Framework. For that, all the
Credentials generation Equations in our Trust Model depends on the User’s overall
perceived Trust. In that Trust Model, we set an arbitrary maximum probability of
generating a new Credential by a given User at a given simulation cycle to be 10%.
This probability could be further reduced by a negative linear relation with the User’s
Trust as listed in Equation 6.5. In addition, all new Credentials could be generated
182
with one of three Sticky Policies, see Subsection 4.4.1 for more details about the Sticky
Policies:
• strict: this prevents the SP acquiring the Credential from sharing it with any
other SP.
• shareWithTop: this enables the SP acquiring the Credential to share it with
only PSP providers because they are thought to be more genuine and less likely
to be malicious.
• shareWithAny: this enables the SP acquiring the Credential to share it with
any SP in the Network.
In this Trust Model, it is assumed that 10% of the new Credentials created by a given
User would be strict, representing valuable and important Credentials like credit cards
details or health records, as listed in Equation 6.6. The remaining 90% of Credentials
would be dynamically adjusted based on the current level of Trust. That is, the
less Trust in the Network, the more Credentials would be assigned shareWithTop
Sticky Policies. Any Credential that does not get the shareWithTop policy would
automatically be assigned a shareWithAny policy as listed in Equation 6.7.
6.5 Simulation Approach
The following are the main steps illustrating the simulation approach we have applied
to study and optimize our proposed Auditor of Chapter 5:
• Defining the factors of interest and the interesting outputs for further optimisa-
tion, see Subsection 6.5.1.
• Defining the main Experimental Stages, see Section 6.6.
• Designing mini-experiments for each Stage based on the partial factorial princi-
ple described in Subsection 6.5.2.
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• Executing the mini-experiments sequentially. That is, we fed the results of
one experiment to the following experiment in the list. We analysed the raw
output results statistically using Minitab software along with MS Excel sheets
to obtain the new optimized values for the following mini-experiment in the list,
see Subsection 6.5.3.
6.5.1 Factors of Interest
Experiment Settings
Factor Low High Notes
Replicas var Depends on total of factors - 30
when all factors are constant and
goes up to 3840 when analysing the
Max. of 11 factors
Table 6.1: Final List of Factors of Experiment Settings
Environmental Factors
Factor Low High Notes
Grouped
iniUsers 50 130
ini prefix: initial number of nodes.
GR suffix: percentage growth rate
of nodes per simulation cycle.
iniPSPs 8 20
iniSPs 16 40
UsersGR 0.05 0.2
SPsGR 0.05 0.1
PSPsGR 0.05 0.1
Grouped
iniMPSPs 4 10
ini prefix: initial number of nodes.
GR suffix: percentage growth rate
of nodes per simulation cycle.
iniMSPs 8 20
iniME MPSPs 5 7
iniME MSPs 8 12
MPSPsGR 0.05 0.1
MSPsGR 0.05 0.1
ME MPSPsGR 0.05 0.1
ME MSPsGR 0.05 0.1
Table 6.2: Final List of Environmental Factors
Users’ Controlled Factors. See Section 6.4 for more details.
Factor Low High Notes
Ignorance Rate 20 80 Probability a User would ignore reporting an
Abuse Case
Table 6.3: Final List of Users’ Controlled Factors
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SPs’ Controlled Factors. See Subsection 5.6.3 for more details.
Factor Low High Notes
Accept DGU Prob 0 40 Probability an SP voluntarily accepts to
Install DGU, if offered to by Auditor.
Accept Strict DGU
Prob
0 20 Probability an SP voluntarily accepts to
Enable Strict DGU, if offered to by Auditor.
Table 6.4: Final List of SPs’ Controlled Factors
Auditor’s and IDP’s Controlled Factors
Factor Low High Notes
TG Ranking Settings. See Section 5.5 and Subsection 5.4.5 for more details.
WTLRavg 20 80 “TLRavg Weight” in Conf. Files.
WTST 20 80 “TST Weight” in Conf. Files
WTGT 20 80 “TGT Whole Weight” in Conf.
Files.
Wsg 20 80 “TGT Weight” in Conf. Files.
Grouped
Wsc 10 40 “TGT Colluding Weight” and
Wwc 40 10 “TGT Weak Colluding Weight” in
Conf. Files.
TLRavg Settings. See Section 5.2 for more details.
Suspicious SP Rank 20 40
Suspicious SP
Banning Rank
5 15
Grouped
Sufficient TLRus
PSP
5 20 Min TLRu ranks to ban (P)SP
based on its T lRavg
Sufficient TLRus
SP
2 10
TST Settings. See Sections 5.3 and 5.7 for more details.
DeployST false true Turning on/off all the ST settings
τST−maxLife 20 80 “ST Max Life Time” in Conf. Files.
Grouped
with GT
Report
Abuse
ST Report Abuse false true Reporting Abuse like ordinary
Users (using Unimportant
Credentials), “ST Report Spam” in
Conf. Files.
PSL ST Selector
false true
ST Selectors. See TST Deployment
Rules in 5.7.
Suspicious Nodes
ST Selector
Top TLRavg ST
Selector
Bottom TLRavg ST
Selector
IIR ST Selector
TGT Settings. See Sections 5.4 and 5.7 for more details.
DeployGT false true Turning on/off all the GT settings
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Auditor’s and IDP’s Controlled Factors
Factor Low High Notes
τGT−maxLife 20 80 “GT Max Life Time” in Conf.
Files.
Grouped
with ST
Report
Abuse
GT Report Abuse false true Reporting Abuse like ordinary
Users (using Unimportant
Credentials), “GT Report Spam” in
Conf. Files.
PCR Threshold 2 7
PCR Weak
Threshold
2 7
Ignore Old G
Ranks
false true TGT ignores all Gs containing a
banned SP
GT Max SP Num 2 7 Max unpopular SPs in each G
GT Max Size 2 7 Max G size
PIIL GT Selector
false true
GT Selectors. See TGT Deployment
Rules in 5.7.
PSL GT Selector
Suspicious Nodes
GT Selector
DGU Settings. See Subsection 5.6.3 for more details.
DeployDGU false true Turning on/off all the DGU settings
Post DGU
Installation Rank
20 80
Grouped Offer DGU Prob 0 20
Offer Strict DGU
Prob
0 10
Table 6.5: Final List of Auditor’s and IDP’s Controlled Factors
Attackers’ Controlled Factors. See Subsections 5.8.6 and 5.8.7 for more details.
Factor Low High Notes
Begin: Factors to be duplicated for M(P)SPs ∈ MEs
Abuse Delay Period 5 50 Simple Data Abusing Algorithms’
factors, see Subsection 5.8.6.
“Spam” instead of “Abuse” in Conf.
Files
Abuse Bombarding
Period
5 50
Abuse Drop User
Rate
20 80
Abuse Drop
Credential Rate
End: Factors to be duplicated for M(P)SPs ∈ MEs
NtoAbuseU 1 5
“ME N MIN MPSPs to Spam User”
NtoAbuseC and “ME N MIN MPSPs to Spam
Credential” in Conf. Files.
Table 6.6: Final List of Attackers’ Controlled Factors
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Monitored Outputs. See Section 6.1 for more details.
Output Notes
All Outputs ending with <> are duplicated four times to record the same output during 4 different
cycles: 125, 250, 375, and 500
Trust In Network Users Avg of all Users Trust by the end of simulation
Active Agents to Users at <> PCT of Agents among total Users
PCT Undetected MPSPs at <>
PCT Undetected MSPs at <>
PCT Undetected Popular MPSPs at <> MPSPs ∈ ME colluding normally
PCT Undetected Unpopular MPSPs at <> MPSPs ∈ ME colluding with a large pool of MSPs
Open cases at <>
PCT Compromised Share with Top
Credentials at <>
PCT Compromised Share with Any
Credentials at <>
PCT Abuse by MPSPs at <>
“Spam” instead of “Abuse” in the raw results.
PCT Abuse by MSPs at <>
PCT Abuse by Popular Colluding ME at <>
PCT Abuse by Unpopular Colluding ME at
<>
PCT PSPs Banned Guilty at <> PCT of PSPs banned because they were thought
Guilty
PCT PSPs Banned DGU at <> PCT of PSPs banned for refusing to Install DGU
PCT PSPs Banned Strict DGU at <> PCT of PSPs banned for refusing to Enable Strict
DGU
The following outputs are duplicated for SPs, MPSPs, MSPs, Popular Colluding MPSPs,
Popular Colluding MSPs, Unpopular Colluding MPSPs, and Unpopular Colluding MSPs
PCT PSPs Installed DGU at <>
PCT PSPs Enabled Strict DGU at <>
Table 6.7: Final List of Monitored Outputs
Initially, the exhaustive analysis of the possible factors for testing generated over 130
factors, see Appendix B. That is an overwhelming number for all types of simulation
tests whether it is partial factorial, sensitivity, or sequential experimentation which
we adopted in 6.5.2. For that, we neutralise many factors by fixing them in all the
experiments. We anticipate that the neutralised factors wonâĂŹt have huge impact
on the monitored outputs based on the pilot screening tests we have carried prior to
starting this simulation process and based on our understanding of the nature of the
implemented Algorithms. We have grouped many factors together during most of the
experiments because of their strong relation and our anticipation that testing them
187
individually would not cause noticeable impacts on the final results. By grouping
we mean that the grouped factors will be treated as a one factor. In other words, if
the conducted factorial experiment requires setting the group to a high value, all the
group factors would be set to high.
The tables of this section contain the final set of factors that were studied in our
conducted Simulation Process. For the full list of all the factors we initially considered,
refer to Appendix B. We classified the final list of factors into several groups, each
group in a separate table, as following:
• Experiment Settings: This set of factors controls for how long an experiment
runs and how many times it repeats, for better accuracy. These settings were
set constant for all of the experiments. See Table 6.1.
• Environmental Factors: This set of factors describes how the Network boot-
straps and how fast it grows. See Table 6.2.
• Users’ Controlled Factors: This set of factors is controlled by the Users and
is responsible for shaping how Users interact and react to received Abuse Cases.
Most of these factors were set to constant except for the Ignorance Rate. See
Table 6.3.
• SPs’ Controlled Factors: This set of factors is controlled by the SPs and
is responsible for shaping how SPs collaborate with each others and how they
react to the Auditor’s requests to Install DGU or Enable Strict DGU. See Table
6.4.
• Auditor’s and IDP’s Controlled Factors: This set of factors is controlled
by both the IDP and the Auditor, which could be implemented as a one unit
if desired. This set is responsible for shaping how the Ranks are weighted, how
testing agents are created, how suspicious SPs are banned or asked to Install
DGU, and how Ranks would be published. See Table 6.5.
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• Attackers’ Controlled Factors: This set of factors is controlled by the at-
tacking entities and is responsible for shaping the combinations of attacks that
are deployed by each different group of attackers. See Table 6.6.
• Monitored Outputs: This set of factors contains the main outputs described
in the simulation scope 6.1. Because it is expensive to repeat a finished experi-
ment, we tried to gather as much information out of an experiment as possible.
Hence, we recorded further detailed versions of those outputs. For example,
we recorded the Undetected MSPs separately from the Uncolluding Undetected
MPSPs, the Colluding Undetected MPSPs, and so on. Furthermore, we have
also taken different records for each measured output at four different timings,
quarters, during each experiment. The reason for that is to detect any unex-
pected changes in behaviour that would take place as time passes. Early on the
Simulation Process, we figured out that many of the monitored outputs were
of less importance and, hence, we stopped analysing them thoroughly. Rather,
we have kept records of them just in case a reinvestigation is needed. Table 6.7
shows the most important set of the Monitored Outputs.
6.5.2 DOE
There were several themes of experimental designs to consider for this Simulation
Process. The sensitivity tests where only one factor would be tested at a time while
the rest are fixed constant was an option that we eliminated. The reason was the
fact that two-way and three-way interactions among the simulated factors would be
ignored. Another option was to design a Full Factorial experiment where all the
possible interactions of the factors of interest would be simulated, at different runs,
to better gauge their effects. However, this approach consumes a lot of resources
measuring the possible effects of interactions that we know that are hard to occur in
real-life or would have little value. For that, the approach that we adopted was the
Partial Factorial design where a partial set of interactions are simulated and analysed.
The details of our experiment design are shown below while more technical details
about the statistical concepts used in this Subsection could be found in [127].
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• Experiment Design: Partial Factorial: a subset of the possible interactions
among the simulated factors are tested at different runs.
• Total Factors: 33.
• Factor Levels: 2: Low and High values for each factor as shown in Subsec-
tion 6.5.1. This setting leads to the linearity assumption where the monitored
outputs are assumed to interact in a linear manner to changes in the simulated
inputs. Since linear relations are not always true, that caused minor issues that
we discuss in Section 6.10.
• Visibility: ≥ V: this means that the measured effects are not confounded with
any two-way interactions.
• Sample size (replicas): 30 all the runs of the partial factorial design would
be repeated 30 times to reduce the bias errors. It is true that this size, which
is used as a rule of thumb by some statisticians [128], may not be large enough
in many cases. However, we anticipate that it would suffice our needs at this
stage of simulation research because we are running a computer code that we
know it would behave in quite a predictable manner and, hence, adding extra
simulation runs should not generate dramatic changes in the measured outputs.
Even with a final list of 33 factors of interest, it is still not wise to simulate all those
factors together in one partial factorial experiment. Unfortunately, analysing a very
large experiment consumes a lot of time. Nevertheless, consuming more than 25%
of the available experimental resources at the very first experiment, is normally not
wise because during the experimentation process, more knowledge about the simu-
lated factors would be gained leading to better design the following experiments to
reduce their cost and improve their results quality [127]. For that, our simulation
approach was to design mini-experiments where each experiment would test up to 11
factors at a time, because this is the maximum number of factors we could analyse
in one experiment using our chosen statistical software, Minitab. Each experiment
was dedicated to optimize a set of closely related factors. At the end of each mini-
experiment, its optimized values were fed to the Simulation Model for the following
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mini-experiment. Those mini-experiments were classified in 8 different Experimental
Stages, see Section 6.6, where each Stage is about optimising and studying some main
features of the simulated Auditor and its Counter-Attackers. Minitab software was
utilized to generate the partial factorial testing plans for different factorial designs
ranging from 2 factors up to 11. Those generated designs were hard-coded in a Java
catalogue utilized by the simulation code to run each experiment.
6.5.3 Statistical Analysis
For this step of our analysis, we relied mainly on the Minitab 17 statistics software.
Basically, after executing each mini-experiment, our Java model would generate a
Data file containing the experiment’s settings as well as the measured effects for each
monitored response, see Table 6.7, for all the 30 executed simulation runs of each of
the partial factorial settings, see Subsection 6.5.2. This generated Data file is then
imported in the Minitab software. We then start our analysis by fitting the DoE
model by specifying for the software the factors and the monitored outputs we are
interested at analysing.
Once we fit the model, Minitab did automatically generate Pareto Charts of effects
that show how significant the effects of each factor on each of the monitored outputs,
see Minitab Support page [129] for more details. In Minitab, any effect that gets
a magnitude over 2 in the Pareto Chart is considered to be of a significant effect.
Nevertheless, we learned in our continuous efforts to optimize the defensive factors
that the factors that barely cross the barrier of magnitude 2 would normally have little
influence on our optimisation process. Hence, we adopted the following convention in
describing the significance of the measured effects in Section 6.6:
• Huge: This refers to effects with: Magnitude ≥ 100.
• Significant: This refers to effects with: 50 ≤Magnitude ≤ 100.
• Mild: This refers to effects with: 20 ≤Magnitude ≤ 50.
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• Ignored Effects: These effects with Magnitude < 20 are not listed. Neverthe-
less, these factors have been considered during our analysis in the cases where
there are not many more significant effects.
After determining the list of significant factors’ effects, we followed by asking Minitab
to generate the factorial plots showing the main effects for each factor independently
as well as the effects of the two-way interactions of the simulated factors, see Minitab
support pages [130] and [131] for more details. By studying these effects, we try to
come up with explanations to why these factors are acting the way they are. The
ongoing optimisation process helped us in confirming or rejecting some of the early
explanations we came up at the beginning of the Simulation Process. This step was a
crucial part of the Simulation Process because it helped us in making educated guesses
on how to manually modify some of the mistakenly optimized values due to some bias
or human mistakes during the process, the Manual Flavour of the Aggressive Defence
Strategy we describe in Subsection 6.6.3 is an example.
A powerful tool of Minitab is the response Automatic Optimizer, see support page
[132] for more details. We heavily used this tool to optimize both the Auditor and
the Attackers’ set of factors to reach an equilibrium point or status. That is, we
normally start the process by setting the Attackers’ factors to their minimum values,
representing trivial attacks. Then, we ask the Optimizer to come up with the best
combination of values for the Auditors’ factors to fulfil the goals listed in the Simula-
tion Scope, see Section 6.1. We then fix the optimized values of the Auditor and ask
the Optimizer again to come up with the best combination of the Attackers’ factors
to achieve the Attackers’ goals listed in the Simulation Scope. We then repeat the
process with the Auditors’ and Attackers’ factors until we reach an equilibrium setting
or a previous setting comes up again. In the latter case, it would be clear that there
would be no equilibrium reached in real-life. Instead, the Auditor and the Attackers
would continuously alter their settings in the quest to make the highest gain. The
winner of the game would be the player that can precisely sense the settings of his
opponent and counter them in time before the opponent realises the altered settings.
For the purpose of our optimisation, however, we look at all the optimized scenarios
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and pick the one that would give the Attackers the best outcome and choose it as the
equilibrium status, since Attackers are the initiators of the game and, hence, would
naturally force the Auditor to counter their attacks.
It should be noted that the Automatic Optimizer would have internal settings that en-
able giving differential weights to certain responses based on their importance. These
weights would range from 1, default, to 10. The default weights we used in most of
our experiments are:
For the Auditors’ Factors
• 5: to Minimise Banned PSPs Rates and Active Agents to Users Rate.
• 5: to Maximise Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate and Users Trust.
• 3: to Maximise Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate and Colluding Unpopular
MPSPs.
• 1: to Minimise Banned SPs Rates, Compromised Credentials Rates, and Open
Cases.
• 1: to Maximise Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rate.
For the Attackers’ Factors
• 5: to Minimise Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate.
• 3: to Minimise Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate and Colluding Unpopular
MPSPs.
• 1: to Minimise Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rate and Compromised Credentials
Rates.
it should be noted that after we have separated the optimisation of the Uncolluding
and Colluding Attackers in Stage 1, we altered the weights so that when we optimize
one group, the weights of the other groups’ factors are set to 1. It should also be noted
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that in Milestone 6.2, we increased the weight of the desire to Minimise the Banned
Innocent PSPs Rates from 5 to 10 due to its large observed values at that Milestone.
Finally, once we get an equilibrium optimal setting, we would run a Confirming
Experiment. In this Confirming Experiment, we basically fix the equilibrium settings
and run the simulation with those settings for 30 runs. Then, we import the generated
Data file in MS Excel so that we can take the average of those 30 runs. We used
the resulted average to draw graphs showing how the measured effects would evolve
at different points of times during the execution cycles. These graphs helped us at
detecting potential patterns or whether a convergence in the effects is about to happen.
It also helped us at detecting potential biases or non-linearity at the analysed effects
of the simulated factors. That was possible by comparing the results of the final
simulation with what the Automatic Optimizer had predicted.
6.6 Experimental Stages
As stated in Section 6.5.2, it is not wise to invest more than 25% of your resources in
the first experiment because more understanding of the nature of the simulated system
and the important factors would arise during the experimentation process, which may
cause changes in the simulation plan. In our case, we started our simulation with a
simple plan of 14 experiments. Nevertheless, we ended up with 33 mini-experiments
that could be grouped in 8 different Stages where at the final Stage, we compare
and contrast the resulted Defensive Strategies’ Flavours. While the initial aim was
to optimize each set of related factors at one mini-experiment and then fix them for
the following mini-experiment where another set would be optimized. We thought
we could further improve the accuracy of our results by re-optimising the important
factors against the initial optimized system in what we called the Refinement Stages.
Given the agile nature of designing and conducting this Simulation Process, there
were some inconsistencies and mistakes. If this Simulation Process is to be repeated,
we could design a better, more organised, approach as we explain in Subsection 6.10.3.
194
In this Section, we briefly present the intermediate results and early observations we
have made during each of the Experimental Stages. Each of these Stages consisted of
one or more mini-experiments that were analysed according to the described process
in Subsection 6.5.3. These mini-experiments are further grouped into Milestones.
In each Milestone, we study and/or optimize a particular basic defensive element of
Section 5.1, the Attackers behaviour against a deployed Defensive Strategy’s Flavour,
or the effects of certain environmental factors like the nodes populations. The details
of each Stage’s Milestones and associated analysis are listed in Appendix C. Those
intermediate results should be helpful for researchers trying to repeat our experiments
or to get more insights about the nature of the simulated factors. For the final set
of results, this Section could be skipped directly to the summary of the observed
Defensive Strategies, their optimized Flavours, and their Counter-Attacking Strategies
in Section 6.7, the Malicious Density Theory that we developed after conducting this
Simulation Process in Section 6.8, and the final Evaluation of the generated different
Defensive Strategies’ Flavours in Section 6.9.
Note that in the following subsections as well as in Appendix C, we may describe the
effect of a factor on a monitored output as positive or negative. A positive effect is
not necessarily a desired goal and a negative effect is not necessarily something we
are trying to avoid. These descriptions are just mathematical relations meaning an
associated increase in the monitored output’s value with the increase in the input
factor’s value for the positive relations. For the negative relations, it is an associated
decrease in the monitored output’s value with the increase in the input factor’s value.
6.6.1 Stage 1: The no Auditor Case Followed by Initial Optimisation
This Stage started with Milestone 1.1 to test the case where there is no Auditor
involved in the Trust Network to compare it to the optimized cases at the end of the
Simulation Process. After that, the TLRavg Approach was optimized against a set of
trivial attacks and, again, against a set of real attacks in Milestone 1.2. Next, the TST
Approach was added to the scene in Milestone 1.3 before ending with the introduction
of the TGT Approach in Milestone 1.4. Regarding the performance of the Auditor
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by the end of this Optimisation Stage, comparing the last Milestone 1.4 with the
first Milestone 1.1 reveals major improvements in the Compromised Credentials Rates
and the Users’ Trust alongside with some slight improvements in the Uncolluding
M(P)SPs Detection Rates. Nevertheless, the Active Agents to Users Rate reached
86%, which is not a good outcome.
6.6.2 Stage 2: 1st Optimisation Refinement of Attacks and Auditorial
Settings
In this Stage, the aim was to refine the initial optimized version of the Auditor Defen-
sive Strategy by re-optimising the promising factors from Stage 1. This Stage started
with Milestone 2.1 where we aimed to check whether removing the TST Approach, or
some of its selectors, in the presence of the TGT Approach would reduce the Active
Agents to Users Rate without affecting the Auditor’s integrity, because the TST Ap-
proach requires Testing Agents. Next, we decided to optimize the important factors
in increasing the Uncolluding M(P)SPs Detection Rates, i.e. the factors belonging to
either the TLRavg or TST Approach in Milestone 2.2. That was followed by opti-
mising the important factors in increasing the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates, i.e.
factors belonging to the TGT Approach in Milestone 2.3.
Interestingly, we have noticed during Milestone 2.1 a conflict of interest between the
Colluding Attackers and the Uncolluding Attackers. Hence, we started from this Mile-
stone on to optimize for each of those two groups of Attackers separately. Since the
system by now started to mature with less sensitivity to variations in the already
optimized factors, we decided to keep the Attacks’ Settings constant and start Refine-
ment Stages for the most important defensive factors that we observed in Stage 1. At
the beginning of each Refinement Stage, we repeat the optimisation process for the
Attackers to reflect how they react to our optimized Auditor. Then, the Defensive
Strategy is optimized against the recently optimized Counter-Attacking Strategy. Ide-
ally speaking, we should have started the separation of Attackers and the Refinement
process from the Stage 1, see Section 6.10 for more details.
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6.6.3 Stage 3: 2nd Optimisation Refinement of Attacks and Auditorial
Settings
As more knowledge about the nature of the simulated model has developed so far, this
Stage of 2nd Refinement should be the role model for any future Refinement Stages that
might be needed, see Subsection 6.10.3. This Stage started with Milestone 3.1 trying
to optimize the launched Counter-Attacking Strategy against the latest optimized
Defence Strategy in the previous Stage. Then, the important factors to improve the
defences against the Uncolluding Attackers were optimized in Milestone 3.2 followed
by the important factors to optimize against the Colluding Attackers in Milestone 3.3.
Toward the end of this Stage, we realised that the Auditor did not get it right at
this point of the Simulation Process. Perhaps that is due to non-linearity in the
PCR Threshold and PCR Weak Threshold monitored responses, see Subsection 6.10.5.
Based on our experience so far with the system, we anticipated that setting PCR
Threshold to 7, PCR Weak Threshold to 2 and Ignore Old G Ranks to false is a
better combination in terms of the Uncolluding/Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates.
As a result, the next Stage is dedicated to compare two different Defensive Strategies’
Flavours that we called the Automatic and Manual Flavours. The Automatic Flavour
includes the settings that we obtained through the automatic optimisation so far, see
Subsection 6.5.3. On the other hand, the Manual Flavour includes the settings that
we thought reasonable based on our understanding of the system at this point of the
Simulation Process.
6.6.4 Stage 4: Comparing the Performance of Manual and Automatic
Optimisation Settings
As stated in Stage 3, see Subsection 6.6.3, we have noted that the automatic opti-
misation process which we have utilized so far, see Subsection 6.5.3, seemed to get
confused by some bias in our experimental settings causing it to yield some counter-
intuitive optimized values for some factors. By bias we are referring to the fact that
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we have restricted ourselves so far to one environmental scenario, a slow bootstrap-
ping Network environmental settings, as well as the fact that some optimized factors
seems to have non-linear effects, see Section 6.10 for more details.
To mitigate for the above-mentioned limitations, we decided to manually optimize
the current Defensive Strategy based on our understanding of the system so far. As
it turned out later toward the end of the Simulation Process, the automatically opti-
mized Defensive Strategy is just a Conservative Defensive Strategy Flavour that we
named, for simplicity: the Automatic Flavour. On the other hand, the manually op-
timized Strategy turned out to be an Aggressive Defensive Strategy Flavour that we
named: The Manual Flavour, see Section 6.7. Table C.1 lists the differences between
the Automatic Flavour and the Manual Flavour. In Milestone 4.1 we have optimized
the launched Counter-Attacking Flavours against both Defensive Flavours. In that
Milestone, after we run the general experiments, varying each variables Low and High
values, we used our statistical software, Minitab, to optimize the Counter-Attacking
Flavours against each Defensive Flavour separately. That gave us two pairs set of op-
timisations: optimized Counter-Attacking Flavour against the Manual Strategy and
optimized Counter-Attacking Flavour against the Automatic Flavour. Further, we
used Minitab to generate two other optimisations scenarios: Trivial Attacks against
the Manual Flavour and Trivial Attacks against the Automatic Flavour. We executed
four Confirming Experiments for each of those four scenarios to observe the Monitored
Outputs with reduced linearity bias as we now have more simulation points rather
than the basic Low and High points. However, once we figured out that the Man-
ual Flavour is the most effective defense in most of the cases, its Counter-Attacking
Flavour was chosen for the following Milestone where we compare the performance of
the two Defensive Flavours at different environmental settings. If this experiment is
to be repeated, we should have tied each Defensive Flavour to its optimized Counter-
Attacking Flavour that we found in this Milestone to get more accurate results.
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Factors’
Setting
Interpretation Effects
Low ini Users
& (P)SPs
A slowly bootstrapping Network. Makes the Banned Innocent PSPs
Rate so high; a side effect that is
further amplified when combined with
Low ini Users & (P)SPS and/or
Manual Defence. However, this
setting Significantly boosts the
Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates.
Low Users &
(P)SPs GR
A Network that is slowly gaining
interest, a Network where Users have
lost faith and are leaving, or simply a
saturated Network.
Slightly reduces the rate of Banned
Innocent PSPs making it slightly
better for the Auditor to prefer the
Manual Flavour.
High ini Users
& (P)SPs
A popular Network among Users. Reduces the Banned Innocent PSPs
Rate making the Manual Flavour
preferable by the Auditor.
High Users &
(P)SPs GR
A Network that is getting popular
very fast.
Reduced the Active Agents to Users
Rate making the Manual Flavour
preferable by the Auditor.
Low ini
M(P)SPs
A Network with little malicious
activities, because M(P)SPs are
normally more interested in heavily
populated Networks, this setting is
associated with Low ini Users &
(P)SPs and/or a highly effective
Defensive Strategy making it
expensive to launch malicious attacks.
Makes the Banned Innocent PSPs
Rate so high; a side effect that is
further amplified when combined with
Low ini Users & (P)SPS and/or
Manual Flavour. Nevertheless, it also
significantly boosts the Colluding
Unpopular MPSPs Detection Rate,
which is usually not a major threat.
Low M(P)SPs
GR
A Network where M(P)SPs are not
eager to join the Network. That
might be because the Network isn’t
populated enough with Users to make
it attractive to take the risk of
Abusing. Or, the deployed Defensive
Strategy might be so powerful that
the potential gained Credentials
mayn’t justify the taken risk.
High ini
M(P)SPs
A Network that is polluted with a
significant M(P)SPs population. A
situation that is expected when a
Network is, or expected to be soon,
popular among genuine Users.
Reduces the Banned Innocent PSPs
Rate making the Manual Flavour
preferable by the Auditor.
High M(P)SPs
GR
A Network that is getting popular
among M(P)SPs. That is usually
expected when the Network is also
getting popular among genuine Users.
Table 6.8: Environmental Factors Real Life Interpretation and Effects
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Populations
Scenario
Optimal
Defensive
Strategy
Justification
Low ini Users &
(P)SPs and High ini
Users & (P)SPs GR
Aggressive
Strategy -
Manual
Flavour
The Low M(P)SPs Detection Rates that is associated
with Low ini Users & (P)SPs makes the Aggressive
Strategy preferable to improve the M(P)SPs
Detection Rates. The side effect of an increased
Active Agents to Users Rate and the Banned Innocent
PSPs is mildly mitigated by the High ini Users &
(P)SPs GR.
High ini Users &
(P)SPs and Low ini
Users & (P)SPs GR
Conservative
Strategy -
Automatic
Flavour
The side effects of High Active Agents to Users Rate
generated by the Aggressive Strategy are magnified
by the High ini Users & (P)SPs. In addition, even
the ini Users & (P)SPs GR, which could reduce
required Agents when they are High, are Low. Hence,
the Conservative Strategy is preferred in this case.
High ini Users &
(P)SPs and High ini
Users & (P)SPs GR
but not (Low ini
M(P)SPs and Low
M(P)SPs GR)
Aggressive
Strategy -
Manual
Flavour
The High ini Users & (P)SPs GR reduces the side
effects of the Aggressive Strategy making it preferable
in this case. That is especially true when combined
with High ini M(P)SPs and High M(P)SPs GR.
Low ini M(P)SPs and
Low M(P)SPs GR
Conservative
Strategy -
Automatic
Flavour
The Low ini M(P)SPs along with the Low M(P)SPs
GR settings make the Aggressive Strategy side effects,
High rates of Active Agents to Users and Banned
Innocent PSPs, cost so high that the Conservative
Strategy settings preferable in this case.
Low ini Users &
(P)SPs and Low ini
Users & (P)SPs GR
but not (High ini
M(P)SPs and High
M(P)SPs GR)
Conservative
Strategy -
Automatic
Flavour
The Low ini Users & (P)SPs means a very High
Banned Innocent PSPs Rate rendering the Aggressive
Strategy inefficient. That is especially true when
combined with Low ini M(P)SPs and/or Low
M(P)SPs GR.
High ini M(P)SPs and
High M(P)SPs GR
Aggressive
Strategy -
Manual
Flavour
The High ini M(P)SPs along with the High M(P)SPs
GR settings reduce the Aggressive Strategy side
effects, High rates of Active Agents to Users and
Banned Innocent PSPs, cost making the Aggressive
Strategy an optimal choice in this case.
Table 6.9: Optimal Defensive Strategy (Manual Vs. Automatic) at Different
Populations Scenarios
So far, all the conducted Milestones were executed with the assumption of slowly
bootstrapping Networks. This choice was initially made to avoid simulating very
large Networks which is expensive in terms of the required resources. However, that
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population setting should not always be assumed in real-life. In fact, this is the worst
setting that we should try to avoid reaching because it resembles a dying Network!
Hence, it is the time at this Stage to examine whether our optimisations so far would
work on other environmental scenarios or not. In fact, we want to know to what extent
our optimisations so far are biased to the initial assumed environmental settings.
In Milestone 4.2, the two Defensive Strategies Flavours were compared against vari-
able initial number of nodes along with their corresponding growth rates. Table 6.8
Lists the different possible population settings in the simulation environment along
with their associated real-life interpretations and their observed effects as noted af-
ter executing this Milestone. Table 6.9 also lists some of the common population
settings along with the best Defensive Strategy the Auditor could deploy at such a
scenario. Interestingly, we have noted that both Defensive Strategies’ Detection Rates
get boosted at certain population scenarios, when both ini Users & (P)SPs and ini
M(P)SPs factors are set to Low in addition to setting either of Users & (P)SPs GR or
M(P)SPs GR High. Setting both Users & (P)SPs GR and M(P)SPs GR High make
the Defensive Strategies effects even more prevalent. This is a key observation that
led us to come up with the Malicious Density Theory that is listed in Section 6.8. At
the end, we found that at the slow bootstrapping scenario, which we have adopted
so far in all of the previous stages, it seems that the Auditor is indifferent to either
of the Defensive Strategies. Hence, we decided, from now on, to switch our assumed
population to a rapid bootstrapping scenario to resemble a more optimistic real-life
scenario.
6.6.5 Stage 5: Introducing DGU with Offering Voluntarily DGU Instal-
lation Randomly along with a Refinement Iteration
In the previous Stages, we have conducted exhaustive optimisation Milestones to come
up with mature Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that are based on Ranking Algorithms
that could be implemented using the technologies available at hand today. In Stage,
6.6.4, it turned out that the Aggressive Strategy - Manual Flavour was the best
choice for the Auditor to deploy in most scenarios. However, this Flavour suffers from
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weak points that we wish to overcome in any real-life implementation. Particularly
speaking, the High Active Agents to Users Rate and the High Banned Innocent PSPs
Rate are the responses that worries us most.
In this Stage, we try to overcome the short comes of the previous Stages by introducing
the Digital Governance Unit, DGU, as a tool, along with its associated Algorithms,
that can be used by the Auditor to develop new Defensive Strategies’ Flavours, see
Section 4.4. This unit is basically supposed to be installed by (P)SPs to guarantee
that they respect the sharing Sticky Policies that are attached to the Credentials
they acquire from Users. Knowing who obtained a compromised Credential through
sharing helps in improving the calculations of the Auditor’s Ranking Approaches, see
Subsection 5.6.3 for more details. It should be noted that the DGU Unit as it is
described in this thesis is not ready for real-life deployment yet. The closest hardware
solution to what we are describing is the TPM chip, which is still under development
and faces many challenges, see Section 3.1.1 for more details. Nevertheless, our Simu-
lation Process assumes a ready to deploy DGU and evaluates whether it is worth the
efforts to develop it for the purpose of providing truly Continuous Trust Management
Framework as described in this thesis.
In Milestone 5.1, we added the DGU along with its associated Algorithms, see Section
5.6.3, to the Manual Flavour that we choose in the previous Stage. Then, we opti-
mized the Counter-Attacking Strategy against the new Defensive Strategy Flavour.
Interestingly, the Automatic Optimizer for the Attackers decided to deploy a tougher
Colluding Settings, preferring Strong Colluding Strategy over Weak Colluding Strat-
egy, while relaxing their Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates. It turned out that the
actual performance of the Attackers got worse than initially anticipated by the Auto-
matic Optimizer. That signals a non-linearity in the measured effects of the Colluding
Settings that causes a bias in our simulation, see Section 6.10 for more details.
In Milestone 5.2, we tried to optimize the important factors related to the Auditors’
TST and TGT Approaches based on our experience so far with the system. The
results of the optimisation were generally good. We have confirmed our belief that the
202
PCR Threshold factor is more effective to tackle Strong Colluding Attacks compared to
the PCR Weak Threshold factor, which is good in Weak Colluding Attacks scenarios.
In Milestone 5.3, we re-optimized the Counter-Attacking Strategy’s Flavour against
the current Defensive Strategy’s Flavour. It seems that the Attackers realised how
bad their Colluding Settings were in Milestone 5.1 and, hence, they have undone those
changes and adopted more classic settings, preferring Weak Colluding Attacks with
higher Colluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates. The final results are pretty
similar to Milestone 5.1, with milder effects for the Attacking Factors. That suggests
the fact that the Auditors’ settings are near the optimal values given the available
options to the Auditor. That is especially true given that the Attackers have switched
their attacking technique from Strong Colluding to Weak Colluding without signifi-
cantly affecting the Auditors’ performance. However, unlike our initial anticipation
that the Post DGU Install Rank is an influential factor since it controls how much
Trustworthy MPSPs look like after they choose to Install DGU, both Milestones 5.1
and 5.3 proved that this factor does not have any noticeable effects. Rather, we found
that the advanced Colluding Settings that Colluding MPSPs adopt after the Auditor
force them to Install DGU are the main factors responsible for the reduced MPSPs
Detection Rates in this Stage.
Overall, it is true that the optimisations of this Stage have failed at achieving no-
ticeable Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates, due to the Colluding Attackers deploying
Advanced Colluding Attacks that we describe in Subsection 5.8.7. Nevertheless, when
we compare the performance figures we achieved by the end of this Stage with those
figures of the Aggressive Strategy - Manual Flavour, which is the base Strategy we
used here, we find good improvements. By deploying the DGU Algorithm, the Banned
Innocent PSPs Rates were reduced considerably from 32% to 0% as well as reducing
the Active Agents to Users Rate from 67% in to 50%, see Milestone 5.3 and Table C.2.
These improvements did not come at the cost of negatively affecting the Users Trust
or the Compromised Credentials Rates. However, we got worried about the Rates of
(P)SPs who Installed DGU and Enabled Strict DGU, which were above 90%. That
is worrying because we do not anticipate such excitement to adopt such a technology
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at a bootstrapping phase in real-life by suspecting (P)SPs who might prefer to leave
the Network rather than Installing DGU, see Section 2.8 for more details. We call the
resulted optimized Defensive Strategy Flavour of this Stage the Conservative Strategy
- vDGU Flavour, where the v refers to the fact that the Auditor gives the option to
voluntarily Install DGU as well as the option to voluntarily Enable Strict DGU. This
Flavour is considered Conservative rather than Aggressive since it is more cautious in
banning suspicious (M)SPs. In Stage 6.6.6, we examine the case where the Auditor
do not offer the option to voluntarily Install DGU or Enable Strict DGU.
6.6.6 Stage 6: Removing the Voluntarily DGU Installation Option along
with a Refinement Iteration
In this Stage, we tried to further optimize the Conservative vDGU Strategy Flavour
we developed in Stage 5, see Subsection 6.6.5, but this time in an environment where
(P)SPs never Install DGU voluntarily. As usual, we started the Stage with a Counter-
Attack Refinement in Milestone 6.1, but without offering the option to voluntarily
Install DGU. The resulted Attacks and the corresponding Auditor performance did
not differ much from what we have observed toward the end of Stage 5.
Despite the unchanged behaviour even without offering the option to voluntarily In-
stall DGU, we decided in Milestone 6.2 to optimize the important TST and TGT
factors. That is because we were desperate to check if there are some factors or envi-
ronmental settings that would do the trick and let the Auditor improve its Colluding
MPSPs Detection Rates. Indeed, the Automatic Optimizer achieved excellent Col-
luding MPSPs Detection Rates by incorporating Weak Colluding detecting settings
instead of the Strong Colluding detecting setting that were prominent in Stage 6.6.5
optimisations. However, those improvements were at the cost of very High Banned
Innocent PSPs Rates.
In our quest to find a possible environmental scenario where utilising the powerful
DGU would not cause major side effects, we conducted Milestone 6.3 with environ-
mental settings resembling an unpopular Network among genuine Users but highly
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populated and popular among M(P)SPs, see Table 6.8. In other words, we wanted
to check whether the current Aggressive Strategy Flavour that utilizes the power of
the DGU is the magical solution to cure Networks that are going to be dead due to
being so polluted with M(P)SPs that genuine nodes would not be interested to join or
utilize. Per our Malicious Density Theory, such environmental settings are probably
within the Threshold Region where High MPSPs Detection Rates could be achieved,
see Section 6.8. The resulted optimisation, however, did little improvements to the
Banned Innocent PSPs Rates while doing worse at the Colluding MPSPs Detection
Rates. For that, the optimisations of this Milestone got abandoned. In addition, we
named the optimisations of Milestone 6.2 the Aggressive Strategy - Extreme DGU
Flavour. In Milestone 6.4, we re-optimized the Counter-Attacking Flavour against
the Aggressive Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour. The results show that he Colluding
Attackers got extra careful by raising their Colluding Settings. That considerably
reduced the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates and the Compromised Credentials Rates as
well as increased the Users’ Trust. However, the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate is still
unacceptably high at around 18%.
Finally, we decided that the settings of the Conservative vDGU Strategy Flavour
would be also utilized even if the Auditor did not offer the option to voluntarily
Install DGU. In that case, we named the new Flavour the Conservative DGU Strategy
Flavour. All the Defensive Strategies Flavours are compared against each other in
Section 6.9 to check which of them would be the best option to deploy at a given
environmental situation.
6.6.7 Stage 7: Comparing the performance of vDGU and DGU
This Stage consists of only Milestone 7.1. This Milestone basically compares the
performance of the Conservative vDGU Strategy Flavour and the Conservative DGU
Strategy Flavour, which we have developed in Stage 6, see Subsection 6.6.6, under
various populations scenarios in a similar fashion to the comparison we made between
the Aggressive Manual Strategy Flavour and the Conservative Automatic Strategy
Flavour in Stage 3, see Subsection 6.6.3. We find out that both Flavours have similar
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effects and, hence, the Automatic Optimizer did not strongly push the Auditor to
deploy any one of those Strategies. That is a good result because it confirms that
whether the genuine PSPs and Users love the idea of voluntarily Installing DGU or
not, the Auditor achieves good results with a maximum penalty of Banned Innocent
PSPs Rates reaching around 8% in the worst-case where no PSP voluntarily accepts
to Install DGU. The results of Milestone 7.1 also confirm the hypothesis we came up
with about the Threshold Density Regions in Section 6.8.
6.6.8 Stage 8: Evaluating the Different Defensive Strategies by ANOVA-
Testing
In this final Stage, we identified the 7 main Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that we
were able to identify thorough our Simulation Process, see their summary in Sec-
tion 6.7. We then simulated each Flavour, including the None Strategy, against its
Counter-Attacking Strategy in different environmental scenarios. These environmen-
tal scenarios are simply the variations of 3 factors:
• Normal Nodes Population: This is a factor consisting of grouping the ini
Users & (P)SPs and the Users & (P)SPs GR factors.
• Malicious Nodes Population: This is a factor consisting of grouping the ini
M(P)SPs and the M(P)SPs GR factors.
• Users’ Ignorance Rate: This factor refers to the probability of Users caring
about and, hence, reporting a received Spam.
Then, we run ANOVA analysis to compare the generated effects of each Strategy’s
Flavours on the different monitored outputs in different environmental scenarios. The
results of this final Stage should be an important guide for any wise Auditor trying
to figure out the best Defensive Strategy Flavour to deploy if he roughly knows the
environmental settings and the nature of the launched Attacks. While this Stages’
Milestones, see Subsection C.8 for more details, lists the main notes and observations
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we made during the ANOVA testing, Section 6.9 summarises these results in a tabular
format.
6.7 Summary of the Optimized Defensive and Attacking Strategies
Strategy Description Strengths Weaknesses
Random Random Detection due to
relying on simple Algorithms
like TLR− avg Approach.
No Agents required; fair enough
against very trivial Attacks
Worse than deploying
nothing if the Attacks
are complex.
Aggressive Random Detection due to
complex Attacks. Relies on
Weak Colluding Detection.
High Trust; Low Compromised
Credentials; High MPSPs
Detection
High Agents
requirements; High
Banned PSPs
Conservative Accurate Detection based on
Strong Colluding evidence.
High Trust; Low Compromised
Credentials; Low Banned PSPs;
Moderate Agents requirements
Low Colluding MPSPs
Detection
Table 6.10: Classifications of the Defensive Strategies
While conducting the Experimental Stages of Section 6.6, we came to realise some De-
fensive patterns with associated Counter-Attacking patterns. As the Stages matured,
we realised three distinctive Defensive Strategies based on those patterns as shown
in Table 6.10. The Random Defensive Strategy is very simple and would be useful
in a limited set of scenarios where most of the malicious nodes are expected to be
novice according to the readings of the Auditor’s Health Gauges, see Subsection 5.6.4,
or when the Auditor could utilize a smart Strategies’ Release Order approach to fool
the Counter-Attackers to think that he is deploying an Aggressive Defensive Strategy
while he could be deploying an inexpensive Random Defensive Strategy, see Subsec-
tion 7.3.1. On the other hand, both the Aggressive Defensive Strategy, that relies
on Weak Colluding detection settings, and the Conservative Defensive Strategy, that
relies on Strong Colluding detection settings, are powerful Strategies that we focused
on optimising through our Simulation Process. Our testing, optimising, and com-
paring process of those main Defensive Strategies along with their Counter-Attacking
Strategies, generated by the Automatic Optimizer of Subsection 6.5.3, led to many
Flavours of those Defensive Strategies. It should be noted that the introduction of the
hypothetical hardware Trust unit, the DGU of Sections 4.4 and 5.6.3, created more
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powerful Defensive Strategies’ Flavours and, hence, forced the Counter-Attackers to
adopt more complex Colluding Attacks that made them almost undetectable, given
the Algorithms we have proposed in this thesis. The seven main Defensive Strategies’
Flavours that we have developed and evaluated are:
• Random GPD: This Flavour is simply about deploying only the TLRavg Ap-
proach. That is, the optimized Auditor by the end of Milestone 1.2.
• Conservative ST: This Flavour is simply about deploying only the TLRavg and
the TST Approaches. That is, the optimized Auditor by the end of Milestone
1.3.
• Aggressive Manual: This Flavour is the result of the manually modified set-
tings based on our understanding of the system by the time we started Milestone
4.1. See Table C.1 for more details.
• Conservative Automatic: This Flavour is the result of the automatically
generated settings by the end of Milestone 3.3. See Table C.1 for more details.
• Conservative vDGU: This Flavour is the result of the automatically generated
settings after deploying the DGU Algorithm and assuming some PSPs would
accept to voluntarily Install DGU. That is, the setting we reached by the end
of Milestone 5.2.
• Conservative DGU: This Flavour is the result of deploying the vDGU Flavour
setting but assuming no PSPs would accept to voluntarily Install DGU. That
is, the setting we reached by the end of Milestone 5.2.
• Aggressive Extreme DGU: This Flavour is the result of the automatically
generated settings after deploying the DGU Algorithm and assuming no PSPs
would accept to voluntarily Install DGU. That is, the setting we reached by the
end of Milestone 6.2.
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Strong Colluding Attacks Weak Colluding Attacks
Description Only Abuse a Credential after a large
enough number of Colluding Attackers
acquire it
Only Abuse a Credential when a large
enough number of Colluding Attackers
deals with the User owning it
Setting Justification Setting Justification
Main
Attack
Settings
High
NtoAbuseC
value
Increase the minimum number
of Colluding Attackers who
have acquired the Credential
High
NtoAbuseU
value
Increase the minimum number
of Colluding Attackers who
have dealt with the User
owning the Credential
Minor
Attack
Settings
Low
Colluding
Users/Cre-
dentials
Drop Rates
To substitute the lost share of
total Abuse Cases due to the
strict Colluding Settings
High
Colluding
Users/Cre-
dentials
Drop Rates
To reduce the Colluding
Attackers footprints in the
reported Cases to avoid getting
Detected
Main
Defence
Setting 1
Turning on
PIIL GT
Selector
PIIL GT Selector is powerful
at detecting Strong Colluding
Attackers who appear in large
Gs within the PIIL Record
High WTGT High WTGT speeds up the
banning since it biases the
TGR Ranks toward the
conclusions made by the TGT
Ranking Algorithms
Main
Defence
Setting 2
Low PCR
Threshold
Low PCR Threshold increases
confidence in the conclusions
made by the TGTsc Strong
Colluding Ranking Algorithm
leading to faster banning
decisions
Low PCR
Weak
Threshold
Low PCR Weak Threshold
increases the confidence in the
conclusions made by the
TGTwc Weak Colluding
Ranking Algorithm leading to
fast banning decisions
Minor
Defence
Setting 1
High G
Max Size
High G Max Size helps
focusing on large Gs of
suspicious Colluding Attackers
instead of small random Gs
Low G Max
Size
Small G Max Size helps
focusing on small Gs of
suspicious Weak Colluding
Attackers who can do their
attacks without necessary
appearing on the MGR or the
MGRsc Records
Minor
Defence
Setting 2
High Wsc
and Wsg
High Wsc and Wsg make the
TG Ranks biased toward the
findings of the TGTsg and
TGTsc Detectors which focus
on Strong Colluding
High Wwc High Wwc biases the TG
Ranks to the findings of the
TGTwc Weak Colluding
Ranking Algorithm
Minor
Defence
Setting 3
Turning off
Ignore Old
G Ranks
Turning off Ignore Old G
Ranks helps keeping valuable
MGRwc logs to track the
tricky Weak Colludings
Table 6.11: The Main Defensive Settings against the main Counter-Attacking
Strategies
Regardless of the settings’ differences found among the different Strategies’ Flavours
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we have generated, the Strategies’ Flavours of each of the two main Defensive Strate-
gies, Aggressive and Conservative, share common influential defensive settings against
common influential Counter-Attacking Strategies. That is, the Aggressive Defensive
Strategy try to defend against Weak Colluding Attacking Strategy while the Conser-
vative Defensive Strategy try to defend against Strong Colluding Attacking Strategy.
In Table 6.11, we briefly describe the common settings for the two main Counter-
Attacking Strategies along with the main influential defensive settings used to tackle
each type of those two Counter-Attacking Strategies. It should be noted that different
Defensive Strategies’ Flavours could try to tackle both types of Counter-Attacking
Strategies, with variable bias toward one of them. Hence, the Auditor may try to
generate an infinite number of Strategies’ Flavours at different times depending on
dynamic Attackers’ behaviour that could be observed by the Auditor’s Health Gauges,
see Subsection 5.6.4.
6.8 The Malicious Density Theory
During our Simulation Stages, we noticed some interesting facts about the effects of
the M(P)SPs ratio to the total inhabitants of the Trust Network, i.e. the Malicious
Nodes Density. Based on our early observations, and confirmed by the final ANOVA
comparisons that we carried for the different Defensive Strategies’ Flavours at variable
Density settings, we observed that:
• At the extreme case of a High Malicious Density, we observed that the Detection
Rates get Low because the Ranking Algorithms cannot draw conclusions about
who is colluding with who. That is caused by the enormous number of M(P)SPs
involved in all the open Cases.
• At the extreme case of a Low Malicious Density, we observed that the Detection
Rates also get Low because the Ranking Algorithms would confuse Innocent
(P)SPs for being colluding or acting maliciously because there is a minority of
M(P)SPs causing a lot of open Cases containing many Innocent PSPs appearing
often together, unintentionally, giving the false sense of being colluding.
210
• At a Threshold Point in between the two extreme cases, we observed the De-
tection Rates to be higher for most of the Defensive Strategies’ Flavours along
with their associated Counter-Attacking Strategies.
DU,S,P =
M(P )SPs
(P )SPs+M(P )SPs+ Users (6.8)
Equation 6.8: Basic Malicious Density Equation
DP =
MPSPs
PSPs+MPSPs (6.9)
Equation 6.9: Malicious Density Equation - PSPs
DS,P =
M(P )SPs
(P )SPs+M(P )SPs (6.10)
Equation 6.10: Malicious Density Equation - (P)SPs
DU,P =
MPSPs
PSPs+MPSPs+ Users (6.11)
Equation 6.11: Malicious Density Equation - PSPs and Users
As a result of our initial observations regarding the effects of the Malicious Density,
we came up with the basic Equation 6.8 to calculate the Density of the M(P)SPs
among all the Trust Networks’ inhabitants: (P)SPs and Users. Nevertheless, we
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thought that this Equation may not give accurate results because it includes the Users’
population that may not affect the integrity of Defensive Strategies’ Flavours, apart
from the Random Strategy - GPD Flavour, since they are not sensitive to the volume
of the reported Cases by the Users. In addition, that basic Equation also includes
the (M)SPs population, which may just add noise to the calculated Density values
because most of the developed Strategies’ Flavours are not bothered with Detecting
the MSPs due to their low risk. For these reasons, we created three variations of the
basic Density Equation. Equation 6.9 considers only the populations of the (M)PSPs
while Equation 6.10 considers only (M)(P)SPs populations and finally Equation 6.11
that only considers (M)PSPs and Users populations.
Knowing that the Detection Rates are boosted at a given Density Region while they
are slowed down in very High or very Low Density Regions, we anticipated that there
is a Density Threshold Point where the Detection Rates are boosted the most. We also
anticipated good Detection Rates at the Density values around the Density Threshold
Point, defining what we would call from now on the Threshold Region. On the other
hand, Density values Lower or Higher than the Threshold Region would lead to either
of the Top/Bottom Low Detection Regions.
Density
Point
Norm.
Pop.
Mal.
Pop.
DU,S,P DP DS,P DU,P Detection Detection
“DGU”
Notes
S1 Low High 0.48 0.75 0.74 0.29 - + At edge of the Top
Low Detection Region
but DGU effects
dragging it down near
the Threshold Point.
S2 Low Low 0.34 0.64 0.61 0.19 + 0+ Very Close to the
Threshold Point but
DGU effects dragging
it down near the
Bottom Low Detection
Region.
S3 High High 0.26 0.55 0.53 0.14 - - In the Bottom Low
Detection Region.
S4 High Low 0.17 0.41 0.39 0.09 - - In the Bottom Low
Detection Region.
Table 6.12: The Observed Malicious Density Values during the Simulation Process
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Figure 6.2: Visualising the Observed Malicious Density Values during the Simu-
lation Process
To test our theory and the accuracy of each of the Density Equations, we generated
Table 6.12 where we calculated the Density values for each of the Density Equations
in four main Density Points. The chosen Density Points are basically all the possible
combinations of the Normal and the Malicious Nodes’ initial populations. The values
we used in these calculations are per our standard settings we used in our Simulation
Process as they appear in Table B.2. We then classified the performance of the Auditor
at a certain Density Point as positive, meaning it is at the Density Threshold Region,
or negative, meaning it is not in the Density Threshold Region. That classification is
based on our observation of the performance achieved by the Auditor at those Points
in Stage 6.6.4, for the Detection column, and in Stage 6.6.6, for the Detection with
DGU column. To better visualise the generated Table 6.12 in light of the proposed
theory, we created Figure 6.2.
Difference DU,S,P DP DS,P DU,P
S1 - S2 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.10
S2 - S3 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06
S3 - S4 0.22 0.2 0.21 0.15
Table 6.13: The Step Value Between Consecutive Density Points Based on the
Density Measure
It is important to define the boundaries of each Region and to decide on the most
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suitable Density Equation among the four proposed Equations. For the first goal, we
could select the S1 Density Point as the lower boundary of the Top Low Detection
Region, the S3 Density Point as the higher boundary of the Bottom Low Detection
Region, and the S2 Density Point as the Density Threshold Point. These boundary
Points are estimates that are good enough for the purpose of our research. Further
Refinement Experiments are needed to predict the exact values of those Points.
For the second goal aiming to choose the best Density Equation, we base our selection
on an important quality: a large enough step size in between each Density Point.
This condition is important because if the step size is small, the Regions would easily
overlap making it hard for the Auditor to determine in which Region he is currently
operating. Furthermore, small step sizes are prone to rounding errors and are hard
for humans to comprehend. For this purpose, we generated Table 6.13 where we
compared the step sizes of all the four Equations based on the Data presented in
Table 6.12. Table 6.13 confirms that all of the DU,S,P , DP , and DS,P have very close
values while the DU,P has smaller step sizes than them deeming it unsuitable measure.
Since the most dominant factor among the Attackers are the MPSPs, we think DP
should be the main measure of Malicious Density. That is, the Regions’ Boundary
should be:
• Lower boundary of the Top Low Detection Region = 75%.
• The Density Threshold ≈ 65%.
• Higher boundary of the Bottom Low Detection Region = 55%.
In our Experimental Process, see Section 6.6, we observed that some factors have
some influence that could slightly shift the Regions’ Boundary Points as we visualise
them in Figure 6.2. We list these factors below. In Figure 6.3, we re-visualise the
Malicious Density Regions based on our chosen DP Equation. The DP Equation is
listed in that Figure as well as the different factors’ expected effects on the stated
Density values. An arrow down means an effect that reduces all the Density values
while an arrow up means the opposite.
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Figure 6.3: Approximate Density Threshold Point and Regions Boundaries
• High Normal Nodes GR: Leads to increasing the denominators of all the
Density Equations. i.e. Decreasing the Malicious Density.
• High Malicious Nodes GR: Leads to increasing the numerators of all the
Density Equations. i.e. Increasing the Malicious Density. Still, this increase
is less significant to the opposite decrease caused by the High Normal GR be-
cause the High Malicious GR slightly increases the denominators of the Density
Equations.
• Utilising DGU: Leads to increasing the Normal nodes population because
it converts all the Detected Uncolluding M(P)SPs into innocent nodes. i.e.
Decreasing the Malicious Density.
• Offering vDGU: Quickly removes most of the innocent (P)SPs from the re-
ported Cases because, in our simulation settings, they quickly and voluntarily
choose to Enable Strict DGU. Once the innocent (P)SPs get neutralised in the
Density Equations, the Malicious Density would sharply increase.
A smart Auditor should take advantage of this Theory to optimize its Defensive
Strategy’s Flavour. That is, when it predicts that the current Density is within the
Threshold Detection Region, it could deploy an Aggressive Strategy Flavour to take
advantage of the current situation. When the Density gets in one of the Low Detection
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Regions, the Auditor would be better off deploying a Conservative Strategy Flavour
to reduce the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates. For such predictions, it is a straight
forward task to calculate the denominator of the Density Equations because there is
no need to distinguish between Normal and Malicious Nodes. On the other hand, it
is quite challenging to accurately predict the numerator values. Some useful starting
points are presented in the Auditor’s Health Gauges of Section 5.6.4.
Finally, the rough Density Regions presented in Figure 6.3 may not work well for all
groups of Attackers. That is, when the DGU is utilized, Colluding Attackers would
resort to the Advanced Colluding settings described in Subsection 5.8.7. Once they
enable that setting, it would be almost impossible to detect them given our current
proposed Algorithms. In other words, they would be invisible nodes that should not
be even considered in the Density calculations. Moreover, the current drawn Density
Regions are potentially biased to the Weak Colluding Attacking Strategy. That is
because in most of the optimisation Stages, the Automatic Optimizer choose that
setting for the Attackers, see Section 6.6. After all, smart Attackers may experiment
with other settings, even if such settings look less optimal, to fool the Auditor who
assumes that Attackers would always deploy their default optimal settings. Altering
the Attacks settings could change how effectively the Auditor Detects M(P)SPs and,
hence, causes the Threshold Region boundaries to shrink, spread, and/or shift its
location up or down.
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6.9 Evaluating the Defensive Strategies’ Flavours
GPD ST Manual Automatic vDGU DGU Extreme
DGU
Developed In Milestone 1.2 Milestone 1.3 Stage 6.6.4 Stage 6.6.4 Milestone 5.2 Milestone 5.2 Milestone 6.2
Optimized in
Density:
S2 S2 S2 S2 S2 - High GRs S2 - High GRs S2 - High GRs
Auditors’ Settings
WTGT 80% 80% 80% 80% 80%
Wsg 20% 25% 20% 20% 20%
Wsc 30% 60% 30% 30% 30%
Wwc 50% 15% 50% 50% 50%
WTLR−avg 100% 44% 4% 16% 8% 8% 8%
WTST 56% 16% 4% 12% 12% 12%
Suspicious SP
Rank
32% 32% 30% 20% 30% 30% 30%
Suspicious SP
Banning Rank
10% 10% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Sufficient
TLRus PSP
20 20 10 20 10 10 10
Sufficient
TLRus SP
5 5 2 2 2 2 2
Post DGU
Install Rank
50% 50% 20%
Agent Report
Spam
false true true true true true
PSL ST
Selector
true false false false false false
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GPD ST Manual Automatic vDGU DGU Extreme
DGU
Suspicious
Nodes ST
Selector
true false true false false true
Top TLRavg
ST Selector
true true false false false false
Bottom
TLRavg ST
Selector
true false false false false false
IIR ST Selector true false true true true false
PCR
Threshold
7 3 2 2 2
PCR Weak
Threshold
2 7 2 2 2
Ignore Old G
Ranks
false true false false false false
GT Max SP
Num.
2 2 2 2 2 2
GT Max SP
Size
5 7 7 7 7 2
PIIL GT
Selector
true false true true false
PSL GT
Selector
false true true true true
Suspicious
Nodes GT
Selector
false false false false false
Counter Attacks’ Settings
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GPD ST Manual Automatic vDGU DGU Extreme
DGU
Uncolluding Attackers’ Settings
Delay Period 50 50 50 50 50 50 5
Bombarding
Period
28 28 37 37 50 50 50
Drop User
Rate
0% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80%
Drop
Credential
Rate
3% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80%
Colluding Attackers’ Settings
Delay Period 50 50 50 50 50 50 37
Bombarding
Period
28 28 50 50 5 5 50
Drop User
Rate
0% 80% 75% 75% 24% 24% 20%
Drop
Credential
Rate
3% 80% 25% 25% 80% 80% 20%
NtoSpamU 1 5 5 5 5 5 5
NtoSpamC 0 1 1 1 1 1 5
Defensive
Strategy
Random Conservative
moderated
version of the
GPD Random
Flavour
Aggressive
Weak Colluding
focus; High
Banned PSPs
Conservative
focusing on
Strong
Colluding
Detection
Conservative focus on Strong
Colluding Detection
Aggressive
focus on Weak
Colluding
Detection
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GPD ST Manual Automatic vDGU DGU Extreme
DGU
Attacks Char-
acteristics
Trivial High-Level
Weak Colluding
Similar to the Counter-Attack of the ST Flavour but relaxed
Drop Rates to generate more Abuse
Slightly relaxed
Uncolluding;
Strong
Colluding
Strengths High Detection
Rates; Doesn’t
require Testing
Agents
Low Agents in
S1 & S2 ;
Detects 20%
Uncolluding
MPSPs & 15%
MSPs; High
Trust in S1 &
S2 ; No Banned
PSPs
Detects up to
40%
Uncolluding
MPSPs, 15%
MSPs, & up to
35% Colluding
MPSPs
Low Agents
except in S1 ;
Detects up to
20% MPSPs &
25% Colluding
MPSPs; No
Banned PSPs
Low Agents in
S1 & S2 ;
Detects up to
25%
Uncolluding
MPSPs; No
Banned PSPs
Detects up to
55%
Uncolluding
MPSPs
High Users’
Trust; Low
Agents in S3 &
S4 ; Detects
over than 65%
Uncolluding
MPSPs
Weaknesses Fooled by
Simple Attacks;
Low Trust;
High
Compromised
Rates; Sensitive
to Users’
Ignorance
High Agents;
Fails to detect
Colluding
MPSPs
High Agents No Uncolluding
MSPs
Detection; very
Low Colluding
Unpopular
MPSPs
Detection
No Uncolluding
MSPs
Detection; very
Low Colluding
MPSPs
Detection
No Uncolluding
MSPs
Detection; very
Low Colluding
MPSPs
Detection; High
Banned PSPs
Rates
No Uncolluding
MSPs
Detection; very
Low Colluding
MPSPs
Detection; very
High Banned
PSPs Rates
Threshold
Region
S1 & S3 All the same S2 S2 S1 S1 S3
Densities of
High Agents
S1 & S2 S1 & S2 S2 S1 & S2 S1 & S2 S1
Densities of
High Trust
S4 S3 & S4 S4 S4 S4 S4 All the same
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GPD ST Manual Automatic vDGU DGU Extreme
DGU
Densities of
High
Compromised
Credentials
S1 S1 & S2 S1 S1 S1 & S2 S1 & S2 S1 & S2
Densities of
High Banned
PSPs
S3 S2 S1 S1
Best in
Densities
S1 & S4 S2 & S3 S1 & S4
Notes Against the
predictions of
the Malicious
Density Theory,
GPD works
best in the Top
Density Region
since it is a
Random
Detector relying
on the volume
of reported
Cases.
Shouldn’t be
deployed in a
Network with
High Colluding
MPSPs Density.
Works best in
Low Detection
Regions given
its stable
performance
and moderate
Agents
requirements.
Powerful but its
associated High
Banned PSPs
Rates makes it
risky to deploy.
Fair Colluding
Detection Rates
making it a
good option to
deploy in the
Threshold
Region.
Good
Uncolluding
MPSPs
Detection, bad
Colluding
Detection, but
no Banned
PSPs. Good
option for Low
Detection
Regions with
Low Users’
Ignorance Rate.
Like vDGU
with better
Uncolluding
MPSPs
Detection in
Threshold
Region but
High Banned
PSPs. In Low
Detection
Regions, vDGU
is preferred to
get more (P)SPs
to Install DGU.
Powerful
Uncolluding
MPSP
Detection but
no Colluding
MPSPs
Detection and
very High
Banned PSPs
Rates making it
risky to deploy
in any Region.
Table 6.14: Evaluating the Defensive Strategies
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This Section is the vital part of the whole Chapter. Here, we present a comprehensive
comparison Table 6.14 where we summarise the results obtained after conducting and
analysing all the Experimental Stages as shown in Section 6.6. In this Table, we
start by comparing the settings of the different Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that
we developed during the Simulation Process, see Section 6.7. That is followed by the
settings of the Counter-Attacking Flavour launched against each different Flavour.
We then present our textual interpretations of those settings as well as the observed
performance metrics at different Density Points as described in our Malicious Density
Theory of Section 6.8. We finally list the Density Points where a wise Auditor should
consider deploying each Defensive Strategy Flavour, based on our observations. Note
that we have listed the factors with the most significant effects, for both the Auditor
and the Counter-Attackers, in bold.
As we reach the end of our Simulation Process, Table 6.14 reveals that we have
succeeded in developing Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that are significantly better
than the current situation, doing nothing. By better, we refer to the qualities of
interest that we listed in the Simulation Scope in Section 6.1. Apart of the GPD
Flavour, all the developed Strategies’ Flavours had significantly increased the level of
the Users’ Trust and reduced the Compromised Credentials Rates. Generally speaking,
each of the two main Defensive Strategies has its own weakness point. The Aggressive
Strategy’s Flavours achieve High MPSPs Colluding Detection Rates at the cost of
High Banned PSPs Rates and High Agents requirements. On the other hand, the
Conservative Strategy’s Flavours can reduce the Banned PSPs Rates and the required
number of Testing Agents at the cost of Low Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates.
Given the Users’ Trust and Compromised Credentials Rates for both Strategies are
similar, we recommend the Auditor to choose the Conservative Strategy to avoid
populating the Trust Network with most of the artificial Testing Agents where a
substantial number of genuine PSPs are mistakenly banned from the Network. Our
decision is reflected in the row describing the best Density Regions to deploy each of
the compared Strategies’ Flavours in Table 6.14. In that row, it could be observed
that there is always a recommended Flavour for an Auditor operating in any Density
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Region if the Auditor is not to utilize the DGU Unit. On the other hand, there is
no recommended Flavour to deploy in S2 and S3 Density Points if the DGU Unit is
to be introduced. In other words, the proposed Flavours utilising the DGU Unit are
not recommended to be introduced in bootstrapping or saturated Networks unless it
is mandatory for all the (P)SPs to install it.
6.10 Known Limitations and their Expected Effects
While conducting this Simulation Process, we suffered from limited available resources
in terms of time and human power, just like any ordinary PhD thesis. Plus, the
pioneering nature of this research where we are investigating new frontiers in the
Continuous Trust Management Frameworks field meant the lack of similar experiments
where we could get inspirations or learn some lessons. Hence, our Simulation Process
has some flaws and limitations. Here we list and discuss the effects of the limitations
that we are already aware of.
6.10.1 Unverified Trust Model
One of the main limitations of this research project is the lack of a verified Users’ Trust
Model. As we described in Section 6.4, the closest existing model to what we are doing
would be the Technology Acceptance Model, TAM, along with its many extensions
covering the effects of SPs perceived usefulness, easiness of use, Security, Privacy, and
Trust [124–126]. Nevertheless, we decided not to incorporate this theory or any of
its extensions due to the unnecessarily added layer of complexity to our code as well
as the inaccuracy of the available TAM models that makes investing our resources
in implementing them unjustified, see Section 6.4 for more details. Moreover, even
if we have implemented the TAM model, it would lack information showing how the
Users’ reactions would differ after we introduce the new Defensive Strategies that we
proposed in this thesis. That is, knowing that the Auditor have the utilities to detect
Abusers may raise the Users’ expectations and, hence, their perceived Trust would
get more sensitive to unexpected Abuse incidents.
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As a result, we proposed a rough Trust Model in Section 6.4 based on our assumptions
about how Users behave. We based our assumptions on the current mentality where
most Users simply ignore Abuse incidents and carry on without worrying too much
about who Abused their personal Credentials. In fact, our model is more restrictive
than that real-life scenario. That is, we assumed a 10% fall in Trust after each received
Abuse and a further 1% decrease for a period of 25 simulation cycles, which could
represent hours or days depending on how active a User is in the Network, or until
the Auditor figures out who the Abuser was. After that period, we assume that the
User would simply forget about that Abuse case and carry on.
If our proposed Trust Model is surprisingly accurate, then we do not really have a
problem. Nevertheless, it is important to know how the integrity of our results would
be affected if our model is not so accurate? To answer this question, we start by
clarifying that we do not expect our model to be far from real-life, based on the
abovementioned scenario. Maybe we just need to calibrate some factors and periods
by conducting some experiments on real Users. Moreover, our Experimental Stages of
Section 6.6 showed that the Users’ Trust is always High unless we deploy a really trivial
Defensive Strategy like the Random Strategy - GPD Flavour. That is because the
Counter-Attacking Strategies against our Defensive Strategies ignore abusing most of
the Users to avoid getting detected by the Auditor. In other words, we are eliminating
most of the currently launched attacks by raising the game level from a defenceless
Trust Network against trivial attackers to a a Trust Network deploying a proactive
Auditor against Counter-Attackers trying very hard to get a tiny fraction of the Abuse
share they used to get before the introduction of the proactive Auditor. As a result,
we are not worried that the real-life Users’ Trust Model is different than what we
anticipated in our experiments.
6.10.2 Limitations of the Utilized Simulation Cycle Concept
In our Simulation Process, we relied on a simulation library called PeerSim as de-
scribed in Section 6.3. That library assumes the simulation model to run in a set
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number of cycles representing real-life periods. That is a rough modeling of the real-
life behaviour of Users because not all Users interact with the Network at the same
pace. That is, while some Users interact with ten (P)SPs a day, other Users may only
interact with one (P)SP on a single day. Further, even if all Users have a unified inter-
actions frequency, we still have the problem of defining what a cycle really represents
in real-life. Is a cycle an hour, a day, or maybe a week? That is particularly important
to better optimize the settings of the Attacking factor Abuse Delay Period. In our
simulation, we assumed the upper limit for that factor to be 50 cycles assuming 50
represents days. Delaying the attack for more than 50 days may lead to attacking a
Users’ Credential that may not exist anymore. On the other hand, if cycles represent
hours, then the Attackers could easily set their Abuse Delay Period to 500 instead of
50.
Fortunately, we think that this limitation should not have major effects on the integrity
of our research. First, even if the Users’ interactions frequencies are not unified, the
Strong Colluding and Weak Colluding defensive settings, see Section 6.7 that are
utilized by our developed Defensive Strategies’ Flavours do not rely on the wealth
of the submitted Abuse cases. Rather, those Detectors depend on patterns of PSPs
appearing suspiciously in different reported Cases, regardless of the frequency of their
submission. The resistance of our Defensive Strategies’ Flavours, apart from the
GPD Flavour to variations in the Users’ Ignorance Rate as shown in Subsection 6.6.8
supports this point. Second, the Experimental Stages Data, see Section 6.6, shows
that the Abuse Delay Period has minor influence on the launched attacks. Particularly
speaking, it influences the Uncolluding Attackers who are not expected to be the main
threat to the Networks’ integrity in most of the cases.
6.10.3 Biased Environmental Settings
When we first designed our environmental factors of interest as shown in Table 6.2
and assigned the Low and High values for the experimentation process, we tried to
set the minimum values of the Attackers large enough to enable launching all different
types of Colluding Attacks. Particularly speaking, we needed at least 5 MPSPs for
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each type of the Colluding Attackers to avoid delaying the Attacks until the Malicious
Growth Rate generates a new MPSP to enable the High-Level Colluding Attacks to
take place. The number of MSPs should be larger than the MPSPs to resemble real-
life situations. That led us to end-up having more M(P)SPs than (P)SPs, which
basically meant that we were biased toward simulating the more pessimistic scenario:
a polluted Trust Network with a majority of Attackers.
To make things more interesting, we started the Simulation Process with the minimum
population settings to save on the computational resources. However, we discovered in
Stage 4, see Subsection 6.6.4, that those population settings were biased toward a Low
Detection Region. Hence, we tried to improve the following Stages by increasing the
populations’ Growth Rates. Toward the end of the Simulation Process, we discovered
that the populations’ Growth Rates do little to move the Simulation Process from a
Low Detection Region to a Threshold Detection Region as we described in Section
6.8.
Honestly speaking, it is better to redo the optimisation process in each different Den-
sity Region to get the ultimate Defensive Strategies’ Flavours for each Region based
on the proposed Ranking Algorithms. Nevertheless, we think the current settings pro-
vide fair enough insights about the main characteristics of the Defensive Strategies
and their main Counter-Attackers, see Section 6.7 as well as how environmental set-
tings affect the relation between the two as described in the Malicious Density Theory
of Section 6.8.
6.10.4 Awkward Experimental Stages Design
In writing this thesis, we tried our best to present the Experimental Stages and process
as smoothly as possible. However, the actual execution of the Simulation Process was
not smooth and straight forward at all. We were improving and editing the design on
an agile basis based on our improved understanding of the system as the time passes.
That is, if this Simulation Process is to be repeated, we would have better design
ideas for it.
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First, the technique we utilized to conduct Stage 1, see Subsection 6.6.1 of our Simu-
lation Process was simply to optimize the relevant Auditor’s and Attackers’ settings
at each Milestone. That meant spending a lot of time on analysing each Milestone
while, at the same time, reducing the accuracy of each Milestones’ results due to the
increased number of evaluated factors. From Stage 2 on, see Subsection 6.6.2, we
started each Stage by optimising the Attackers’ settings at a dedicated first Mile-
stone and then optimising the Auditors’ settings against the initial optimized Attack
in separate Milestones. The settings may not be accurate enough that way, hence,
we repeated that process for several Stages in what we called the Refinement Stages,
to get stable realistic results. Due to time limitations, we could not run Refinement
Stages after we introduced the hypothetical DGU Unit. Still, our findings should
be good enough at this phase to understand the possible effects of this unavailable
technology yet.
Another issue with the Experimental Stages design is the fact that we initially assumed
the Attackers acting as a one group with similar interests when we tried to optimize
their attacks in the first Stage. Nevertheless, we came to realise that there is potential
conflict of interest in between the Colluding and Uncolluding Attackers as we showed
in Stage 2, see Subsection 6.6.2. From that Stage on, we started to optimize for
each group of Attackers separately. Although the first stage had the two groups tied
together, we do not expect that to have a major threat to the integrity of our findings
due to the utilisation of the Refinement process that aims to eliminate inaccuracies
in the prior Stages.
6.10.5 Non-Linearity in the Measured Effects
We showed in Section 6.5 that our Simulation Process is based on conducting sequen-
tial Stages of mini-experiments. Those mini-experiments were designed based on the
partial factorial principles with two simulation points: High and Low. That is, we
measured the effects of each factor when its value is Low and when its value is High.
Then, our statistical software, Minitab, draws a line between the two measured values
of each response to understand the effects of varying the simulated factor.
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While this simple approach gives us valuable insights about the potential effects of
each simulated factor, it has the risk of drawing linear conclusions about non-linear
relations. That is, for example, many factors could have no significant effects on the
measured responses they generate until their value reaches a certain threshold near
the High value. To capture such behaviour, it is recommended to introduce centre
points in the partial factorial designs in addition to the Low and High points to better
draw the effects graph, see [127] for more details.
However, introducing centre points in our design wasn’t feasible. That meant increas-
ing the required time to run each experiment by around 50% for each additional centre
point. In addition, that also meant radical changes to our hard-coded Java catalogue
of partial factorial designs used to run our mini-experiments, see Subsection 6.5.2.
Given the nature of this Simulation Process, the cost of the extra accuracy gener-
ated by the introduction of centre points is unjustifiable at the moment. Instead, we
resorted to the Confirming Experiment as a screening tool to confirm whether the
automatically optimized values generate the expected effects or not, see Subsection
6.5.3. Significant deviations from the predictions of the Automatic Optimizer probably
signal non-linearity in the measured effects in the first experiment. That is because
the Automatic Optimizer makes its predictions based on the linearity assumption.
While most factors did not show significant deviations from the linearity assumption,
few important factors did. Particularly speaking, the PCR Threshold, PCR Weak
Threshold, NtoAbuseU , NtoAbuseC , and WTGT factors showed non-linearity behaviours as
can be seen in Subsections 6.6.3, 6.6.5, and 6.6.6. To mitigate the adverse effects of
the non-linearity showed by those factors, we tried to repeat the Confirming Experi-
ment with manually adjusted values for those factors to get more realistic optimized
values. Nevertheless, future optimisation efforts looking to generate better accurate
optimisations should consider introducing centre points for those important factors.
A final note is about the potential non-linearity observed in Milestone 5.2 in the Col-
luding Settings that caused the Attackers to focus on the Strong Colluding Attacking
Strategy instead of the potentially more rewarding Weak Attacking Strategy. Instead
of manually adjusting the optimized values for the Attackers, we decided to keep it as
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it is because we wanted to observe how the Auditor adjusts its Defensive Strategies
against a Strong Colluding Attacking Strategy. At the end of the Stage, the At-
tackers readjusted their Attacks automatically to focus again on the Weak Colluding
Attacking Strategy. That is, by ignoring to promptly fix the non-linearity possible
flaw, we were able to observe an interesting possible real-life scenario. After finishing
our analysis, the Attackers’ Automatic Optimizer realised its mistake and readjusted
its values without our intervention. The final results of our observations about the
Strong Colluding Strategy and Weak Colluding Strategy could be seen in Section 6.7.
6.10.6 Programming Errors
This Simulation Process required enormous amount of agile, incremental improve-
ments, coding for both the Simulation Model, see Section 6.3, and the Simulation
Engine that is based on the Peersim library, see Section 6.3 for more details. By enor-
mous, we are talking about over 24,000 lines of Java code without counting empty
lines. We do not expect our code to be perfect because doing this large coding project
without formal verification is prone to mistakes.
One error we have discovered toward the end of our Simulation Process is the fact
that the calculated Compromised Credentials Rates do only count the Compromised
Credentials that the Users have actually reported to the Auditor. That is against our
intention to count all the Compromised Credentials including those that the Users
decided not to report. Nevertheless, this error is not a big deal since the Users’
Ignorance Rate is known to be either 20% or 80% depending on the simulation settings.
Hence the current Compromised Credentials Rates could be increased by 20% or 80%
of their currently recorded values for a good approximation of the real Rates.
Another error we have discovered earlier in our process is the fact that a set of measures
we have coded to count the percentages of the MPSPs each Ranking Algorithm has
banned, forced to Install DGU, or forced to Enable DGU, is not giving accurate
results. Although we have figured out this error early in our Simulation Process, we
decided to ignore it and continue conducting our experiments without utilising those
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measures on our analysis. They would have been very helpful and insightful if they
were working properly, but we could not afford the time and resources to fix them.
6.10.7 Human Mistakes in Updating the Experiments Settings
Like the programming errors, human mistakes were present while feeding each experi-
ment’s Configuration file with the optimized settings of the Automatic Optimizer, see
Section 6.5.3. Usually, finding these mistakes meant repeating all the experiments that
were based on the wrong inputs to insure the results’ integrity. This hard task was
not always possible specially when we discover an early Stages’ error toward finishing
the Simulation Process; it would have meant basically repeating the whole process!
Among those mistakes is the fact that the Milestones starting from Milestone 1.3 until
Milestone 2.1 were conducted with an ini Uncolluding MPSP = 1 instead of 3 like
the rest of the following Milestones until Milestone 4.2. Repeating those Milestones
would have been very expensive since we found about it toward the end of the Simu-
lation Process. We anticipate that this mistake has negatively affected the automatic
optimisation process for Defending against the Uncolluding Attackers in Stage 1, see
Subsection 6.6.1. However, given the following refinements Stages and the Manual
edits we have introduced in Stage 4, see Subsection 6.6.4, the negative impacts of this
mistake should be substituted.
Another mistake occurred in Milestone 5.3 and lasted until the end of the Simulation
Process. It is the fact that we input the values of WTLRavg and WTST as 8% and
12% instead of 4% and 16%. That basically meant that the Final TG Ranks were
slightly more biased toward the decisions of the TLRavg Approach at the cost of the
decisions of the TST Approach. Given the small differences in the values and given the
Low influence of the two factors on the measured effects during the whole Simulation
Process, we thought fixing this mistake does not worth repeating the last 3 Stages.
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Chapter 7. Discussions and Future Prototype Enhancements
In this Chapter, we discuss the whole picture of the conducted research in this thesis.
We start the discussion by arguing that our proposed Continuous Trust Management
Framework does achieve its original goal, satisfying all its Stakeholders, by providing
the vitally missing feature in the current Trust Frameworks Continuous Data Control
where the exchanged Data would be handled in a Trustworthy manner before and
after the Data release to the other parties. We support our argument by fitting our
developed and simulated prototype at the core of our proposed Continuous Trust
Management Framework Design of Chapter 4. That is, we answer the questions of
whether our proposed Design would satisfy the needs of all its Trust Stakeholders and
whether it is practical for development at the near future given the current state of
the art technologies combined with our proposed Auditor Model.
The Continuous Trust Management Framework may not be developed completely as
it appears in Chapter 4 sometime soon. Nevertheless, the proposed ideas, algorithms,
and future milestones should be vital to make this Continuous Framework a reality.
The performance of our prototype has raised the level of the game between the Trust
Framework trying to protect its Users’ Data against the malicious attackers trying to
compromise those Credentials. That means making the Data breaches more expensive
for the attackers and, hence, reducing their volume leading to increased Trust among
the Network’s Users. While our proposed Auditor is good at tackling Basic Active
Attacks against the Users’ Credentials, see Subsection 4.2.2, it is still challenging to
fully protect against some types of Data attacks like the Targeted 2.0 Attacks or
the Passive Attacks, see Subsection 2.4. Also, while the proposal relies on Security
features built in the state of the art technologies, it is essential to evaluate whether
the Framework’s components would work in harmony or whether new loopholes would
arise by the new combination.
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Also in this Chapter, we evaluate the proposed Continuous Trust Auditor prototype
in Chapter 5 to check its resilience against the posed risks listed in the Threat Model
of Section 5.8. This evaluation is based on the observed performance of the Simulation
Process described in Chapter 6. Finally, we list some possible future enhancements
to the current prototype to improve its performance based on our discussions.
7.1 Discussing the Proposed Continuous Trust Framework, Should it be
Trusted?
In this Section, we try to answer the most important question, should our proposed
Continuous Trust Management Framework be Trusted? That is, is it able to offer the
essential Trust Requirements we list in Section 2.5 for its Stakeholders? Moreover, is
our proposal practical to deploy given the available technologies and the efforts needed
to bootstrap it? We believe that the answer to the previous question is generally, yes!
It is true that the proposed prototype is far from ready for deployment as it needs the
addition of some essential building blocks as well as further pilot studies. Nevertheless,
our research addressed many important Trust issues as we discuss in here.
7.1.1 Satisfying the Trust Stakeholders Needs
A main design principle that influence our proposed Continuous Framework Design
is to consider the needs of all the main Stakeholders as we describe in Subsection 2.2.
As a result, our Continuous Trust Framework Design, see Section 4.1, incorporates
some of the best building blocks that are available in the existing Trust Frameworks.
Particularly speaking, our proposed Continuous Framework Design contains Authen-
tication, Authorisation, and Secure Communication layers to insure the Security of
the Continuous Framework. The Trust Management layer would enable negotiating
tailor made contracts by means of Sticky Policies, see Subsection 4.4.1. Further, the
Auditor unit would enforce such contracts, see Subsection 7.1.2, and maintain access
logs that could be presented, upon request, to Legal Authorities in case they need
to proceed their own investigations. In other words, our proposed Continuous Trust
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Framework Design should satisfy all its Stakeholders since it considers all the Trust
Requirements we describe in Section 2.5. It is true that the current prototype does not
implement all the components present in the proposed Continuous Trust Framework
Design but, as we discuss in Subsection 7.1.3, this task should not be very challenging
for a group of expert programmers.
It is true that our prototype currently focus on the interests of one Stakeholders,
the User. We think that is important because most of the legacy systems already
focus on protecting the rights of the Service Providers by paying great attention
to the Security issues. Improving the Network’s Security is not a bad thing but it
should be accompanied by improving the Users’ Privacy to avoid letting down an
important Trust Stakeholder, the User. As we show in Section 4.2, our prototype
is built on top of the OpenID Connect protocol that takes care of implementing the
Secure Communication, Authentication, and Authorisation layers of our proposed
Continuous Framework Design. That is, we are already taking care of the Service
Providers’ most important concern: the Network’s Security. Nevertheless, we need to
conduct integration tests to ensure that the combination of protocols and algorithms
would not generate new loopholes in the Trust Framework.
When it comes to Legal Authorities interests, the Auditor Unit would be a welcomed
addition since it could reduce the volume of Abuse Cases they would have to inves-
tigate manually. In case they need to carry out a manual auditing, the kept Records
by our Auditor would provide a great help for their task. Nevertheless, pilot real-life
experiments should be carried to verify the extent of help our prototype could provide
for the Legal Authorities.
7.1.2 Enforcing Continuous Data Control
In Section 3.5, we illustrated that the main weakness of the current Trust Manage-
ment Frameworks is the lack of support for a Continuous Data Control Attribute,
especially after their release. Hence, the main focus of our proposed Continuous
Trust Management Framework is to provide that vital feature. That is, to protect
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the Users’ Credentials that they share with other parties through Trust transactions
before they release them as well as after they release them. In Chapter 5, we introduce
a set of Ranking Algorithms, Utility Units, and Deployment Rules that should aid
the Auditor Unit of our proposed Continuous Trust Framework Design in detecting
malicious entities abusing the acquired Data after their release. In our Simulation
Process, see Chapter 6, we developed several Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that de-
ploys the different configurations of the proposed Algorithms and Units of Chapter 5
based on the Network’s environmental situation. those Defensive Strategies Flavours
were able to achieve significant improvements in terms of maximising the Users’ Trust
and minimising the Compromised Credentials Rates when comparing these metrics to
the widely deployed Strategy today: doing nothing! Although some of our devel-
oped Defensive Strategies Flavours assumed the presence of the DGU unit, even the
Flavours that did not have that assumption achieved significantly good performance,
see Section 6.9.
It is true that the wealth of the generated Abuse Cases for some Credentials in some
types of attacks, like credit cards stealing attacks, could be much less than the wealth
of Abuse Cases generated by other forms of attacks, like email spamming because the
email address is a frequently used Credential and the spam is an easy way to signal the
Abuse Case. Nevertheless, most of our Defensive Strategies Flavours showed immunity
toward High Users’ Ignorance Rate when it comes to reporting Abuse Cases. In other
words, even when we reduce the flow of Abuse reports, in analogy to the situation
with other Credentials types where it is hard to detect Abuse, our Defensive Strategies
Flavours would still be able to provide good protection.
When it comes to enforcing after release protection on Data sets rather than the
Credentials, many challenges that are not addressed by our prototype would arise.
First, it would be essential to identify the proper Data owner before trying to protect
his rights. That could be an easy task when it comes to Data files like pictures or
videos taken by the owner’s camera. Such files could be easily watermarked with the
date of creation to prove ownership of it in a similar fashion to the UCON projects,
see Subsection 3.1.2. Nevertheless, watermarking blog’s posts or products’ reviews
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would not be a practical option. Second, looking for Data Abuse Cases could face
performance issues. Unlike the User’s Credentials, which is normally a limited set, the
Data generated by the User is enormous. If every User would deploy bots traversing
the Internet looking for fractions of his Data that might have been Abused, the Trust
Network would probably get congested by such bots’ traffic. The Data Classifier unit
in our proposed Continuous Trust Framework Design would reduce the severity of
this problem as it would enable the Users to classify the important Data that they
require to impose protection on them. The UMA project is aimed at managing Users’
Data sets and could help at the task of providing intuitive Data classifications, see
Subsection 3.1.6.
The hypothetical DGU unit that we present in Section 4.4 could further help at the
issue of protecting the Data after release. If all the Trust Network residents agree
to Install DGU, then the DGU would be able to keep Trusted Records of all the
Data generated by any User, on the User’s machine, even if that Data is a social
media comment or a sent email message. Further, the DGU proxy would not let any
Network entity to download any piece of Data unless this action is allowed by its
attached Sticky Policy. This feature is not only important for the Users, but also for
the Service Providers who are eager to protect the digital rights of their Data, see
Subsection 3.1.1.
It is true that our prototype would work best when protecting against Mass Active
Attacks. That is, our Algorithms are not designed and should not be assumed capable
of protecting Users’ Credentials against Passive or Targeted Attacks. That is because
our Ranking Algorithms depends on analysing access logs generated after receiving
an Abuse report. The more received reports the Ranking Algorithms get, the more
evidence it would have to deduce who is the Abuser. Passive Attacks do not generate
Abuse reports while Targeted Attacks do not generate enough reports, see Subsection
2.4.
Nevertheless, we think if the hypothetical DGU unit becomes a reality and adopted
by all the Trust Network’s residents, it would help in tackling these issues. That is,
the DGU proxy unit would monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic in any entity.
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In that case, if a malware is installed in the machine of a Targeted Attack victim,
the malware would not be able to transfer any classified Data outside the machine
as it would be blocked by the DGU proxy, see Section 4.4. Further, even if an MSP
acquired some Data through genuine interaction, he would not be able to blackmail
her owner. That is, the identity of the MSP would be verified by the DGU that he
already installs. That means the victim could report the blackmail attack to Legal
Authorities who would figure out who is the MSP and take proper action against him.
Further, the User would be able to use the revocation feature to revoke the given
grant for the Abuser to access the Data. The DGU would be able to immediately
erase such Data instantly from the Abuser’s machine. Even if the MSP tries to share
this Data with another MSP that does not Install DGU, the DGU may not allow this
transfer if the Data Sticky Policies’ prevent this sharing.
7.1.3 Enabling Real-Life Deployment Given the State of the Art Tech-
nologies
We believe that a dedicated team of expert developers should not have great problems
to make our proposed Continuous Trust Framework Design, see Section 4.1, a reality
in a relatively short period of time. That is, our presented prototype in Section 4.2
already deploys the main building blocks for the Communication Channel, Authenti-
cation, and Authorisation layers. Our Auditor’s Algorithms of Chapter 5 are already
coded in our Simulation Model of Section 6.3. That is, it is possible to reuse the code
to generate a real Auditor instead of a simulation unit.
Generalising the provided protection from the specific spam use-case that we imple-
ment in our prototype to any Users’ Credentials could be tedious, but straight forward
since the mechanism is the same, see Subsection 7.1.2. Building proper negotiation
unit and some of the mentioned enhancements of Section 7.3 could get tedious as well
but, again, straight forward given the theories are already present. Implementing the
DGU, on the other hand, would be a real challenge that may not be ready in a short
period of time. Nevertheless, our developed Defensive Strategies achieved significantly
good performance even without utilising the DGU, see Subsection 6.7. Hence, it is
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still possible to introduce the proposed Continuous Framework without the DGU unit.
DGU units could be bootstrapped at a later phase once the Trust Network’s residents
start to build Trust on this Framework.
When developing a real-life implementation of our proposed Continuous Framework,
developers should try to keep an eye on some worrying performance metrics. First,
the Aggressive Strategy’s Flavours, see Section 6.7, generate an unacceptably High
Active Agents to Users Rate reaching around 80%. That is, a Network full of artificial
undercover Users, or simply Testing Agents. Such a Network would cause real Users
and SPs to leave while MSPs could take advantage of the situation by making money
out of the Testing Agents pocket, see Subsection 5.8.3. The current solution is to
refrain from deploying this Strategy and relying instead on the Conservative Strategy’s
Flavours like the Automatic Flavour that have moderate, but still worrying, Active
Agents to Users Rates. The proposed enhancement of Subsection 7.3.9 could help in
improving this situation, but that would require further studies to confirm.
Finally, one weak point of our current prototype is the fact that it does not address
the threat of malicious Auditor or IDP. We assumed these entities to be fully Trusted
while, in reality, that is not necessarily true. As we describe in Section 4.4, this issue
would be tackled if these entities deploy the DGU hypothetical unit. Given this unit’s
expected absence in the near future, the Continuous Framework developers should
resort to temporary mitigations to avoid creating a single point of failure for the
proposed Framework. A possible mitigation would be to have multiple Auditors and
IDPs to operate independently in the Trust Network. The entities of the Network
would then rank those Auditors and IDPs based on their experience. Bad Auditors or
IDPs should get lower Ranks leading to less reliance on them. Maybe some Network’s
residents could create their own Testing Agents and Testing SPs to interact with the
suspicious IDPs and Auditors to prove whether their Ranks are correct or not. Such
a complex Ranking Algorithm would re-introduce the threats we described in Section
5.8 but, this time, for malicious and colluding Auditors and IDPs instead of SPs.
Given the extra powers the Auditors and IDPs have compared to the SPs, the threat
model should be expanded accordingly. Otherwise, the Network residents should put
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their sole Trust on an official Auditor that is run by a government or an institute with
a good reputation. At the end, most of the current Trust Frameworks would operate
assuming a Trusted operator.
7.2 Discussing the Extents of the Posed Risks in the Threat Model
In this Section, we evaluate the proposed Continuous Trust Auditor Model of Chapter
5 to check its resilience against the posed risks listed in the Threat Model of Section
5.8. This evaluation is based on the observed performance of the Simulation Process
described in Chapter 6.
7.2.1 Effects of Users Not Reporting all Abuse Cases
In Section 6.9, we show that the Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that we have developed
are all resilient to fluctuations in the Users’ Ignorance Rate to report received Abuse
Cases. The only exception is the Random Strategy - GPD Flavour, which is not a
good Strategy to deploy by a wise Auditor in most of the cases, see Subsection 7.3.1
for the few cases when it would be wise to deploy such a Defensive Strategy. Hence,
this threat does not pose a major risk to the integrity of our proposed Auditor in the
case of protecting Users against Active Attacks Abusing, the use-case that we have
simulated.
Nevertheless, utilising our Strategies to enforce the Sticky Policies attached to Cre-
dentials or Data Sets in other use-cases may reveal more sensitivity toward Users’
Ignorance Rate. That is especially true in case of Passive Attacks or Targeted 2.0 At-
tacks, see Section 2.4, where the attackers would barely leave any footprint revealing
the existence of their malicious activity, let alone their identity. However, such cases
would be viewed by Users as more serious breaches, in comparison to the more com-
mon spamming attacks for example. Hence, we anticipate that the Users’ Ignorance
Rate in such serious cases would be Low. In Subsection 7.3.7, we describe a possible
future enhancement that would make reporting breach Cases more User friendly and,
hence, reduces the Users’ Ignorance Rate.
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7.2.2 Effects of Malicious Users
This threat was not considered in the Simulation Process, which we describe in Chap-
ter 6, due to time limitations. It is almost impossible to detect malicious Users launch-
ing Passive Attacks, i.e. interacting genuinely with other entities while analysing the
published TG Ranks by the Auditor, see Section 5.5, against their own reported
Cases to Reverse-Engineer the Auditor’s Algorithms and update the ME that they
are associated with, see Subsection 5.8.5. Nevertheless, utilising a User Index utility,
similar to the proposed enhancement in Subsection 7.3.7, could eliminate the number
of possible malicious Users in the Network and, hence, their power to tamper with
the Auditor’s integrity.
7.2.3 Effects of Sharing with Malicious SPs
Although our Simulation Process, which we describe in Chapter 6, includes sharing
partnerships among (M)(P)SPs, we were not interested in studying the effects of those
partnerships due to time limitations. Nevertheless, if the rate of Data exchange among
the partners and/or the period of the partnership are Low, then there would not be
enough footprint to detect either partnership. On the positive side, the amount of
generated Abuse Cases due to such partnerships would be minimal due to the Low
exchange rate among the two partners.
On the other hand, if the exchange rate among partners and/or the partnership period
is High, then they would appear in the MGR Records, see Section 5.4, as colluding
partners. As a result, they could be both banned which would be unfair for the
innocent partner. Nevertheless, the Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that utilize DGU
would give any innocent partner the chance to prove their integrity by agreeing to
install DGU.
When it comes to Credentials or Data Sets other than our simulated email address
use-case, this threat should not be a major issue. In real-life scenarios, genuine PSPs
would not share Users’ sensitive Data with another (M)PSP since the Users would
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assign such Data a strict Sticky Policy preventing its sharing, see Section 6.4. Even
if a User did not assign such a Sticky Policy to her sensitive Credentials, it is not
imaginable that an innocent PSP would share his Users’ Credit Cards numbers with
another (M)PSP. In case of less sensitive Data, they would probably be treated similar
to the simulated email address and, hence, this threat would have the same Low impact
on those other Credentials.
7.2.4 Effects of Reverse Engineering the Detection Algorithms by a Ma-
licious Entity
While conducting our Experimental Stages, see Section 6.6, we have noticed that
in most of the simulated scenarios, it is rare to find an equilibrium status where
both the Auditor and the Counter-Attackers would be happy with optimal settings.
Rather, each entity is continuously altering its settings to maximize its gains based
on the latest settings made by its opponent. Actually, when the Automatic Optimizer
described in Subsection 6.5.3 optimizes the settings for one entity, it has full knowledge
about the exact settings of that entity’s opponent, which enables the best possible
optimisation. In contrast, such full knowledge cannot be assumed in real-life and,
hence, it is vital for the Auditor to rely on a set of robust Network Trust Health
Gauges as described in Subsection 5.6.4. For the Counter-Attackers, it is equally vital
to rely on robust Reverse Engineering tools to better respond to updates made to the
Auditor’s Defensive Strategy Flavour.
The entity with the most accurate tools to analyse its opponents’ settings is the
entity that would make the most gains. That is, if the Auditor, for example, noticed
that most of the current Attacks are launching Strong Colluding Attacking Strategy,
see Section 6.7, it could deploy a Defensive Strategy Flavour that focuses on Strong
Colluding detection. If the Attackers could quickly enough figure out the nature of the
newly deployed Strategy’s Flavour, they could switch to the Weak Colluding Strategy.
Only when the Auditor realises the changed nature of the attacks, it would deploy a
Weak Colluding oriented Defensive Strategy Flavour, see the proposed enhancements
of Subsection 7.3.1 for more details about how to dynamically update the Auditor’s
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deployed Strategy. However, the Attackers would have a great advantage as long as
the Auditor does not notice its altered Counter-Attacking Strategy.
When it comes to malicious Users cooperating with the Attackers by interacting in
certain patterns to understand how the internal ranking works, this would be an un-
practical threat unless when deployed in bootstrapping Networks. While malicious
Users are almost impossible to detect, the User Index, proposed in Subsection 7.3.7,
should minimise their influence on the decisions of the Auditor and, as a result, min-
imise the amount of knowledge they can infer about its deployed Algorithms. Further,
applying such a technique to a mature Network is not expected to generate a good
model since the majority of residents, which are not affiliated with the malicious
entity, would have greater effects on the decisions of the Auditor meaning that the
reconstructed model would be affected by Network noise. However, if such a tech-
nique is utilized in a fresh new Network where the malicious Users and SPs belonging
to the malicious entity could form the majority of the Network’s residents, then the
reconstructed model would be very accurate.
There is also the threat of large number of temporary MSPs indulging in malicious
activities to get caught and, hence, enable its creator to infer the detailed internal
settings behind their detection. We think this is not a major threat to worry about
because no wise ME would sacrifice an MPSP for the sake of inferring the internal
settings of the Auditor. Rather, if this technique is to be used, the ME would probably
sacrifice temporary MSPs. Our Simulation Process reveals that MSPs are not a major
threat to the Trust Network and, hence, most Defensive Strategies’ Flavours do not
even bother at detecting them. That would mean even if the ME is able to get a
good understanding of the internal defensive settings behind detecting its temporary
MSPs, that would be of little value since it would be different than the defensive
settings used to detect the more important MPSPs.
When it comes to reverse engineering the deployed Defensive Strategy’s Flavour by
monitoring how the published TG Ranks would react to alterations in the Attacking
settings, the case is trickier. If the response is harsh, then that would signal for
the Attackers that they should change their deployed attacks. Hence, it would be
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wise to delay publishing the TG Ranks to obscure the Attackers’ analysis and slow
down their optimisation process. Nevertheless, the more the publishing of the TG
Ranks is delayed, the more Users would deal with the Attackers assuming they have
High TG Ranks. This trade-off should be carefully balanced through further future
experimental studies as proposed in the Enhancement of Subsection 7.3.5.
7.2.5 Effects of Misleading the Auditor with Simple Data Abusing Al-
gorithms
Our Simulation Process revealed that the Simple Data Abusing Algorithms, described
in Subsection 5.8.6, would be the main weapons available for the Uncolluding MPSPs.
When the Auditor deploys a trivial Defensive Strategy Flavour like the Random Strat-
egy - GPD Flavour, the Uncolluding MPSPs would have to raise the Abuse Delay
and Bombarding Periods for moderate values to fool the Auditor. However, when the
Auditor deploys a more advanced Defensive Strategies’ Flavours, especially Aggres-
sive ones, then the Abuse Bombarding Period would be of little help to protect the
Uncolluding MPSPs. Setting the Abuse Delay Period to its max value would provide
some help. Nevertheless, the most vital weapons for the Uncolluding Attackers would
be the Users/Credential Abuse Drop Rates that should be set to their max values to
minimise the MPSPs Detection Rates. Still, in most of the Density Points, see more
about the Density Points in Section 6.8, the advanced Defensive Strategies’ Flavours
would be able to achieve at least 20% Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate even if all
the Simple Data Abusing Algorithms are set to their maximum values, see Section
6.6.8. In fact, the Aggressive Strategy - Extreme DGU Flavour would always achieve
around 70% Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rates regardless of the Density Point it is
operating at.
These Simple Data Abusing Algorithms would also be helpful for the Colluding MP-
SPs but not to the same extent. That is, both the Strong Colluding and Weak Collud-
ing Attacking Strategies would rely mainly on their Colluding Settings. In case of the
Strong Colluding Strategy, the Attackers would slightly relax their Users/Credentials
Abuse Drop Rates to substitute the number of Abuse Cases they would generate in
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exchange for their restrictive and limited Colluding Settings, see Section 6.7. On the
other hand, in case of the Weak Colluding Strategy, the Attackers would be better off
increasing their Users/Credentials Drop Rates to decrease their footprint given their
relaxed Colluding Settings. The Abuse Delay Period would mostly be irrelevant since
both Colluding Strategies would mean naturally waiting for long times until the vic-
tims has dealt with the minimum number of Colluding Attackers per their Colluding
Strategy for the attack to take place. This long time is usually close to the maximum
value of the Abuse Delay Period.
High Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates would mean that the Attackers would re-
frain from attacking most of the Users in fear of looking suspicious and, hence, banned
from the Trust Network. That is a desired outcome since it would mean a more
Trustworthy Network. Our Defensive Strategies’ Flavours, apart from the Random
Strategy - GPD Flavour show some immunity against High Abuse Delay Periods,
which is also good. However, we are not sure what would happen if the Attackers
decide to raise the maximum value of the Abuse Delay Period from 50, like in our
experimental settings, to a larger value like 500. Maybe that could success in fooling
our Defensive Strategies’ Flavours to some degree. Nevertheless, the larger the Abuse
Delay Period is, the less value the Attacker would get out of the Abuse. That is,
if the period resembles days in real-life, Abusing an email address after 500 days of
acquiring it may reveals that the User has already dismissed that email address and,
hence, the Attacker would get no gain out of this attack. Similar scenarios would
happen when attacking a Credit Card after its expiry date or when blackmailing a
User who have already passed away! In order to better understand the real effects of
this type of attacks, we should build a more accurate Simulation Model with a more
real-life interpretation of the execution cycle, see Subsection 6.10.2. The enhanced
selection mechanism suggested in Subsection 7.3.9 should provide a good utility to
improve Detecting Uncolluding M(P)SPs who deploy large Abuse Delay Periods.
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7.2.6 Effects of Colluding MPSPs
In our Simulation Process, we evaluated three main Colluding types as described
in Subsection 5.8.7. The results of our Simulation reveal that the Popular MPSPs
Colluding with a Large Pool of Unpopular MSPs type of colluding would have minimal
effects on the integrity of the Trust Network due to its minimal attacking activities.
Hence, this type of colluding should not pose a serious risk to the Trust Network’s
integrity despite its very Low Detection Rates by the Auditor.
The Second type of Colluding is the Popular Colluding MPSPs, which is the major
threat to the Network in most of the cases. That is, by deploying either Strong
Colluding or Weak Colluding Strategy, see Section 6.7, these Colluding MPSPs are
able to compromise up to 10% of all the Users Credentials in the Trust Network with
minimal Detection Rates. Deploying Aggressive Defensive Strategy’s Flavours would
significantly improve detecting these Colluding MPSPs but at the cost of significantly
increasing the Banned PSPs Rates as well as the Active Agents to Users Rate.
Incorporating DGU in the Defensive Strategies’ Flavours is effective in improving the
Popular Colluding Detection Rates. However, given the fact that Strategies’ Flavours
deploying DGU would give the detected (M)PSPs the chance to avoid getting banned
by agreeing to Install DGU means simply giving life to the Colluding MPSPs so
they could continue their malicious activities by deploying the third type of Collud-
ing Strategies, Advanced Colluding. Unfortunately, this Colluding Strategy is able
to fool all our proposed Ranking Algorithms. Thankfully, this type of attack is ap-
plicable only when the DGU is utilized and, hence, we have time to improve our
Algorithms until the DGU is ready for real-life deployment. Further, the proposed
enhancement to the DGU Deployment Rules, see Subsection 7.3.3 could be the basis
to improve our current Algorithms. The proposed Divide and Conquer Algorithm,
see Subsection 7.3.9, could also improve how the TGT Approach Algorithms analyse
the available MGR Records and how to create Testing Agents in a smarter way that
lead to eventually improve the Detection Rates of all type of Colluding Attacks.
244
7.2.7 Effects of Popular SPs Committing Suicide Attack Combined with
MSPs Registration Bombarding
This threat was not considered in our Simulation Model since we think it is not a
realistic threat. That is because of the High cost of losing a popular MPSP, which
takes a lot of efforts to publicise among real Users. Second, this threat would not
work unless the utilized Defensive Strategy Flavour enables Ignoring old G Ranks.
Among all the developed Strategies’ Flavours, only one Strategy does enable this
setting. Interestingly, it is the Aggressive Manual Flavour that we do not recommend
deploying anyways.
Nevertheless, we will discuss here the possible consequences in case the Auditor did
not detect the nature of the Suicide Attack and proceeded to ignore all the G Ranks
where the suicider appears. As shown in Subsection 5.8.8, the τMPSP−Halt value would
be reached by three triggers:
τMPSP−Halt =
CMR ∗ SPn−real
(CGR ∗ UGR) + (CGR−newPII ∗ Un)− (CMR ∗ SPGR−real)
(7.1)
where SPn−real is the current number of real SPs that Users are dealing with at a normal rate
and SPn−real ≥ 0,
SPGR−real is the real SPs Growth Rate and SPGR−real ≥ 0.
Equation 7.1: Recovery Period after Detecting MPSP launching a
combined Suicide and MSPs registration Bombarding Attacks
Considering the Soft Trust effects, τMPSP−Halt
• CMR ≈ ∞: Such a CMR value would be an indication that the deployed De-
fensive Strategy’s Flavour is useless as it cannot detect M(P)SPs no matter
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how many evidences it collects from the Network’s Users. In such a case, the
Trust Network could be either compromised even without a Suicide Attack or
may have just reached an equilibrium status where there is almost no MPSPs
Detection combined with minimal malicious activity.
• SPnM ≈ ∞: Such an SPnM value means that while the MSPs Registration
Bombarding attack by itself might be of little value for the ME, it would be
very harmful for the Network when combined with a Suicide Attack as shown
in Subsection 5.8.9. It is shown there that this combination could permanently
paralyse the Auditor’s Defensive Strategy. However, this should not be expected
in most real-life scenarios. That is because Equation 5.12 does not consider
the effects of the Soft Trust, see Subsection 2.8. For example, if a PSP, like
Google, decides to launch the MSPs Registration Bombarding Attack, it would
need to create a very large number of MSPs that needs to look legitimate and
Trustworthy for Users. That means, simply recreating the same MPSP, Google
in our example, by altering few details like the MSP title or background color
will not fool the Users to Trust dealing with these new random entrants. i.e
while Users would love to deal with Google, they would be very suspicious to
deal with Google2, Google3, Google4 and so on specially that Google should
refrain from relating itself to these dummy websites in order not to be blamed
for any Abuse Cases coming from these websites. By considering the Soft Trust
effect, Equation 5.12 could be shortened to Equation 7.1.
• CGR ≈ 0: Such a CGR value would indicate a saturating Network where Users
are not interested in it anymore. That could be due to lack of interesting (P)SPs
or the lack of Trust on the Network. Since “Trust is hard to build but easy to
lose [16]”, it would be challenging to restore any lost Trust in the Network and,
hence, a Suicide Attack on such a Network, without Counter-Defences like not
Ignoring Old G Ranks, might be the death bullet for it.
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7.2.8 Effects of Introducing DGU
Here we are not discussing a threat. Rather, we are trying to evaluate the benefits
of introducing the hypothetical DGU unit to be utilized by the developed Defensive
Strategies’ Flavours, see Sections 4.4 and 5.6.3. During our Simulation Process, we
have observed that the Defensive Strategies’ Flavours employing the DGU unit have
shown less dependency on Testing Agents and less Banned PSPs Rates, except for
the Aggressive Strategy - Extreme DGU Flavour as shown in Subsection 6.6.8. In
other words, the DGU unit has the desired effects of improving the accuracy of the
Defensive Strategies. That is especially true knowing that the base Strategy Flavour
that we used to optimize the deployment of the DGU unit on top of it prior to the
DGU Refinement Stages is the Aggressive Strategy - Manual Flavour with significantly
High Agents consumption and Banned PSPs Rate.
The main disadvantage of introducing the DGU unit is the fact that it gives the Col-
luding MPSPs second lives where they could deploy the Advanced Colluding Strategy.
This type of Colluding cannot be detected, yet, by our proposed Ranking Algorithms,
see Subsection 7.2.6. Nevertheless, the Users’ Trust Rate would still be High while
the Compromised Credentials Rate would still be Low since the Colluding Attackers
would still be deploying a conservative Attacking Setting to avoid getting detected.
We think further experimentation and research should yield better Ranking Algo-
rithms that are capable of Detecting the Advanced Colluding Strategy. A first step
would be to develop the proposed enhancements to the DGU Deployment Rules as
described in Subsection 7.3.3.
The DGU would also have some interesting effects on light of our Malicious Den-
sity Theory, see Section 6.8. In that theory, we propose that a moderate density of
M(P)SPs in the Network, not Low or High, would boost the detection of them even
by applying a Random Aggressive Strategy Flavour. By employing the DGU unit,
all (P)SPs who Enabled Strict DGU would be excluded from the calculations carried
out by the Ranking Algorithms. Hence, those PSPs would be considered vanished in
the perspective of the Malicious Density Theory leading to a High Density of MPSPs.
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This High Density would push the Auditor into the Top Low Detection Region as
shown in Figure 6.3. Nevertheless, since the employment of DGU pushes the Collud-
ing Attackers to adopt the Advanced Colluding Strategy that our current Ranking
Algorithms cannot recognise, those Colluding MPSPs could also be assumed to be
vanished in the perspective of the Malicious Density Theory. That would lead to
lowering down the Uncolluding MPSPs density to, perhaps, the Detection Threshold
Region.
Finally, the effect of offering the Network’s inhabitants the option to voluntarily Install
DGU and/or Enable Strict DGU would mean constant MGR Records discarding as
(P)SPs that appear in those Records would be eliminated after they adopt the DGU
unit. This constant updates would lead to a temporary slowdown in the detection
process. This temporary effect could turn into a permanent effect if the Normal Nodes
GR continues High leading to a constant supply of new (P)SPs who keeps adopting
the DGU after spending a while in the Network creating some MGR Records by their
genuine interactions. This effect is illustrated in Figure 6.3.
7.3 Enhancements to the Developed Prototype
In this Section we introduce some enhancements to improve the performance of the
proposed Auditor Model of Chapter 5 along with the optimized Defensive Strategies’
Flavours of Chapter 6 as well as to enhance its immunity against the various types
of threats that were introduced in Section 5.8 and Discussed in Section 7.2. We start
with the idea of optimising the Defensive Strategies’ Flavours release order for a wise
dynamic Auditor. Further, we list some enhancements to improve different aspects of
the developed Model such as the system’s overall efficiency, Malicious Density Theory
and DGU Deployment Rules.
7.3.1 Enhanced Defensive Strategies Release Order
Given the variety of the Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that we have already devel-
oped, there must be a robust selection mechanism for the Auditor to pick the best
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Flavour for the environment it is operating in. Real-life Networks are dynamic with
Attackers continuously adapting their Counter-Attacking Strategies to fool the de-
ployed Defensive Strategy’s Flavour. Hence, a smart Auditor should keep an eye on
its Health Gauges, see Subsection 5.6.4, to determine whether it is time to release a
new Defensive Strategy.
In fact, our research on Defensive Algorithms in the Cyber Security Research Centre
at Newcastle University shows that the order of the Defensive Algorithms’ release
does matter in prolonging the system’s immunity against breaches even if it is the-
oretically possible to breach the system at certain time in the future [133]. In our
preliminary experiment, we found that if there is a Strong Algorithm, usually more
computationally expensive to deploy, that can be slightly modified by adjusting some
of its variables or breaking it into smaller and easier to compromise Algorithms, then
variations of that Algorithm could be released, each for a limited time, to prolong
the system’s immunity against compromise in comparison to deploying the original
Strong Algorithm straight away. In addition, we found that deploying the toughest
versions of the Strong Algorithm before the simpler ones would be more effective since
this would disturb the normal learning curve where the learning Attacker would learn
by breaking simpler defences before facing the more complicated defences.
In case of our Auditor, deploying a tough Aggressive Defensive Strategy’s Flavour at
the beginning does make perfect sense, see Section 6.7. That is because the Aggressive
Strategy’s Flavours demand more resources to operate, Testing Agents in particular.
Hence, deploying an Aggressive Strategy in a small bootstrapping Network would cost
much less than deploying it in a large Network. In addition, starting tough would mean
that the bad residents, M(P)SPs, would be caught quickly leading to boosted Users’
Trust and discouraging the MPSPs from trying to tamper with the Networks’ integrity.
Plus, passive malicious residents trying to launch Reverse Engineering Attacks, see
Subsection 5.8.5, would reconstruct the toughest of the Defensive Strategies’ Flavours
as the default Auditor model. That would give the Auditor the advantage to relax its
Defensive Strategy’s Flavour while the MPSPs are not realising the change quickly
enough, see Subsection 7.2.4. In fact, if the Auditor decides to be proactive by altering
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its deployed Flavour frequently, it could take the lead in the optimisation game against
the Counter-Attackers. That is, the Auditor could keep the passive malicious residents
busy building a good approximate model of the Auditor’s deployed Flavour without
success, since it would be trying to model a Flavour that is not deployed anymore.
Example 7.1: Estimating the Density Region
• Fact 1: We learn from the Experimental Stages, see Section 6.6, that the MPSPs
would cause about 90% of the generated Abuse in most of the cases.
• Fact 2: The SPnM−est Health Gauge, see Subsection 5.6.4, gives an estimation
of all the M(P)SPs in the Network by dividing the number of open Cases over
the number of Cases it takes the Auditor to detect a single M(P)SP.
• Fact 3: From Fact 1 and Fact 2, MPSPs ≈ 90% ∗ SPnM−est.
• Fact 4: The most accurate Density Equation is DP = MPSPsPSPs+MPSPs , see Section
6.8.
• Fact 5: The Auditor could get the actual number of all the Service Providers,
(M)(P)SPs, in the Network directly from the IDP.
• Fact 6: Knowing that all the Popular Service Providers, (M)PSPs, would be
around 20% of all (M)(P)SPs per Pareto Rule [121], the denominator of Equation
DP can be estimated to be PSPs+MPSPs ≈ 20% ∗ (M)(P )SPs.
• Fact 7: Using the MPSPs value from Fact 3 and the MPSPs + PSPs value
from Fact 6, the DP can be calculated to roughly determine the current Density
Region.
In Section 6.9, we list few different Defensive Strategies’ Flavours, each with its own
strengths and weaknesses. As we stated above, a wise Auditor could start with one of
the Aggressive Strategy’s Flavours. Then, it should keep an eye on the performance of
the Attackers just in case they have succeeded in figuring out the currently deployed
Flavour and, hence, increasing their Abuse rates without getting detected. For that,
the Auditor should implement the necessary Health Gauges of Subsection 5.6.4 to be
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able to predict in which Density Detection Region he is operating in per the Malicious
Density Theory of Section 6.8. Example 7.1 illustrates how this could work.
In addition, the Auditor should be able to sense the type of the dominant Counter-
Attacks being launched against its deployed Defensive Flavour. That is, it should be
able to relate the current Counter-Attacks to a known Counter-Attacking Strategy
like Strong Colluding or Weak Colluding, see Section 6.7. That could be done by
starting with, lets say, a Conservative Strategy Flavour to tackle Strong Colluding
Attacks. Then, the Auditor could slightly alter its deployed Flavour to be more Weak
Colluding Attack oriented, i.e. an Aggressive Strategy’s Flavour. If the Auditor
observes good improvements in the Users’ Trust Rate, reduction in the Compromised
Credentials Rates, and increased MPSPs Detection Rates, then that would signal that
the current Counter-Attacking Strategy is more Weak Colluding Attack oriented. If
the opposite observations are found, then the current Counter-Attacking Strategy is
probably Strong Colluding Attack oriented. Also, the Auditor could try to relax its
Defensive Flavour and monitor whether that would negatively affect the Trust metrics
or not. If not, then maybe the Network is dominated with trivial attackers and, hence,
the Auditor could relax the deployed Flavour for a while.
Knowing the current Density Region and the nature of the launched Counter-Attacking
Strategy is essential to optimize the release order of the deployed Defensive Strategy
Flavour. Table 6.14 compares the currently available Flavours and shows in which
Density Region each of them is safe for deployment. The following rules provide more
advanced guidance to aid the Auditor in its quest to deploy the most effective Flavour
for the environment he is operating at:
• Deploy an Aggressive Strategy’s Flavour when operating within the Density
Threshold Region unless the Counter-Attacking Strategy Flavour is intensively
Weak Colluding oriented and most (P)SPs have not Installed DGU yet. In that
case, try to harness the Aggressive Strategy’s Flavour with some Conservative
settings. For example, limit the Weak Colluding analysis to the (P)SPs who did
not Install DGU.
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• Stop offering the possibility to voluntarily Install DGU when operating within
the Density Threshold Region to boost the MPSPs Detection Rates. That is
because the vDGU Conservative Flavour could push the Density Point toward
the Top Low Detection Region, see Section 6.8.
• Deploy the Extreme DGU Aggressive Flavour when operating within the Den-
sity Threshold Region and most (P)SPs have already Installed DGU, to take
advantage of the powerful Detection Rates of that Flavour in the Density Re-
gion where it is easy to detect most of the MPSPs. A big disadvantage of the
Extreme DGU Aggressive Flavour is its High Banned Innocent PSPs Rates,
but that is not a big concern if the Auditor already knows that most innocent
PSPs have already Installed DGU. Alternatively, this powerful Flavour could be
utilized to calculate the Ranks for only the (P)SPs who have already Installed
DGU, to tackle the issue of the Advanced Colluding Strategy of Subsection 5.8.7.
• Deploy a Conservative Strategy’s Flavour when operating within the Top/Bot-
tom Low Detection Regions, to avoid banning innocent (P)SPs by an Aggressive
Strategy’s Flavour.
• Offer (P)SPs the possibility to voluntarily Install DGU when operating within
the Top/Bottom Low Detection Regions. That is because the vDGU Conser-
vative Flavour side effect of reducing the MPSPs Detection Rates would not be
noticed within these Low Detection Regions. Rather, this step would be like an
investment to gain better MPSPs Detection Rates when the Auditor moves to
operate within the Density Threshold Region, see Subsection 7.2.8.
• Deploy the GPD Random Flavour when the dominant Counter-Attackers are
trivial Uncolluding Attackers to reduce the demand for Testing Agents.
• Deploy the ST Conservative Flavour when the dominant Counter-Attackers are
Uncolluding M(P)SPs. Alternatively, minimise the WTGT to reduce theBanned
Innocent PSPs Rates.
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7.3.2 Enhanced Malicious Density Theory
The proposed Malicious Density Theory of Section 6.8 generally success in explaining
most of the variations in the Detection Rates of the different Defensive Strategies’
Flavours when operating at different environmental settings with different rates of
Nodes Populations. Nevertheless, we have observed toward the end of our Experimen-
tal Process that each Flavour would have slightly different Density Regions Boundary
Points, see Section 6.9. These observations would suggest that we could improve the
current form of the theory by introducing separate Density Graphs for each of the dif-
ferent Flavours, or at least for each Defensive Strategy. To even improve the accuracy,
those newly introduced Density Graphs should be three-dimensional. The third di-
mension would represent the type of the attack because some types of attacks would
be easily detectable within a larger Threshold Density Zone, like the Uncolluding
MPSPs Attack for example.
7.3.3 Enhanced DGU Deployment Rules
Employing the DGU unit in the Auditor’s deployed Defensive Strategy’s Flavour has
many advantages in terms of improving the Auditor’s detection accuracy. Never-
theless, that comes at the cost of encouraging the Colluding MPSPs to adopt the
Advanced Colluding Strategy, giving them immunity against the Defensive Strategies
as shown in Subsection 7.2.8. The Colluding MPSPs are able to adopt this type of
Settings by misusing the Credentials sharing feature which is possible by the DGU.
That is, a PSPx who has already Installed DGU could legitimately share Credx with
SPy who has not Installed DGU yet. When SPy Abuses Credx, then the MGR
Records would show, at least, the pair of PSPx and SPy in the suspicious Colluding
chain, see Section 5.4. PSPx would keep sharing with different PSPs, that have not
Installed DGU yet, to Abuse Credentials in its behalf and, hence, the TGT Rank-
ing Algorithms would not be able to distinguish a suspicious colluding chain to be
responsible for the majority of the Abuse Cases.
253
To tackle this issue, the Auditor could discard the option to Install DGU .
That is, if any (P)SP decides to voluntarily adopt the DGU, it should Enable Strict
DGU, see Subsection 5.6.3 straight away to completely eliminate the possibility of
the Advanced Colluding Strategy Attacks. We anticipate that most (P)SPs would
be reluctant to adopt this restrictive DGU mode at the early bootstrapping phase.
Nevertheless, the more (P)SPs adopting it, the more the Malicious Density would
increase, see Subsection 7.2.8. If this increased Density moves the Auditor from the
Bottom Low Detection Zone to the Threshold Detection Zone, then the Detection
Rates would be boosted leading to forcing the Colluding MPSPs to either Enable
Strict DGU or leave the Network, which is a desired outcome. On the other hand, if
the Auditor fails to deploy the correct Flavour to neutralise or eliminate most of the
Colluding MPSPs in the Threshold Detection Region, see Section 6.8, the Malicious
Density would continue to raise moving the Auditor to operate within the Top Low
Detection Region where it would start to accuse innocent PSPs for Abuse Cases they
did not commit. If innocent PSPs did not like the idea of forcing them to Enable Strict
DGU and decided to leave, that may increase the Banned PSPs Rates to unacceptable
levels. Further experimental studies are needed to evaluate the effects and the real-life
(P)SPs altitude toward this approach.
7.3.4 Enhanced Users Sticky Policies Options
If the population of PSPs in real-life is reluctant to adopt the restrictive Enable Strict
DGU as suggested in Subsection 7.3.3, then Users’ pressure could help speeding up the
process. That is, Users could assign their Credentials a new Sticky Policy called Share
with DGU, see the simulated policies in Section 6.4. This policy basically means
that the User is fine with sharing her Credentials with third-party partners provided
that they are Trusted. That is, it forces the PSP acquiring those Credentials to act
as if he has already Enabled Strict DGU, even if he has not yet, when handling those
Credentials. The more Users assigning their Credentials with that policy, the more
PSPs would be encouraged to adopt this more restrictive, but Trustworthy, mode.
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7.3.5 Enhanced Ratings Publishing Mechanism
A wise Auditor should not publish any TG Ranks before waiting for a period of
time τpublish to prevent M(P)SPs from Reverse Engineering the Auditor’s deployed
Defensive Strategy’s Flavour by associating an action they commit with a change
in their TG Ranking, see Subsections 5.8.5 and 7.2.4. In other words, limiting the
feedback M(P)SPs can get regarding the deployed Flavour. Plus, the Auditor could
make τpublish a variable value so that MEs would not be able to figure out when to
look for the delayed Auditor’s feedback to get published.
7.3.6 Enhanced Internal Ratings Records
In our developed Model, the SPR and IIR Records are introduced to aid the Auditor
in selecting suspicious (P)SPs for investigations by the Testing Agents, see Subsections
5.6.1 and 5.6.2. This idea of classifying the different types of threats in specialised
Records could be extended to cover the serious Threats described in the Threat Model,
Section 5.8. That is, we could create specialised Records to log how likely a PSPx
to be involved in a certain attack type, like Uncolluding, Popular Colluding, or Ad-
vanced Colluding. For example, when the Auditor suspects that PSPx is involved
in a Colluding Popular Attack and, as a consequence, created a GTx Agent who,
eventually, got positive results confirming its suspicions, then it should add PSPx to
the Colluding Popular PSPs Record and increase his counter by 1. When another
GTy, testing a different G containing PSPx, gets created with the same motivations,
suspecting a Colluding Popular MPSPs Attack, and that GTy got positive results
confirming its suspicions, then PSPx’s counter in the Colluding Popular PSPs Record
should now become 2. Such Attacks’ Records would help in improving the Testing
Agents’ efficiency as it would restrict creating Agents to the (P)SPs appearing in cer-
tain important Records only. The importance of the Records would be figured out if
further Simulation Research takes place to test these ideas. Note that we have already
implemented a beta version of such classification Records but the generated results
are still unreliable, see Subsection 6.10.6.
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7.3.7 Enhanced User Reporting Handling
To tackle the issue of genuine Users not reporting all their Abuse Cases, see Subsection
5.8.1, a good User interface design should be considered. Such a design should make
reporting an Abuse a simple and straight forward task. Automating this task would
be even better by deploying some filters that detects common spam patterns, for
example. For Data breach cases, other than the spam scenario, a bot that search
the web trying to find whether the Credentials of its owner are present somewhere in
the Network without permission or not would be a valuable tool. If this bot could
detect a Data breach, it could automatically report a breach Case without the need
of consent from its owner.
Regarding the risk of malicious Users reporting inaccurate Cases, see 5.8.2, a User
Reliability Index is something that should be considered by the Auditor. Such an
Index would give weight for each reported Case based on how reliable a User would
look like. This Index should consider factors like how real and Trustworthy a User is
by checking its interactions history and whether he got friends, joined social Networks,
got positive peer reviews, and got non-suspicious overall interactions pattern, see the
Reputation Systems of Section 2.8. There are many challenges to design such an Index
like maintaining Users’ Privacy and the Index integrity. For example, the design must
ensure that the collected Data are anonymised by a good anonymity factor to protect
the Users’ Privacy [25].
7.3.8 Enhanced Testing Agents Performance
The following is a list of techniques that would enhance how the Testing Agents
Perform:
Agents Recycling: To improve the overall system efficiency, the Auditor should
consider recycling expired STs by using them as seeds for new GT Agents. The same
applies for expired GTs as they could be utilized to seed new GTs to test bigger Gs
where the old Agent’s G is a subgroup of the new G, see Subsection 5.4.1. Furthermore,
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to improve the Auditor’s efficiency, more STs and GTs could be created and utilized
whenever more computational resources are available. However, this act should be
planned with caution since if smart M(P)SPs observe a High volume of Testing Agents
that are active at certain times of the day, perhaps with less traffic, they would then
adjust their malicious activity to take place at the busier times of the day where less
Testing Agents would be active.
Multitasking ST Agent ’with a set of non-testing Data’: To confuse any
Reverse Engineering Attack, see 5.8.5, an enhanced ST Agent could interact with
more than one SP but with a different set of personal Data. This way, one ST Agent
could be used to test several SPs at once.
Adapting the average User pattern: Since some M(P)SPs would refrain from
Abusing Users that do not follow the average User interaction pattern, see 5.8.5, the
Testing Agents should improve their interaction pattern by making it identical to the
average User model. That could be done by analysing the reported Cases by Users to
generate an average User model. This model should be embedded by all the created
Testing Agents. Of course, the average User model assumed by the M(P)SPs would
differ from that of the Auditor since the latter has access to a wider range of Users’
logs. Hence, the Testing Agents’ interaction settings should have some variability so
that they could not form a recognizable pattern.
7.3.9 Enhanced Testing Agents Selection Algorithms
The following is a list of Selection Algorithms to aid the Auditor in deciding when
and how to create new Testing Agents. Variations of these Algorithms could be
deployed depending on the available computing resources and the release order plan,
see Subsection 7.3.1.
Divide and Conquer GT Selector: If a GTx is testing a large Gx gets an Abuse,
the Auditor could decide to get bolder TGT values by using a Dividing Algorithm.
Such Algorithm would divide Gx into smaller Gy and Gz. Then, the Auditor could
create new GT Agents Gy and Gz for each of the newly generated Gs respectively.
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The division could be random, by checking the Gx subsets that already appear in
the PIIL Record even with a Low count, or by selecting the first few (P)SPs as
they appear chronologically to tackle the possibility that these first few could have
committed an Abuse but the User failed to report it, see Subsection 5.8.1.
Small PIILs Selector: A GT Selector that favours smaller PIILs could improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the Auditor. That is because small collations would be
exposed in a quicker manner compared to Testing Larger Gs and then applying the
Divide and Conquer Selector to it or keeping its less assertive TGT values. For that,
it would be a good idea to select the top 20% of PIILs entries, in spirit of Pareto
Principle [121], and then ordering the generated list based on G size. Then, start
creating GT Agents for the smaller groups before heading for the larger ones.
Excluding Suspicious Colluding (P)SPs from ST Testing: Based on the pro-
posed enhanced Attacks’ Records of Subsection 7.3.6, the Auditor could decide to
exclude suspicious (P)SPs from Selection for ST Agents Testing. That is because ST
Agents cannot detect Colluding M(P)SPs anyways and, hence, it is wise not to waste
the ST Agents resources on hopeless tasks.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion and Future Directions
Before we conduct our research, there was very little work done to support Continuous
Data Control by the existing Trust Management Frameworks. It is true there are many
measures already existing to improve the Data Control Before Release for the Users’
Credentials to be shared with third-parties. Nevertheless, the current Trust Frame-
works do not support the vital Attribute of Data Control After Release to enforce the
Trust rules on Users’ Data after releasing them to the requesting third-parties, see
Section 3.5. Meanwhile, our proposed Continuous Trust Framework Design achieves
significant improvements to the Network’s Users’ Trust level in addition to significant
reductions in the Users’ Compromised Credentials Rates by introducing pioneering
Defensive Strategies’ Flavours to protect the Users’ Credentials even after they are
released.
Our approach to derive the final set of Defensive Strategies’ Flavours was systematic,
yet agile and dynamic. We started with carefully studying the literature to clearly
understand the purpose of the Trust Frameworks and the needs of their main Stake-
holders: the Users, Service Providers, and Legal Authorities. It was clear from the
beginning that Trust is hard to build but very easy to destroy [16]. For that, our aim
was to design and proof the concept of a Continuous Trust Management Framework
that satisfies all its Stakeholders by supporting all the Trust Requirements we list in
Section 2.5 including the vitally missing Continuous Data Control Attribute.
In our quest to satisfy the key Trust Frameworks Stakeholders, we propose the Con-
tinuous Trust Framework Design that is based on the best practices found in the
literature. In addition, we introduce new building blocks to tackle the least covered,
yet vital, Continuous Data Control Attribute, see Subsection 2.6.2. This Trust At-
tribute is essential for our proposal to be considered a Continuous Trust Management
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Framework where the Trust it provides would start with the first instant of commu-
nication between any two parties and would last even after the transaction finishes.
To prove the practicality of our proposed Continuous Framework, we implemented a
minimal version of it on top of the OpenID Connect protocol, see Section 4.2.3. Our
simple prototype shows how the Trust Stakeholders would interact in real-life and
how the Auditor Unit that we introduce would aggregate Data access logs. We have
further designed a hypothetical Data Governance Unit, DGU, that could be realised
using Hard Trust Measures Level solutions like the TCG technologies [65]. The DGU
unit would provide the ultimate Trust if it gets implemented and fully deployed by
all the Trust Network’s residents, See Section 4.4.
Given the fact that the DGU cannot be assumed to be available and widely adopted
sometime soon, we introduced a set of Ranking Algorithms, Utilities, and Deployment
Rules to aid in the design of a powerful Auditor that could make use of the aggregated
Data access logs, see Chapter 5. Our Ranking Algorithms incorporate the innovative
idea of creating artificial Testing Agents that could interact with suspicious Service
Providers to detect their malicious acts. Through an extensive Simulation Process,
we simulated and optimized how our Auditor would behave when operating in large
Networks under different environmental situations, see Chapter 6. This Simulation
process generated a set of different Defensive Strategies’ Flavours that are suitable
for deployment against different Counter-Attacking Strategies operating in different
environmental settings. In fact, we came up with the Malicious Density Theory that
predicts how effective the performance of the Auditor would be given the Density of
malicious nodes present in the Network, see Section 6.8.
By the end of our Simulation Process, we carefully analysed our findings to build
on the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses. We came up with a set of possible
enhancements for the future as well as discussed the limited effects of the currently
posed threats. In Section 7.1, we argue that the proposed Continuous Framework has
proved its capability to achieve its ultimate aim: providing Continuous Trust for its
Stakeholders throughout all their transactions phases. All in all, we believe that our
contribution in this thesis is an important addition to the Trust computing literature
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that would set the ground for a new era where the Trust Frameworks’ Stakeholders
would consider the Continuous Data Control an essential requirement rather than a
science fiction!
8.1 Future Directions
In this Section, we list some of the future directions that we would love to take to
improve our proposed Continuous Framework:
• Implementing the DGU: that is an important step that would solve many
of the current challenges facing our proposed Continuous Framework. It would
be challenging because it depends in its core on the TCG technologies, which
are still novice. An alternative path would be to consider implementing the
DGU based on the Blockchain theory that gained momentum in parallel to
our research work, thanks to its infamous application: the Bitcoin. There are
preliminary research work to utilize the Blockchain theory to enforce Continuous
Data Control but there are still many concerns regarding the scalability of this
new theory [134].
• Incorporating the Simulation Model Algorithms in the Simple Proto-
type: that is, we want to reuse the code we have already written to simulate the
Auditor’s Defensive Strategies’ Flavours into our simple proof-of-concept proto-
type. This way, we will get a more advanced prototype that could be utilized
to run pilot real-life experiments with real Users.
• Implementing the proposed Enhancements: that is, we want to implement
the proposed enhancements of Section 7.3 first in the Simulation Model and then
in the actual prototype to improve the current performance metrics. Particularly
speaking, we wish to reduce the Active Agents to Users Rate to a very low value,
something less than 10%, without affecting the Malicious Providers Detection
Rates.
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• Running a real-life experiment based on a game model: that is, devel-
oping and deploying an online simulation game representing the environment
of the Continuous Framework. All the interactions would be done on one sim-
ulation server. Plus, there is no need for a large number of participants. A
human player could start a game session by selecting one of the roles and then
interacting with a system of automated entities (Users, SPs, Auditors, . . . etc).
It should be possible to have more than one human player though if there are
many logged-in humans in the server. The player could setup the game session
at the beginning so that she plays with a specific number of entities with spe-
cific percentages of traffic and malicious nodes Density or Counter-Attacking
Strategies to test all the special cases that could arise in a real-life Continu-
ous Framework. At the end of the session, the player would be given statistics
showing how accurate the Auditor was during the simulation.
• Implementing the Legal Conformance unit of the Continuous Frame-
work: this unit would be a unique addition to the Trust computing literature.
It would basically store a Database of all the relevant legalisation covering how
Data should be handled online. Then, it should screen any contract signed be-
tween Users and Service Providers to detect any policy that contradicts with one
of the laws. For example, if a Service Provider asks for too many Credentials,
he would be notified that this request is against the EU Data minimisation act.
• Implementing the Negotiation unit of the Continuous Framework: this
unit would allow tailor made contracts to take place in our proposed Continu-
ous Framework, which would enhance the experience of the Trust Network’s
Users and give them more satisfaction.
• Extending the Auditor’s protection to cover Users’ Data: this is a
challenging task but could be possible by incorporating the UMA protocol, see
Subsections 7.1.2 and 3.1.6.
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Appendix A. Screenshots of the Implemented Prototype
Figure A.1: Index Page
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Figure A.2: Admin Page
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Figure A.3: Manage Users Page
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Figure A.4: Manage Logs Page1
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Figure A.5: Manage Logs Page2
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Figure A.6: Manage Logs Page3
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Figure A.7: User Simulation Session
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Figure A.8: User Simulation - Login IDP
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Figure A.9: User Simulation - Consent to IDP
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Figure A.10: User Simulation - Confirm Service Request
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Figure A.11: User Simulation - User Inbox
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Figure A.12: User Simulation - MSP SPAM
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Figure A.13: User Simulation - Report SPAM - Choose Auditor
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Figure A.14: Auditor Simulation
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Figure A.15: Auditor Simulation - Case View
277
Figure A.16: User Simulation - View Auditor Update
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Appendix B. Initial List of the Simulation’s Process Factors
of Interest
This Appendix list all the factors of interest that we could come up with at the initial
analysis of the simulated Auditor Model. The factors without Low and High values
are the factors that were set constant and not chosen for the preliminary simulation
experiments during this project. For more details, refer to Subsection 6.5.1.
Experiment Settings
Factor Low High Notes
Replicas var Depends on total of factors - 30
when all factors are constant
Cycles 505 Higher values could cause out of
memory errors
Table B.1: Factors of Experiment Settings
Environmental Factors
Factor Low High Notes
Network Size
= 3 + iniUsers + iniPSPs + iniSPs + iniMPSPs + iniMSPs +
iniME + iniME * (iniMEMPSPs + iniMEMSPs)
The 3 nodes are Super, IDP, and Auditor
Grouped
iniUsers 50 130
ini prefix: initial number of nodes.
GR suffix: percentage growth rate
of nodes per simulation cycle.
iniPSPs 8 20
iniSPs 16 40
UsersGR 0.05 0.2
SPsGR 0.05 0.1
PSPsGR 0.05 0.1
Grouped
iniMPSPs 4 10
ini prefix: initial number of nodes.
GR suffix: percentage growth rate
of nodes per simulation cycle.
iniMSPs 8 20
iniME MPSPs 5 7
iniME MSPs 8 12
MPSPsGR 0.05 0.1
MSPsGR 0.05 0.1
ME MPSPsGR 0.05 0.1
ME MSPsGR 0.05 0.1
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Environmental Factors
Factor Low High Notes
iniME 2 ME1 Popular Colluding, ME2
Unpopular Colluding.
MEGR 0 No new MEs created dynamically
ME-MaxMPSPs 15
ME-MaxMSPs 50
Table B.2: Environmental Factors
Users’ Controlled Factors. See Section 6.4 for more details.
Factor Low High Notes
Generate New
Service Request
Rate
50
Generate New
Credential Rate
10
Strict Credential
Prob
10
Ini Credential Type 0 0 = Strict, 1 = ShareWithTop, 2 =
ShareWithAny
Ignorance Rate 20 80 Probability a User would ignore
reporting an Abuse
Stop Using
Credential After
Spam
false Users continue to use their
Credentials even after receiving an
Abuse
trusto 50 “Trust In Network” in Conf. Files.
Trust In Network
Dynamic
true trust0 for new Users should be
dynamically adjusted to the
average trust of current Users
Table B.3: Users’ Controlled Factors
SPs’ Controlled Factors. See Subsections 5.6.3 and 5.8.4 for more details.
Factor Low High Notes
new Partnership
Prob
0.2 Probability of an SP making a
partnership relation with another
SP at a given simulation cycle.
new Partnership
Duration
50 The period, in cycles, of a newly
created partnership relation.
partner Sharing
Prob
30 Probability of sharing a new
Credential with a Partner
Accept DGU Prob 0 40 Probability an SP voluntarily
accepts to install DGU, if offered to
by Auditor.
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SPs’ Controlled Factors. See Subsections 5.6.3 and 5.8.4 for more details.
Factor Low High Notes
Accept Compulsory
DGU Prob
60 When SP detected, it should either
accepts DGU or get banned
Accept Strict DGU
Prob
0 20 Probability an SP voluntarily
accepts to enable strict DGU, if
offered to by Auditor.
Accept Compulsory
Strict DGU Prob
40 When SP detected, it should either
accepts DGU or get banned
Table B.4: SPs’ Controlled Factors
Auditor’s and IDP’s Controlled Factors
“SPAM” instead of ”Abuse” in Conf. Files.
Factor Low High Notes
Update IDP
Rankings Freq
1 how often Auditor updates IDP
with latest ranks
ini SP Rank 100 Initial rank of newly created SP at
the bootstrapping cycle.
TG Ranking Settings. See Section 5.5 and Subsection 5.4.5 for more details.
WTLRavg 20 80 “TLRavg Weight” in Conf. Files.
WTST 20 80 “TST Weight” in Conf. Files
WTGT 20 80 “TGT Whole Weight” in Conf.
Files.
Wsg 20 80 “TGT Weight” in Conf. Files.
Grouped
Wsc 10 40 “TGT Colluding Weight” and
Wwc 40 10 “TGT Weak Colluding Weight” in
Conf. Files.
TLRavg Settings. See Section 5.2 for more details.
Suspicious SP Rank 20 40
Suspicious SP
Range
5
Suspicious SP
Banning Rank
5 15
Grouped
Sufficient TLRus
PSP
5 20 Min TLRu ranks to ban (P)SP
based on its T lRavg
Sufficient TLRus
SP
2 10
TST Settings. See Sections 5.3 and 5.7 for more details.
DeployST false true False would turn off all the ST
settings
τST−idle 1 “ST Idle Time” in Conf. Files.
τST−maxLife 20 80 “ST Max Life Time” in Conf. Files.
ST Agent Status
Post Abuse
3 1 = active, 2 = killed, 3 = killed
and stop behaving as normal user
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Auditor’s and IDP’s Controlled Factors
“SPAM” instead of ”Abuse” in Conf. Files.
Factor Low High Notes
ST Unimportant
Credentials Pool
5
Grouped
with GT
Report
Abuse
ST Report Abuse false true Reporting an Abuse like ordinary
Users (using Unimportant
Credentials)
Top TLRavg
PCT-ST 20 To Aid ST Selectors
Bottom TLRavg
PCT-ST
PSL PCT-ST
PSL ST Selector
false true
ST Selectors. See TST Deployment
Rules in 5.7.
Suspicious Nodes
ST Selector
Top TLRavg ST
Selector
Bottom TLRavg ST
Selector
IIR ST Selector
TGT Settings. See Sections 5.4 and 5.7 for more details.
DeployGT false true False would turn off all the GT
settings
τGT−idle 1 “GT Idle Time” in Conf. Files.
τGT−maxLife 20 80 “GT Max Life Time” in Conf.
Files.
GT Agent Status
Post Abuse
3 1 = active, 2 = killed, 3 = killed
and stop behaving as normal user
GT Unimportant
Credentials Pool
5
Grouped
with ST
Report
Abuse
GT Report Abuse false true Reporting an Abuse like ordinary
Users (using Unimportant
Credentials)
PCR Threshold 2 7
PCR Weak
Threshold
2 7
Ignore Old G
Ranks
false true TGT ignores all Gs containing a
banned SP
GT Max SP Num 2 7 Max unpopular SPs in each G
GT Max Size 2 7 Max G size
PIIL PCT 20
PIIL GT Selector
false true
GT Selectors. See TGT Deployment
Rules in 5.7.
PSL GT Selector
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Auditor’s and IDP’s Controlled Factors
“SPAM” instead of ”Abuse” in Conf. Files.
Factor Low High Notes
Suspicious Nodes
GT Selector
DGU Settings. See Subsection 5.6.3 for more details.
DeployDGU false true False would turn off all the DGU
settings
Post DGU
Installation Rank
20 80
Post Strict DGU
Enable Rank
100
Grouped Offer DGU Prob 0 20
Offer Strict DGU
Prob
0 10
Table B.5: Auditor’s and IDP’s Controlled Factors
Attackers’ Controlled Factors. See Subsections 5.8.6 and 5.8.7 for more details.
“SPAM” instead of ”Abuse” in Conf. Files.
Factor Low High Notes
Abuse Drop Strict
Credential Prob
100
Begin: Factors to be duplicated for M(P)SPs ∈ MEs
Abuse Delay MSP
PCT
0
PCT of M(P)SPs deploying Delay
attack only
Abuse Delay MPSP
PCT
Abuse Delay Period 5 50 Simple Attacking Strategy, see
Subsection 5.8.6
Abuse Bombarding
MSP PCT
0
PCT of M(P)SPs deploying
Bombarding attack only
Abuse Bombarding
MPSP PCT
Abuse Bombarding
Period
5 50 Simple Attacking Strategy, see
Subsection 5.8.6
Abuse Drop MSP
PCT
0
PCT of M(P)SPs deploying Drop
User attack only
Abuse Drop MPSP
PCT
Abuse Drop User
Rate
20 80
Simple Attacking Strategy, see Sub-
section 5.8.6
Abuse Drop
Credential Rate
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Attackers’ Controlled Factors. See Subsections 5.8.6 and 5.8.7 for more details.
“SPAM” instead of ”Abuse” in Conf. Files.
Factor Low High Notes
Abuse Delay
Bombarding MSP
PCT
0
PCT of M(P)SPs deploying Delay
and Bombarding attacks only
Abuse Delay
Bombarding MPSP
PCT
Abuse Delay Drop
MSP PCT
0
PCT of M(P)SPs deploying Delay
and Drop attacks only
Abuse Delay Drop
MPSP PCT
Abuse Drop
Bombarding MSP
PCT
0
PCT of M(P)SPs deploying Drop
and Bombarding attacks only
Abuse Drop
Bombarding MPSP
PCT
Abuse Delay Drop
Bombarding MSP
PCT
100
PCT of M(P)SPs deploying Delay,
Drop and Bombarding attacks
Abuse Delay Drop
Bombarding MPSP
PCT
End: Factors to be duplicated for M(P)SPs ∈ MEs
ME Colluding
Unpopular PCT
50 Half MEs deploy large pool of
MSPs colluding and the other half
normal colluding. All would launch
advanced colluding after installing
DGU.
NtoAbuseU 1 5
“ME N MIN MPSPs to Abuse
User”
NtoAbuseC and “ME N MIN MPSPs to Abuse
Credential” in Conf. Files.
Table B.6: Attackers’ Controlled Factors
Monitored Outputs. See Section 6.1 for more details.
“SPAM” instead of ”Abuse” in Conf. Files.
Output Notes
All Outputs ending with <> are duplicated four times to record the same output during 4 different
cycles: 125, 250, 375, and 500
Trust In Network Users Avg of all Users Trust by the end of simulation
Trust In Network Users 1-125 Avg Trust of Users created between cycles 1 and
125 by the end of simulation
Trust In Network Users 126-250
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Monitored Outputs. See Section 6.1 for more details.
“SPAM” instead of ”Abuse” in Conf. Files.
Output Notes
Trust In Network Users 251-375
Trust In Network Users 376-500
Trust In Network Users at <> Avg Trust of all Users by <> cycle
Trust In Network Agents Avg of all Testing Agents’ Trust by the end of
simulation
Trust In Network INI Agents Avg of bootstrapping Agents’ Trust at the end of
simulation
Trust In Network Agents at <> Avg Trust of all Agents by <> cycle
Active Agents to Users at <> PCT of Agents among total Users
Avg Time To Resolve Case at <>
PCT Undetected MPSPs at <>
PCT Undetected MSPs at <>
PCT Undetected Popular MPSPs at <> MPSPs ∈ ME deploying normal colluding
PCT Undetected Popular MSPs at <>
PCT Undetected Unpopular MPSPs at <> MPSPs ∈ ME deploying colluding with a large
pool of MSPs
Open cases at <>
Open cases at <>
PCT Compromised Share with Top
Credentials at <>
PCT Compromised Share with Any
Credentials at <>
PCT Abuse by MPSPs at <>
PCT Abuse by MSPs at <>
PCT Abuse by Popular Colluding ME at <>
PCT Abuse by Unpopular Colluding ME at
<>
Avg Abuse to Ban MPSP at <>
Avg Abuse to Ban MSP at <>
Avg Abuse to Ban Popular Colluding MPSP
at <>
Avg Abuse to Ban Popular Colluding MSP
at <>
Avg Abuse to Ban Unpopular Colluding
MPSP at <>
Avg Abuse to Ban Unpopular Colluding
MSP at <>
Avg Abuse to Ban MPSP at <> Avg Num of Abuses an MPSP sends out before
getting banned
Avg Abuse to Ban MSP at <>
Avg Abuse to Ban Popular Colluding MPSP
at <>
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Monitored Outputs. See Section 6.1 for more details.
“SPAM” instead of ”Abuse” in Conf. Files.
Output Notes
Avg Abuse to Ban Popular Colluding MSP
at <>
Avg Abuse to Ban Unpopular Colluding
MPSP at <>
Avg Abuse to Ban Unpopular Colluding
MSP at <>
PCT PSPs Banned Guilty at <> PCT of Innocent PSPs banned because they were
thought Guilty
PCT SPs Banned Guilty at <>
PCT PSPs Banned DGU at <> PCT of Innocent PSPs banned because they
refused installing DGU
PCT SPs Banned DGU at <>
PCT PSPs Banned Strict DGU at <> PCT of Innocent PSPs banned because they
refused enabling strict DGU
PCT SPs Banned Strict DGU at <>
The following outputs are duplicated for SPs, MPSPs, MSPs, Popular Colluding MPSPs,
Popular Colluding MSPs, Unpopular Colluding MPSPs, and Unpopular Colluding MSPs
PCT PSPs Installed DGU at <>
PCT PSPs Enabled Strict DGU at <>
(Beta Implementation) the following outputs are duplicated for SPs, MPSPs, MSPs, Pop-
ular Colluding MPSPs, Popular Colluding MSPs, Unpopular Colluding MPSPs, and Un-
popular Colluding MSPs
PCT PSPs Detected by TLRavg at <>
PCT PSPs Detected by TST at <>
PCT PSPs Detected by TGTsg at <>
PCT PSPs Detected by TGTsc at <>
PCT PSPs Detected by Agent at <>
PCT PSPs Detected by Total Rank at <>
Table B.7: Monitored Outputs
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Appendix C. Detailed Milestones Data of the Simulation
Stages
In Section 6.6, the Experimental Stages of our Simulation Process were briefly de-
scribed. In this Appendix, we list the detailed analysis of the Milestones that made
up those Stages. In other words, here we list the intermediate results we have obtained
before arriving to the conclusions we have listed in Sections ??, 6.8, and 6.14.
C.1 The Milestones of Stage 1: The no Auditor Case Followed by Initial
Optimisation
Milestone 1.1: No Auditor Case
• Simulated Factors: Ignorance Rate, Normal Users & (P)SPs population, Malicious (P)SPs popula-
tion.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The Ignorance Rate has significant positive effect on Users
Trust followed by the Normal Nodes Population. The Malicious Nodes Population has significant,
but milder, negative effects on the Users Trust. The Interaction of High Ignorance Rate and High
Normal Nodes Population as well as the interaction of High Ignorance Rate with Low Malicious Nodes
Population have mild positive effects on the Users Trust.
• Attack Characteristics: Trivial attacking algorithm where the M(P)SPs would simply abuse any
Credential they acquire.
• Main Attackers: Uncolluding MPSPs and Popular Colluding MPSPs are equally the main threats
causing together around 90% of the network Abuse Rate.
• Trust Status: Users Trust is between 20% when the Ignorance Rate is low and 65% when it is high.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Ignorance Rate is set to low assuming a Users’ pop-
ulation that is serious about its privacy. Normal and Malicious Nodes Populations are set to low to
avoid running out of memory during the simulation process, a technical limitation which we discuss in
Section 6.10.
Milestone 1.2: TLRavg Approach is Introduced and Optimised
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• Simulated Factors: TLRavg Settings of Table 6.5 and the Attackers Factors of Table 6.6.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The Abuse Delay Period has a significant negative effect
on the MPSPs Detection Rate as well as a mild negative effect on the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate.
The Suspicious SP Rank has a mild positive effects on the MPSPs Detection Rate but also with a mild
negative effect on the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate. The Sufficient TLRus SP has a mild negative effect
on the MSPs Detection Rate as well as a mild positive effect on the Banned Innocent SPs Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: The Attackers were manually set not to collude because it is not needed
to fool this algorithm. This Milestone was repeated twice. The first time we forced the attacking
settings to be trivial: short Abuse Delay & Bombarding Periods between 1 and 5, and small Users &
Credentials Drop Rates between 5 and 20. The second time we forced more realistic ranges as described
in Table 6.6. In both cases, the automatic optimiser for the attackers did not require setting their
attacking factors High because it is possible to compromise the deployed defenses with less complicated
attacks. Increasing the attacks complexity would be an overkill that would reduce the percentage of
the compromised Credentials the attackers would gain.
• Main Attackers: The Uncolluding MPSPs are the main threat generating over than 55% of the total
Abuse followed by the Popular Colluding MPSPs generating over than 30% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: Poor performance even in the trivial attacks case. Given the poor detection
figures, the TLRavg factors were optimised at modest values to avoid banning innocent (P)SPs. An
interesting observation is that during high Abuse Bombarding attacks, the Auditor tends to optimise
the Suspicious SP Rank and Suspicious SP Banning Rank at high levels to eliminate those bombarding
entities ASAP. Nevertheless, the High Abuse Delay Period attack setting forced the Auditor to slow
down banning (M)PSPs, by increasing the Sufficient (P)SP TLRus factor, to reduce the Banning
Innocent PSPs Rate.
• Trust Status: In both attacking scenarios, the Users’ Trust reaches 20% while the comprmised rates
of Share with Top Credentials and Share with Any Credentials reached more than 50% and 65% respec-
tively.
• Auditor Performance: Poor Detection Rates reaching 0% in most cases even with trivial attacking
settings and the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate reached over 2%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Suspicious SP Rank = 32, Suspicious SP Banning
Rank = 10, Sufficient TLRus PSP = 20, Sufficient TLRus SP = 5, Abuse Bombarding Period = 28
(this attacking factor was fixed due to its low impact).
Milestone 1.3: TST Approach is Introduced and Optimised
• Simulated Factors: WTLRavg , WTST , and TST Settings of Table 6.5, except for the ST Report
Abuse factor, and the Attackers Factors of Table 6.6 except for the Abuse Bombarding Period.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The τST−maxLife has a significant negative effect on the
Active Agents to Users Rate. The Abuse Delay Period has significant negative effects on the M(P)SPs
Detection Rates. The interaction of Abuse Delay Period with the τST −maxLife where τST−maxLife
is larger than Abuse Delay Period, would have mild positive effects on the M(P)SPs Detection Rates.
The NtoAbuseC with significant positive effects on the Users’ Trust while the NtoAbuseU would have
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mild effects on that response. The Users and Credentials Drop Rates have mild positive effects on
the Users Trust as well as mild negative effects on the Uncolluding M(P)SPS Detection Rates. The
Top/Bottom TLRavg ST Selectors have huge positive effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate as well
as mild positive effects on the Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rates. The PSL ST Selector has significant
positive effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: The Attackers were forced to deploy more sophisticated colluding attacks
to avoid banning their valuable MPSPs. That is, setting Users and Credentials Drop Rates = 80,
NtoAbuseU = 5 but keeping NtoAbuseC = 1. Hence, almost all the attackers were not detected.
• Main Attackers: The Uncolluding MPSPs are the main threat generating over than 45% of the total
Abuse followed by both the Popular Colluding MPSPs and Uncolluding MSPs where each of them
generating around 25% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: The Auditor started the optimisation process with great Uncolluding
M(P)SPs Detection Rates causing the attacking entities to deploy some forms of colluding attacks.
When it comes to the ST selectors, turning on either of the Top/Bottom TLRavg ST Selectors would
lead to selecting more than 20% of the the whole SPs population leading to a sharp increase in the
number of Testing Agents. This increase is undesirable in our optimisation process, see 6.1. Therefore,
the Auditor is inclined to turn on the PSL ST Selector which selects the most important category of
attackers: the MPSPs. Given the strong colluding attacks, those settings would fail at improving the
Detection Rates causing the Auditor to switch on only one of the aggressive Top/Bottom TLRavg ST
Selectors since the M(P)SPs’ deployed simple strategies could make their rankings bounce between the
Top and the Bottom of the TLRavg record. However, the more complicated the attacks settings get,
particularly the colluding settings, the more useless the TST Approach gets at detecting such attacks
leading the Auditor to turn on all it’s ST selectors in hope of improving the detection rates. It should
be noted that the more complicated the Attacks get, the less Abuse that would be generated leading to
better Users Trust.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 90% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 2.5% and 0.5% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: Poor Popular/Unpopular Colluding Detection Rates reaching 0% while the
Uncoluding MPSPs and Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rates reached around 30% and 10% respectively.
The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate reached about 0.9% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached
about 80%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: τST−maxLife = 57, WTLRavg = 44, WTST = 56, all
TST selectors switched on.
Milestone 1.4: TGT Approach is Introduced and Optimised
• Simulated Factors: TG and TGT Settings of Table 6.5 and the Attackers Factors of Table 6.6 except
for the Abuse Bombarding Period.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The τGT−maxLife has mild negative effects on the Active
Agents to Users Rate. The PIIL GT Selector has a mild positive effect on the Active Agents to Users
Rate. The NtoAbuseC has a significant positive effect on the Users’ Trust, a mild positive effect on
the Active Agents to Users Rate, and a significant negative effect on the Colluding Popular MPSPs
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Detection Rate. The NtoAbuseU has a mild positive effect on the Users Trust as well as a significant
negative effect on the Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate. The interaction of High NtoAbuseU
and High NtoAbuseC has a significant positive effect on the Users Trust as well as significant negative
effect on the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rate. The Users/Credentials Drop Rates have mild negative
effects on the Users Trust, Active Agents to Users Rate, Uncolluding M(P)SPS Detection Rates, and
Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: Similar to the previous Milestone 1.3.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs are the main threat generating around 75% of the
total Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating around 15% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: As the attacks got more complicated, the internal TG and TGT Ranking
Weights did not have any significant effect. When it comes to the GT Selectors, we noted that at low
level attacks, the PIIL GT Selector would mistakenly cause more innocent (P)SPs to be banned while
that effect would almost vanish at high level attacks. That could be because of the large volume of
logs generated at low level attacks with few PSPs on them leading to the false illusion of colluding
relations. Hence, at low level attacks, the Auditor decided to switch off all the GT Selectors. However,
once the attack gets a bit tougher, it turned on all the Selectors but the PIIL GT Selector to tackle the
current threats. At the highest attack level, all the Selectors would be of little impact at detecting very
advanced colluding settings. Therefore, the Auditor preferred to turn all the GT Selectors off in order
to save on the cost of creating new Agents. However, we believe that since the Auditor is indifferent to
switching on or off the GT Selectors during high levels attack, it would have been better to switch on
the PIIL GT Selector, see Stage 6.6.4. Generally speaking, if the Auditor can detect the nature of the
attacks the network is currently receiving, see 5.6.4, it should try to minimise the WTGTsg and/or turn
off the PIIL GT Selector during low level attacks to avoid mistakenly banning innocent (P)SPs.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 97% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 8% and 3% respectively. The reason why Share with
Top Credentials are having higher probability of being abused is the fact that they are obtained and
shared only by the top (M)PSPs which increases the chance of being acquired and abused by an MPSP.
That could be a problem with our simulation setting because we put a percentage of MPSPs that equal
or sometimes outnumber the PSPs population, i.e. we are simulating the pessimistic scenario, see 6.10.
• Auditor Performance: Poor Popular/Unpopular Colluding Detection Rates reaching 0% while the
Uncoluding MPSPs and Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rates reached around 30% and 10% respectively.
The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate was 0% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 85%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: τGT−maxLife = 55, PCR Threshold = 5, PCR Weak
Threshold = 5, Ignore Old G Ranks = true, GT Max SP = 5, GT Max Size = 5, WTLRavg = 22,
WTST = 28, WTGT = 50, WTGTsg = 50, WTGTsc = 25, WTGTwc = 25, all TGT selectors switched on
except the PIIL GT Selector.
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C.2 The Milestones of Stage 2: 1st Optimisation Refinement of Attacks
and Auditorial Settings
Milestone 2.1: Testing the importance of TST and optimising the two groups of Attackers (Uncolluding
and Colluding)
• Simulated Factors: Deploy ST, Top TLRavg ST Selector, IIR ST Selector, and the Attackers Factors
of Table 6.6 except for the Abuse Bombarding Period.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The Deploy ST factor has a huge negative effect on the
Total Agents to Users Rate, 80% rise in that rate when Deploy ST is turned on. Deploy ST also has
mild positive effects on the Uncolluding M(P)SPs Detection Rates. When the internal ST selectors were
examined, it turned out that the Top TLRavg ST Selector is the main influencer of the Deploy ST ’s
observed effects, noting that the Bottom TLRavg ST Selector is believed to have the same influence
if it is turned on. The NtoAbuseC has a positive significant effect on the User’s Trust and, together
with NtoAbuseU , significant negative effects on the Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate. The
Users/Credentials Drop Rates have mild positive effects on the Users Trust as well as mild negative
effects on the Uncolluding M(P)SPs Detection Rates.
• Attack Characteristics: In this Milestone, we separated the Attackers into two groups: Uncolluding
Attackers and Colluding Attackers. For the Uncolluding Attackers, the toughest simple strategies
settings were selected. Interestingly, it seems they prefer if the Colluding Attackers are not setting
the highest levels of colluding, i.e. they wish if the Auditor focus its’ detection efforts on the other
competing group of Attackers. That could be because if the population of Attackers falls down to a
certain limit, it would be very hard for the Auditor to detect any further MPSPs because the available
logs and Algorithms would be insufficient to distinguish the tiny population of MPSPs among the Normal
innocent population, see Section 6.8. For the Colluding Attackers, they choose the opposite settings.
i.e. lowest values for the simple strategies settings and the highest values for both the NtoAbuseU and
NtoAbuseC .
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs are the main threat generating around 70% of the
total Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating slightly less than 20% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: Switching off Deploy ST lowered down the Active Agents to Users from
around 80% to less than 5%, bearing in mind that the TGT most agressive selector, PIIL GT Selector
is also turned off since the last stage. That desired result came with some side effects. First, it is
advantageous for the Auditor to turn on the TST Approach during low level attacks to quickly eliminate
the Uncolluding Attackers or trivial Colluding Attackers. Second, even during high level attacks, the
Uncolluding Attackers Detection Rate would fall from 20% to 6% if the Deploy ST is switched off. That
would lead to adding more noise to the open logs since the TGT G’s would get filled with Undetected
Uncolluding Attackers which would be thought to be colluding. Moreover, the increase in the number of
open logs along with the increase in their sizes would lead to accusing many innocent PSPs which would
be thought to be colluding. This situation would lead the Colluding MPSPs to relax their attacking
simple strategies in order to compromise more Credentials and to increase the wealth of reported cases
to make it even more challenging for the Auditor to make correct acquisitions. Ideally speaking, if
the Auditor can detect the nature of the deployed attacks against it, it should turn on Deploy ST
during low level attacks and turn it off during high level attacks. Even when we tried to check whether
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deploying only the Top TLRavg ST Selector and/or the IIR ST Selector to tackle this dilemma, we
observed that the Top TLRavg ST Selector is the main influencer of the TST Approach generated
responses. However, the IIR ST Selector showed acceptable Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate, not
Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rate, during low level attacks with only 40% of Active Agents to Users
Rate. Interestingly, we noted that when only the Top TLRavg ST Selector is switched on, the colluding
attack would get tougher. We initially thought the reason might be just random or it could be that
during high level attacks, the IIR ST Selector would initially detect more Uncolluding MPSPs leaving
more room for the Colluding MPSPs to hide among a larger population of innocent PSPs appearing
in the reported logs. Whereas without that selector, the TGT Approach would have to analyse more
logs to detect colluding groups, thanks to the Ignore Old G Rank factor which gives the benefit of the
doubt for both innocent and guilty (P)SPs by ignoring to consider all Gs containing a banned (P)SP
in the TGT calculations. Alternatively, we thought the reason might be simply that the tougher the
colluding attack gets, the easier it would be for the Uncolluding MPSPs to attack since they would
go unnoticed in the long pile of unresolved cases generated by the Colluding MPSPs. In other words,
there is a potential conflict of interest between the Colluding and the Uncolluding attackers affecting
the optimisation process and, hence, untying the two categories of attackers was decided from this point
on, see 6.10. In fact, toward the end of the whole simulation process, we figured out that the most
likely reason for the tougher colluding attacks when we turn off the IIR ST Selector would be explained
by the Malicious Density Theory which we developed during this simulation process, see 6.8 for more
details.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 97% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 7% and 4% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: Poor Popular/Unpopular Colluding Detection Rates reaching 1% while the
Uncoluding MPSPs and Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rates reached around 10% and 12% respectively.
The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate was 0% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 85%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Deploy ST = true, all TST selectors turned off
except for the Top TLRavg ST Selector, Uncolluding Abuse Delay Period = 50, Uncolluding Abuse
User/Credntial Drop Rates = 80, Colluding Abuse Delay Period = 5, Colluding Abuse User/Credntial
Drop Rates = 20, NtoAbuseU = 5, and NtoAbuseC = 5.
Milestone 2.2: Optimising TLRavg and TST Approaches against Uncolluding Attacks
• Simulated Factors: WTLRavg , WTST , TLRavg and TST Settings of Table 6.5, except for the ST
Report Abuse factor.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: Similar to Milestone 1.3, the τST−maxLife has signifi-
cant negative effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate and mild positive effects on the Uncolluding
M(P)SPs Detection Rates. This confirms our point in Milestone 1.3 that τST−maxLife must be larger
than Abuse Delay Period in order to capture Uncolluding M(P)SPs. The Top/Bottom TLRavg ST
Selectors have significant positive effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: Fixed since Milestone 2.1.
• Main Attackers: The Uncolluding MPSPs are the main threat generating around 48% of the total
Abuse followed by the Popular Colluding MPSPs generating around 38% of the total Abuse.
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• Defense Characteristics: The Auditor performance is similar to Milestone 1.3. However, since the
attacks are now optimised at more complicated level compared to the initial optimisation settings in
Milestone 1.3, the Auditor seems to get less confident at detecting the smart M(P)SPs deploying tough
colluding as well as simple attacking strategies. Hence, we observed the tendency to minimise the
WTST to its minimum in favour of increasing the WTLRavg that we know since Milestone 1.2 is a
weak and inaccurate detection algorithm. In other words, the Auditor is tempted to deploy random
detecting algorithms during very complicated attacks. Of course that would lead to an increase in the
Banned Innocent PSPs Rate and, hence, the Auditor tries to minimise this side effect by increasing
the Suspicious SP Rank and Banning SP Rank as well as the Sufficient TLRUs to Ban PSPs to their
utmost levels.
• Trust Status: Slightly better than Milestone 1.3. The Users Trust reached 99% while the compromised
rates of Share with Top Credentials and Share with Any Credentials reached around 2.5% and 1%
respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Popular Colluding MPSPs, Uncolluding MPSPs and Uncolluding MSPs
Detection Rates reached around 20%, 18%, and 10% respectively. The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate
reached about 0.5% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 60%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Suspicious SP Rank = 40, Suspicious SP Banning
Rank = 15, Sufficient TLRus PSP = 9, Sufficient TLRus SP = 10, τST−maxLife = 80, WTLRavg =
30, WTST = 10, all TST selectors switched on except for PSL ST Selector and IIR ST Selector.
Milestone 2.3: Optimising TGT Approach along with the “Deploy ST” option against the Colluding
Attacks
• Simulated Factors: TG and TGT Settings of Table 6.5, and Deploy ST.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: Similar to Milestone 1.4, the τGT−maxLife with mild
negative effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate. The Deploy ST factor with a huge positive effect
on the Active Agents to Users Rate. The PIIL GT Selector also has a significant positive effect on the
Active Agents to Users Rate. Interestingly, the Deploy ST factor has a troublesome relation with the
PIIL GT Selector. When Deploy ST is turned on while PIIL GT Selector is turned off, the User’s
Trust would increase by about 2% and the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate would fall by 1%. But when we
switch off Deploy ST and switch on PIIL GT Selector we notice that the Uncolluding MPSPs Detection
Rate falls from 20% to 4% and the Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate would increase from 40%
to 45% compared to the Rates we could get when both Selectors are switched on together. We also
noted that turning on Deploy ST would always generate an 80% figure of Active Agents to Users Rate.
Nevertheless, switching on the PIIL GT Selector while Deploy ST is off would generate a rate of only
40% Active Agents to Users.
• Attack Characteristics: Fixed since Milestone 2.1.
• Main Attackers: The Uncolluding MPSPs are the main threat generating around 58% of the total
Abuse followed by the Popular Colluding MPSPs generating around 28% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: Similar to Milestone 1.4, the internal TG and TGT Ranking Weights did
not have any significant effect. Nevertheless, we noticed that the Auditor is tempted to set the WTGT ,
Wwc, and Wsc to high levels in order to get more aggressive acquisitions during the current high level
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attack. However, the high cost of increasing the Banning Innocent PSPs Rate held the Auditor back
and forced it to keep WTGT = 80% but also increasing Wsg to 80% instead of giving more weight to
the more aggressive GT Detectors: Wsc and Wwc. That is a compromise to get some of the aggressive
detection powers the GT Detectors while trying to reduce the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate. When it
comes to the GT Selectors and the Deploy ST factor, we noted similar results to Milestone 2.1. That is,
turning on the TST Approach would always generate the 80% figure Active Agents to Users Rate while
turning on the PIIL GT Selector while Deploy ST is off would generate a rate of 40% Active Agents to
Users. Since the TST Approach is crucial to detect Uncolluding MPSPs while the PIIL GT Selector is
also crucial to detect Colluding MPSPs, the Auditor decided to keep both Selectors on. Finally, due to
the highly complicated attacks launched against the network, the Auditor is tempted to act as a random
Detector. Hence, it decided to reduce both the pcrThreshold and pcrWeakThreshold to their minimum
values which would, in turn, make more aggressive banning decisions. As a result, the Banned Innocent
PSPs Rate rose from 0.05% to 1.8% despite the Auditor’s decision to slow down the banning decisions
by setting the Ignore Old G Ranks = true. i.e. ignoring all those ranks where a banned (P)SP appears.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 99% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 1% and 3% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Popular Colluding MPSPs, Uncoluding MPSPs, Uncolluding MSPs and
Unpopular Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates reached around 30%, 25%, 10%, and 5% respectively.
The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate reached about 1.8% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached
about 80%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: τGT−maxLife = 80, PCR Threshold = 2, PCR Weak
Threshold = 2, Ignore Old G Ranks = true, GT Max SP = 2, GT Max Size = 2, WTLRavg = 16,
WTST = 4, WTGT = 80, WTGTsg = 80, WTGTsc = 16, WTGTwc = 4, all TGT selectors switched on
except the PSL GT Selector.
C.3 The Milestones of Stage 3: 2nd Optimisation Refinement of Attacks
and Auditorial Settings
Milestone 3.1: Optimising the two groups of Attackers (Uncolluding and Colluding)
• Simulated Factors: The Attackers Factors of Table 6.6.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The NtoAbuseC factor has significant positive effects on the
User’s Trust and the Active Agents to Users Rate. Both the NtoAbuseC and the NtoAbuseU factors
have significant negative effects on the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates either by themselves or by
the Interaction of their High values. The Uncolluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rate has a mild
negative effects on the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates. The Uncolluding Abuse Delay Period has
mild positive effect on the Active Agents to Users Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: For the Uncolluding Attackers, the toughest simple strategies settings were
selected except for the Abuse Bombarding Period. Actually, the interaction of setting both the User-
s/Credentials Drop Rates high would yield the ultimate result at reducing the Uncolluding M(P)SPs
Detection Rates. That could be explained by the fact that low Users Drop Rate would mean many
294
Users reporting Cases containing the same (P)SP while low Credential Drop Rate would mean that a
small group of Users, which are not dropped by a given Uncolluding MPSP would keep reporting Cases
against that same Uncolluding MPSP leading the Auditor to catch it at the end of the day. For the
Colluding Attackers, the most influential factors to reduce the Colluding Detection Rates were both
the NtoAbuseU and NtoAbuseC followed by, with less extent, the Users/Credentials Drop Rates belong-
ing to Colluding MPSPs. We noticed that setting the Users/Credentials Drop Rates belonging to the
Colluding MPSPs low would increase the Compromised Credentials Rates as expected. Nevertheless,
setting NtoAbuseC low while setting NtoAbuseU high would give the best combination to maximize the
Compromised Credentials Rates without risking an increase in the Colluding Detection Rates. That
might be because these settings would relax the colluding policy, enabling the Attackers to get as much
Credentials as possible without risking an increase in the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates. That is
because setting NtoAbuseu = 5 while reducing NtoAbusec from 5 to 1 would technically mean launching
Weak Colluding Attacks which are tricky to catch and easier to launch. That is because this attack
requires the targeted Credential to be dealt with a less number of Colluding MPSPs, see 5.4.4 and 5.8.7.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs are the main threat generating over 60% of the total
Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating over than 25% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: In the previous stage, it was obvious that the Auditorial Defensive Strategy
Flavour Flavour was bold and random at detecting and banning suspicious SPs. For that, when the
Colluding Attackers decided at this Milestone to focus more on Weak Colluding Attacks, more Cases
are now generated making it trickier for the Auditor to process and make banning decisions based on
them even with the bold and random detection policy of the previous stage. The Colluding Attackers
decision to increase their Colluding Abuse User/Credential Drop Rates to higher levels made it even
more trickier for the Auditor to detect them. Another interesting point that we have noted is the
positive relation between the triviality of the attacks and the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate. That might
be because the current Defence Strategy Flavour Flavour is more random than evidence based, in order
to function better under uncertain environment. That would come at the cost of rising risk of trivial
attacks, launched in purpose, to increase the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate which would, in turn, increase
the Malicious MPSPs Density for the benefit of the Attackers, See 6.8.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached about 95% while the compromised rates of Share with Top
Credentials and Share with Any Credentials reached around 9% and 5% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: Poor Unpopular Colluding Detection Rate and Popular Colluding Detection
Rate reaching around 2% and 4% respectively while the Uncoluding MPSPs and Uncolluding MSPs
Detection Rates reached around 15% and 5% respectively. The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate reached
about 0.6% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 85%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Uncolluding Abuse Delay Period = 50, Uncolluding
Abuse Bombarding Period = 5, Uncolluding Abuse User/Credntial Drop Rates = 80, Colluding Abuse
Delay Period = 48, Colluding Abuse Bombarding Period = 5, Colluding Abuse User Drop Rate = 60,
Colluding Abuse Credential Drop Rate = 76, NtoAbuseU = 5, and NtoAbuseC = 1.
Milestone 3.2: Optimising TLRavg and TST Approaches against Uncolluding Attacks
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• Simulated Factors: WTLRavg , WTST , TLRavg and TST Settings of Table 6.5, except for the ST
Report Abuse and τST−maxLife factors.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The Top/Bottom TLRavg ST Selectors have significant
positive effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate. The interactions of Top/Bottom TLRavg ST
Selectors as well as the Suspicious ST Selector High values would have mild positive effects on the
Active Agents to Users Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: Fixed since Milestone 3.1.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs are the main threat generating around 65% of the
total Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating around 25% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: The Auditor performance is similar to Milestone 2.2. However, we observed
in this Milestone that the Auditor is confused whether to increase its randomness bold Defensive Strategy
Flavour Flavour in order to detect more Colluding Attackers, mostly by pure luck, or to decrease that
randomness behaviour in order to detect more Uncolluding Attackers. Detecting the latter is now a more
systematic job, thanks to the lowered Abuse Bombarding Period. Since the main target of this step was
to detect Uncolluding Attackers, the settings boosting their detection were preferred over those needed
to detect the Colluding Attackers. That is, the Suspicious Rank was reduced while the Sufficient TLRUs
to Ban PSPs was increased. Interestingly, the WTST was decreased and the Top/Bottom TLRavg ST
Selectors were turned off while the PSL/Suspicious ST Selectors were turned on. In other words, the
Auditor decided to operate the TST Approach at its minimum capacity. That was not expected because
it reduced the Uncolluding MPSPs Dectection Rates. This unexpected optimisation could be explained
by the gain of reducing the Active Agents to Users Rate as well as the slight increase in the Users Trust.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached around 95% while the compromised rates of Share with Top
Credentials and Share with Any Credentials reached around 9% and 5% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Uncoluding MPSPs, Popular Colluding MPSPs, and Uncolluding MSPs
Detection Rates reached around 19%, 2%, and 2% respectively. The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate
reached about 0.25% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 80%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Suspicious SP Rank = 20, Suspicious SP Banning
Rank = 15, Sufficient TLRus PSP = 20, Sufficient TLRus SP = 2, WTLRavg = 16, WTST = 4, all
TST selectors switched off except for Suspicious ST Selector and IIR ST Selector.
Milestone 3.3: Optimising TGT Approach along with the “Deploy ST” option against the Colluding
Attacks
• Simulated Factors: TG and TGT Settings of Table 6.5, except for τGT−maxLife, and Deploy ST.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The Deploy ST is now less influencing than PILL GT
Selector. The latter now has mild positive effects on Users Trust, Active Agents to Users Rate as well
as mild negative effects on the Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate. Moreover, we noted that
turning on PIIL GT Selector would always generate around a figure of 80% Active Agents to Users
Rate. Nevertheless, switching on the Deploy ST while PIIL GT Selector is off would generate a rate
of around 40% Active Agents to Users. That is just the opposite of the case in the previous refinement
Stage, see Milestone 2.3.
296
• Attack Characteristics: Fixed since Milestone 3.1.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs are the main threat generating around 65% of the
total Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating around 20% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: Unlike what we were expecting, the Auditor choose almost the opposite
settings by setting PCR Threshold to 3, PCR Weak Threshold to 7, and Ignore Old G Ranks to true. The
reason could be the fact that there is no significant effect for those factors on the Colluding/Uncolluding
Detection Rates and, hence, the Auditor preferred to reduce the Active Agents to Users Rate. In
comparison to Milestone 3.3, GT Max Size has increased to accommodate the increasing population
of Colluding MPSPs generated by the current Weak Colluding Attack while both the PCR Threshold
and PCR Weak Threshold have increased to reduce the randomness behaviour of the Auditor. When
it comes to the Agents Selectors, we found that despite the positive effect of the PIIL GT Selector
on Users Trust, it has negative effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate and Uncolluding/Colluding
MPSPs Detection Rates. The reason might be the higher volume of logs and the slower detection
caused by the optimised setting PCR Weak Threshold to low, setting increasing Ignoring old G Ranks
to true, and increasing GT Max Size. That combination of setting would cause generating weaker ranks
which, in turn, restricts the Auditor’s ability to quickly ban Suspected SPs leading to the described
negative impacts. The sense of increased Users Trust might be because of the reduced activities caused
by the intermediate decline in Users Trust, meaning that deploying the PIIL GT Selector under such
conditions would mean it would function well for a limited capacity of traffic before breaking down until
the traffic reduces again to the permissible limits. In other words, this combination of settings does not
scale. As a result, the Auditor decided to turn off the PIIL GT Selector as well as the Suspicious GT
Selector, which has milder effects than the PIIL GT Selector.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 92% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 7% and 5% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Popular Colluding MPSPs, Uncoluding MPSPs, and Unpopular Collud-
ing MPSPs Detection Rates reached around 14%, 11%, and 2% respectively. The Banned Innocent
PSPs Rate reached about 0.25% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 36%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: PCR Threshold = 3, PCR Weak Threshold = 7,
Ignore Old G Ranks = true, GT Max SP = 2, GT Max Size = 7, WTLRavg = 16, WTST = 4, WTGT
= 80, WTGTsg = 25, WTGTsc = 60, WTGTwc = 15, all TGT selectors switched off except the PSL GT
Selector.
C.4 The Milestones of Stage 4: Comparing the Performance of Manual
and Automatic Optimisation Settings
Manual Vs. Automatic Defensive Strategies Settings
Factor Manual Automatic Notes
TG Ranking Settings. See Section 5.5 and Subsection 5.4.5 for more details.
WTLRavg 4 16 Under high level Attacks, WTLRavg becomes
just a random factor that should not be relied
upon for fair banning decisions.
297
Manual Vs. Automatic Defensive Strategies Settings
Factor Manual Automatic Notes
WTST 16 4 WTST can prove if an Uncolluding M(P)SP is
acting maliciously, but cant prove the opposite
and, hence, is of little importance.
WTGT 80
Wsg 20 25 Wsg is of little importance when NtoAbuseC is
low, which is highly expected from optimised
Attackers.
Wsc 30 60 Same as the above note.
Wwc 50 15 Opposite the above note.
TLRavg Settings. See Section 5.2 for more details.
Suspicious SP Rank 30 20 Useful to detect Uncolluding MPSPs quickly
before Open Cases pile up. However, it should
not have been altered for the Manual Strategy
Flavour Flavour since it has no effect without
enabling either the Suspicious ST Selector or
Suspicious GT Selector. See Section 6.10.
Suspicious SP
Banning Rank
15
Sufficient TLRus
PSP
10 20 Negative effects on Uncolluding MPSPs
Detection Rate and Banned Innocent PSPs
Rate.
Sufficient TLRus
SP
2
TST Settings. See Sections 5.3 and 5.7 for more details.
τST−maxLife 80
ST Report Abuse True Starting from Milestone 4.2.
PSL ST Selector false
Suspicious Nodes
ST Selector
false true Showed little significance so far
Top TLRavg ST
Selector
true false Aggressive Selector selecting many
Uncolluding M(P)SPs who try to fool Auditor
by simple attacks that give them high ranks.
Bottom TLRavg ST
Selector
false
IIR ST Selector false true Showed little significance so far.
TGT Settings. See Sections 5.4 and 5.7 for more details.
τGT−maxLife 80
GT Report Abuse true Starting from Milestone 4.2.
PCR Threshold 7 3 Has little importance when NtoAbuseC is low,
which is highly expected from optimised
Attackers.
PCR Weak
Threshold
2 7 Opposite the above note.
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Manual Vs. Automatic Defensive Strategies Settings
Factor Manual Automatic Notes
Ignore Old G
Ranks
false true
GT Max SP Num 2
GT Max Size 5 7 Lower GT Max Size values would generate
smaller potential Colluding Gs leading to
bolder TGT ranks.
PIIL GT Selector true false Expected to boost the Detection Rates with
the combination of the other Manual settings.
PSL GT Selector false true Has little effects when PIIL GT Selector is
turned on.
Suspicious Nodes
GT Selector
false
Table C.1: Manual Vs. Automatic Defensive Strategies Settings
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Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
High High High High
Best Defense: Manual Settings’ Interpretation: A popular network among Users, (P)SPs, and M(P)SPs.
Defense Agent
Report?
UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned
Inoc. PSPs
Manual True 15% 32% 11% 35% 63% 91% 11% 8% 17%
Automatic True 2% 14% 0% 11% 18% 90% 10% 8% 1%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
High Low High High
Best Defense: Manual Settings’ Interpretation: A popular network among Users, (P)SPs, and M(P)SPs, but Users and
(P)SPs are losing interest in it, due to saturation, better alternatives, and/or
the high density of M(P)SPs in the network.
Defense Agent
Report?
UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned
Inoc. PSPs
Manual True 10% 19% 12% 28% 84% 82% 14% 8% 7%
Automatic True 2% 5% 0% 6% 37% 79% 12% 12% 0%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
Low High High High
Best Defense: Manual Settings’ Interpretation: A bootstrapping network that is gaining rapid popularity among Users and
(P)SPs. However, M(P)SPs have already anticipated this success and, hence,
they were among the early members to join the network and populate it.
Plus, they are still joining at a steady pace.
Defense Agent
Report?
UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned
Inoc. PSPs
Manual True 17% 36% 13% 37% 75% 87% 14% 13% 19%
Automatic True 1% 6% 0% 6% 20% 83% 12% 13% 1%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
Low High Low High
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Best Defense: Manual Settings’ Interpretation: A bootstrapping network that is gaining rapid popularity among Users,
(P)SPs and M(P)SPs as well.
Defense Agent
Report?
UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned
Inoc. PSPs
Manual True 37% 57% 11% 51% 67% 88% 10% 8% 32%
Automatic True 8% 22% 0% 19% 25% 84% 10% 10% 3%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
Low Low Low High
Best Defense: Automatic Settings’ Interpretation: A bootstrapping network that is gaining rapid popularity among M(P)SPs
but not genuine Users and (P)SPs, perhaps due to the network getting
polluted with many M(P)SPs.
Defense Agent
Report?
UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned
Inoc. PSPs
Manual True 42% 52% 12% 47% 85% 68% 13% 13% 39%
Automatic False 5% 17% 0% 17% 55% 66% 14% 15% 3%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
Low Low Low Low
Best Defense: Automatic Settings’ Interpretation: A bootstrapping network that is not gaining interest from any party,
including M(P)SPs. i.e. probably a dying network.
Defense Agent
Report?
UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned
Inoc. PSPs
Manual True 27% 37% 9% 39% 85% 75% 13% 11% 22%
Automatic False 7% 21% 0% 19% 55% 72% 14% 13% 4%
Table C.2: Simulation Stage 4 Detailed Results
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In Stage 4, see Subsection 6.6.4, two main Defensive Strategies, Manual and Auto-
matic, were tested under various environmental settings related to the populations and
growth rates of Users, (P)SPs, and M(P)SPs. Table C.1 compares between the set-
ting of the two Strategies while Table C.2 lists the detailed results of their Simulation
testing under various Environmental conditions.
Milestone 4.1: Optimising the two groups of Attackers (Uncolluding and Colluding) Against the Manual
and Automatic Defensive Strategies
• Simulated Factors: Defense Strategy Flavour Flavour and the Attackers Factors of Table 6.6.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The Manual Strategy Flavour Flavour has huge positive
effects on the Total Agents to Users Rate and the Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rate, over 40% in
comparison to those rates generated when Automatic Strategy Flavour Flavour is turned on. When it
comes to the Attackers effects, they are quite similar to Milestone 3.1.
• Attack Characteristics: For the Uncolluding Attackers, the toughest simple strategies settings were
selected, although the Uncolluding/Colluding Abuse Bombarding Periods did not show noticeable ef-
fects. For the Colluding Attackers, it was interesting to note that the combination of NtoAbuseU = 5
and NtoAbuseC = 1 would have the same negative effects on the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates but
with the advantage of increasing the Compromised Credentials Rates. In other words, launching Weak
Colluding attacks is justified despite the slight risk of abusing a Testing Agent. That is specially true
when such Weak Colluding attacks are combined with high Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates. Nev-
ertheless, if for any reason the Attackers decided to launch a Strong Colluding Attack, it would be better
to lower down the values of Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates in order to increase the Compromised
Credentials Rates. Interestingly, we have noted that if the Attackers got a way to determine which De-
fensive Strategy Flavour Flavour is being deployed by the Auditor, see the Reverse Engineering Threat
in 5.8.5, and they figured out it was in deed the Automatic Strategy Flavour Flavour, shifting from Low
Level to High Level Colluding Attack settings would generate a very good outcome for the Attackers in
terms of increasing the Compromised Credentials Rates and decreased Colluding/Uncolluding MPSPs
Detection Rates.
• Main Attackers: In this Milestone we compared 4 Scenarios. First, when the Manual Strategy
Flavour Flavour is deployed during High Level Attacks, the Popular Colluding MPSPs would be the
main threat generating around 80% of the total Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating
around 20% of the total Abuse. Second, when the Automatic Strategy Flavour Flavour is deployed
during High Level Attacks, the Popular Colluding MPSPs would be the main threat generating around
80% of the total Abuse followed by both the Uncolluding MPSPs and Unpopular Colluding MPSPS
where each is generating around 10% of the total Abuse. Third, when the Manual Strategy Flavour
Flavour is deployed during Low Level Attacks, the Unpopular Colluding MPSPs would be the main
threat generating around 82% of the total Abuse followed by the Popular Colluding MPSPs generating
around 13% of the total Abuse. Fourth, when the Automatic Strategy Flavour Flavour is deployed
during Low Level Attacks, the Unpopular Colluding MPSPs would be the main threat generating
around 55% of the total Abuse followed by the Popular Colluding MPSPs generating around 28% of
the total Abuse and the Uncolluding MSPs generating around 19% of total Abuse.
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• Defense Characteristics: We have noted that the Manual Strategy Flavour Flavour would increase
the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate during Low Level Colluding Attacks. That is probably because the more
trivial the Colluding Attacks are, the more Cases they would generate and, hence, more confused the
PIIL GT Selector, which is utilised by the Manual Strategy Flavour Flavour, would get. This confusion
would cause it to become a random Selector with a high Banning Innocent PSPs Rate. Hence, the
Automatic Strategy Flavour Flavour is preferred during Low Level Attacks due to its modest Banned
Innocent PSPs Rate and to its low Active Agents to Users Rate. In the other hand, during High
Level Attacks, the Auditor is indifferent to which Strategy Flavour Flavour is being utilised. That is
probably because although the Manual Strategy Flavour Flavour is doing a better job at increasing
the Uncolluding/Colluding MPSPS Detection Rates, by utilising the PIIL GT Selector and improving
the TGT Ranking Weights and settings, it is huge demand of Testing Agents makes the Automatic
Strategy Flavour Flavour an equally appealing alternative. Just like Milestone 3.3, we have noted that
the PIIL GT Selector, which is utilised by the Manual Strategy Flavour Flavour, does not scale; it does
an excellent job at detecting High Level Colluding Attackers if the network population is small enough.
Once a population threshold is crossed, the PIIL GT Selector starts to act as a random Detector, see
the Malicious Density Theory 6.8.
• Trust Status: In this Milestone we compared 4 Scenarios. First, when the Manual Strategy Flavour
Flavour is deployed during High Level Attacks, the Users Trust reached 93% while the compromised
rates of Share with Top Credentials and Share with Any Credentials reached around 12% and 7%
respectively. Second, when the Automatic Strategy Flavour Flavour is deployed during High Level
Attacks, the Users Trust reached 80% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 10% and 9% respectively. Third, when the Manual
Strategy Flavour Flavour is deployed during Low Level Attacks, the Users Trust reached 65% while
the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials and Share with Any Credentials reached around
8% and 4% respectively. Fourth, when the Automatic Strategy Flavour Flavour is deployed during Low
Level Attacks, the Users Trust reached 70% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 18% and 10% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: In this Milestone we compared 4 Scenarios. First, when the Manual Strategy
Flavour Flavour is deployed during High Level Attacks, we got the Uncoluding MPSPs, Uncolluding
MSPs, and Colluding Unpopular MPSPs Detection Rates reaching around 11%, 8% and 2% respectively.
The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate was 0.5% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 88%.
Second, when the Automatic Strategy Flavour Flavour is deployed during High Level Attacks, we got
the Uncoluding MPSPs and Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rates reaching around 20% and
10% respectively. The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate was 1.8% and the Active Agents to Users Rate
reached about 32%. Third, when the Manual Strategy Flavour Flavour is deployed during Low Level
Attacks, we got the Uncoluding MPSPs, Colluding Popular MPSPs, Uncolluding MSPs, Colluding
Unpopular MPSPs, and Colluding Unpopular MSPs Detection Rates reaching around 100%, 100%,
90%, 70%, and 5% respectively. The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate was 16% and the Active Agents
to Users Rate reached about 86%. Fourth, when the Automatic Strategy Flavour Flavour is deployed
during Low Level Attacks, we got the Uncoluding MPSPs, Colluding Popular MPSPs, Uncolluding
MSPs, Colluding Unpopular MPSPs, and Colluding Unpopular MSPs Detection Rates reaching around
100%, 95%, 40%, and 15%. The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate was 5.5% and the Active Agents to Users
Rate reached about 31%.
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• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Uncolluding Abuse Delay Period = 50, Uncolluding
Abuse Bombarding Period = 37, Uncolluding Abuse User/Credntial Drop Rates = 80, Colluding Abuse
Delay Period = 50, Colluding Abuse Delay Period = 50, Colluding Abuse User Drop Rate = 75,
Colluding Abuse Credential Drop Rate = 25, NtoAbuseU = 5, and NtoAbuseC = 1.
Milestone 4.2: Optimising the Manual and Automatic Defensive Strategies under variable Populations
Scenarios
• Simulated Factors: Defense Strategy Flavour Flavour, ST/GT Report Abuse, ini Users & (P)SP
Nodes, Users & (P)SPs Nodes GR, ini Uncolluding MPSPs & Colluding M(P)SPs, Uncolluding MPSPs
& Colluding M(P)SPs GR, ini Uncolluding MSPs, and Uncolluding MSPs GR.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The Manual Defence has huge positive effects on the Active
Agents to Users Rate as well as mild positive effects on the Users Trust, M(P)SPs Detection Rates
and the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate. The ini Users & (P)SPs factor has a significant negative effect
on the Active Agents to Users Rate as well as a mild positive effect on the Users Trust. The Users &
(P)SPs GR has a significant positive effect on the Users Trust as well as significant negative effect on
the Active Agents to Users Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: Fixed since Milestone 4.1.
• Main Attackers: In this Milestone, we compared many different populations scenarios. We noticed
that in all of the scenarios, the main threat was the Colluding Popular MPSPs Attackers with total
percentage of Abuse ranging between 60% to 70%. The second threat was coming from the Uncollud-
ing MPSPs with total percentage of Abuse ranging from 15% to 30%. Intrestingly, we noticed that
when both the ini Users & (P)SPs and the ini M(P)SPs factors are Low, the threat of the Collud-
ing Unpopular MPSPs Attackers becomes almost identical to the threat of the Uncolluding MPSPs
Attackers.
• Defense Characteristics: We have noted that both the ini Users & (P)SPs and the Users & (P)SPs
GR have significant positive independent effects on the Users Trust. That could be due to the wealth
of generated Cases, by a larger population of Users, or due to the increased percentage of innocent
(P)SPs, perhaps a simulation bias as explained in Section 6.10. The Users & (P)SPs GR also has a
milder positive independent effect on the Active Agents to Users Rate which could be explained by the
fact that the new innocent (P)SPs that are added, at a higher growth rate with higher initial ranks,
to the network would be attractive alternatives to the polluted population of (P)SPs that inhabits the
network. An alternative explanation might be the wealth of Cases that would be generated by the new
Users joining the Network which would, in turn, make it possible to the TGT Detectors to detect the
Colluding MPSPs without the need to create many GT Agents. The ini M(P)SP factor has negative
effects on the Uncolluding/Colluding M(P)SPs Detection Rates since an increased population of MPSPs
would mean many of them would appear, in the reported Cases logs, to be colluding while they are not.
Furthermore, the tremendous amount of open Cases would make it unclear who is really guilty among all
the MPSPs appearing within those Cases. Surprisingly, the ini Users & (P)SPs) factor has a negative
effect on those Uncolluding/Colluding M(P)SPs Detection Rates. That could be probably explained by
the fact that an increased percentage of innocent (P)SPs combined with a deployed High Abuse Delay
Period Attack, the open Cases would contain mostly innocent (P)SPs. Many (P)SPs could appear
together in several open Cases making them falsely accused for colluding by the TGT Detectors leading
to an increase in the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate. However, this negative effect would disappear when
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ini M(P)SPs value is High. We have also noted that the MSP GR does not have any notable effects
on the Monitored Responses. Prior to the simulation, we anticipated that overwhelming the network
with MSPs, that are cheap to create by the Attackers, would confuse the Auditor and render its logs
useless due to the wealth of Cases generated by those extra MSPs. However, this hypothesis is rejected
by this experiment. That might be because the Users are less likely to interact with Unpopular MSPS
and the fact that the TGT Detectors do not give much consideration in their analysis to those MSPs.
Interestingly, we noted an interaction between Low ini Users & (P)SPs and Low ini M(P)SPs lead
to Low Users Trust, High Uncolluding/Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates, and High Banned Innocent
PSPs Rate. This means that the previous Milestones, which were executed in an environment containing
that interaction, would be biased toward this setting and may not necessarily represent the equilibrium
Regions between the Auditor and the Attackers at different populations settings. This is discussed more
in Section 6.10. Table 6.8 summarise the interpretations of each population factor setting along with
their observed effects. Table ?? shows the optimal choice of Defensive Strategies to be deployed by
the Auditor at different populations settings. The observations of Table ?? can be summarised by the
following rules:
– When MPSPs Detection is easy, trivial Attackers, use Automatic Defence.
– When the Banning Innocent PSPs Rate and the Active Agents to Users Rate are minimised
by either, or all, of High Users & (P)SPs GR, High M(P)SPs GR, ini Users & (P)SPs, or ini
M(P)SPs factors, use Manual Defence.
Another way to look at those observations would be using the following rules:
– At periods of rapid bootstrapping (including M(P)SPs) and/or Positive Saturation, use Manual
Defence.
– At periods of slow bootstrapping and/or stable Saturation, use Automatic Defence
– At periods of positive saturation and M(P)SPs losing interest in the Network, use Automatic
Defence.
• Trust Status: Interestingly, we noted that the deployed Defensive Strategy Flavour Flavour wont
have a noticeable influence on the the Trust observed outputs; it is the populations settings that would
matter. The detailed results could be looked at Table C.2.
• Auditor Performance: Similar to the previous Milestones, we noted that the Manual Strategy Flavour
Flavour is a more aggressive Detector, compared to the Automatic Strategy Flavour, that can detect
much more M(P)SPs at the cost of extreme rates of Active Agents to Users and Banned Innocent
PSPs. We have also noted that both Defensive Strategies’ Detection Rates would get boosted at
certain population scenarios, when both ini Users & (P)SPs and ini M(P)SPs factors are set to Low in
addition to setting either of Users & (P)SPs GR or M(P)SPs GR High. Setting both Users & (P)SPs
GR and M(P)SPs GR High would make the Defensive Strategies effects even more prevalent. The
detailed results could be looked at Table C.2.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Defensive Strategy Flavour = Manual, ST/GT report
Abuse = True, ini Users & (P)SPs = Low, Users & (P)SPs GR = High, ini M(P)SPs = Low, M(P)SPs
GR = High.
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C.5 The Milestones of Stage 5: Introducing DGU with Offering Volun-
tarily DGU Installation Randomly along with a Refinement Iteration
Milestone 5.1: Optimising the two groups of Attackers (Uncolluding and Colluding) against the Manual
Defensive Strategy Flavour in a rapid bootstrapping environment after the introduction of DGU
• Simulated Factors: Post DGU Installation rank and the Attackers Factors of Table 6.6.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The NtoAbuseC has significant positive effects on the User’s
Trust and the Active Agents to Users Rate. Both NtoAbuseC and NtoAbuseU have negative effects on the
Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate as well as mild negative effects on the Colluding Unpopular
MPSPs Detection Rate either by themselves or by the interaction of their High values. The NtoAbuseU
has a mild negative effect on the Users Trust. The Colluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates have
mild positive effects on the Users Trust as well as mild negative effects on the Colluding Popular MPSPs
Detection Rates. The Uncolluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates have significant negative effects
on the Uncolluding M(P)SPs Detection Rates as well as mild negative effects on the Active Agents to
Users Rate. The Uncolluding Abuse Delay Period also has a mild negative effect on the Uncolluding
M(P)SPs Detection Rates.
• Attack Characteristics: Generally speaking, the Attacks Characteristics are similar to those observed
in Milestone 4.1. One exception is the fact that the Users/Credentials Drop Rates, Abuse Delay Period,
and the NtoAbuseC and NtoAbuseU settings are now having less influence on the Open Cases Rate
compared to the Abuse Bombarding Period influence which becomes dominant. The reason might be
the fact that most innocent (P)SPs would eventually choose to install DGU voluntarily when asked to
do so. Such a behaviour would eliminate those (P)SPs from the Cases and, hence, leave the MPSPs
alone in those Cases. That would lead to speeding up the detection process with better accuracy. That is
due to the fact that the deployed Defensive Strategy Flavour, Manual Strategy Flavour is an aggressive
Strategy Flavour that would try to ban even the innocent (P)SPs. Given the fact that innocent PSPs
would be rare in the Cases, most of the initially detected (M)PSs would probably be MPSPs, even if
they were selected randomly. In case an innocent PSP is mistakenly accused, it would still has the
chance to reverse the banning decision by accepting to install DGU, or enabling strict DGU if it had
already installed DGU. Still, the Abuse Bombarding Period could increase the initial Banned Innocent
PSPs Rate and, hence, forcing those innocent PSPs to either install DGU or getting permanently
banned from the network. As a result, MPSPs may get temporarily , or perhaps permanent, relief from
getting banned if innocent PSPs kept joining the network at high enough rates where the Cases wont get
dominantly populated with MPSPs as described earlier. Another interesting difference from Milestone
4.1 is found in the Colluding MPSPs optimal settings. Instead of setting one of the Users/Credentials
Drop Rates High along with the combination of NtoAbuseU = 5 and NtoAbuseC = 1, the automatic
optimiser for the Attackers opted this time for Low Users/Credentials Drop Rates along with increasing
NtoAbuseC from 1 to 3. By comparing the initially anticipated outputs of the currently optimised attacks
to the earlier settings, they seem to have almost the same effectiveness. However, the main intended
advantage of the new setting would be the increase in the Compromised Credentials Rates. The reason
could be the fact that the more innocent PSPs voluntarily installing DGU, the more Colluding MPSPs
would be exposed in the new Cases. That would mean that the users/Credentials Drop Rates wont hide
them as effectively as it used to do and, hence, it would be more interesting to increase the Compromised
Credentials rates. That could be achieved by decreasing the Users/Credentials Drop Rates values and
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increasing the complexity of the Colluding Attack settings to overcome the lowered effectiveness of the
Users/Credentials Drop Rates settings. Another possible explanation for the reason why the Attackers
decided to reduce their Users/Credentials Drop Rates could be the fact that when Colluding MPSPs got
detected and requested to install DGU, they could basically accept the offer and get, in return, a new
long life where they can deploy the Advanced Colluding Attack, See Subsection 5.8.7. Hence, there is no
serious threat for the Colluding MPSPs when they reduce their Users/Credentials Drop Rates. Rather,
they would just gain increased Compromised Credentials Rates. Nevertheless, the actual running of
the new settings showed worse performance than previous Milestones. That is, the MPSPs Detection
Rates got better while the Compromised Credentials Rates got worse. That would signal a non-linearity
in the Colluding Attacks Settings measured effects. In other words, it seems the Colluding Attackers
should have chosen NtoAbuseC = 4 instead of 3 or they should have kept one of the Users/Credentials
Drop Rates High in order to obtain the desired results. See Section 6.10 for more details.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs is the main threat generating around 72% of the
total Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating around 15% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: We have noted that the newly introduced factor, Post DGU Install Rank
did not show any noticeable effects on the measured outputs. We have also noted that the Defence
in this Milestone is worse than what it used to be in Milestone 4.1, before introducing DGU, with
the exception of the significantly lowered Active Agents to Users Rate. The lowered Active Agents to
Users Rate might be due to the different environmental settings of this Milestone. Actually, while the
introduction of DGU helped in protecting innocent PSPs from being falsely accused of being guilty,
a serious shortcome of the Manual Strategy Flavour that was chosen in Stage 6.6.4 as the optimal
Defensive Strategy Flavour for most of the environmental scenarios, DGU significantly reduced the
Users Trust and prolonged the network exposure to malicious activities. That is because it gave the
accused entities, good and bad ones, second lives by simply accepting to install DGU. We initially
thought that a possible mitigation would be to lower the Post DGU Install Rank, the new life Rank.
Hence, we examined the responses with explicitly setting the Post DGU Install Rank to be 20%, 50%,
and 80%. However, it turned out that this factor does not have any noticeable effects and, hence, it
was set to 50% as the average value for the following milestones. Generally speaking, it is good that
the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates reached 0 at the end of this Milestone. However, it is worrying that
most of the Innocent PSPs have already not only Installed DGU at the early cycles of the simulation,
but also Enabled Strict DGU, something that is not expected to be as rapid in real life situations where
everyone would be hesitant to deploy such a new technology. This situation is a potential bias source
in our next set of simulation Milestones, see Section 6.10 for more details.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 96% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 9% and 4% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Uncoluding MPSPs, Uncolluding MSPs, and Colluding Popular MPSPs
Detection Rates reached around 45%, 12% and 10% respectively. The Banned Innocent PSPs Rates
were all 0%. The Uncolluding MPSPs, Uncolluding MSPs, Colluding Popular MPSPs, and Colluding
Unpopular MPSPs who Installed DGU Rates reached around 45%, 12%, 70%, and 40% respectively
while the PSPs and SPs who Installed DGU Rates reached around 99% and 98% respectively. The
Uncolluding MPSPs and the Colluding Popular MPSPs who Enabled Strict DGU Rates reached around
4%, 6% respectively while the PSPs and SPs who Enabled Strict DGU Rates reached around 95% and
92% respectively. The Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 68%.
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• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Post DGU Install Rank = 50, Uncolluding Abuse
Delay Period = 50, Uncolluding Abuse Bombarding Period = 5, Uncolluding Abuse User/Credential
Drop Rates = 80, Colluding Abuse Delay Period = 50, Colluding Abuse Bombarding Period = 50,
Colluding Abuse Credential Drop Rate = 20, NtoAbuseU = 5, and NtoAbuseC = 3.
Milestone 5.2: Optimising important TST and TGT factors after deploying DGU
• Simulated Factors: WTGT , TGT/TST internal Selectors, PCR threshold, PCR Weak Threshold, and
GT Max Size.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The PIIL GT Selector has huge positive effects on the Users
Trust, Active Agents to Users Rate. It also has significant positive effects on the Uncolluding MPSPs
Detection Rate and the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates. Top TLRavg ST Selector has a huge positive
effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate as well as a significant positive effect on the Uncolluding
MSPs Detection Rate. The Suspicious Nodes ST Selector also has a significant positive effect on the
Active Agents to Users Rate. The PCR Threshold has mild negative effects on the Colluding MPSPs
Detection Rates.
• Attack Characteristics: Fixed since Milestone 4.1.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs are the main threat generating around 68% of the
total Abuse followed by both the Uncolluding MPSPs and Colluding Unpopular MPSPs each generating
around 12% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: Unlike Milestone 3.3, the PCR Threshold here has more noticeable effects
than PCR Weak Threshold. That is expected given the focus of the current Attackers on Strong
Colluding Attacks, setting NtoAbuseC = 3. Furthermore, most innocent (P)SPs are now voluntarily
Installing DGU, meaning that they are automatically excluded from the open Cases logs. Hence, the
Auditor would end up with smaller Cases logs to analyse with less Weak Attacks probability. In such
a situation, the TGTsg and TGTsc are expected to perform better than TGTwc. In other words,
it is advantageous now for the Auditor to deploy more evidence based detection process rather than
aggressively, and often randomly, accusing PSPs for open Abuse Cases. Interestingly, we have noted
that the PIIL GT Selector is the main factor influencing the Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate rather
than the Top TLRavg ST Selector as in the previous Milestones. That could be explained by the fact
that under the current Defensive Strategy Flavour, the MPSPs are expected to appear in many open
Cases in suspicious patterns since the logs are now smaller, because most innocent PSPs have already
Installed DGU. Hence, the Uncolluding MPSPs would get accused for potential colluding although they
are not really colluding. At the end, the automatic optimiser preferred turning off the Top TLRavg ST
Selector to decrease the Active Agents to Users Rate at the cost of reducing the Uncolluding MSPs
Detection Rate to almost 0, which are not a major threat anyways.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 96% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 7% and 3% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Uncolluding MPSPs, Popular Colluding MPSPs, and Unpopular Col-
luding MPSPs Detection Rates reached around 62%, 42%, and 30% respectively. The Banned Innocent
PSPs Rates reached about 0% and the Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 50%.
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• Final Settings for the following Milestone: WTGT = 80, all ST Selector turned off except for IIR
ST Selector, all GT Selectors are turned on except for Suspicious GT Selector, PCR Threshold = 2,
PCR Weak Threshold = 7, and GT Max Size = 7. It should be noted that due to human error which
was explored toward the end of the simulation project, WTLRavg was changed from 4 to 8 while WTST
was changed from 16 to 12 by the end of this Milestone. This change is a mistake that should not have
happened. Still, we do not think it would have noticeable effects on the integrity of this simulation
project, see Section 6.10 for more details.
Milestone 5.3: Optimising the two groups of Attackers (Uncolluding and Colluding) against the opti-
mised Auditor deploying DGU
• Simulated Factors: Post DGU Installation rank and the Attackers Factors of Table 6.6.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: Similar to Milestone 5.1 but with generally milder effects. An
exception is the Uncolluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates which now have significant negative
effects on the Uncolluding M(P)SPs Detection Rates as well as mild negative effects on the Colluding
MPSPs Detection Rates. That is expected since turning off the Top TLRavg ST Selector had the side
effect of reducing the Uncolluding M(P)SPs Detection Rates leading to an increase volume of open Cases
logs. This increase would negatively affect the efficiency of the accurate TGTsg and TGTsc Detectors
that were relied upon in Milestone 5.2. This scenario means that High Users/Credentials Drop Rates
would cause even more confusion and trouble to the currently deployed accurate Detectors.
• Attack Characteristics: Generally speaking, the Attacks Characteristics are similar to those observed
in Milestone 4.1. Even the changes made in Milestone 5.1 where the Colluding Users/Credentials Drop
Rates were both minimised and the increasing of factor NtoAbuseC from 1 to 3 are now undone.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs is the main threat generating around 75% of the
total Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating around 18% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: Similar to Milestone 5.1, we have noted that the factor Post DGU Install
Rank did not show any noticeable effects on the measured outputs. We have also noted that the Defence
in this Milestone is is better than Milestone 5.1, except for the Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rate. Still,
the defense in this Milestone is worse than Milestone 4.1, except for the Active Agents to Users and the
Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate. It seems that deploying PIIL GT Selector along with lower PCR
Threshold under an environment where most innocent (P)SPs voluntarily install DGU helped a lot in
reducing the Active Agents to Users Rate and Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate without increasing
the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates. Still, giving the Colluding MPSPs a fresh life deeply affected the
detection rates of colluding. To be accurate, it is not the Post DGU Install Rank aspect of the new
life that aided the Colluding MPSPs to survive, according to our analysis in both this Milestone and
in Milestone 5.1. Rather, it is the advanced colluding attack that we, unwillingly, push the Colluding
MPSPs to adopt after we force them to Install DGU, see Subsection 5.8.7 for more details.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 85% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 8% and 9% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Uncoluding MPSPs Detection Rate reached around 20% while the rest
of M(P)SPs Detection Rates were almost 0%. The Banned Innocent PSPs Rates were all 0%. The
Uncolluding MPSPs, Uncolluding MSPs, Colluding Popular MPSPs, and Colluding Unpopular MPSPs
who Installed DGU Rates reached around 21%, 2%, 17%, and 5% respectively while the PSPs and SPs
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who Installed DGU Rates both reached around 98%. The M(P)SPs who Enabled Strict DGU Rates
were all below 1% while the PSPs and SPs who Enabled Strict DGU Rates both reached around 91%.
The Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 50%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Post DGU Install Rank = 50, Uncolluding Abuse
Delay Period = 50, Uncolluding Abuse Bombarding Period = 50, Uncolluding Abuse User/Credntial
Drop Rates = 80, Colluding Abuse Delay Period = 50, Colluding Abuse Bombarding Period = 5,
Colluding Abuse User Drop Rate = 24, Colluding Abuse Credential Drop Rate = 80, NtoAbuseU = 5,
and NtoAbuseC = 1.
C.6 The Milestones of Stage 6: Removing the Voluntarily DGU Installa-
tion Option along with a Refinement Iteration
Milestone 6.1: Optimising the two groups of Attackers (Uncolluding and Colluding) against the opti-
mised Auditor deploying DGU without offering voluntary DGU installation
• Simulated Factors: Post DGU Installation rank and the Attackers Factors of Table 6.6.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: Similar to Milestone 5.3.
• Attack Characteristics: Generally speaking, the Attacks Characteristics are similar to those observed
in Milestone 5.3 but with slightly increased Colluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates. The reason
for this slight increase might be the fact that the automatic optimiser choose to reduce the Post DGU
Install Rank from 50% to 20%. The new lower value would mean that the Auditor would get more
aggressive at banning suspicious nodes and, hence, the Colluding MPSPS should get extra careful by
reducing their Abuse rates.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs is the main threat generating around 68% of the
total Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating around 20% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: Similar to Milestone 5.3 but with a slight surge in the Banned Innocent
PSPs Rate “Refused to Install DGU”. The reason for the surge in the Banned Innocent PSPs Rate
“Refused to Install DGU” could be the fact that, unlike Stage 6.6.5 where most PSPs would voluntarily
install DGU prior to appearing in open Cases logs, PSPs now appear in the open Cases logs just like
the situation before we introduce DGU in Stage 6.6.5. For that, PSPs are now falsely accused to be
acting maliciously and, hence, are forced to Install DGU or getting banned.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 94% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 10% and 7% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Uncoluding MPSPs Detection Rate reached around 21% while the rest
of M(P)SPs Detection Rates were almost 0%. The Banned Innocent PSPs Rate “Refused to Install
DGU” reached around 4%. The Uncolluding MPSPs, Uncolluding MSPs, Colluding Popular MPSPs,
and Colluding Unpopular MPSPs who Installed DGU Rates reached around 21%, 0%, 23%, and 14%
respectively while the PSPs who Installed DGU Rate reached around 7%. The M(P)SPs and Colluding
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Popular MPSPs who Enabled Strict DGU Rates were both around 1% while the PSPs and SPs who
Enabled Strict DGU Rates both were 0%. The Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 53%.
• Final Settings for the following Milestone: Post DGU Install Rank = 20, Uncolluding Abuse
Delay Period = 50, Uncolluding Abuse Bombarding Period = 49, Uncolluding Abuse User/Credntial
Drop Rates = 80, Colluding Abuse Delay Period = 50, Colluding Abuse Bombarding Period = 5,
Colluding Abuse User Drop Rate = 56, Colluding Abuse Credential Drop Rate = 74, NtoAbuseU = 5,
and NtoAbuseC = 1.
Milestone 6.2: Optimising important TST and TGT factors after deploying DGU without offering
voluntary DGU installation
• Simulated Factors: WTGT , Wsc, Wwc, TGT/TST internal Selectors, PCR threshold, PCR Weak
Threshold, and GT Max Size, .
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The WTGT is the dominant influencing factor with a
mild negative effect on the Users Trust as well as significant positive effect on the Uncolluding MPSPs
Detection Rate, the Colluding Popular MPSPs Rate, and the Banned Innocent PSPs “Refused to Install
DGU” Rate. The interaction of High WTGT and turned off PIIL GT Selector as well as the interaction
of High WTGT and Low PCR Weak Threshold both have positive effects on the MPSPs Detection Rates
and the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates. The PCR Weak Threshold have mild negative effects on the
Users Trust, the Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate, the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates and the
Banned Innocent PSPs. The interaction of Low PCR Weak Threshold and turned off PIIL GT Selector
has a mild positive effects on the Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rates as well as mild negative
effects on the Users’ Trust. The Top TLRavg ST Selector has huge positive effects on the Active Agents
to Users Rate and a significant positive effect on the Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rate. The interaction
of setting one of Suspicious ST Selector or Top TLRavg ST Selector High while setting the second Low
has mild positive effect on the Users Trust and the Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rates.
• Attack Characteristics: Fixed since Milestone 6.1.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs are the main threat generating around 75% of the
total Abuse followed by both the Uncolluding MPSPs and Colluding Unpopular MPSPs each generating
around 9% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: Unlike Milestone 5.2, in this Milestone where no (P)SPs are willing to
voluntarily Install DGU, the PIIL records would get so large that the PIIL GT Selector along with its
associated Low PCR Threshold would be of little value. Instead, the PCR Weak Threshold would be a
more powerful Detector. Combined with High WTGT value, this Detector would get extra authority to
ban PSPs even more faster. This new setting causes reduced Users Trust. Nevertheless, this reduction
appears to be temporarily since the curve of Compromised Credentials goes steeply high before starting
to go sharply down toward the end of the simulation. If we run the simulation for an extended period,
we anticipate the Users Trust level to get equivalent or even better than Milestone 5.2. However, the
Banned Innocents PSPs Rates are so bad because the PCR Weak Threshold is a Weak Detector that
would accuse many innocents that did not voluntarily Install DGU. Another interesting observation
is the fact that the interaction between Suspicious ST Selector and Top TLRavg ST Selector would
have an optimised value when only one of them is switched on. The reason for this odd interaction,
which would boost the MPSPs Detection Rates, is the fact that under the other optimised settings,
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the main factor determining who would be ranked suspicious, and then gets eligible for selection by the
Suspicious ST Selector, would be the PCR Weak Threshold. Hence, this Selector would eliminate many
Uncolluding MPSPs quickly from the Cases logs making the task of the rest of Selectors easier as they
would be dealing with smaller sizes logs. The same effect could be achieved using the Top TLRavg ST
Selector. Hence, turning on both of those Selectors would be a slightly bad idea because that would
remove most of the Uncolluding MPSPs from the logs leaving smaller set of logs. Less logs to evaluate
makes the PCR Weak Threshold unable to make definite guesses about who are the MPSPs. In other
words, the PCR Weak Threshold is a good Detector only when dealing with large and hard to analyse
logs. At the end, it is kind of a Random Detector that works better in heavily polluted networks with
high MPSPs Density, see Section 6.8. In fact, that would explain why turning on the PIIL GT Selector
would negatively affect the Detection Rates in this milestone. That is is because the PIIL GT Selector
would detect some MPSPs but, at the same time, reduce the number of open Cases logs making the
task of the PCR Weak Threshold even harder. Although the MPSPs Detection Rates are stunning in
this Milestone, the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates are so high and unacceptable. To reduce the Banned
Innocent PSPs Rates without reducing the MPSPs Detection Rates, the Auditor should either convince
more (P)SPs to voluntarily Install DGU or try to compromise some of the optimised settings. We
tried the latter solution by manually adjusting the internal weights of the automatic optimiser so that
it doubles the importance of reducing the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates, see Subsection 6.5.3. The
automatic optimiser then suggested reducing the WTGT to 51% instead of 80%. However, we realised
that despite the achieved reduction in the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates, the Auditor failed to sustain
the good MPSPs Detection Rates against the prediction made by the automatic optimiser. That reveals
non-linearity in the measured effects of the WTGT , see Section 6.10. For that, we run the simulation
with fixed values except for the WTGT which we gradually increased it from 51% to 80% by steps
equivalent to half the space between the current run and the final value. It turns out that the critical
point where the Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate would get boosted is when we set WTGT around
76%. However, no good Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates improvement happens until WTGT reaches
its maximum value of 80%.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 94% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials both reached around 6%.
• Auditor Performance: The Uncolluding MPSPs, Popular Colluding MPSPs, and Unpopular Col-
luding MPSPs Detection Rates reached around 71%, 30%, and 20% respectively. The Banned Innocent
PSPs “Refused to Install DGU” and the Banned Innocent PSPs “Refused to Enable Strict DGU”
reached about 24% and 6% respectively. The Uncolluding MPSPs,Colluding Popular MPSPs, and Col-
luding Unpopular MPSPs who Installed DGU Rates reached around 71%, 72%, and 73% respectively
while the PSPs who Installed DGU Rate reached around 34%. The Colluding Popular MPSPs and
Colluding Unpopular MPSPs who Enabled Strict DGU Rates were around 30% and 21% repectively
while the PSPs who Enabled Strict DGU Rate was about 3%. The Active Agents to Users Rate reached
about 31%.
• Final Settings for the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour: WTGT = 80, Wsc = 30, Wwc = 50, all
ST Selector turned off except for Suspicious ST Selector, all GT Selectors are turned on except for PSL
GT Selector, PCR Threshold = 2, PCR Weak Threshold = 2, and GT Max Size = 2.
Milestone 6.3: Optimising important TGT factors after deploying DGU without offering voluntary
DGU installation in a slowly bootstrapping network among Normal nodes but highly popular among
malicious nodes
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• Simulated Factors: WTGT , Wsc, Wwc, PIIL GT Selector, PCR threshold, PCR Weak Threshold,
and GT Max Size, .
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The PIIL GT Selector has a huge positive effect on the
Active Agents to Users Rate as well as a significant positive effect on the Users Trust. The PCR Weak
Threshold has mild negative effects on the Users Trust the Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate, and the
Banned Innocent PSPs “Refused to Install DGU” Rate. The interaction of High PCR Weak Threshold
and the turned off PIIL GT Selector has a huge negative effect on the Active Agents to Users Rate
as well as mild negative effect on the Users’ Trust. Both the WTGT by itself and the interaction of
High WTGT and Low PCR Weak Threshold have a mild positive effect on the Uncolluding MPSPs
Detection Rate as well as a mild negative effect on the Banned Innocent PSPs “Refused to Install
DGU” Rate. The interaction of Low WTGT and turned off PIIL GT Selector has a mild negative effect
on the Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate and the Banned Innocent PSPs “Refused to Install DGU”
Rate. The PCR Threshold has a mild negative effect on the Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate. The
Interaction of turned on PIIL GT Selector and Low PCR Threshold has a mild positive effect on the
Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: Fixed since Milestone 6.1.
• Main Attackers: The Popular Colluding MPSPs are the main threat generating around 60% of the
total Abuse followed by the Uncolluding MPSPs generating around 27% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: In comparison to Milestone 6.2, the responses in the new environment of
this Milestone are generally less sensitive to variations in the defensive factors. However, the combination
of turned on PIIL GT Selector with Low PCR Threshold, which we could call the Strong Colluding
Detector, is now more effective at detecting MPSPs and, hence, it effects exceeded those of the Weak
Colluding Detector: Low PCR Weak Threshold combined with High WTGT . Actually, the Strong
Colluding Detector detection effects are now reversed from Milestone 6.2. That is, those effects are now
positive rather than negative. That would indicate that the Strong Colluding Detector has switched
from its Low Density Detection Region to its Threshold Detection Region, see Section 6.8. Surprisingly,
the automatic optimiser did not turn on the PIIL GT Selector despite its positive effects on the MPSPs
Detection Rates. It looks as if those positive effects would not justify the high cost of increased Active
Agents to Users Rate. Rather, the optimiser prefers to continue relying on the Weak Colluding Detector
combined with the PSL GT Selector that would basically put all the MPSPs under a Weak Collective
test. Given the large population of MPSPs, this Selector turns out to be very effective in detecting
trivial MPSPs, not those deploying Advanced Colluding Attacks. We have also observed that there is a
non-linearity in the observed effects of the PCR Weak Threshold. Actually, through running simulation
with increasing steps of that factor values, we found that there is a critical PCR Weak Threshold
point, around 4.5, where the Weak Colluding Detector would render useless. In such a case, the Strong
Colluding Detector would be the main MPSPs Detector with a better accuracy but reduced efficiency,
increased Active Agents to Users Rate, as well as effectiveness, reduced Detection Rates.
• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 86% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 13% and 10% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate reached around 62% while the rest
of the Detection rates were almost 0%. The Banned Innocent PSPs “Refused to Install DGU” reached
about 23%. The Uncolluding MPSPs,Colluding Popular MPSPs, and Colluding Unpopular MPSPs who
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Installed DGU Rates reached around 59%, 60%, and 52% respectively while the PSPs who Installed
DGU Rate reached around 30%. The (M)PSPs who Enabled Strict DGU Rates were all 0%. The Active
Agents to Users Rate reached about 69%.
Milestone 6.4: Optimising the two groups of Attackers (Uncolluding and Colluding) against the opti-
mised Auditor of this Stage
• Simulated Factors: Post DGU Installation rank and the Attackers Factors of Table 6.6.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The NtoAbuseC has a significant positive effect on the Users
Trust and mild positive effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate while it has a significant negative
effect on the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates and a mild negative effect on Banned Innocent PSPs
“Refused to Enable Strict DGU” Rate. The Uncolluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates have a
mild positive effects on the Users Trust and mild negative effects on the Uncolluding M(P)SPs Detection
Rates as well as mild negative effects on the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates. Nevertheless, the
Uncolluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates now have less influence than they used to have in
Milestone 6.1. The Colluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates have a mild positive effect on the
Users Trust Rate. The Uncolluding Abuse Delay Period has mild negative effects on the Active Agents
to Users Rate and the Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: In this Milestone, it seems that the aggressive Extreme DGU Strategy
Flavour is forcing the automatic optimiser to raise the complexity of the colluding attack by raising the
value of NtoAbuseC from 1 to 5. That is essential to maintain Low MPSPs Detection Rates. It should be
noted however that in Milestone 5.1 we figured out the presence of non-linearity in the measured effects
of the NtoAbuseC factor and, hence, a lower value of it may do the trick for the Attackers’ automatic
optimiser. Since the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour of Milestone 6.2 does not rely on the PIIL GT
Selector but, instead, on PCR Weak Threshold, the Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates are now of
less influence in the measured effects since their main goal is to trick the PIIL GT Selector which is
not utilised now. That would explain the decision of the automatic optimiser to raise the complexity of
the colluding attacks while minimising the Colluding Users/Credentials Abuse Drop Rates. That would
also explain why the Colluding Popular MPSPs are not the main threat now to the network since they
are more reluctant to send SPam due to their complex colluding settings.
• Main Attackers: The Uncolluding MPSPs is the main threat generating around 48% of the total
Abuse followed by the Colluding Popular MPSPs generating around 30% of the total Abuse.
• Defense Characteristics: We have noted in this Milestone that the Active Agents to Users Rate
is considerably lower than it used to be in Milestone 6.1 due to turning off many Agents Selectors.
However, this output is now more sensitive to variations in the Uncolluding Abuse Delay period since
the Suspicious ST Selector is now active. That is because the Suspicious ST Selector is triggered by
new (P)SPs being classified as suspicious through the TLRavg Approach, which is the main Defence
Strategy Flavour that the Abuse Delay Period tries to evade. By having large Delay values, it would
take longer to receive Cases and to lower down the suspicious (P)SPs ranks. Further, the larger logs
generated by the Delay attacks means that the ranks lowering process would get even slower and, hence,
less the Suspicious ST Selector would create less ST Agents. The Colluding Abuse Delay Period is
not as sensitive because complex Colluding Attacks would naturally be delayed until all the colluding
condition are fulfilled, regardless of the preset Colluding Abuse Delay Period.
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• Trust Status: The Users Trust reached 98% while the compromised rates of Share with Top Credentials
and Share with Any Credentials reached around 5% and 1% respectively.
• Auditor Performance: The Uncoluding MPSPs, Uncolluding MSPs, Colluding Popular MPSPs, and
Colluding Unpopular MPSPs Detection rates reached around 59%, 2%, 4%, and 4% respectively. The
Banned Innocent PSPs Rate “Refused to Install DGU” reached around 16% while the Banned Innocent
PSPs Rate “Refused to Enable Strict DGU” reached around 2%. The Uncolluding MPSPs, Colluding
Popular MPSPs, and Colluding Unpopular MPSPs who Installed DGU Rates reached around 60%
while the Uncolluding MSPs who Installed DGU reached around 2% while the PSPs who Installed
DGU Rate reached around 27%. The M(P)SPs and Colluding Popular MPSPs who Enabled Strict
DGU Rates reached around 6% and 4% respectively while the PSPs and SPs who Enabled Strict DGU
Rates both were almost 0%. The Active Agents to Users Rate reached about 34%.
• Final Settings for the Extreme DGU associated Attack: Post DGU Install Rank = 20, Un-
colluding Abuse Delay Period = 5, Uncolluding Abuse Bombarding Period = 50, Uncolluding Abuse
User/Credntial Drop Rates = 80, Colluding Abuse Delay Period = 37, Colluding Abuse Bombarding
Period = 50, Colluding Abuse User/Credential Drop Rates = 20, NtoAbuseU = 5, and NtoAbuseC = 5.
C.7 The Milestones of Stage 7: Comparing the Performance of vDGU
and DGU
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Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
High High High High
Best Defense: None Settings’ Interpretation: A popular network among Users, (P)SPs, and M(P)SPs.
Defense UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned Inoc.
PSPs
vDGU 0% 0% 2% 20% 28% 88% 7% 7% 0%
DGU 0% 0% 1% 14% 36% 92% 8% 11% 1%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
High Low High High
Best Defense: None Settings’ Interpretation: A popular network among Users, (P)SPs, and M(P)SPs, but Users and (P)SPs are
losing interest in it, due to saturation, better alternatives, and/or the high density
of M(P)SPs in the network.
Defense UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned Inoc.
PSPs
vDGU 0% 0% 2% 9% 50% 80% 10% 10% 1%
DGU 0% 0% 0% 11% 64% 89% 11% 12% 1%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
Low High High High
Best Defense: None Settings’ Interpretation: A bootstrapping network that is gaining rapid popularity among Users and (P)SPs.
However, M(P)SPs have already anticipated this success and, hence, they were
among the early members to join the network and populate it. Plus, they are still
joining at a steady pace.
Defense UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned Inoc.
PSPs
vDGU 1% 3% 1% 27% 53% 87% 10% 10% 0%
DGU 1% 3% 1% 37% 54% 92% 10% 12% 8%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
Low High Low High
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Best Defense: None Settings’ Interpretation: A bootstrapping network that is gaining rapid popularity among Users, (P)SPs and
M(P)SPs as well.
Defense UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned Inoc.
PSPs
vDGU 1% 3% 1% 24% 50% 87% 9% 9% 0%
DGU 1% 3% 0% 35% 56% 91% 9% 11% 8%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
Low Low Low High
Best Defense: None Settings’ Interpretation: A bootstrapping network that is gaining rapid popularity among M(P)SPs but not
genuine Users and (P)SPs, perhaps due to the network getting polluted with many
M(P)SPs.
Defense UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned Inoc.
PSPs
vDGU 1% 2% 2% 14% 72% 75% 12% 11% 0%
DGU 1% 4% 1% 30% 78% 83% 12% 13% 8%
Settings:
ini Norm. Norm. GR ini Mal. Mal. GR
Low Low Low Low
Best Defense: None Settings’ Interpretation: A bootstrapping network that is not gaining interest from any party, including
M(P)SPs. i.e. probably a dying network.
Defense UnPop.
Detct.
Pop.
Detct.
MSPs
Detct.
MPSPs
Detct.
Agents /
Users
Trust Cmp. shrTop
Crd.
Cmp. shrAny
Crd.
Banned Inoc.
PSPs
vDGU 1% 2% 2% 24% 75% 80% 12% 11% 0%
DGU 1% 3% 2% 30% 80% 87% 12% 13% 6%
Table C.3: Simulation Stage 7 Detailed Results
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In Stage 7, see Subsection 6.6.7, two main Defensive Strategies, vDGU and DGU, were
tested under various environmental settings related to the populations and growth
rates of Users, (P)SPs, and M(P)SPs. Table C.3 lists the detailed results of their
Simulation testing under various Environmental conditions.
Milestone 7.1: Optimising the vDGU and DGU Defensive Strategies under variable Populations Sce-
narios
• Simulated Factors: Defense Strategy Flavour, ini Users & (P)SP Nodes, Users & (P)SPs Nodes GR,
ini M(P)SPs, and M(P)SPs GR.
• Factors with most Significant Effects: The Users & (P)SPs Nodes GR factor has a negative
significant effect on the Active Agents to Users Rate as well as a mild positive effect on the Users Trust.
The ini Users & (P)SPs factor has a mild negative effect on the Active Agents to Users Rate.
• Attack Characteristics: Fixed since Milestone 5.3.
• Main Attackers: In this Milestone, we compared many different populations scenarios. We noticed
that in the scenarios when the ini M(P)SPs is High, the main threat was the Colluding Popular
MPSPs Attackers with total percentage of Abuse around 62% while the second threat was coming from
the Uncolluding MPSPs with total percentage of Abuse ranging around 28%. When the ini M(P)SPs is
Low, we noticed that the threat of the Colluding Popular MPSPs Attackers raised to becomes around
72% while the threat of the Uncolluding MPSPs decrease to get around 15%.
• Defense Characteristics: We have noted that the measured Defensive Strategies’ effects are milder
than what what we have seen in Milestone 4.2, i.e. before introducing DGU. That could be due to
the stability and extra moderation in the Detection process, by offering to Install DGU before banning
a suspicious (P)SP. That would mean that feeding the Auditor with extra logs, by increasing the
populations, is not enough to improve the MPSPs Detection Rates significantly since DGU is giving new
lives for guilty M(P)SPs who agrees to Install DGU. Once Colluding MPSPs agrees to Install DGU, they
would continue their malicious activities using more Advanced Colluding Settings as described in 5.8.7.
We have also noted that that both the Users & (P)SPs GR and ini Users & (P)SPs factors have positive
independent effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate. That could be explained by the fact that the
new innocent (P)SPs that are joining the network with high ini Ranks would be attractive alternatives
to the polluted population of M(P)SPs that inhabits the networks. An alternative explanation might
be the wealth of Cases that would be generated by the new Users. Particularly speaking, the new PIIL
records, added by the new Users, would reduce the need for creating new Testing Agents to generate
new logs. We have also noted that the ini Users & (P)SPs and Users & (P)SPs GR factors would
have mild effects reducing the Compromised Share with Any Credentials while the ini M(P)SPs factor
would have a milder opposite effect. The reason for the ini Users & (P)SPs and Users & (P)SPs GR
reduction effects could be the fact that the more genuine (P)SPs are available in the network, the less
likely Users would interact with the M(P)SPs. Moreover, the less Users interacting with M(P)SPs,
the longer it would take them to interact with the minimum MPSPs required to fulfil the Colluding
condition.
• Trust Status: Generally speaking, the vDGU Strategy Flavour would have worse Users Trust values
than the DGU Strategy Flavour by 4% to 9%. The detailed results could be looked at Table C.3.
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• Auditor Performance: Since the Top TLRavg ST Selector is turned off, the Uncolluding MSPs De-
tection Rate is almost 0% by both Strategies. Further, since the Colluding MPSPs deploy Advance
Colluding Settings after they Install DGU, the Colluding MPSPs Detection Rates are also close to 0%
by both Stratgies. The Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate is generally better by the DGU Stratgey.
Regardless of the Strategy Flavour, that Rate gets boosted when the ini Users& (P)SPs is Low, some-
thing that could be explained by mapping the Density zones described in Section 6.8. When it comes
to the Active Agents to Users, the vDGU Strategy Flavour demand less Agents by percentages ranging
from 1% to 14%. I highly saturated network the Active Agents to Users Rate would be around 32%
while that rate would be around 57% when the genuine Users and (P)SPs start to lose interest in the
saturated networks. In bootstrapping networks, that Rate would raise to around 75%. When it comes
to the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates, the vDGU Strategy Flavour would generate 0% while the DGU
Stratgey would generate around 8%. The detailed results could be looked at Table C.3.
C.8 The Milestones of Stage 8: Evaluating the Different Defensive Strate-
gies by ANOVA-Testing
An important note about results presented in the below Milestones is their division
into three main categories:
• Important Observations: These are some important observations which are
helpful to understand how we come to our conclusions when we compared the
several Defensive Strategies in Section 6.9.
• General Notes: These are some notes that are applicable to certain Strategies
regardless of the Density Point where it is being evaluated at.
• Malicious Density Theory Notes: These notes are some specific notes to
give us hints on how the different Strategies are behaving at different Density
Points. These are crucial to confirm some of our initial hypothesis presented in
the Malicious Density Theory of Section 6.8 or to show some non-conformance
with the Theory which would suggest more improvements to it.
Milestone 8.1: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Users’ Trust
• Important Observations:
– The fact that the GPD Strategy Flavour is performing poorly, worse than the None Strategy
Flavour in many cases, confirms our observation that this Strategy Flavour is useless and should
not be adopted by a wise Auditor unless it is anticipated that the Attackers population is made
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up by a majority of amateur Attackers who do not even know how to utilise the Simple Attacking
Strategies of 5.8.6.
– The little effects of the Users’ Ignorance Rate means that the evaluated Strategies are tolerant
to User’s ignorance and can perform to their full potential even with a fraction of the real Abuse
Cases reported. Maybe that is a result of the Attackers’ adoption of complex Attacking settings
where the reported Cases, even when the Users’ Ignorance Rate is Low, would be so large making
it indifferent to the large Cases that would be received from log an ignorant User. Nevertheless,
the fact that the GPD Strategy Flavour would perform worse than the None Strategy Flavour
when the Users’ Ignorance Rate is High confirms this fact since this Strategy Flavour assumes
small Cases in order to identify suspicious (P)SPs to accuse based on the chronological order of
their appearing in those small Case, see Section 5.2.
• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
– As expected, the Lower the Malicious Density is, the better the None Strategy Flavour would
preform, since there would not be major Trust Threats.
– The Automatic Strategy Flavour is doing 10% worse in the S1 Density compared to the S2
Density.
– In both the S4 Density and the S3 Density, i.e. the Low Density Region, the ST, Manual, and
DGU Strategies are doing 10% better than in the High Density Region while the Automatic
Strategy Flavour is better by 30% and the vDGU Strategy Flavour is better by 15%. These good
figures might be due to the fact that the less the Malicious Density is, the less Normal Users
would deal with the Malicious Nodes who would compromise their credentials causing their Trust
to drop.
– In all environmental scenarios, the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour is doing significantly better
than the rest of the Strategies. That is specially true in the S1 Density and S2 Density, i.e. near
the Threshold Region. That would be at the expense of High Banned Innocent PSPs Rates.
Milestone 8.2: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Active Agents to Users Rate
• Important Observations:
– Similar to Milestone 8.1, the Defensive Strategies were resilient to varying Users’ Ignorance Rate
which is good.
• General Notes:
– Both the None and GPD Strategies do not generate Agents. Nevertheless, both are almost
useless and, hence, this is not really an incentive to deploy either Strategy Flavour.
• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
– The significantly least Strategy Flavour in creating Agents is the Automatic Strategy Flavour
followed by the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour in S1 Density and S2 Density and the vDGU
Strategy Flavour in S3 Density and S4 Density.
– Generally speaking, the S1 Density and S2 Density required higher rates of Agents compared
to the S3 Density and S4 Density. That should be due to the fact that in the Higher Density
320
Regions, there would be many Users to report sufficient Cases for each Detector. Still, the Users’
Ignorance Rate did not had a significant influence on the observed results. That is because it
is not the number of Cases that matters here. Rather, it is the the accumulative record of the
PSPs, MGR records of Section 5.4, that a single victim has dealt with that would matter in the
ranking process regardless of the number of the actual reported Cases. Those MGR records are
utilised by the powerful TGT Detectors.
– While the Automatic Strategy Flavour requires a population of about 50% Active Agents in
the S2 Density, its requirement drops to less than 20% in the other Density points. That may
indicate that the S2 Density is within the Threshold Region for the Automatic Strategy Flavour
and, hence, more Agents are required to detect more suspicious (P)SPs.
– The Agents populations requirements for the vDGU, DGU, and Extreme DGU Strategies are
High in the S1 Density and S2 Density while they would significantly fall down, closer to the
Automatic Strategy Flavour requirement in theS3 Density and S4 Density. That may indicate
that the S1 Density and S2 Density are within the Threshold Region for the Strategies that
utilise DGU and, hence, they require more Agents to detect more suspicious (P)SPs.
– An alternative possible explanation for the last two points is the fact that the less Users are
present, in S1 Density and S2 Density, the less Cases that would be reported causing the need
for the extra Agents.
Milestone 8.3: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate
• Important Observations:
– Outside the Threshold Density Regions, where the Density Points S2 and S3 are located, there
is no advantage to deploy the Manual Strategy Flavour instead of the ST Strategy Flavour when
it comes to improving the Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rate.
– The Automatic Strategy Flavour is almost useless when it comes to improving the Uncolluding
MPSPs Detection Rate in the S1 Density and, hence, it should not be deployed in an environment
dominated by such Attackers. That might be due to its conservative setting like setting the Ignore
Old G Ranks = true, PCR Threshold = 3, and Suspicious SP Rank = 20. Being conservative
in a High Malicious Density Region is not a good idea since it would make the Trust situation
gets even worse, by the reduced volume of the Detected MPSPs.
– While the vDGU Strategy Flavour is significantly better than the Automatic Strategy Flavour
in the S2 Density, it is sometimes similar or even worse than either of the Automatic and ST
Strategies. Given that even the Automatic Strategy Flavour is not better than the ST Strategy
Flavour, if the environment is dominated by Uncolluding MPSPs, there would be no point in
deploying either of the Automatic or vDGU Strategies instead of the ST Strategy Flavour.
– The reason for the superior performance of the DGU Strategy Flavour compared to the vDGU
Strategy Flavour in the S1 Density and S2 Density is the fact that the vDGU Strategy Flavour
slows down the Detection process by wiping away all the records containing the (P)SPs who
are continuously installing DGU voluntarily. In the S1 Density and the S2 Density where the
Malicious Density is High, the system can not tolerate slowing down the Detection process.
• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
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– The GPD Strategy Flavour is doing a good job at Detecting Uncolluding MPSPs in Density
Points where their population is High, i.e. S1 Density and S3 Density, since they would generate
more Cases. However, High Users’ Ignorance Rate would render this Strategy Flavour useless,
because of the reduced reported Cases that are vital for this Strategy Flavour to function well.
– The best Strategy Flavour at Detecting Uncolluding MPSPs is definitely the Extreme DGU. In
all Density Points, its Detection Rate is around 65%. In one case, the S4 Density, High Users’
Ignorance Rate caused an improvement of 5% on the Detection Rate. That could be because
this is a Random Strategy Flavour and, hence, less Cases would increase the randomness and
the detection as well. Still, the Banned Innocent PSPs Rates were unaffected by the Users’
Ignorance Rate.
– The ST Strategy Flavour Detection was stable in all Density Points with values around 20%.
– the Manual Strategy Flavour is Detecting best in Density Points S2 Density and S3 Density.
In those Density Points, it achieves significantly more Detection than the ST Strategy Flavour
by about 10%. However, in Density Points S1 Density and S4 Density, there was no significant
difference between the ST Strategy Flavour and the Manual Strategy Flavour.
– The Strategies relying on the Weak Colluding Detector, i.e. Manual, vDGU, DGU, in addition to
the ST Strategies, are a bit sensitive to variations in the Users’ Ignorance Rate. However, those
variations caused significant effects on the Ucolluding MPSPs Detection Rate only in Density
Points S4 for the Manual Strategy Flavour and the S1 Density for the DGU Strategy Flavour.
That might be explained because those Density Points Region are probably outside the Threshold
Region and, hence, variations in the reported Cases numbers would have stronger effects on the
Weak Colluding Detector performance. In all cases, the difference was not huge, around 5%
decrease in the Detection Rate.
– Since the Automatic Strategy Flavour relies mainly on Agents reported Cases, this Strategy
Flavour is not significantly affected by variations in the Users’ Ignorance Rate.
– The Automatic Strategy Flavour Detection Threshold Region includes the S2 Density Point with
around 20% Detection Rate while the S3 Density and the S4 Density had about 10% and the
S1 Density had about 5% Detection Rates.
– For the vDGU Strategy Flavour, the best Detection Rate is achieved in the S1 Density with a
Rate of 25% followed by the S2 Density with Rate of 20% and then both the S3 Density and
the S4 Density with a rate of 15%. It is noted that the Rate achieved in the S1 Density is not
significantly different from the Rate achieved in the S2 Density while the rate achieved in the S3
Density is not significantly different from the Rate achieved in the S4 Density. Still, the Rate
achieved in the S1 Density would be significantly different from the Rate achieved in both the
S3 Density and S4 Density.
– For the DGU Strategy Flavour, the best Detection is achieved in the S1 Density with a Rate
of 45% followed by the S2 Density with a rate of 35% and then the S3 Density with a Rate of
85% and finally the S4 Density with a Rate of 95%. All of those Rates are slightly significant
compared to each other.
– Putting the GPD and Extreme DGU Strategies aside, due to their unbearable side effects, the
DGU Strategy Flavour is significantly the best Uncolluding MPSPs Detector in the S1 Density.
Moreover, it is significantly better than the vDGU Strategy Flavour and comparable to Manual
Strategy Flavour in the S2 Density. However, it is the worst Detector in the S3 Density and the
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S4 Density with comparable performance to the vDGU and Automatic Strategies. It should be
noted that this Strategy Flavour is sensitive to variations in the Users’ Ignorance Rate due to
its dependence on the Weak Colluding Detector.
Milestone 8.4: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rate
• General Notes:
– Due to their low activity profile, the GPD Strategy Flavour is unable to detect Uncolluding
MSPs under any environmental scenarios.
– Since only the ST and Manual Strategies deploy the Top TLRavg ST Selector, these Strategies
are the only effective ones at achieving significant Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rates. However,
this achievement is at the cost of requiring a High Active Agents to Users Rate.
• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
– The Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rates for both of the ST and Manual Strategies are around
15% without any significant difference in most Regions and ignorance rates except for:
∗ The S2 Density and Low Users’ Ignorance Rate: The ST Strategy Flavour performed
better than the Manual Strategy Flavour by about 5%.
∗ The S3 Density: The Manual Strategy Flavour performed significantly worse than itself
when the Users’ Ignorance Rate was set High. In addition, the Manual Strategy Flavour
did significantly worse than the ST Strategy Flavour when the Users’ Ignorance Rate was
set High.
– The reason why the Manual Strategy Flavour is affected by variations in the Users’ Ignorance
Rate could be the fact that the ST Strategy Flavour Selectors are dependant on the TG Rank-
ings which are affected mainly by the WTGT . In the other hand, the ST Strategy Flavour is
performance is mainly affected by the settings of the WTST and WTLRavg . When the mMli-
cious population is low in the S2 Density and the S3 Density, MSPs may not get noticeable with
higher than normal ranks, due to the low volume of interactions they would be able to engage in.
If they happen to have lower ranks, they would get caught by the Bottom TLRavg ST Selector
which is utilised only by the ST Strategy Flavour.
Milestone 8.5: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate
• General Notes:
– Since the Colluding MPSPs Attacks wont deploy any colluding against the trivial GPD Strategy
Flavour, this Strategies performance at Detecting Colluding Popular MPSPs is similar to its’
performance at Detecting Uncolluding MPSPs 8.3.
– With the exception of the GPD Strategy Flavour, theUsers’ Ignorance Rate did not generate any
significant difference in the Strategies performance at Detecting the Colluding Popular MPSPs.
– Since the ST Strategy Flavour can not Detect Colluding MPSPs, and given that the Colluding
MPSPs detected by the Strategies utilising the DGU would adopt Advanced Colluding Settings
that would make their Detection almost impossible, the ST Strategy Flavour and the DGU
variants of Strategies have negligible effects on the Colluding Popular MPSPs Detection Rate.
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• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
– The Detection Rates achieved by the Manual Strategy Flavour are around 22% in the S1 Density,
35% in the S2 Density, 30% in the S3 Density, and 10% in the S4 Density. That is going in
confirmation with the predictions of the Malicious Density Theory about the Threshold Region.
– The Detection Rates of the Automatic Strategy Flavour are around 0% in theS1 Density, 25%
in the S2 Density, 10% in the S3 Density, and 15% in the S4 Density. That is an unexpected
diversion from the predictions of the Malicious Density Theory. It looks like that this Strategy
Flavour works better with Low Malicious population and, hence, the sharp divergence when
the Malicious Population get High. This divergence goes to the point that even increasing the
Normal population wont be as effective at improving the Detection Rates as it would normally
do with the rest of the Strategies. That might be due to the fact that this Strategy Flavour is
ultra conservative which is not a good quality in High Malicious Density Regions.
Milestone 8.6: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Colluding Unpopular MPSPs Detection
Rate
• General Notes:
– Given how complicated this attack is, the only Strategy Flavour that would be able to Detect a
significant number of these Attackers is the Manual Strategy Flavour due to its reliance on the
Weak Colluding Detector. Despite that all the DGU variants of Strategies are also dependant of
the Weak Colluding Detector, they tend to give Detected Colluding MPSPs a second life where
they would Install DGU and, then, adopt Advanced Colluding Settings making their Detection
almost impossible.
• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
– It is noted that the Threshold Regions for the Manual Strategy Flavour include the S2 Density
followed by the S3 Density while its worst Detection Region would include the S4 Density where
the Detection is almost vanished as predicted by the Density Theory. It is also noted that when
the Users’ Ignorance Rate is High, the Detection Rate would decrease by a range between 5%
and 10%. That is expected since the Weak Colluding Detector, which this Strategy Flavour
relies on, is dependant on Users Cases. Still, only the differences in the S1 Density and the S3
Density are slightly significant.
Milestone 8.7: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Compromised Share with Top Credentials
Rate
• Important Observations:
– It is noted that the GPD Strategy Flavour is doing almost like the None Strategy Flavour
despite the High Detection Rates it achieves in some Density Points. That might be because of
the inaccurate TG Rankings, as a consequence of the Attackers’ utilisation of Simple Attacking
Strategies 5.8.6, leading most Users to deal with the most Malicious MPSPs given their High TG
Ranks. That is also true for the rest of the Strategies but the Attackers wont dare abusing the
Credentials they own unless they satisfy some complex Colluding Settings to avoid Detection by
the rest of the smarter Strategies.
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– It is also noted that when the Users’ Ignorance is High, the GPD Strategy Flavour is doing
much worse than the None Strategy Flavour due to the above mentioned issue of inaccurate TG
Rankings combined with the fact that the GP Strategy Flavour can not Detect well without a
large supply of reported Cases which would lead to a surge of the Malicious Nodes in the network.
• General Notes:
– It is noted that the Users’ Ignorance Rate does not have significant effects on any of the Strategies’
achieved Compromised Share with Top Credentials Rates, apart of the None and GPD Strategies.
– The Compromised Share with Top Credentials Rate achieved by the ST Strategy Flavour is
constant around 10% in all Density Points.
–
• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
– The Compromised Share with Top Credentials Rate achieved by the Manual Strategy Flavour
would be between 15% and 20% in the S1 Density and the S2 Density while it would significantly
drops to around 10% in the S3 Density and the S4 Density. The reason for the High rate of the
Compromised Share with Top Credentials achieved by this Strategy Flavour could be the fact
that its Counter-Attack setting is to generate more abuse in order to confuse it. More abuse
would cause the High Compromising Rates. In Low Malicious Density settings, the increased
abuse effects would get negligible.
– The Automatic Strategy Flavour achieved similar results of the Manual Strategy Flavour ex-
cept in the S1 Density and the S4 Density where it achieved slightly better results. Given
the Counter-Attack settings against both Strategies are the same and that the Manual Strat-
egy Flavour is doing better at Detecting M(P)SPs, the explanation to the Automatic Strategy
Flavour superiority in reducing the Compromising Rate would be the reduced Users Trust that is
caused by its poor Detection Rates leading to reduced traffic in the network and, hence, reduced
Compromising Rates.
– The DGU Strategy Flavour achieved similar results of the Automatic Strategy Flavour except in
case of High Users’ Ignorance Rate where it achieved slightly better results.
– The DGU Strategy Flavour performed almost exactly like Automatic Strategy Flavour. Maybe it
is the extra speed of Detection, compared to the vDGU Strategy Flavour, that would enable the
DGU Strategy Flavour to achieve a similar reduced Compromising Rates of the more conservative
Automatic Strategy Flavour.
– The Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour has a similar effect of the ST Strategy Flavour except in S4
Density where it is doing slightly better and in the S1 Density with a High Users’ Ignorance Rate
where it is doing slightly worse. The good performance of the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour
might be caused by the Advanced Colluding Settings that is adopted by its Counter-Attackers
leading to less overall abusing activity. In the S4 Density where the Malicious Nodes population
is Low, it would be even harder to satisfy the strict colluding conditions leading to even better
performance of the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour.
Milestone 8.8: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Compromised Share with Any Credentials
Rate
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• Important Observations:
– It is noted that the GPD Strategy Flavour is doing almost like the None Strategy Flavour, just
like its performance discussed in 8.7.
• General Notes:
– It is noted that the Users’ Ignorance Rate does not have significant effects on any of the Strategies’
achieved Compromised Share with Any Credentials Rates, apart of the None and GPD Strategies.
– The Compromised Share with Any Credentials Rate achieved by the ST Strategy Flavour is
constant around 5% in all Density Points.
–
• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
– The GPD Strategy Flavour has the same Compromised Share with Any Credentials Rate as
the None Strategy Flavour except in the S2 Density and the S3 Density, where the Malicious
Density is low. The Detection Rates in these Density Points are still better than the None
Strategy Flavour and the Banned Innocent PSPs does not reach more than 5%. So, a possible
explanation for the High Compromised Share with Any Credentials Rate could be the fact that
the more you detect, the smaller the Malicious Density gets making it even harder to detect the
M(P)SPs hiding among piles on Innocent (P)SPs. Instead, they would gain High Ranks causing
them to get even more traffic of credentials.
– The Compromised Share with Any Credentials Rate achieved by the Manual Strategy Flavour
would be between 10% and 15% in the S1 Density and the S2 Density while it would significantly
drops to a value between 5% and 10% in the S3 Density and the S4 Density. The reason for
the High rate of the Compromised Share with Top Credentials achieved by this Strategy Flavour
could be the fact that its Counter-Attack setting is to generate more abuse in order to confuse
it. More abuse would cause the High Compromising Rates. In Low Malicious Density settings,
the increased abuse effects would get negligible.
– Unlike the situation in 8.7, The Automatic Strategy Flavour achieved similar performance to the
Manual Strategy Flavour even in the S1 Density and the S4 Density. The reason might be the
fact that the Share with Top Credentials would be biased for sharing with (M)PSPs. Since the
MPSPs have High Density in S1 Density and the S4 Density if if the Manual Strategy Flavour
is deployed because its achieved Banned Innocent PSPs Rates in those Density Points are High
while the MPSPs Detection Rates are Low.
– Both the DGU Strategy Flavour and the vDGU Strategy Flavour performed similarly good and
slightly significantly better than the ST Strategy Flavour except when the Users’ Ignorance Rate
is Low in the S2 Density and the S4 Density. The better performance can not be explained sim-
ply by the better Uncolluding MPSPs Detection Rates that are achieved by the DGU variants
Strategies in the S1 Density and the S2 Density. That is because even the ST Strategy Flavour
would achieve better Detection Rates in S3 Density and the S4 Density in addition to its con-
siderably better Uncolluding MSPs Detection Rate compared to the DGU variants of Strategies.
A better explanation would be the fact that the DGU variants of Strategies would detect a much
larger population of (M)PSPs and, then, give them the option to Install DGU where they would
only be allowed to share the Credentials they acquire with only trusted (P)SPs, who have also
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installed DGU, or PSPs. Sharing to PSPs would create a bias toward abusing the Share with
Top Credentials. In addition, When the Malicious population is Low, the ST Strategy Flavour
would be able to catch up unless the Users’ Ignorance Rate is High where it wont be as effective
as the DGU variants Strategies.
– The Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour has a slightly significantly better effect compared to the ST
Strategy Flavour except in the S4 Density where the Users’ Ignorance Rate is Low as their effects
where similar in that particular situation. The good performance of the Extreme DGU Strategy
Flavour might be caused by the fact that the main contributor to abusing the Share with Any
Credentials would be the Uncolluding MPSPs which are heavily Detected by the Extreme DGU
Strategy Flavour.
Milestone 8.9: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Banned Innocent PSPs “Guilty” Rate
• General Notes:
– All Defensive Strategies achieved Banned Innocent PSPs “Guilty” Rates were not significantly
different from 0 except for the GPD Strategy Flavour and the Manual Strategy Flavour regardless
of the level of the Users’ Ignorance Rate.
– When it comes to the Manual Strategy Flavour, High Users’ Ignorance Rate would lead to
an improvement decrease in the Banning Rates of about 2%. That might be because the less
reported Cases and the longer Cases, due to the delay in reporting them, would increase the
Manual Strategy Flavour uncertainties forcing it to slow down in the Banning process.
• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
– It is noted that in the S4 Density, the GPD Strategy Flavour would ban about 3% Innocent
PSPs while in the S3 Density, it would ban about 5%. That is, in Regions of High Normal Nodes
Density, the GPD Strategy Flavour would ban more Innocent PSPs. That could be because in all
Regions, the rankings are distorted by the Simple Attacking Strategies of 5.8.6 and the increase
of reported Cases has simply magnified the distortion and make the Banning mistakes visible
within the simulation period. i.e. in longer simulations, it is expected that all Density Regions
would show similar Banning Rates if not even more. The fact that High Users’ Ignorance Rate
leads to a decrease in the Banning Rates supports this explanation.
– the Manual Strategy Flavour falsely Banned about 7% Innocents in the S1 Density, 26% in the
S2 Density, 18% in the S3 Density, and 13% in the S4 Density. The reason for the extraordinary
High Banning Rate would be the fact that this is an aggressive Random Detector. The massive
increase in the S4 Density followed by the S3 Density is explained by the Malicious Density
Theory 6.8.
Milestone 8.10: ANOVA testing the Strategies effects on the Banned Innocent PSPs “Refused to Install
DGU” Rate
• Important Observations:
– This measure is only applicable to DGU variants of the Defensive Strategies.
– The vDGU Strategy Flavour achieved almost 0% Banned Innocent PSPs “Refused to Install
DGU” Rate in all the Density Points since most Innocent PSPs would voluntarily Install DGU.
327
– The Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour is significantly the worst offender followed by the DGU who
still generated High Banning Rates.
• Malicious Density Theory Notes:
– In the S1 Density, the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour achieved about 22% Banned Innocent
PSPs while the DGU Strategy Flavour achieved about 13%. When the Users’ Ignorance Rate is
High, the Banning Rates changed dramatically to 15% for the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour
and 10% for the DGU Strategy Flavour.
– In the S2 Density, the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour achieved about 14% Banned Innocent
PSPs while the DGU Strategy Flavour achieved about 8%. When the Users’ Ignorance Rate is
High, the Banning Rates were almost the same.
– In the S3 Density, the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour achieved about 17% Banned Innocent
PSPs while the DGU Strategy Flavour achieved about 2%. When the Users’ Ignorance Rate is
High, the Banning Rates were almost the same.
– In the S1 Density, the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour achieved about 9% Banned Innocent
PSPs while the DGU Strategy Flavour achieved about 1%. When the Users’ Ignorance Rate is
High, the Banning Rates were almost the same.
– Since the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour is dependant on Users’ reported Cases, the Users’
Ignorance Rate have huge impact on its integrity. That is true in High Density Regions where
this Strategy Flavour is confused due to the enormous amount of abuse Cases it receives. The
less Cases it gets, the less accusations in general, including banning decisions, it would make.
the DGU Strategy Flavour is also dependant on Users’ reported Cases but it also utilises Agents
feedback making it more conservative in comparison to the Extreme DGU Strategy Flavour.
– In Low Density Points, things are more settled down and there is almost no sensitivity towards
variations in the Users’ Ignorance Rate.
In Stage 6.6.8, we distinguished between 7 different Defensive Strategies that the
Auditor could deploy. We compared, by means of ANOVA testing, the performance
of those 7 Strategies against the case where the Auditor would simply do nothing.
Below is a selected set of our ANOVA comparisons graphs for some of the most relevant
responses. Note that we have repeated the comparison at different population settings
as well as we varied the Users Ignorance Rate Factor which simply shows how sensitive
genuine Users would be against the received Abuse. So, the title of each figure would
start with the measured response followed by the value of the grouped setting of
the ini Users & (P)SPs and the Users & (P)SPs GR, which could be either Low or
High. Then, the value of the grouped setting of the ini M(P)SPs and the M(P)SPs
GR follows in a similar fashion. Finally, the value of the Ignorance Rate factor,
which could be either 20% or 80%, follows. Another note to consider is the fact that
unlike our analysis in Chapter 6 where we analysed the responses of MPSPs Detection
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Rates, we show in the below figures the opposite response, MPSPs Undetection Rates.
The reason is simple that during the simulation process, the MPSPs Undetection
Rates were utilised but we decided to just use its inverse in this Thesis to make our
conclusions clear and more understandable.
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Figure C.1: Trust Low Low 20 Figure C.2: Trust Low Low 80
Figure C.3: Trust Low High 20 Figure C.4: Trust Low High 80
Figure C.5: Trust High Low 20 Figure C.6: Trust High Low 80
Figure C.7: Trust High High 20 Figure C.8: Trust High High 80
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Figure C.9: Agents Low Low 20 Figure C.10: Agents Low Low 80
Figure C.11: Agents Low High 20 Figure C.12: Agents Low High 80
Figure C.13: Agents High Low 20 Figure C.14: Agents High Low 80
Figure C.15: Agents High High 20 Figure C.16: Agents High High 80
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Figure C.17: Undetected MPSPs
Low Low 20
Figure C.18: Undetected MPSPs
Low Low 80
Figure C.19: Undetected MPSPs
Low High 20
Figure C.20: Undetected MPSPs
Low High 80
Figure C.21: Undetected MPSPs
High Low 20
Figure C.22: Undetected MPSPs
High Low 80
Figure C.23: Undetected MPSPs
High High 20
Figure C.24: Undetected MPSPs
High High 80332
Figure C.25: Undetected MSPs
Low Low 20
Figure C.26: Undetected MSPs
Low Low 80
Figure C.27: Undetected MSPs
Low High 20
Figure C.28: Undetected MSPs
Low High 80
Figure C.29: Undetected MSPs
High Low 20
Figure C.30: Undetected MSPs
High Low 80
Figure C.31: Undetected MSPs
High High 20
Figure C.32: Undetected MSPs
High High 80333
Figure C.33: Undetected Popular
MPSPs Low Low 20
Figure C.34: Undetected Popular
MPSPs Low Low 80
Figure C.35: Undetected Popular
MPSPs Low High 20
Figure C.36: Undetected Popular
MPSPs Low High 80
Figure C.37: Undetected Popular
MPSPs High Low 20
Figure C.38: Undetected Popular
MPSPs High Low 80
Figure C.39: Undetected Popular
MPSPs High High 20
Figure C.40: Undetected Popular
MPSPs High High 80334
Figure C.41: Undetected Unpopu-
lar MPSPs Low Low 20
Figure C.42: Undetected Unpopu-
lar MPSPs Low Low 80
Figure C.43: Undetected Unpopu-
lar MPSPs Low High 20
Figure C.44: Undetected Unpopu-
lar MPSPs Low High 80
Figure C.45: Undetected Unpopu-
lar MPSPs High Low 20
Figure C.46: Undetected Unpopu-
lar MPSPs High Low 80
Figure C.47: Undetected Unpopu-
lar MPSPs High High 20
Figure C.48: Undetected Unpopu-
lar MPSPs High High 80335
Figure C.49: Compromised share-
TopCred Low Low 20
Figure C.50: Compromised share-
TopCred Low Low 80
Figure C.51: Compromised share-
TopCred Low High 20
Figure C.52: Compromised share-
TopCred Low High 80
Figure C.53: Compromised share-
TopCred High Low 20
Figure C.54: Compromised share-
TopCred High Low 80
Figure C.55: Compromised share-
TopCred High High 20
Figure C.56: Compromised share-
TopCred High High 80336
Figure C.57: Compromised share-
AnyCred Low Low 20
Figure C.58: Compromised share-
AnyCred Low Low 80
Figure C.59: Compromised share-
AnyCred Low High 20
Figure C.60: Compromised share-
AnyCred Low High 80
Figure C.61: Compromised share-
AnyCred High Low 20
Figure C.62: Compromised share-
AnyCred High Low 80
Figure C.63: Compromised share-
AnyCred High High 20
Figure C.64: Compromised share-
AnyCred High High 80337
Figure C.65: BannedGuilty Low
Low 20
Figure C.66: BannedGuilty Low
Low 80
Figure C.67: BannedGuilty Low
High 20
Figure C.68: BannedGuilty Low
High 80
Figure C.69: BannedGuilty High
Low 20
Figure C.70: BannedGuilty High
Low 80
Figure C.71: BannedGuilty High
High 20
Figure C.72: BannedGuilty High
High 80338
Figure C.73: Banned refusedIn-
stallDGU Low Low 20
Figure C.74: Banned refusedIn-
stallDGU Low Low 80
Figure C.75: Banned refusedIn-
stallDGU Low High 20
Figure C.76: Banned refusedIn-
stallDGU Low High 80
Figure C.77: Banned refusedIn-
stallDGU High Low 20
Figure C.78: Banned refusedIn-
stallDGU High Low 80
Figure C.79: Banned refusedIn-
stallDGU High High 20
Figure C.80: Banned refusedIn-
stallDGU High High 80339
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